Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 41

Mon, 08 Feb 2010

• 1. New Brachos (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 2. Re: Halacha vs. Policy - Poll re: Who To Marry (rabbirichwolpoe@gmail.com)
• 3. Re: Looking for sources about Chazal's Ruach Hakodesh (Micha Berger)
• 4. Halacha vs. Policy - "halakhah ve'ein morin kein" (rabbirichwolpoe@gmail.com)
• 5. Re: Halacha vs. Policy - Poll re: Who To Marry (Michael Makovi)
• 6. Re: Kol Isha - HETER (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: Habituation (Akiva Blum)
• 8. Re: Habituation (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 9. Re: Habituation (Samuel Svarc)
• 10. Re: Habituation (Chana)
• 11. Re: Mikvah for Geirus/Nidah (Akiva Blum)
• 12. Re: Mikvah for Geirus/Nidah (Arie Folger)
• 13. Re: Mikvah for Geirus/Nidah (Chana)
• 14. Re: Looking for sources about Chazal's Ruach (hankman)

Add "Lishmo'a m'gillah"
To the list of new brachos

Rema 689:2 [apparenly quoting Mordechai] *
MB 8
Quoting MGA + Chayei Adam
Also See Sha'ar Hatziyyun 16

* NB: I heard/saw this b'sheim B'HaG

Tangentially: 
Also see Baeir Hetev 3 quoting midrash neelam [IE Zohar] regarding women
listening and not reading even for themselves, [note this is a Tosefta
IIRC]. Interesting to quote Qabbalah re: this Halachah.

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

T6...@aol.com:
> I do not believe this can possibly be a halachic teshuvah -- IOW it
> MUST be meta-halachic -- because no true halachic shailah can ever be
> couched in these terms:? "Rabbi, I have absolutely made up my mind to
> sin and I want you to tell me which sin to commit, sin A or sin B."? No
> halachic teshuvah could ever be rendered to any such phoney shailah.?
> No posek could ever pasken that a Jew should commit a sin.? (He could
> give advice, but not a psak.)

As framed above this is a good point

However, usually the case of a couple having relations w/o benefit of
taharas hamishpacha is not framed with a "hinneni muchan umzuman to ignore
the mikveh". Usually it's the obvious m'tizus of those couples who are
not obsrvant and will obviously just ignore it w/o a such a declaration.

That's why rabbis get paid the "big bucks" ;-)

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

On Mon, Feb 08, 2010 at 11:33:30AM -0500, David Riceman wrote:
: Micha Berger wrote:
: >I would think that even the Ramban et al would consider a conversation
: >with a mal'akh to be nevu'ah, as in Manoach's words after he and his
: >wife saw a mal'akh, "mos namus, ki E-lokim ra'inu" (Shofetim 13:22)

: No.  He explicitly mentions the angels' conversation with the 
: inhabitants of Sodom as a counterexample.

Which should have been obvious, since that's the core of his machloqes.

Unless the Ramban differs between a mar'eh and nevu'ah in general.

The pasuq (including my example) does seem to assume, as the Rambam
does in Vayeira, that speaking with an angel is tantamount to speaking
with G-d.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
mi...@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (270) 514-1507      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

Plz post
Micha:
?Isn't that the gemara's concept of "halakhah ve'ein morin kein"? ?

B"H we were both m'chavein to discuss
"halakhah ve'ein morin kein" at about the same time - albeit addrssing different heicha timtzas.

Case 1:
Coffeemakers set to go off on Shabboss

I had a chat with a lamdan who attends a minyan with me at a nursing home. 
He starts asking loudly in shul, "takeh why can't we set up a coffee-maker
to go off on shabbos?"

I was trying to shoosh him down because many unlearned people were around.  

Finally I simply said:  "halakhah ve'ein morin kein".  And he immdiately "got it"
Yes technically this is so, but it's not a public topic especially for an unlearned public.


I have several more examples and I wil post them BEH


Editorial:
Lefties [esp C's] seemed to have  lost this sensitivity.  They ignore gray areas where meta issues would advise caution.

KT
RRW

Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

> A person has the
> choice of marrying a Jewish woman who doesn't observe the laws of family
> purity or a non-Jewish woman. Which is preferable? A student who has not
> properly served an apprenticeship with an experienced posek will say
> that it is obvious that the person should chose to marry the non-Jewish
> woman.
>
> Rabbi Yaakov Kaminetsky, quoted by R' Daniel Eidensohn

I've seen this before, and I've never understood where Rabbi Kaminetsky
gets his prima facie from. I haven't served as an apprentice to a poseq,
but nevertheless, it was still my gut reaction that marrying the Jewish
woman who violates niddah is preferable to marrying the non-Jew. This is
obvious, and you don't need to serve under a poseq to know it. I don't see
why serving under a poseq would make this any more or less obvious. Why on
earth would someone think that it is better to marry the non-Jew??!! Just
read all the Tanakhic narratives and midrashim about marrying gentiles,
versus the narratives and midrashim about niddah, and see which one says
worse things. I believe Ezra compares intermarriage to worshiping other
gods, but I don't recall seeing anything like this about niddah. Rabbi
Kaminetsky's opinion, that the unexperienced unlearned will say that it
is better to marry a non-Jew, is simply false in my experience.

I just asked a random non-gadol friend of mine to answer this question,
and he answered (without missing a beat) that to him it was obvious,
a no-brainer, that one marries the Jewish woman who violates niddah,
and not the gentile.

So I'm not sure why Rabbi Kaminetsky thinks it is obvious that the
non-scholar will answer that a non-Jew is preferable. It appears to me
that no, the non-scholar will answer that the Jewish woman who violates
niddah is preferable.

So I'm confused. Why does Rabbi Kaminetsky believe (wrongly, IMHO)
that the non-scholar will answer that a non-Jew is preferable?

If Rabbi Kaminetsky is basing himself on which has the more severe
punishment, then this is obviously a false analysis, and it take no
talmid hakham to realize it. By that logic, it is preferable for me
to kill someone by grama (which is patur from all earthly punishment),
instead of stealing a penny (which is punished by my having to pay two
pennies). But what kind of idiot would say that it is preferable to
murder rather than steal one cent, simply because the punishment for
the theft is more severe? Since when we do pasqen by punishment!!! It
says right in Pirqei Avot that we serve G-d not because of reward and
punishment!! Anyone who answers based on the more severe punishment, is
simply an imbecile who knows nothing about Torah. So maybe an imbecile
will answer that it is preferable to marry a non-Jew rather than a Jew
who violates niddah, but the frum Jew of average intelligence (but still
NOT a talmid hakham) will answer differently than the imbecile.

[EMail #2. -micha]

One little aside: the fact that according to Rabbi Yaakov Kaminetsky's
litmus test, I've (almost?) a poseq, is good evidence for why I distrust
authority so much, and for why I'm so ready to disagree with those far
greater than me. Rabbi Kaminetsky offers a litmus test to distinguish
between those who have apprenticed under a poseq, and those who haven't,
and according to his test, I have in fact so apprenticed!! It is only due
to my own knowledge of myself that I know I'm nowhere near the stature
of a poseq, but if I were to rely on Rabbi Kaminetsky's test, I'd have
to say I am in fact a poseq. Anyone who's standards are so low as his,
I don't want to be a part of his group. If Rabbi Kaminetsky's litmus
test for poseqim is indicative of his own personal stature as a poseq,
then I don't want him as my poseq. He says I'm of the stature of a poseq,
but I disagree and I say I'm not of that stature.

That is why I'm so ready to disagree with those greater than me.

Michael Makovi

On Wed, Feb 03, 2010 at 03:16:06PM +0200, Michael Makovi wrote:
: > Arguably, it is more accurate to define kedei leihanot as:
: > Only if there is no shred of desire to find hana'ah, even if that desire
: > remains unfulfilled.
...
: But, I don't want to quibble on exactly what hirhur / hana'ah is,
: because if you really pushed me into a corner, I'd have to say the
: fear of hirhur / hana'ah is that it will lead to illicit
: relationships....

: But R' Micha's statement seems fair, that illicit hirhur / hana'ah
: includes even the mere attempt to find hirhur / hana'ah, even if that
: attempt fails....

But you missed my focus on KEDEI leihanos. I'm not defining hana'ah, I'm
pointing out the word before it.

I think this is the implied basis of RYBS's pesaq, that opera is okay,
but listening to someone who uses non-tzeniusdik attire (even if you
can't see it) would be a problem. Because the latter is trying to create
hanaah.

But in either case, others showed that your presumed level of sufficient
hana'ah isn't born out by the sources.

: >> 4) The Jewish communities of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Syria,
: >> Germany, and Cochin were historically lenient....

: > Which proves nothing. You would need to show that they historically
: > weren't being yelled at, despite violating the pesaq of their own
: > community's rishonim. Most Litvisher women didn't cover their hair, but
: > no one was pasqining it's okay. Just that it wasn't a battle they could
: > win.

: Which is precisely why I combined both halakhic and historical
: examples...

Yes, your brought textual proof from someone who is more machmir, and
mimtetic indication from a community that we don't know if their own
leaders believed in the appropriateness of what they were doing.
And you are bringing a historical example of a different community as
though it's more relevent than the history of the community in question???

...
: Furthermore, some of these anecdotes of mine actually involve rabbis
: themselves listening to kol isha, so it's difficult to say the rabbis
: merely chose not to fight the battle. As the Egyptian testimony of
: mine says, the rabbis of Egypt used Umm Kalthoum's tunes in the
: synagogue, even though they knew exactly where they came from! I think
: it's fair to say that this is an actual implicit permission to listen
: to her.

Where's the qol ishah in your example? Because they knew where the songs
were from when they heard a male chazan sing them?

:> And RYYW [ = Rabbi Yehiel Weinberg] was only meiqil because
:> it was to inspire kids who would
:> otherwise seek clubs not particular to promoting Yahadus! You keep on
:> invoking him, but RYYW didn't buy into any of your arguments except
:> where there was a conflicting mitzvah involved!

: That's true, but it's not the whole truth. Rabbi Weinberg first
: established that:
: 1) Kol isha is mutar when hirhur / hana'ah is absent
: 2) Here ( = mixed-sex youth groups and Shabbat zemirot) there is no
: hirhur / hana'ah

: Only then did Rabbi Weinberg invoke the Mordekai's eit la'asot lashem,
: to be lenient in kol isha for the sake of saving the Torah.

This actually WEAKENS your argument. RYYW considered your arguments and
found them insufficient for general use. He only allowed them to be
invoked in a near eis-laasos.

We are meiqil in stam keilim einam ben yonam WRT grandma's fine china
in cases where we wouldn't be meiqil if the cup in question were a $7
mug from the local mall. A poseiq would invoke hefseid merubah.

Which would mean state that he wouldn't use the line of reasoning for a
lesser hefseid, and someone who did so couldn't claim to be following
the original teshuvah.

On Wed, Feb 03, 2010 at 07:52:01PM +0200, Michael Makovi wrote:
: My interpretation of the Rambam is explicit in Rabbi Yehiel Weinberg.
: Rambam says something like assur l'histakel b'etza ketana kedei
: leihanot, v'gam lishmoah kol shel ha-erva. Is there any possible
: interpretation other than to say (as Rabbi Weinberg does) that both
: kol isha and etzba ketana are conditioned on kedei leihanot?
...

Well, look at Issurei Bi'ah 21:2 inside. The Rambam lists:
    Someone who does one of these (21:1) chuqim is chashud al ha'arayos.
    It is prohibited for a person to make a sign with his hands or feet,
    or hint with his eyes to one of the arayos
    o lischoq imah
    o lehaqeil rosh
    or even to smell the spices which are on her
    or to look at her beauty is assur.
    And someone who premeditatedly does one of these things gets maqas
    mardus.

    Someone who looks (mistaqeil) even in a woman's etzba qatana with
    the intent to get hana'ah, it is as though he looked in the most
    private place
    and even listening to the voice of an ervah
    or so see her hair
    is prohibited.

This last piece most naively reads as as three item list:
    - looking at her pinky with the wrong intent (complete with
      comparison)
    - qol ishah
    - sei'ar
Where would one assume that the intent applies to all three?

And in fact as I will argue further down, I don't even think RYYW found
his argument compelling, and only included it among his sum of factors.

: I realize my interpretation is cavalier, but what can I say? The
: rishonim will interpret kol isha based on time and place, and Ra'avad
: and Ra'avya both limited it to singing based on this, whereas the
: clear peshat of the Gemara (as well as the interpretation of Rambam
: and Rabbi Yehuda he-Hasid) is that is that kol isha includes even mere
: speech. How can the Aharonim say that hergel is an illegitimate means
: to limit kol isha, when they rely on the hergel-limitation when they
: say kol isha is limited to singing? ...

That's a great question -- not an answer.

Issur veheter aren't defined by looking at the rishonim and pretending
that the subsequent centuries of halachic development didn't exist.
Their words are binding, at least to some extent, and certainly can't be
dismissed until after you understand where they'r coming from and can
prove a different al mi lismoch.

:                They are relying on hergel at the very moment they say
: hergel is not a legitimate factor! If you reject hergel, then you MUST
: say that to speak to a woman violates kol isha. And if you say kol
: isha is limiting to singing, that itself is a legitimation of hergel.

Except that speech wasn't permitted simply due to hergel. Veharaayah,
how many conversations with women are quoted in the gemara? "Al TARBEH
sichah im ha'ishah..." -- a little is not being advised against, and a
lot is a Pirqei Avos issue, not tzeni'us one.

So, I would go back to the Rambam, but, well, Bar Ilan and I can't find
anything about talking to women in the Rambam. Greetings, yes, but that's
even via a messenger as well (ibid halakahha 5). It's not about voice.

: Read Rabbi Howard Jachter's article (cited in my essay), for example.
: It's an excellent article, and a very useful one, to which I am
: indebted. But it's rather frustrating to see him discuss Rabbi
: Weinberg at length, and then conclude that no posqim have allowed
: hergel to mitigate the prohibition. Excuse me?? Isn't that EXACTLY
: what Rabbi Weinberg did??...

Not in general. Just as a tzad heter among other tzedadaim.

On Mon, Feb 08, 2010 at 04:32:46PM +0000, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
: Isn't this exactly what the Aruch Hashulchan was referring to in his
: p'sak (O"C 75:7) about saying brachos in the presence of a married woman's
: uncovered hair? His view clearly seems to be that because we can safely
: presume that the average man's hirhur/hanaah will be insignificant,
: therefore it becomes mutar for him to say brachos there.

Except that miDas Moshe, she still isn't complying to halakhah.

The parallel to nidon didan would assur kol ishah, but allow someone to
daven while a woman is singing in the background. (Assuming a culture
where hearing a woman sing is common place.)

What RMM tried doing by citing the Rambam was effectively to argue that
the Rambam holds qol ishah is das Yehudis. I find it methodologically
wrong to cherry-pick like that; to use a machmir to "prove" a qulah
probably meant you misunderstood your source.

Except that's not necessaerily what the Rambam said, and the only
person of the hundreds who write on the subject after having learned the
Rambam who might suggest otherwise was trying to matir something in an
in extremis situation. And I am not even sure RHJ actually agrees that's
RYYW's intent altogether!

In general, I find your reliance on prefiltered sources, reading the
promary sources via secondary ones and never revisiting them to form your
own opinion bothersome. Particularly since you keep an unbalanced set
of secondary sources. People can extrapolate, and then you extrapolate
for them, leaving you cantilevered over the abyss.

But then you're combining this level of knowledge with a willingness
to second guess centuries of poseqim who invested so much more time
analyzing the same topic.

And THEN, what I really find troublesome is that a web site associated
with a nascent finds that level of discussion of an innovation of halakhah
to be an article worthy of their audiences consideration.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
mi...@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (270) 514-1507      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: avodah-boun...@lists.aishdas.org 
> [mailto:avodah-boun...@lists.aishdas.org] On Behalf Of 
> kennethgmil...@juno.com
> Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 6:33 PM


> At weddings, Rav Acha used to carry the kallah on his 
> shoulders, explaining that she was merely like a wooden beam 
> to him. (Kesubos 17a) Was Rav Acha *distracted* by Mitzvas 
> Simchas Chasan v'Kallah? Or was there simply an undeniable 
> reality that he was unaffected by this contact? Either way, 
> **IF** one can be equally sure of being unaffected by 
> [whatever], then where is the issur?
> 

What is the issur in carrying kallas? It's not described by Chazal as ervah. Yet
the svara clearly indicates that there would be, for the overwhelming majority,
an issue of hirhur.

Hair is described by Chazal as ervah, hence an absolute ervah irrespective of
personnel piety.

Akiva

R' Rich Wolpoe wrote:
> Simply put -
> There are absolute erva's and relative erva's
> AIUI - "ufara es Roshah" creates an absolute erva WRT to married
> [Jewish] women's hair, with other women - it's subject to hergel.
> Reductio ad absurdum
> Would we say that a nudist colony - since due to hergel lacks any
> hirhur - therefore has zero laws of tz'nius?
> I think not!

My gut feeling is the same as yours. But still.....

How do you resolve this with Rav Acha carrying the kallah?

I can't help but wonder if this concept of absolute and relative erva might
lead us to distinguish between what a person wears and what a person sees.
IOW, regardless of the local standards and habituations, and even where
there is no hirhur, a person must always still cover those parts of the
body. But perhaps, just maybe, is it possible that a man who is so deadened
to any such thoughts, might indeed be allowed to be in a nudist colony with
eyes wide open - provided that he is himself clothed?

I have heard stories of certain rabbonim who were scheduled to give a
shiur, or a drasha in shul, and upon seeing the short sleeves of some of
the women, changed their speech to be one of mussar and stories which would
not technically constitute "learning Torah" in the presence of erva. But I
have *not* heard of hechsherim which insist on proper-length sleeves for
the waitresses in their restaurants. I suppose it is possible that the rav
hamachshir expects us to avert our eyes when we says brachos in his
restaurant. But could it be that the halacha which the Aruch Hashulchan
applied to uncovered hair might also be applied to uncovered arms?

Akiva Miller

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On Mon, Feb 8, 2010 at 11:32 AM, kennethgmil...@juno.com
<kennethgmil...@juno.com> wrote:
> >From the lack of restrictions on doctors, I had concluded that the principle of habituation *is* widely accepted.
>
> but R' Zev Sero corrected me:
>> And here's where, AIUI, you go wrong: the heter is not
>> habituation but distraction. ?He is busy with his work, and
>> the context makes him see the person before him not as a
>> woman but as an anatomical construction that is either
>> functioning or not. ?Similarly, a photographer sees a female
>> subject not as a woman but as an object to be manipulated so
>> as to properly integrate into the composition.
>
> and R' Rich Wolpoe gave another example:
>> Watching animals mate is assur because it provokes hirhur
>> However, a farmer is allowed to physically mate two animals
>> mamash with his hands - because due to the work/tirda he is
>> simply too occupied to have hirhurim.
>> I don't recall the specific daf
>
> to which R' David Riceman offered:
>> BM 91a, EH 23:3.
>
> Thanks very much, all of you. I stand corrected. The physician's habituation is *not* the only factor which allows him to do these things.
>
> But even so, I think it is still fair to say that these examples all
> prove that the acts of touching, seeing, or listening to ervah are not
> *inherently* assur. They are > assur only when they bring one to
> hirhur or hanaah. The only difference between my first guess and these
> responses, is in the mitigating circumstances which > hold the
> hirhur/hanaah down to the zero level.

Incorrect. 'Oseh makom' is assur to look at, if ones very looking is
distracted then we have 'heterim'.

> At weddings, Rav Acha used to carry the kallah on his shoulders, explaining that she was merely like a wooden beam to him. (Kesubos 17a) Was Rav Acha
> *distracted* by Mitzvas Simchas Chasan v'Kallah? Or was there simply an undeniable reality that he was unaffected by this contact? Either way, **IF** one
> can be equally sure of being unaffected by [whatever], then where is the issur?

You're conflating a stock issur of seeing 'ervah' which is not
dependent on 'hanaah' and is only mitigated when the seeing itself is
distracted, with an issur that is dependent on 'hirur -hanaah',
namely, touching.

> Isn't this exactly what the Aruch Hashulchan was referring to in his p'sak (O"C 75:7) about saying brachos in the presence of a married woman's uncovered
> hair? His view clearly seems to be that because we can safely presume
> that the average man's hirhur/hanaah will be insignificant, therefore
> it becomes mutar
> for him to say brachos there.

Not every 'eravah' is the same. Some are ervah like 'oseh makom' and
others are dependent on their 'hirur-quotient' to 'pasul' tefillah.
Meaning they remain ervahs but don't pasul the tefilah. That is the
basis for the AH.

> Those who disagree with that Aruch Hashulchan seem to hold that it is inherently assur for a man to say brachos in the presence of a married woman's
> uncovered hair, regardless of his not getting any hirhur/hanaah from it. How do those poskim justify Rav Acha's contact with the kallah?

What is there to justify? Did R' Acha make a brocha while in front of
an ervah or some such? No. So what 'issur' is left to discuss? The
discussion is if that contact will lead to 'hirur' and thereby be
'assur'. Chazal seemed to have trusted R' Acha that there was no
'hirur'. I personally wouldn't trust anyone alive today if he made
such a statement or I would at least check to see if he was a eunuch.

> I want to stress that I am NOT campaigning for any particular act to
> be considered mutar or assur. Quite the contrary, it seems to me that
> *none* of these acts are inherently assur or inherently mutar -- they
> must *all* be evaluated in light of the norms of the society and the
> sensitivity of the individual. If it can be safely presumed that no
> significant hirhur/hanaah will result, then it is mutar, else it is
> assur.
>
> A similar thought appears in "Understanding Tzniut" by Rabbi Yehuda Henkin, on page 95, where he writes:
>
> "As opposed to any touching at all between husband and wife when she
> is in a state of niddah, which is explicitly forbidden in the Shulchan
> Aruch [Yoreh Deah 195:2...], no such sweeping prohibition of all
> physical contact is found in relation to other 'arayot. Thus, while
> the Shulchan Aruch [Even ha-Ezer 21:1] forbids numerous forms of
> interaction with 'arayot including winks and gestures and pleasurable
> gazing, simple touching without intention of affect is not one of
> them."
>
> In other words, Rabbi Henkin is unaware of any *inherent* issurim in
> this area. None of these issurim is *always* in effect. They *all*
> carry the stipulation of
>being in effect *only* when they cause some amount of hirhur/hanaah.

This is true in regard to *touch*, yes. However, will he 'mattir'
someone raised in a nudist colony to make a brocha in front of and
looking at 'oseh makom'? If he doesn't, I fail to see what the
relevancy is.

KT,
MSS

RMM writes:

> The Ra'avyah says that we aren't concerned with an unmarried woman's
> uncovered hair, because we're used to it, and likewise with her
> speaking voice. (I don't understand the Arukh ha-Shulhan's statement
> that there is a d'oraita for a married woman to cover her hair,
> whether or not there's hirhur. Given that the Gemara and Rambam speak
> of Jewish WOMEN covering their hair, married or not, where did the
> Arukh ha-Shulhan derive a principle of married women specifically
> being required? I'm honestly confused.

The discussion regarding women covering their hair comes up in Ketubos 72a-b
and it is there that the Sifri (Rabbi Yishmael) learns from the pasuk
(Bamidbar 5:18) a warning to bnos yisroel not to go out with uncovered head.

Obviously there is an obvious limud to say that this applies to all women
(bnos yisroel), married or not. And has nothing to do with hirhur, being a
straightforward limud from the Torah.

BUT Bamidbar 5:18 is discussing the Sotah.  A Sotah can only be a Sotah if
she is married.
Similarly, the discussion in Ketubos is all about married women (one can
only be divorced without a ketuba if one is married and has one to lose).
And while the Mishna seems to be talking about head covering as a matter of
custom (Dat Yehudit), the gemora, certainly on its most straightforward
reading brings Rabbi Yishmael in the Sifri and appears to posken
accordingly.

So while there is clearly a logic to learning that this is talking about all
women, the narrowest construction for those who accept the limud from Sotah
and the pashtus of the Gemora in Ketubos would limit the d'orisa to married
women since that is clearly the subject matter (and the only subject matter)
of these sources.

 According to what I've seen,
> the only heter that UN-married women have,is a hergel one. Were it not
> for habituation, unmarried women would have exactly the same
> requirement to cover their hair as married women. Shouldn't hergel
> apply to married women just the same as unmarried women, given that
> the Gemara and Rambam don't distinguish between married and unmarried
> women?)

But the Gemora in Ketubos clearly does distinguish, in the sense that it is
not at all dealing with, unmarried women.  You have to derive by implication
that the same law would apply to an unmarried women.  It is an
understandable derivation, but it is not axiomatic.  And once you through
the Sifri into the equation, you appear to be talking about a d'orisa for
which no logic or question of hirhur is necessary.  It becomes a technical
question, not a hirhur one.  The further question is about how this
interacts with the Gemora in Brochos 24a which is far more clearly
discussing hirhur issues, and it is understandable that the two were
understood by some to be intertwined.  But again that is not a necessary
limud.


> Michael Makovi

Regards

Chana

 


  _____  

From: avodah-boun...@lists.aishdas.org [mailto:avodah-boun...@lists.aishdas.org]
On Behalf Of Daniel Eidensohn
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 9:28 PM

Yevamos(45b):The slave of R. Hiyya b. Ammi once made a certain idolatress bathe
for a matrimonial purpose.28 Said R. Joseph: I could declare her to be a
legitimate Jewess29 and her daughter30 to be of legitimate birth.31 In her case,
in accordance with the view of R. Assi; for R. Assi said, ?Did she not bathe for
the purpose of her menstruation??32 In the case of her daughter, because when an
idolater or a slave has intercourse with a daughter of an Israelite, the child
[born of such a union] is legitimate.3


Henry Topas wrote: 

If a woman enters the mikvah l?tzorech geirus and such t?vilah coincides with
the timing that would normally be required l?tzorech taharas hamishpocha,  can
the same t?vilah serve for both?

 

 

The gemorah's case has a tevilla for niddah working also for geirus. Our case is
much better because, as mentioned, she was never tomei at all.

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Cantor Henry Topas asked:
> If a woman enters the mikvah l'tzorech geirus and such t'vilah
> coincides with the timing that would normally be required l'tzorech
> taharas hamishpocha,  can the same t'vilah serve for both?

The laws of taharat hamishpa'ha do not apply to non Jews, and hence,
the women who just converted cannot have become tame before her
conversion. There is no need for shiva' neqiyyim and no need for
tevilat nidah, unless she is still bleeding at the time of her
conversion. There are published teshuvot on this, though I can't
remember the exact references.

However, sekhel hayashar dictates that she should at least have a
hefseq taharah right before tefilah, for the 'hazaqah of still
bleeding is a physical fact, not a din in status, and lacking a hefseq
taharah, we would assume that she is still bleeding right after her
conversion.
-- 
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Is the New Israel Fund Indirectly Responsible for the Goldstone
Blood Libel? (en & de)
* Is Mu?ammar Al-Qadhafi Jewish
* After the Tefillin Terror Scare
* Der schwierige Nachlass
* Was ist Bitach?n (Zuversicht)?

; > Henry Topas wrote:
> >
> > If a woman enters the mikvah l'tzorech geirus and such t'vilah
> > coincides with the timing that would normally be required l'tzorech
> > taharas hamishpocha,  can the same t'vilah serve for both?
> > charset="iso-8859-1"; Format="flowed"

And RDE replied

> Yevamos(45b):The slave of R. Hiyya b. Ammi once made a certain
> idolatress bathe for a matrimonial purpose.28 Said R. Joseph: I could
> declare her to be a legitimate Jewess29 and her daughter30 to be of
> legitimate birth.31 In her case, in accordance with the view of R.
> Assi;
> for R. Assi said, 'Did she not bathe for the purpose of her
> menstruation'?32 In the case of her daughter, because when an idolater
> or a slave has intercourse with a daughter of an Israelite, the child
> [born of such a union] is legitimate.3

Further to this gemora source, here is the Shulchan Aruch reference: - This
is Hilchos Gerus Yoreh Deah Siman 268 Si'if 3:

All the matters of a ger whether making known to him the commandments to
accept them whether the circumcision whether the tevila needs that there be
three kosher men to judge and during the day (Tosphos and the Rosh in perek
Hacholez) and this is davka l'chatchila but bideved if he was circumcised or
immersed before two (or relatives)(hagahos Mordechai), at night, or even if
he was not immersed l'shem gerus except a man immersed for semen emission or
a woman for nidah he is a ger and permitted to a Jewish woman; except for
the kabalas mitzvos [the acceptance of the commandments] that prevents if it
isn't during the day and before three.  And the Rif and the Rambam say even
bideved if he immersed or circumcised before two or at night it prevents and
he is forbidden to a Jewish woman.  But if he married a Jewish woman and had
a child from her we do not invalidate him.

> > Cantor Henry Topas

Regards

Chana

RMB wrote: "IOW, ruach haqodesh is obtaining knowledge. There is nothing there about
a conscious experience of receiving it. Just that the author wrote
megillas Esther, and post facto it's obvious s/he described things s/he
couldn't have otherwise known."

1) The distinctions at the lower end of the spectrum I referred to in my
post are still not clear to me and not yet addressed. The knowledge the
author of ME included in Megilla but could not have known on his own could
also have come from sod HaShem el yerai'ov or seyata DiShemaya not just
ruach hakodesh.

2) If one says for example that chidushai Torah were nisgaleh  al pi ruach
hakodesh to some kadosh, but chidushai Torah he might have come to on his
own so how do we (he) know it was ruach hakodesh, as opposed to sod HaShem
el yerai'ov, seyata DiShemaya or even his "own" thoughts? I presume these
are not synonymous terms.

3) Finally, this gemara can not be used to differentiate the latter three categories for us. Further nuance is needed.

Kol Tuv

Chaim Manaster
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