Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 178

Tue, 01 Sep 2009

• 1. lo tasur (Eli Turkel)
• 2. Re: Rambam (Micha Berger)
• 3. pshat in Rambam on teshuva (Eli Turkel)
• 4. Re: Shehechiyanu (Zev Sero)
• 5. Re: lo tasur (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: Kol kevudah: a woman's place is in the home (Micha Berger)
• 7. on whose cheshbon??? rochel, leah, tamar and embarrasment.... (Harvey Benton)
• 8. The Jewish View of Self-Sacrifice (Yitzchok Levine)
• 9. Asking mechilah for LH (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: Kol kevudah: a woman's place is in the home (Shoshana L. Boublil)
• 11. Re: Kol kevudah: a woman's place is in the home (Yitzhak Grossman)
• 12. Re: Kol kevudah: a woman's place is in the home (Micha Berger)
• 13. Re: Kol kevudah: a woman's place is in the home (Yitzhak Grossman)
• 14. Laughing at one who does a mitzvah (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 15. The Extra Mitzvah of Being Mesameach a Yesomah (Micha Berger)
• 16. Re: Laughing at one who does a mitzvah (Zev Sero)

<<A cheirem is based on kavod harav, not lo sasur. A rav has the power to
tell the kehillah to shun anyone who berates him, or who is in siruv.>>

R. Elchanan Wasserman holds that Lo Tasur applies to the bet din hagadol
before the churban AND to anything accepted by all of Israel.
Hence, he holds that Lo Tasur applies to gezerot in the Mishna and Gemara
but not to an later authorities


-- 
Eli Turkel

On Wed, 26 Aug 2009 5:20pm EDT I wrote:
: RRW asked for where the Gra discusses the Rambam's methodology (and
: how he related to the Y-mi where the Bavli had sevara, not a quoted
: pesaq). It's at OC 335.
: It will be interesting to contrast with RRW's source, the Bach on
: the Rambam's attitude toward shaqla vetarya: EHE 6.

Another source:
Rambam, Issurei Bi'ah 15:2, and the Magid Mishnah sham
    MM: "Lo naniach gemara arukhah venifsoq halakhah mimasa umatan..."

(If you want to remember that mar'eh maqom to be able to find it for
Shabbos, I remembered it from my commute until now with the following
mnemonic:
    - "Tov me'od" in Bereishis refers to the yeitzer hara, and 
    - Of all the yitzrei hara, it was the one on piryah verivyah that
      AKHG tried to eliminate but saw it would have destroyed the world.
    - So issurei bi'ah refers to that which HQBH called tov,
    - 16:2 is T"o:V)

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The waste of time is the most extravagant
mi...@aishdas.org        of all expense.
http://www.aishdas.org                           -Theophrastus
Fax: (270) 514-1507

We have discussed the Brisker Derech and how much it reflects pshat in Rambam.

Let me present another Rambam that I  (and others) find difficult.
In hilchot teshuva the Rambam defines Tzaddik, Rasha and Benoni in
simple arithmetic terms, more, less or equal mitzvot to averot
(suitably weighted but that doesnt affect our analysis). That implies that
it is highly improbable to be a benoni and further one can change ones
status several times a day.
A further problem is that for the 10 days of repentance Rambam stresses teshuva
and it is not clear what the connection is to the previous arithmetic
calculation.

R. Hutner answers that what counts is not the (weighted) arithmetic
comparison but
rather ones entire personality and outlook. One looking for mitzvot is
a tzaddik,
for aveirot is a rasha and one without a clear goal is a benoni.
Thus to become a tzaddik during the 10 days of teshuva one needs to change
one's outlok and not simply add one more mitzva.

IMHO though this pshat is very satisfying I find it difficult to put
it into the words
of the Rambam. Moreover further down in chapter #3 the Rambam adds
that one should
see himself and indeed the whole world as exactly in the middle and so
his mitzvah or
averah will decide. This does not seem to fit at all with R. Hutner.
Our rabbi tried
to explain that what Rambam means is that one must change ones
personality traits
as R. Hutner says. However, to do that one starts one mizvah at a
time. It cannot
be changed entirely overnight.

Again, nice pshat but difficult to fit into the words of the Rambam.

Bottom line is that a simple reading of the words of the Rambam leads to very
difficult conclusions. However, any reasonable explanation has to be
forced into the words of Rambam.


-- 
Eli Turkel

Allen Gerstl wrote:
                   .      .      . 
>>... The reason we don't say shehecheyanu on potatoes is not that 
>> they're vegetables but that they're stored all year; if they weren't, 
>> we would.

> What of fruits and vegetables that are shipped in to your community
> from various faraway places

This is surely the same as storage; the point is that the "season" has
been artificially extended to the whole year, and one can no longer
tell one season from the next.   So the question becomes the same as
it is with storage: how common is it?  If only a few rich people keep
a fruit in cold storage, but it's unavailable to most people, then that
doesn't count.  Essentially batla daatan etzel kol adam -- it may not
be seasonal in this house, but it's seasonal in the city as a whole.
But if it's commonly stored, so that essentially everyone enjoys it
all year round, then it's no longer seasonal.

So how does this apply to shipping?  If the fruit is only available
in winter at a few luxury fruiterers, then it seems obvious to me that
it's like the case where only a few rich people store it.  But what
if it's available pretty much everywhere, but at a very high price?
Here I'm not so sure, but it seems to me that $10/lb cherries are a
very different kind of fruit than $3/lb cherries, and that for the
average person the $10/lb cherries may be nice to look at but are not
really to be considered "available" for eating; so long as $3/lb
cherries are still seasonal, one should still be able to say
shehecheyanu on them, just as one says it separately on, e.g., red
and white cherries.

But maybe not; $10/lb cherries may not be something one can eat *every*
week, but most people *can* eat them in any *particular* week, at the
cost of something else.  That makes them different than a fruit that
just isn't available in the market, and to get it (e.g. for a pregnant
woman with cravings) one must knock on the rich person's door and ask
for some.

And even if one can't afford to buy $10/lb cherries, one still gets
the pleasure of seeing them regularly.  Perhaps we can relate this to
the question of when one says the bracha: The ikkar hadin is that the
chiyuv of shehecheyanu attaches when one first *sees* the fruit, not
when one first eats it; the pleasure of seeing it in the market is
enough to create a chiyuv.  But the minhag is not to say it until one
actually eats it, and there is a chiluk minhagim about which bracha to
say first.  The obvious halacha is to say shecheheyanu first, because
its chiyuv attached as soon as one saw the fruit, while the chiyuv of
ha'etz only came once one decided to eat it immediately.  But many
people have the minhag of saying ha'etz first, because it is tadir.
Perhaps we can say that for those who follow the first shita, the
din hasn't really changed; the ikkar pleasure is from seeing, and
therefore since  cherries can now be seen (for free) at any time of
year, it is no longer a seasonal fruit.  But perhaps those who follow
the second shita hold that there has been a fundamental change in the
din: ledidan the ikkar pleasure is from eating, not from seeing, and
since one does not eat cherries all year round it is still seasonal.

But that is not muchrach: Even for those who say shehecheyanu first,
and therefore hold that the original din still applies and seeing is
the ikkar, what kind of seeing triggers the simcha that creates the
chiyuv?  Stam seeing the fruit, and thus being reminded that there is
such a thing in the world?  Or is it the anticipation of eating it?
Does one have the same simcha when seeing a fruit that one can't eat?
Even back in the days when one said the bracha in the market, did one
say it on a fruit that one disliked, or to which one was allergic?

Another point:  Grapes of kerem reva'i that are grown within a day's
journey of Yerushalayim can't be redeemed for money, and must be
physically transported there, "in order to decorate the markets of
Y'm with fruit".  This shows us that there is an inyan in a fruit
simply being readily available in the market, "decorating" it and
giving the passersby the pleasure of seeing it.  Perhaps this has
some effect on our question.  Or perhaps not, since it only applies
to grapes and not to other fruit.


> Thus, as an example, kiwis are available throughout the year where I 
> live

Nitpick: kiwis are treife birds, not fruit.  You mean kiwi fruit.
(Which are really called Chinese gooseberries, but the New Zealand
marketers have successfully spread this new name in order to plant
in people's minds an association between the fruit and their country.)


> (and also 
> what is the meaning of "storage" need such be storage as a fresh
> fruit or vegetable or is it considered as storage if the fruit or
> vegetable is commonly frozen or what if it is available as a canned
> food?

Frozen and canned fruit are easily distinguished from fresh, and are
inferior to fresh, so they do not affect the shehecheyanu.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

On Fri, Aug 28, 2009 at 01:42:51PM +0300, Eli Turkel wrote:
:> A cheirem is based on kavod harav, not lo sasur. A rav has the power to
:> tell the kehillah to shun anyone who berates him, or who is in siruv.

: R. Elchanan Wasserman holds that Lo Tasur applies to the bet din hagadol
: before the churban AND to anything accepted by all of Israel.
: Hence, he holds that Lo Tasur applies to gezerot in the Mishna and Gemara
: but not to an later authorities

Again, there is no indication that gezeiros or taqanos can be made
without a Sanhedrin. "Lo sasur" usually refers to a difference in
*pesaq* not someone overturning earlier legislation.

I don't see, therefore, how your response shows that Rabbeinu Gershom's
charamim are in the category of dinim derabaanan. The Rambam and REW's
position could very well be only about pesaqim that were accepted by all
of Israel.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow
mi...@aishdas.org        man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries
http://www.aishdas.org   about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                       - Rav Yisrael Salanter

I was instantly taken by RSRH's explanation of the pasuq, which was
pointed out to me by RMPoppers in Avodah's early days. (It doesn't
change any halachic / minhagic observations hung on it, just discussing
peshat in the pasuq.)

I developed the whole thing further after one of the iterations in
between at <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2008/06/gender-differences.shtml>.

Quoting my blog:
    Rav Hirsch speaks in terms of "inside" vs. "outside", community in
    service of its members, vs the expansion of the community's domain,
    reach, and standard of living. The similarity to Rav Aharon's
    dichotomy of qibbush extending our reach vs. chazaqah developing
    what we have is quite strong, although not identical.

    Thus, his "kol kevudah bas melekh penimah" (Tehillim 45:14) is
    "But the king's daughter is all glorious within, more than the
    golden borders of her raiment." As R Michael Poppers pointed out a
    long while back, this better fits the hyphenation of "kol-kevudah"
    as well as the use of "kevudah" not "kevudas". The commentary reads:

        "But", the singer adds with infinite tact and delicacy, "though
        the princess may appear glorious and splendid in public, she
        reveals her true glory in quiet, more private circles, and the
        splendid qualities she shows there are much greater than the
        exquisite beauty of the gold borders which shine at the hem of
        her garment." Penimah "within," is always used to designate an
        inner recess as opposed to the outer chambers.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When faced with a decision ask yourself,
mi...@aishdas.org        "How would I decide if it were Ne'ilah now,
http://www.aishdas.org   at the closing moments of Yom Kippur?"
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On a related topic to rmb's response (below) to who was yaakov's real wife:
my question is as follows: we are taught from the yehuda/tamar story that
it is better to be burned at the stake than to embarrass someone. However,
with the rochel case, she didn't want to embarrass her sister, not on her
own cheshbon's account (like tamar) but on yaakov's account. Was this
proper???
hb
rmb:BTW, who said that Leah wasn't Yaaqov's true wife? Reflect on how Yaaqov's
life actually went. Racheil died young. For the vast majority of his life,
it was him, Leah, and the shefachos.
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Is complete self-sacrifice required by the Torah?

In his commentary of Devarim 22:4

You shall not see your brother's donkey or his ox lying on the way 
and to hold yourself back from them; you shall raise them up with
him.

RSRH writes

It is permissible to take
compensation for t'ena. So, too, the duty to restore lost property without
taking compensation devolves only on someone who has no other employment,
but a person who is employed is not obligated to neglect his
own livelihood without appropriate compensation. These halachos are
deeply characteristic of Jewish law's outlook on the fulfillment of duties
in society.

Jewish law does not subscribe to that extravagant zeal which demands
complete self-abnegation as a general rule in communal life, and
which equates virtue with self-sacrifice. Jewish law does not accept such
a philosophy, because it could never become a universal standard. Indeed,
if it were to be put into practice, it would spell the end of all
social commerce. If such an impracticable ideal were to be accepted as
the standard for everyday conduct, "practical-minded" people would
feel they would have no other alternative but to adopt an attitude of
rank egotism. The universally binding Jewish social principle accords
full moral validity to man's need to provide for his own existence and
independence. At the same time, however, the Law demands that, in
addition to, and simultaneously with, seeing that our own needs are
met, we cooperate, with equal seriousness, in attending to and assisting
in the preservation of our neighbor's property and the furtherance of
his endeavors.

As we have already noted (Commentary, Vayikra 19:18), Jewish truth
denies that any selfishness attaches to striving for one's own interest;
indeed, it views such striving as a duty commanded by God. Only thus
could it truly place the Divine seal, Ani HaShem, on its rule, "Love 
your neighbor
as yourself." 
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Among long-timers here on Avodah, the subject of whether one has to
or is not permitted to ask mechilah for LH that the victim doesn't
know about is well known machloqes between RYS and the CC. Here is R'
Hutner's take on the subject.

-micha

: Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2009 08:49:55 +0200
: From: Shabbat BeShabbato <shabbat.beshabb...@gmail.com>
: Subject: Shabbat-B'Shabbato -- Parshat Ki Tavo
: To: d...@zomet.org

:         No 1289: 16 Elul 5769 (5 September 2009)

: RESPONSA FOR OUR TIMES

: Asking Forgiveness for "Lashon Hara" - by Rabbi Re'eim Hacohen, Rosh Yeshiva
: and Chief Rabbi, Otniel

: Question: If somebody speaks "lashon hara" -- slander -- about somebody else,
: who does not know about it, is it necessary to apologize to him? And what is
: the law if the victim does know what was said?

: Answer: To begin, we must first discuss the limits of appeasement when one
: repents any sin between one man and another. It is written in the Mishna,
: "Sins between man and G-d are atoned for by Yom Kippur, sins between one man
: and another are not atoned by Yom Kippur unless one placates his friend..."
: [Yoma 8:7]. The source of this law is a quote by Rabbi Elazar Ben Azaria:
: "You will be purified of all your sins before G-d" [Vayikra 16:30]. This is
: not a straightforward comment, since the simple view of the verse implies
: that all purification (for any sin) stems from G-d and not from other people
: (see Tiferet Yisrael). Evidently Rabbi Elazar interprets the verse to mean
: that one cannot be purified by being "before G-d" unless he has first
: apologized to his friend. This is similar to the statement in the Talmud
: that one cannot bring a sacrifice on a private altar if the Torah describes
: it with the words, "before G-d" (Zevachim 119b).

: Based on this principle, Rabbi Hutner explains in his book Pachad Yitzchak
: why Rabbi Yona writes at the end of Sha'arei Teshuva that on Yom Kippur (as
: opposed to on normal days) one who confesses to his sins before he has
: apologized to his friend must confess a second time after he apologizes. He
: notes that in order to repent on Yom Kippur a person is required to stand up
: before G-d, and if he has not first apologized to his friend the confession
: does not have the status of being "before G-d." This implies that if a
: person has not apologized to his friend he will not even be forgiven for
: sins between man and G-d, since he does not have the proper status of
: standing before G-d.

: Another source for the need to apologize appears in the Mishna: "Even though
: he returns the item he is not forgiven unless he apologizes... And how do we
: know that the friend should not be cruel (and refuse to accept the apology),
: as is written, 'Avraham prayed to G-d, and G-d cured Avimelech' [Bereishit
: 20:17]." [Bava Kama 92a].

: The next thing that we must discuss is exactly what is included in the
: category of sins "between one man and another." The Rambam notes that one
: who damages property belonging to another is not required to repent if he
: pays for the damage (Hilchot Teshuva 2:9; Hilchot Chovel U'Mazik 5:9). On
: the other hand, one who causes physical harm to another person is required
: not only to pay five different categories of payments, he must also ask his
: victim for forgiveness. The principle in the Rambam seems to be that in
: property damage the forgiveness of the injured party is not necessary
: because in that case the only harm is a financial loss, but one who causes
: physical damage (or who robs another person) also causes physical harm and
: shames the person, and this leads to a requirement of forgiveness. (This
: implies that for a case of stealing no forgiveness is necessary, unlike
: robbery which includes physical injury in addition to the financial loss.)

: In view of the above we see that the obligation to apologize is relevant for
: a case of personal suffering but not for financial harm. Thus, if one speaks
: evil about another person who does not know what was said, the victim does
: not suffer personally. The very fact that somebody repents and comes to
: apologize might in fact cause the victim to feel bad, and by apologizing the
: sinner might thus do more harm than good. Thus, according to the Rambam, as
: long as the victim does not know about the slander he has not suffered
: personal harm and the slanderer is not required to apologize.

: In Pachad Yitzchak, Rabbi Hutner quotes from the "elders of the generation"
: in the name of Rabbi Yisrael Salant that in a case when one spreads slander
: about another person who does not know about it but will be upset if he does
: find out, the sinner is not allowed to ask for forgiveness. This is because
: the requirement of forgiveness does not give the sinner permission to make
: his friend suffer. This implies that in principle the sinner should be
: required to ask for forgiveness even if the victim does not know about the
: slander but that he is not allowed to do so, and that this dilemma has no
: solution. On the other hand, based on our analysis above, it would seem that
: there is no need in principle to apologize and to repent, and that the
: sinner can confess to G-d without explicitly apologizing. Rabbi Salant's
: analysis implies that one is forbidden to ask for forgiveness, and since
: this is a situation of doubt one who slandered another person should not
: apologize to his friend.
...
: * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
: SHABBAT-ZOMET is an extract from SHABBAT-B'SHABBATO, a weekly bulletin
: distributed free of charge in hundreds of synagogues in Israel. It is
: published by the Zomet Institute of Alon Shevut, Israel, under the auspices
: of the National Religious Party.
:     Translated by: Moshe Goldberg

: To subscribe, go to www.zomet.org.il and press the link, "Subscribe to
: Shabbat BeShabbato". Contact d...@zomet.org about any problems or comments.
...

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Nearly all men can stand adversity,
mi...@aishdas.org        but if you want to test a man's character,
http://www.aishdas.org   give him power.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                      -Abraham Lincoln

From: Celejar <cele...@gmail.com>
> To: Avodah <avo...@lists.aishdas.org>
> Subject: [Avodah] Kol kevudah: a woman's place is in the home

> Yevamos 77a is another explicit source that derives the norm that a
> woman's place is in the home from "kol kevudah".  [It is possible,
> albeit implausible in my view, that there is also a dissenting
> exegetical view there.]

I am not someone who can teach G'mara, but I can learn, at least to a 
limited extent.

What I was taught was that the first thing one should do is study the 
context of the saying.  To do so entails going back one daf to 76b.

The discussion is a famous one - Do'eig HaEdomi is trying to question 
David's antecendents. The issue surrounds the saying "Amoni VeLo Amonit" 
etc.

During that discussion the sentence "Kol Kevudah" is brought up.

From the reading of the context and the content it appears that if there was 
an issue of staying home - it was in a historical context - that is, women 
at the Historical Time and Place behaved in one way, and the men acted in 
another way. Chzal are NOT trying to imply that women SHOULD stay home, they 
are saying there that it was customary at the time.

As this is not the only opinion concerning the understanding of Amoni etc. 
to be raised, including the understanding that this is a "Mekublannu" (that 
is - Torah LeMoshe MiSinai) and that Do'eig's various comments show that he 
didn't have a problem with women in the public place (though he was silenced 
for other reasons), I would dare say that the discussion is historical and 
not at all intended to teach a halachic law of "women should stay at home".

To compare, imagine saying that men are not allowed to drive b/c when they 
left Egypt they did not drive.  Sometimes history is just history.

Shoshana L. Boublil

On Mon, 31 Aug 2009 17:42:58 +0300
"Shoshana L. Boublil" <toram...@bezeqint.net> wrote:

...

> >From the reading of the context and the content it appears that if there was 
> an issue of staying home - it was in a historical context - that is, women 
> at the Historical Time and Place behaved in one way, and the men acted in 
> another way. Chzal are NOT trying to imply that women SHOULD stay home, they 
> are saying there that it was customary at the time.

At least we've gotten past the idea of "kol kevudah" referring
exclusively to the internal beauty of the soul as opposed to the outer
layer of riches.  Incidentally, another Gemara which uses kol kevudah
to suggest that a woman's place is in the home is Shevuos 30a (and see
Tosfos there).

I do concede the plausibility of your suggestion that the Gemara in
Yevamos can be understood as descriptive rather than normative.
Nevertheless, the Aharonim that I've seen, perhaps in light of all the
Gemaros together, perhaps from some other basis, do understand kol
kevudah to be normative (although it obviously remains to be determined
exactly what conduct is being praised here).  In addition to the Hasam
Sofer (Resp. EH II:99) mentioned in my previous mail, see R. Leiter's
fascinating and erudite collection of sources in his MiTorasan Shel
Rishonim to Gittin 12a.

Moreover, I remind you once again that you have yet to respond to the
Rambam who explicitly derives from the verse that a woman's place is in
the home.

Yitzhak
-- 
Bein Din Le'din - http://bdld.info - *** Note change of address ***
http://bdld.info/2009/07/19/by-any-other-url/
A discussion of Hoshen Mishpat, Even Ha'Ezer and other matters

On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 07:28:42PM -0400, Yitzhak Grossman wrote:
: At least we've gotten past the idea of "kol kevudah" referring
: exclusively to the internal beauty of the soul as opposed to the outer
: layer of riches.....

Again, see RSRH. 

For sources, I recommend RnCL's posts at
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol04/v04n121.shtml#11>
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol04/v04n129.shtml#22>
too much there to start quoting

In <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol04/v04n122.shtml#01> R Mordechai
Torczyner writes:
> Kol Kevodah, on the other hand, places an emphasis on actually being away
> from the sight of others (Rashi Tehillim 45:14, and others there). This
> does not necessarily refer to being indoors, but it does mean staying out
> of the spotlight, as a general course of behavior (see Avodah Zarah 18a,
> Rashi there sv Dikdekah - it is clear that the problem is not with being
> in public, it is with being in the spotlight of avoiding the spotlight.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             With the "Echad" of the Shema, the Jew crowns
mi...@aishdas.org        G-d as King of the entire cosmos and all four
http://www.aishdas.org   corners of the world, but sometimes he forgets
Fax: (270) 514-1507      to include himself.     - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On Mon, 31 Aug 2009 19:53:04 -0400
Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:

...

> In <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol04/v04n122.shtml#01> R Mordechai
> Torczyner writes:
> > Kol Kevodah, on the other hand, places an emphasis on actually being away
> > from the sight of others (Rashi Tehillim 45:14, and others there). This
> > does not necessarily refer to being indoors, but it does mean staying out
> > of the spotlight, as a general course of behavior (see Avodah Zarah 18a,
> > Rashi there sv Dikdekah - it is clear that the problem is not with being
> > in public, it is with being in the spotlight of avoiding the spotlight.

Rambam and Hasam Sofer (that I keep mentioning in this thread) clearly
understand the issue to be inside vs. outside the house, and not being
in vs. avoiding the spotlight (although it should be acknowledged that
HS is disparaging a woman who wanders off to a remote and dangerous
location without her husband's knowledge, and he's presumably not
criticizing a woman who shops locally as per the family arrangements).

Yitzhak
-- 
Bein Din Le'din - http://bdld.info - *** Note change of address ***
http://bdld.info/2009/07/19/by-any-other-url/
A discussion of Hoshen Mishpat, Even Ha'Ezer and other matters

This evening I was reminded of a halacha in Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (15:5)
that one should not answer Kaddish too loudly, because people might laugh
at him for this, and he'd thereby be causing them to sin. (Mishne Brurah
56:5 says the same thing.)

I soon found myself recalling other examples which support or go against
this idea: One may wear shoes on Tisha B'Av, if one walks among non-Jews
who would laugh at us. (Rama 554:17 and Mishne Brurah 554:34) But in
contrast, the very first Rama in Orach Chaim 1:1 tells us, "Don't be
embarrassed by people who laugh at someone for his Avodas Hashem."

How can we reconcile these ideas?

If the halacha had said that one should not answer Kaddish too loudly
because it disturbs the kavana of other people, I would understand that.
But merely because they are laughing? I don't get it.

If halacha does not want non-Jews to laugh at the barefoot Jews because it
is some sort of Chilul HaShaym, there ought to be a lot of other halachos
which are similarly waived in such circumstances. And in any event, how is
the Rama in 554:17 consistent with the Rama in 1:1?

If anyone can suggest any distinctions between these examples, I'd love to
hear it. (It's possible that my confusion is caused by my translating
several different words ("mal'igim", "yislotz'tzu") in the same way
("laugh"), and a more careful distinction would reveal differences.)

Alternatively, if someone has no explanation, but does have other examples,
that could help. Where else does the halacha talk about things that one
should be careful about even if others will laugh, or that one should be
careful about *unless* others will laugh?

advTHANKSance,

Akiva Miller

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On Tue, Sep 01, 2009 at 3:54pm GMT, R Gershon Dubin wrote to Areivim:
: Whichever word you hear, keep in mind the extra mitzva of being
: mesameach a yesomah.

You remind me of my long-standing problem of how to understand what
lishmah means when it comes to MBALC. If you turn the yesomah
into a cheftzah shel mitzvah, making her happy *because* it's an extra
mitzvah, is that more or less lishmah than if you make her happy because
you feel that way toward yesomos, having internalized the feeling?

In <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2005/09/lishmah-of-interpersonal-mitzvos.s
html>,
written after some Avodah discussion, I suggested:
> The paradox seems to be addressed by the Torah by giving two overarching
> principles that motivate chessed. The first is "ve'ahavta lerei'akha
> kamokha -- and you shall love your neighbor as yourself." The other is
> "vehalakhta bidrakhav -- and you shall walk in His ways", to which Chazal
> comment (Sifri ad loc, among many other places), "Just as He is described
> as Merciful, so too must you be merciful. Just as He is described as Kind,
> so must you too be kind. Etc...."
...
> Ve'ahavta obligates us to act out of love for the other. Vehalakhta, out
> of love for and obedience to G-d. Which one is fulfilling in a given act,
> which could mean both as well, could very well depend on the intent of
> the person.

IOW, I made a tzvei dinim.

Now I'm thinking that perhaps it's related to my recent post about the
nature of the yeitzer hatov. Is the ideal to internalize the appropriate
middah, what REED would call placing the decision beyond the nequdat
habechirah so that one unconsiously makes the right choice before any
conscious thought? Or is the YhR by definition to be conscious about it,
acting in the tzelem of Ratzon haBorei?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When faced with a decision ask yourself,
mi...@aishdas.org        "How would I decide if it were Ne'ilah now,
http://www.aishdas.org   at the closing moments of Yom Kippur?"
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
> This evening I was reminded of a halacha in Kitzur Shulchan Aruch
> (15:5) that one should not answer Kaddish too loudly, because
> people might laugh at him for this, and he'd thereby be causing
> them to sin. (Mishne Brurah 56:5 says the same thing.)
> [...]
> One may wear shoes on Tisha B'Av, if one walks among non-Jews who
> would laugh at us. (Rama 554:17 and Mishne Brurah 554:34) But in
> contrast, the very first Rama in Orach Chaim 1:1 tells us, "Don't
> be embarrassed by people who laugh at someone for his Avodas Hashem."
> How can we reconcile these ideas?

Very easily.  One shouldn't feel embarrassed at doing the right thing.
But what if one does?  Reminding oneself that one is right and the
mockers are wrong is all very well, but what if it doesn't help?
What if it's still painful to walk around barefoot and be an object
of fun for all passersby, no matter how convinced one is that this is
right?  Is it that important to go barefoot on Tisha B'av?  No, it
isn't.  The idea is to deny oneself a comfort, not to subject oneself
to acute discomfort of this sort; fasting is enough for that.

We are certainly not concerned about lifnei iver here.  If the goyim
want to make fun of a yid for following the halacha, then "hal'itehu
larasha veyamos"; it's none of our concern, and in fact it's an avera
to rescue them from such a fate -- see Bava Basra 8-10 or so.  But in
the case of kaddish we're talking about fellow yidden who are in the
shul, and we are certainly responsible for them; doing a mitzvah in a
way that seems strange and funny, and is likely to provoke automatic
laughter from anyone unused to seeing it, is a problem.


-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher


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