Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 143

Wed, 22 Jul 2009

• 1. Re: eisav (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 2. ratzon chachamim (Rich, Joel)
• 3. Re: Lo Ra'inu Eino Raya ==> Blanket Heter (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 4. Brisk - Gerus (Eli Turkel)
• 5. Shabbos Hazzon, Lecha Dodi (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 6. Re: Tznius and Gender Roles (zelig...@aol.com)
• 7. Tzeni'us and gender roles (Joseph C. Kaplan)
• 8. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (Meir Shinnar)
• 10. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (Joseph C. Kaplan)
• 12. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (Meir Shinnar)
• 13. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (Micha Berger)
• 14. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)

RTK:
This issue has been discussed before on Avodah.
See the archives, Avodah V12 numbers 64 and 65, in December 2003.
In no 12:64 I wrote: http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol12/v12n064.shtml#13
> Hirsch says that Rivka, the daughter and
> sister of duplicitous men, was able to see through Esav all along, whereas
> Yitzchak, the son of tzaddikim and an ish tam, was not. The pasuk itself
> says about Esav, "Tzayid befiv," which means, according to Rashi, that
> Esav deceived Yitzchak--not once, but all his life. Rivka was forever
> telling her husband, "I'm TELLING you, the boy's no good," but he just
> didn't believe her...

> I love this passage from Hirsch and have given it as a dvar torah
> several times...


My salient point though is simpler, less sophisticated, and so obvious -
so it's easy to overlook.

If you set aside every Rashi and Midrash the story makes perfect sense
on its own. Perhaps the only factoid needed is the concept of listening
to a Navi as a hora'as sho'oh But even here if you set aside that avos
kept torah even that is unnecessary.

Was Yaakov a "faker"?

Clearly NOT according to the sotry. Actually he resists his own favorite
Mom's plot!

Was Rivka being duplicitous?

Of course not! Either going with Hirsch's more elaborate charade or more
simply put: she felt obliged to help fulfill the prophecy given to her.

So why was Esav Angry at Yaakov's deception?

Well Esav was not privy to either Rivka's prediction nor to the fact that
Yaakov had actually resisted playing along with this charade at first.

What about Yitzchak?

Besides his well-meaning naivete WRT Esav, the narrative reveals the sale
of the Bechora to Yitzchak at the climax. So Yitzchak - while ostensibly
"duped" realizes that "yad Hashem" got the bracha to the bechor after all
- Either via Hirsch's model or via the simple stripped down textual model.

The Midrashim aisi clutter up the simple read; and NOT in order to
override peshat but to provide moral-ethical teachings that may not all
fit together with the story line.

Think of the Midrashim here as a collection of Drashos given by different
rabbis over the course of generations and later anthologized. Who would
expect them to fit in a single neat package together?

Of course on a very high level away from the text they may indeed be
highly consistent in the values that they honor, but not necessarily
because a single consistent story line teaches those values!

Rather they are culled as a set of "tangents" off of the central story
line.

And at the very worst Yaakov comes off as an obsequious "mama's boy"
rather than as a deceiver

And Yitzchak as an overly indulgent doting father failing to see his
son Esav's faults. And possessed a serious blind-spot WRT Esav's behavior

And at worst Rivka comes across as failing to convince Yitzchak re:
Esav's flaws until this moment. IOW flawed communication.


None of these 3 "alleged" flaws are fatal - and again are only "flaws"
when cast in a negative light to begin with.

Perhaps a great literary Gadol can reconcile all the Midrashim on Toldos
into a single unified theory. In the meantime the "raw" peshat actually
conveys Yitzchak Rivka and Yaakov in a moderately positive light.

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

I'm reviewing the sugya of pidyon shvuyim (gittin 45a).  It occurs to me
that to the best of my knowledge the only discussions of whether something
was historically done "Brtzon chachamim" are all mishnaic.  In general when
the gemara brings a proof from a maaseh shehaya iirc the question of brtzon
chachamim is not raised except here (by abaye) and similarly by abaye in
moed katan 18b. Note that it doesn't seem that abaye had a mesora that the
actions were against the ratzon, he just seems to posit it as a
possibility.  Isn't it always the case that it is a possibility-why doesn't
the gemara posit this every time?  Perhaps it knew the halachic result it
wanted???


She-nir'eh et nehamat Yerushalayim u-binyanah bi-mherah ve-yamenu

KT
Joel
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R' Rich Wolpoe asked me if he is summarizing my understanding accurately:

> Correct me if necessary but as I understand you:
> No halachic issur can be issued after Shas
> But a minhag or a gezeira a hanhagah or a harchaka or a policy MAY be enacted after shas. Correct?

Yes, that's pretty much what I've been taught. Except for the "after Shas"
part. I think it would be more accurate to say that new issurim (and new
chiyuvim) stopped at the closing of the Sanhedrin - or the Beis Din
Hagadol, or however you want to refer to the Halachic Legislature.

After that point, I'm really not sure what "enacted" means. "Lo sasur yamin
o smol" obviously applies to decisions of the Sanhedrin itself. I'm pretty
sure that it also applied to those who still had Real Semicha in the
post-Sanhedrin era, but that might be a machlokes. But if we're talking
about people who *don't* have Real Semicha, then what can "enacting a
hanhaga" or "enacting a policy" possibly mean? If a leader of a community
says, "We ought to be doing ABC", and an individual ignores him, what has
he violated? I don't know. Maybe he has failed to give kavod to a talmid
chacham?

Another clarification: I'm talking specifically about the enactment itself.
If someone more recent than the Sanhedrin claimed that "I have a mesora
that the Sanhedrin legislated XYZ to be assur", then I'd have no logical
problem with that statement, even if XYZ was never mentioned in Shas. We
would then go into a discussion over this person's reliability to make such
a claim. We would not discuss his authority to create the issur, because he
is not claiming to create any new issur. But we could certainly discuss
where he got this information about an issur that Shas didn't mention.

> If so you can explain the Agur/Rema/Shach vs. BY
> BY is correct WRT the Halachah
> But Rema-Shach can still keep women from shechita as a matter of "policy".

Nope, sorry. I have not learned these topics well enough to offer anything
meaningful. I don't even know which siman to look in. Even saying "Yoreh
Deah Chelek Alef" is just a wild guess.

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Find a licensed private investigator to help you be in the know. Click now!
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31/fc/BLSrjnsFksEEelLOxXG2X5NddSrUonwM2cjsI1jqCqSVApf2WtifX1tH1D6/

An interesting exchange on the "truth" of the Brisker Torah

http://www.hakirah.org/Vol%208%20Forum.pdf

The second part of the forum deals with a debate over Gerus

(no connection between the two topics)

highly recommended

-- 
Eli Turkel

Q: 
How can we mourn publicly on Shabbos
By chanting lecha Dodi to the tune of Eli Tziyon?

A:
1. While the tune is mournful, that does not necessarily constitute
"mourning" in a technical sense!

2 Many congregations chant the passuk Eicha in the Torah Reading and
most of the Haftara of Hazzon to the Megilas Eicha "trop". So what's
the big deal doing Lecha Dodi, too?

3 Tunes for Lecha Dodi sometimes reflect the season. Therefore the melody
isn't in order to mourn but to remind one of the time of year.

4. Hazzanim already reicte the plea of Bneh Vais'cha kevatchila on Yom
Tov to the Eli Tziyyon motif!


5 Most Obvious: Shabbos does not start - according to most Pos'qim -
until Mizmor Shir or Bor'chu. Therefore, Lecha Dodi precedes Shabbos
anyway

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

May I suggest that the Torah?as understood?in many Aggadic passages?and
by?such classical Mfarshim as Rashi?provides many example of gender roles
that are based upon considerations?? The Avos and Imahos had clearly
differentiated roles-Avraham and Sarah focused on the? respective spiritual
progress of the ?men and women . Yitzchak, Yaakov, Rivkah, Rachel and Leah
all followed in that role as? father , mother and spouse and the public and
?private guardians of the Bris Avos ,?

 . Moshe Rabbeinu, Aharon HaKohen and Miriam HaNeviah dealt with the public
 roles of dealing with Pharoah and impllementing Yeztias Mitzrayim while
 Miriam dealt with the home front and encouraged Jewish women to enable
 their?husbands to remain loyal spouses and?to?keep having childrren .
 After Yam Suf, Miriam led the women in a special women's only shirah. The
 women remained loyal in the episodes of? the Golden Calf, the Spies and
 the Korach revolt and reminded Moshe Rabbeinu of the halachos of
 inheritance?One looks in?vein for any complaint of inequality, etc. ??One
 can argue ?that gender roles have existed from the dawn of the Jewish
 People and that the rush to eradicate all gender based roles within
 Judaism is a classical example of rejecting a legacy as old as the Avos
 and Imahos and that women have long expressed and developed their own
 innate spirituality without the need to imitate men in their public role
 or the performance of mitzvos. . 

Steve Brizel
Zelig...@aol.com






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RMB: "Isn't that logically compelled? If being private is a value, then being
a public person is a violation of that value. And if one is called upon
to do so, one is making a necessary sacrifice. I don't see how you can
accept that postulate and not *deduce* the conclusion, even if RHS didn't
spell it out."

I don't find it compelling.  Being private is a value; being a public
servant is also a value.  Being private, even if you're especially
qualified to serve the public, is not a violation of the value of public
service; it's simply the emphasizing of a different value.  Same for the
public person. We need both, but neither is violating any value by choosing
between them.

Joseph Kaplan
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On Wed, Jul 22, 2009 at 01:57:20PM -0400, Joseph C. Kaplan wrote:
: Being private is a value; being a public servant is also a value.
: Being private, even if you're especially qualified to serve the public,
: is not a violation of the value of public service; it's simply the
: emphasizing of a different value. Same for the public person. We need
: both, but neither is violating any value by choosing between them.

Emphasizing one of a conflicting pair of values IS violating one for the
sake of the other, a necessary sactifice. I don't see how your reply in
in contradiction to my words that you're quoting: "If being private is
a value, then being a public person is a violation of that value. And
if one is called upon to do so, one is making a necessary sacrifice."

There is a difference, yes, between justifiably choosing to violate
one goal and doing so for no reason or insufficient reason. But that
difference doesn't make the middah that is neglected any less neglected.
This notion of having to choose between them is why I asked those who
want to add modes of avodas H' for women, and change our lifestyle in
fundamental ways, to prove the existence of sufficient reason.

I didn't even assert that the reason doesn't exist. Just that I personally
would require one before liking the venture, and I personally fail
to see it. (Beyond the yoetzet's ability to increase shemiras taharas
hamishpachah.)

The reply has so far been to question the need for such a threshold,
but I haven't really seen the substance of that objection.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Wed, Jul 22, 2009 at 2:43 PM, Micha Berger<mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 22, 2009 at 01:57:20PM -0400, Joseph C. Kaplan wrote:
> : Being private is a value; being a public servant is also a value.
> : Being private, even if you're especially qualified to serve the public,
> : is not a violation of the value of public service; it's simply the
> : emphasizing of a different value. Same for the public person. We need
> : both, but neither is violating any value by choosing between them.
RMB
> Emphasizing one of a conflicting pair of values IS violating one for the
> sake of the other, a necessary sactifice. I don't see how your reply in
> in contradiction to my words that you're quoting: "If being private is
> a value, then being a public person is a violation of that value. And
> if one is called upon to do so, one is making a necessary sacrifice."
>
One (hopefully last) attempt:
As tzeniut can be translated as private (better might be modest), RMB
suggests an intrinsic conflict with private and public - and
therefore, that any public role is necessarily a violation of tzeniut
- and therefore, there has to be a cost benefit analysis.

What I (and I think others) - do not see the dichotomy as public
versus private - but as a mode of being and behavior - hatznea lechet
and anavut are fully compatible with being a public figure  - and
therefore there isn't the necessary tension.

 It is reasonable to argue that that mode of being and behavior is
more difficult and less common in a public figure - just as, say
lacking yuhara - a related value - is more difficult and less common
in a public figure - but not that there is an intrinsic conflict
(which is  why, in the current debate, modest is a better translation
of tzeniut).  - One can completely lack tzeniut as a completely
private person, and have it as a very public figure.  This is a far
better fit for the sources - none of which (as ably documented by RCL)
go along with your understanding of tzeniut - although they use  the
term.

Indeed, the proof texts I cited make precisely this point.  vehaish
moshe anav me'od is said about moshe the public figure - anavut and
being a public figure are completely compatible.  It is also RYBS's
point - that public figures are obligated in hatznea lechet - if being
a public figure was, as you suggest, an intrinsic violation of hatznea
lechet - this would not make sense, but one would talk that even
though they are violating it, they should minimize the violation -
whihc is very different than his statement

Meir Shinnar

On Wed, Jul 22, 2009 at 04:34:50PM -0400, Joseph C. Kaplan wrote:
: I still don't agree.  When I have to me mechallel Shabbat to save a life 
: I'm not violating the value of Shabbat; I'm choosing, as halacha tells me 
: to, a different value...

This is the whole question of hutrah vs dechuyah.

If you say dechuyah, then yes, you are violating Shabbos because halakhah
tells you to follow the other value. If you say huterah then you are
not violating Shabbos. Something done for hatzalas nefashos is not a
melakhah. One nafqa mina would be whether someone who must eat meat on
Shabbos to live but there is nothing nishchat should eat neveilah or
should have meat shechted for him on Shabbos. If Shabbos is hutrah,
then shecht the meat; if it's dechuyah, then neveilah is the lesser
mitzvah to be overridden.)

Also the discussion of tum'ah hutrah betzibbur really means mutar,
or maybe it's also dechuyah.

However, here it's not halakhah; it's middos. IOW, one would have to
say that to breach one's privacy for the sake of the communal need or
some other personal need one isn't practicing a lack of privacy. There
is no parallel to hutrah, where the middah doesn't even come into play.

Rather, you are, as you write "choosing ... a different value". IOW,
developing one's achrayus for others (eg) at the expense of developing
tzeni'us.

R' Dr Shinnar writes:
> What I (and I think others) - do not see the dichotomy as public
> versus private - but as a mode of being and behavior - hatznea lechet
> and anavut are fully compatible with being a public figure  - and
> therefore there isn't the necessary tension.

The two sides of being vs behavior don't exist independently of eachother.
Haadam nif'al lefi pe'ulaso, as the Chinukh reiterates and reiterates.
There is no way to act without middos being involved. This unity of being
and behavior underlies Yahadus. It's how "heyei tamim" or "qedoshim tihyu"
translates to masei mitzvah rather than navel contemplation in some
cloistered meditative setting.

(It also underlies a point of Hebrew grammer -- is "boneh" a builder,
or the present tense verb?)

And is also why there is no parallel to "hutrah" for middos. E.g. Someone
who kills in a milkhemes mitzvah is still more able to kill than I am
and a shocheit is less queasy at the sight of blood than when he started.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

RMB:
> Emphasizing one of a conflicting pair of values IS violating one for the
> sake of the other, a necessary sactifice.

I still don't agree.  When I have to me mechallel Shabbat to save a life I'm 
not violating the value of Shabbat; I'm choosing, as halacha tells me to, a 
different value.  (In this case, of course, I have no choice.)  But Judaism 
also requires someone to lead a community, teach Torah in public, read a 
ketuba under the chupah, serve on a shul or school board, lobby secular 
public officials on issues important to our community; Judaism can't exist 
without those roles being filled.  So when someone fills them they are not 
violating or sacrificing any more than driving to the hospital on Shabbat is 
a sacrifice or violation.

Joseph Kaplan 

>
> R' Dr Shinnar writes:
>> What I (and I think others) - do not see the dichotomy as public
>> versus private - but as a mode of being and behavior - hatznea lechet
>> and anavut are fully compatible with being a public figure ?- and
>> therefore there isn't the necessary tension.
>
> The two sides of being vs behavior don't exist independently of eachother.
> Haadam nif'al lefi pe'ulaso, as the Chinukh reiterates and reiterates.
> There is no way to act without middos being involved. This unity of being
> and behavior underlies Yahadus. It's how "heyei tamim" or "qedoshim tihyu"
> translates to masei mitzvah rather than navel contemplation in some
> cloistered meditative setting.
>
> (It also underlies a point of Hebrew grammer -- is "boneh" a builder,
> or the present tense verb?)
>
> And is also why there is no parallel to "hutrah" for middos. E.g. Someone
> who kills in a milkhemes mitzvah is still more able to kill than I am
> and a shocheit is less queasy at the sight of blood than when he started.
>
While being and behavior do not exist independently, what I (and
others) are saying that being a public figure is not the mode of being
or behavior that is the problem - one can be be and act in completely
tzanua fashion while being a public leader - they have not been the
opposites of public/private - because the meaning of tzanua as private
is not in not being in the public arena.  (again, vehaish moshe anav
meod - anivut, tzniut etc coexist in being and action with being the
leader of klal yisrael.) One can be private public figure - that is
the essence of hatznea lechet according to RYBS.  You have brought no
support for the position that being a public figure is something that
is intrinsically bad - because it violates tzeniut - that therefore
requires something to be mattir it.

I disagree with RJK's analysis, because the conflict is not between
two competing values.
Howeverr, RJK's analysis, and your response - heighten the issue.
Shabbat and pikuach nefesh are not necessarily in conflict - most
cases of pikuach nefesh do not occur on shabbat, and the question
therefore arises what to do when they are in conflict.

Your (and RJK's)  analysis would put public service, rather than as an
intrinsic good, as an evil  that is intrinsically in conflict with
tzeniut - - which is then only mitigated by the good that the
particular public service brings.   This is the problematic part -
which has no support in the literature.  vekhol mi sheoskim betzorche
tzibbur - the only requirement is that it is be'emunah.

I would add one thing - that RHS's and your analysis reflect a growing
trend - the emphasis on the importance of personal perfection rather
than the needs of the community - which has many other manifestations
in current haredi society (and reflects RHS"s haredi bent),  What is
unique about this analysis that it is the first that I know off  that,
in viewing the conflict between the needs of the community and that of
personal perfection - views communal service as intrinsically
detrimental to the individual - even if, under some circumstances, it
becomes muttar - rather than potentially posing dangers, depending on
the invididual and the nature of the service.  It is therefore highly
morally problematic.

Meir Shinnar

On Wed, Jul 22, 2009 at 05:32:25PM -0400, Meir Shinnar wrote:
: Your (and RJK's)  analysis would put public service, rather than as an
: intrinsic good, as an evil  that is intrinsically in conflict with
: tzeniut - - which is then only mitigated by the good that the
: particular public service brings.   This is the problematic part -
: which has no support in the literature.  vekhol mi sheoskim betzorche
: tzibbur - the only requirement is that it is be'emunah.

And that it be tzorkhei tzibbur, which is a "good that the particular
public service brings".

Is the benefit a Maharat over a Yoetzet bring to the table the public's
or in her opportunity to serve G-d in the way the contemporary world
told her was more valuable? Or the benefit of being at the amud for
Pesuqei Dezimara rather than behind the mechitzah that of the community?

: I would add one thing - that RHS's and your analysis reflect a growing
: trend - the emphasis on the importance of personal perfection rather
: than the needs of the community...

Think of how ironic your description is. If I came in to the conversation
at this point, I would think that you're saying I want to accomodate the
individual women's desire for religiosity, and you're the one trying to
preserve the social structure.

I'm saying there are conflicting values between my privacy and my need
to serve the community. Nothing about choosing one over the other on a
wholesale basis, but a call for case-by-case assessment.

I'm objecting to your choosing one over the other, as though having a
good reason to be in the public eye means that one isn't workiing against
one's own hatznei'ah lekhes. Therefore you are advocating going ahead
with this change without needing to make a real argument that the change
is worth the cost.

All halachic or mussar terms aside, the Maharat who gets a rabbi-like
role leading a shul and its congregation will have a harder time walking
privately with G-d. It's straight psychology, if not the Chinukh's
constant refrain.

I would also argue (as R Dr Haym Soloveitchik did) that the growing trend,
outside various forms of neo-Chassidus (be they Carlebachite or Aish
Kodesh in Woodmere) is toward hyperlegalism and an ignoring of values
or personal development. You appear to be describing a world so overrun
with erev Shabbos Jews, they want to ban melakhah on Friday afternoon.

It's not that public service is detrimental even if sometimes muttar,
it's that it is detrimental in one way even if it can be more constructive
in another. You are casting a mussar argument into halachic terms. I
apologized for doing so, and returned to the hutrah-dechuyah distinction
only to show why it doesn't apply to mussar.

In short, I would argue that the Maharat as an insitution violates
qadeish es atzmekha bema shemutar lakh (cast into lashon neqeivah). It's
not assur by the letter of the law, but it's not stepping back from
something whose middos negatives far outweigh the benefit.

-Micha

PS: As for chareidi bents, I never claimed to be more MO than chareidi.

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Joseph Kaplan :
> read a ketuba under the chupah,

Q:
When a chassa-callah ask a famous rabbi (let's say Rashi)
to read the kesubbah
Who is being honored - the rabbi or the chassan-callah?

And the answer may go to the heart of when tznius is "set aside" hutra
or d'chuya.

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile



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