Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 123

Thu, 25 Jun 2009

• 1. Re: R Tzadok-TSBP (Yitzhak Grossman)
• 2. Re: Rambam on Metaphors (Michael Makovi)
• 3. Re: Tiqun Olam (Michael Makovi)
• 4. Re: Tiqun Olam (Micha Berger)
• 5. The Halachic Prohibition Against Smoking (Yitzchok Levine)
• 6. FW: R Tzadok-TSBP (Allen Gerstl)
• 7. Re: Rambam on Metaphors (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 8. Re: Hashgacha Pratis for goyim (Micha Berger)
• 9. Psulei edus invalidating the whole group (Zev Sero)
• 10. Baruch Hu Uvaruch Shemo (Simon Montagu)
• 11. Halachic Analysis of the "Carlebach Minyan" (AES)
• 12. Re: R Tzadok-TSBP (Michael Makovi)
• 13. Re: R Tzadok-TSBP (Michael Makovi)
• 14. Re: Baruch Hu Uvaruch Shemo (Daniel Israel)
• 15. Re: Baruch Hu Uvaruch Shemo (Zev Sero)
• 16. Re: FW: R Tzadok-TSBP (Micha Berger)

On Tue, 23 Jun 2009 18:45:00 -0400
Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Jun 23, 2009 at 9:45pm IDT, Michael Makovi wrote:
> : Regarding post-modernism, as exemplified in Shapiro, Wyschogrod, etc.
> : my mind is still not entirely made up...

...

> For example, what difference does it make what Shapiro or Wyschogrod
> think of post-modernism compared to the people actually doing halakhah?
> Did you ever hear Rav Ovadiah say that he's deconstructing a text?

For the record, while I utterly reject this post-modernist stuff out of
hand, Shapiro, in an appendix to his "Studies in Maimonides and His
Interpreters", cites a number of passages of R. Y. Y. Weinberg where he
seems to take exactly this view of Brisker lomdus, that R. Haim's
interpretations of Rambam are not correct as a matter of original
intent, but that they are nevertheless valuable as brilliant hiddushe
Torah in their own right.  Once again, I do not understand this
position at all.

Yitzhak
--
Bein Din Ledin - http://bdl.freehostia.com
A discussion of Hoshen Mishpat, Even Ha'Ezer and other matters

R' Rich Wolpoe asked about the difference between yad hashem being
metaphorical and eiyin tachat eiyin (hereafter ETE) *not* being
metaphorhical, within the confines of Rambam's own philosphy.

I'm not sure I fully understand the question, however, but I will
respond to what the question appears to be. As far as I can tell, the
question appears to be: why can we allegorize yad hashem but not ETE?

My understanding:

As far as halakhah goes, Rambam holds it illegitimate to allegorize,
etc. Hazal had a Sinaitic tradition that eiyin tachat eiyin is to be
interpreted in a certain way (Introduction to the Mishnah), and this
is inviolable. (Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner in his hakdama to the Dor
Revi'i would say that even ETE can be overturned as per Hilkhot
Mamrim, but Rambam explicitly denies this possibility in Introduction
to the Mishnah.) Apparently, we have an assumption that in matters of
law, the Torah said what it meant. (Except where tradition declares
otherwise; gezerah shavah, etc.) The Torah did not use allegory, etc.,
in matters of law. The Garden of Eden can be an allegory; the law to
eat kosher cannot be.

But furthermore: Rambam only allegorizes when reason contradicts the
peshat. When reason says nothing, or when reason is uncertain (for
example, Aristotle and Plato on eternity and unformed matter), we go
by the Torah's peshat. When reason yields certain results, and only
then, do we reinterpret the Torah. As Wyschogrod reviewing Fox notes
(Tradition 28:2, 1994),
(Quote) " It is Maimonides who is convinced, as Fox says, "that what
reason finds incorrect and unacceptable cannot be the meaning of
Scripture, no matter what it appears to say." Scripture and rabbinic
texts are thus no obstacle to any doctrine, as long as Maimonides is
convinced that the doctrine is rationally sound. Scripture and
rabbinic texts are subject to interpretation, guided by reason. Where
reason yields uncertain results, Scripture needs to be listened to on
its own terms. But when reason speaks clearly, Scripture must yield."
(End quote)
Wyschogrod then adds an interesting possibility of his own, that
perhaps Rambam's understanding of what reason could prove and not
prove, was itself dictated by what Judaism said. That is, perhaps
Rambam's understanding that eternity of the universe had not been
proven by Aristotle, was itself determined by the Torah's own apparent
belief in creation ex nihilo. In other words, reason and the Torah's
peshat are mutually influential; where reason is certain, the Torah's
peshat must yield, but the Torah's peshat can dictate where reason is
certain and where reason is not.

But the point is that the Torah's peshat yields only when reason is
certain. If anything, reason declares that ETE cannot be literal; as
Hazal note, what if a one-eyed man blinds a two-eyed man, etc.?  If
anything, then, ETE *is* metaphorical, based on both reason and
Hazal's Sinaitic tradition that ETE is not literal. But in most
halakhot, the peshat reigns supreme, because halakhah is different
than narrative and musar and the like, whereas in the latter, reason
can override the peshat.

Michael Makovi

> [RSRH criticized the] Hellenic philosopher's [i.e. Rambam's] priority of knowledge rather than morality
>
> R' Micha

And like R' Levine, I believe the Kuzari and Ramhal are similar to the
Rambam here. They replace knowledge with spiritual holiness, but the
two are not really not so different. The mechanism and means are
different, but the upshot is the same; whether one achieves knowledge
of G-d via speculation or spiritual holy closeness to G-d via
korbanot, the final upshot is that morality in and of itself is given
less value. Rambam and Kuzari/Maharal both believe that life's purpose
is holiness and closeness to G-d, and that morality is a means to this
end. And I believe Rav Hirsch disagrees. True, the Kuzari and Ramhal
are less cerebral, but they still devalue morality, and I believe the
Kuzari's apothecary parable is targeted by Rav Hirsch's criticism of
theurgy. (And Derech haShem has an entire section of several chapters
on theurgy!)

For Rabbi Hirsch, ikkar shechina b'tachtonim. Closeness to G-d is
achieved primarily via closeness to His children. As Dr. Nachum
Klafter once noted, for someone like Rav Hirsch, giving tzedaka to a
poor person IS a spiritual moment of closeness to G-d.

You draw a hiluq between practicing morality and the mission of
mankind, and becoming the sort of person who has internalized and had
inculcated in him morality and that mission. I don't see this
distinction as being very meaningful. The person who internalizes will
practice, and the person who practices does so because he has
internalized. (Or if not yet, he will soon internalize; the heart
follows the deeds.) They're one kit and kaboodle.

Regarding Kabbalah, I follow the interpretation of Rabbi Danziger, in
his dialogue with Rabbi Elias at
http://www.stevens.edu/golem/llevine/rsrh/Danziger.pdf and
http://www.stevens.edu/golem/llevine/rsrh/RS%
20Hirsch%20R'Elias%20vs%20R%20Danziger%20JAction.pdf
Yes, Rav Hirsch studied the Zohar, studied Maharal, and used a siddur
with Kabbalistic notes. But as Dr. Nachum Klafter agreed with me, Rav
Hirsch read the Zohar like we read Midrash Rabbah. Every time Rav
Hirsch brings a Kabbalistic teaching, he rationalizes it, and removes
all theosophy and theurgy. And indeed, in Nineteen Letters, he
vigorously criticizes theosophy and theurgy; as far as I can tell,
he's not criticizing overmuch reliance on theosophy and theurgy in
Kabbalah, but rather, he's criticizing any belief in theosophy and
theurgy at all.

As for R' Faur: yes, I agree with him. The Torah isn't concerned
whether unicorns exist, and neither is it concerned whether other gods
exist. And just as the sun surely exists despite the prohibition of
worshipping it, other gods might exist too, even if we are prohibited
from worshipping them. Of course, as R' Faur says, if other gods do
exist, they exist only because Hashem created them, along with the sun
and unicorns. What's beautiful is that by the end of this, the other
gods are basically angels or demons or fairies or whatevers, only
under a different name; I don't believe demons exist, but even if they
do exist, this does not threaten monotheism.

Michael Makovi

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 at 11:48:36AM +0300, Michael Makovi wrote:
: And like R' Levine, I believe the Kuzari and Ramhal are similar to the
: Rambam here. They replace knowledge with spiritual holiness, but the
: two are not really not so different...

"Aside from that, Mrs Lincoln, how did you like the play?"

That replacement is a HUGE difference.

The Kuzari, the Ramchal and RSRH himself write about the role of
halakhah is making a better person, one who is more moral and who
is closer to G-d.

The Rambam discusses things in exactly the same terms as the Rihal's
philosopher.

    1:1 ... Everything is reduced to a Prime Cause; not to a Will
    proceeding from this, but an Emanation from which emanated a second,
    a third, and fourth cause.

    The Cause and the caused are, as thou seest, intimately connected with
    one another, their coherence being as eternal as the Prime Cause and
    having no beginning. ... In the perfect person a light of divine
    nature, called Active Intellect, is with him, and its Passive
    intellect is so closely connected therewith that both are but one. The
    person [of such perfection] thus observes that he is the Active
    Intellect himself, and that there is no difference between them. His
    organs -- I mean the limbs of such a person -- only serve for the
    most perfect purposes, in the most appropriate time, and in the
    best condition, as if they were the organs of the Active Intellect,
    but not of the material and passive Intellect, which used them at
    an earlier period, sometimes well, but more often improperly. The
    Active Intellect, however, is always successful. This degree is
    the last and most longed for goal for the perfect man whose soul,
    after having been purified, has grasped the inward truths of
    all branches of science, has thus become equal to an angel, and
    has found a place on the nethermost step of seraphic beings...
    Keep just ways as regards character and actions, because this will
    help thee to effect truth, to gain instruction, and to become similar
    to this Active Intellect... the veneration of the Prime Cause,
    not in order to receive favour from it, or to divert its wrath,
    but solely to become like the Active Intellect in finding the truth,
    in describing everything in a fitting manner, and in rightly
    recognizing its basis. These are the characteristics of the [Active]
    Intellect. If thou hast reached such disposition of belief, be not
    concerned about the forms of thy humility or religion or worship,
    or the word or language or actions thou employest....
    ...
    3. The Philosopher replied: The philosophers' creed knows no
    manslaughter, as they only cultivate the intellect. ...

This parallel fits what RSRH said, having gotten into Aristotilian
mindset, the Rambam makes mitzvos about cultivating an idea. Morality
he explicitly places a step below, a function of eating from the eitz
hadaas, and life is supposed to be about knowledge and truth.

:           the final upshot is that morality in and of itself is given
: less value. Rambam and Kuzari/Maharal both believe that life's purpose
: is holiness and closeness to G-d...

I don't know about the Maharal, but the Kuzari and Ramchal define that
closeness as having a tzelem E-lokim that is a more faithful rendering
ON THE MORAL LEVEL.

...
: You draw a hiluq between practicing morality and the mission of
: mankind, and becoming the sort of person who has internalized and had
: inculcated in him morality and that mission. I don't see this
: distinction as being very meaningful. The person who internalizes will
: practice, and the person who practices does so because he has
: internalized. (Or if not yet, he will soon internalize; the heart
: follows the deeds.) They're one kit and kaboodle.

The difference is whether one shows respect to challah because it's
the staff of life. That's not moral, it's a personal morality increasing
practice. Similarly mitzvos. Are they all direct expressions of the
Divine Values, or are some of them excercises that develop the person's
loyalty to those values and the ability to follow them? Clearly RSRH
says the latter, or else his taxonomy of mitzvos would have fewer
categories.

...
: Yes, Rav Hirsch studied the Zohar, studied Maharal, and used a siddur
: with Kabbalistic notes. But as Dr. Nachum Klafter agreed with me, Rav
: Hirsch read the Zohar like we read Midrash Rabbah. Every time Rav
: Hirsch brings a Kabbalistic teaching, he rationalizes it, and removes
: all theosophy and theurgy...

As did the Ramchal, a man who writes about being visited by Eliyahu
haNavi and various mal'akhim, aside from having a maggid.

...
: As for R' Faur: yes, I agree with him. The Torah isn't concerned
: whether unicorns exist, and neither is it concerned whether other gods
: exist. And just as the sun surely exists despite the prohibition of
: worshipping it, other gods might exist too, even if we are prohibited
: from worshipping them. Of course, as R' Faur says, if other gods do
: exist, they exist only because Hashem created them, along with the sun
: and unicorns....

At some point you're abussing the word "god". After all, dor Enosh
worshipped real things, and I already posted more than once about keruvim,
the cult of Apis, the eigel, and the idolatry of Malkhus Yisrael. Nu,
so I theorize that the bulls of Yeravam's religion were representations
of qeruvim, and were the carriers of prayers up to HQBH. Since there
are qeruvim, the things they worshipped exist. No less so than sun
worshippers. But that doesn't mean it's okay to worship the qeruvim as
the Romans worshipped Mercury (their messenger god).

Where the line is between that and the "Machnisei Rachamim" is a thorny
matter. Personally, I'm more at home with the Gra's harder line.
Others draw the line elsewhere. But hakol modim -- yeish gevul.

You said that henotheism was a "kosher Torah belief for a frum Jew".
That means more than that these things exist even if I were to believe
that idolatry never got beyond the dor Enosh idea of worshipping His
entourage and into worshipping fictions. It is a denial of the 5th
ikkar, reducing it to an issur of worshipping anything else, not an
emunah/yedi'ah that there is nothing else appropriate to worship.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Take time,
mi...@aishdas.org        be exact,
http://www.aishdas.org   unclutter the mind.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm

In response to my recent email about Kiddush clubs 
(http://www.thejewishweek.com/viewArticle/c55_a16075/Editori
al__Opinion/Opinion.html 
) someone wrote to me asking, "What do you have on smoking?"  I did 
an Internet search and came up with the links below that deal with 
this topic. I quote from the first link,

"Accordingly, this analysis must lead to the unambiguous conclusion 
that smoking is clearly and unquestionably forbidden by halacha and 
that this should be made known to all who care about the Torah and 
their health."

YL

  http://www.rabbis.org/pdfs/Prohibition_Smoking.pdf

http://www.jlaw.com/Commentary/smoking.html

http://www.revach.net/article.php?id=3388

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArti
cle%2FShowFull&;cid=1215330889024 


http://www.koltorah.org/RAVJ/15-13_The_Prohibition_to_Smoke_1.htm

http://www.koltorah.org/ravj/15-16_The_Prohibition_to_Smoke_2.htm

http://nmhs.blogspot.com/2006/07/smoking-in-halacha.html

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R' Michael Makovi wrote:
:: It is for this reason that Rabbi Angel, following Rabbi Hayim David
:: Halevi. said that while one may be as personally strict as he desires,
:: he must nevertheless respect the lenient opinions. ...


On June 23rd, 2009 R' Micha Berger wrote:
:The other acharonim's opinions on giyur can actually be gone, closed
:options, and yes, declared invalid except possibly as a snif lehaqeil
:beshe'as hadechaq -- assuming other snifim can be found. You don't have a
:"full right to follow" whomever you want. Doubly so on an issue that has
:impact ledorei doros far beyond the sho'eil and the meishiv's community
:of followers.

:The opinion may be "valid" in the sense of a qiyum of Talmud Torah, but
:someone relying on them needs to prove that consensus hasn't taken them
:off the poseiq's table. *That* needs to be RMAngel's central theme, not
:that these neglected pesaqim existed, some of them made by great men
:who did not have the fortune of having a major impact on the flow of
:halachic development. (And RMM could have noticed that in his need to
:tell us who they are.) Compared to a commonly-followed understanding of
:the Rambam?
_____________________________
Some comments:

I am very grateful to have had the opportunity to read RMB's beautiful
description of the development of our knowledge of Halacha and his analogies 
to developments in our knowledge of Physics.

I would, however, respectfully take issue with his description of the
(mostly theoretical) STATUS of minority opinions (but only when such 
are those of Rishonim and Achronim).
In the usual course such minority opinions admittedly are only able to be 
utilized in the manner that is described by RMB as their each being (merely) 
a "snif lehaqueil" (and I can personally recall shiurim with the late posek,
Rav Gedalia Felder, z"l in which he provided examples of such usage as he does 
in his Teshuvot,Yesodei Yeshurun).
 
However, please see Rav Moshe's Teshuva in Igrot Moshe[1], 
Yoreh Deah 1, No. 101, that I submit provides the best 
THEORETICAL understanding.


Thus we are told that in rare cases of a great posek having "raayyot nechonot"
(and such certainly would not include the use of sociology of knowledge but
true halachic raayot) the opinion of the posek (which 
might include such a minority opinion) may yet
become more than merely a snif lehakeil. 
Rav Moshe brings the caveat that such must not be against the SA given the accepted 
status of the SA. (See similarly SA:CM25)  


I fully realize that only someone of the knowledge, ability and stature of a
Rav Mosheh would still utilize this method and then only in rare situations 
(and those persons of lesser knowledge, ability and stature who try to do so 
are misguided) however this concept is still important for an understanding of 
the nature of pesak.


KT
Eliyahu

Michael:
> But furthermore: Rambam only allegorizes when reason contradicts the
> peshat. When reason says nothing, or when reason is uncertain (for
> example, Aristotle and Plato on eternity and unformed matter), we go
> by the Torah's peshat. When reason yields certain results, and only
> then, do we reinterpret the Torah

Well read the above

As Raavad will tell you MANY reasonable people did NOT alegorize
anthropomorphic aspects of Torah

So since Rambam was willing to allegorize more agressively than others
in these matters

Therefore why stop there and draw the line at Divine attributes? 

The Rambam was far more prone to allegorize. Obviously much of torah
is written poetically. Use of metaphor, simile, and idiom abound.
So why not see the eye in ETE as an idiom, metaphor, etc.?

It seems to me these hard and fast black and white rules are somewhat
arbitrary.

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

On Wed, Jun 17, 2009 at 04:15:47PM +0300, Michael Makovi wrote:
: Note that Psalm 33 explicitly says "kol benei ha'adam"/"kol yoshvei
: ha'aretz" and "hishgiah". Apparently, hashgahah is given regardless of
: whether one is a Jew or gentile, righteous or not. Of course, perhaps
: His *act* of hashgahah will differ, between reward and punishment, or
: consigning one to the whims of nature...

Isn't the latter is definitionally not hashgachah? It could be itself
an onesh -- the removal of hashgachah. Also, the Rambam's notion that
not every homo sapien is equally human WRT HP would apply to this
pasuq as well.

But the Rambam's line is yedi'ah, not Jewishness, so it's not relevent.
And even he notes that HP for all homo sapiens is the normal understanding
of the mesorah.

: So perhaps G-d only feeds the righteous, whereas He even causes famine
: to the wicked, or simply consigns them to the whims of natural law.
: (This would bring us back to Rambam et. al., about G-d working within
: nature.) But in any case, He certainly pays attention to everyone,
: righteous and wicked alike; how He acts is perhaps otherwise.

The Chovos haLvavos also notes these two facets of hashgachah.


I have a real problem, though, understanding:
:                                                   Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan
: (Faces and Facets) cites a midrash to the effect that a certain poor
: man would have to have creation recreated, with his being placed in a
: different generation, in order to be saved from his poverty; Rabbi
: Kaplan concludes that the wheels of history sometimes demand a few
: people suffer undeservedly.

After all, HQBH created not only history, but the very rules by which it
plays. Nu, some things are inherently soseir, and so perhaps universal
sechar va'onesh in olam hazeh can be absolutely ruled out on the grounds
that it would make bechirah all about pain-avoidance and reward-gathering.
Not true choice between good and evil. (And if we allow even for setiros,
we can't use reason to discuss the topic and might as well close the
discussion anyway.)

But given all the degrees of freedom that implies and the Infinite Wisdom
Hashem posesses, why can't he make a puzzle in which all the pieces fit,
in which every person gets to make all his own choices and yet every
person receives exactly what is appropriate for him?

(Particularly with his Breslov connection, or any Chassidish or Desslerian
approach, this kind of philosophy is the one I would have more readily
expected from RAK.)

How I wish RAK was still around to ask...

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
mi...@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabindranath Tagore

Does this apply only to people who could be in the geder of edus, if
only they weren't relatives, cardsharps, or whatever?   In other words,
if women are included among the witnesses, can we say that they don't
invalidate the male witnesses, because they're not even potentially
kosher, so they're as if they weren't there?

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

From the Daily Halacha emails which appear in my inbox:

> 966. One should be mindful to carefully pronounce each word when
responding "Boruch Hu U'voruch Shemo", and be especially vigilant to
pronounce the letter "Vuv" of U'voruch. Piskei Tshuvos 124:11, Kaf Hachaim
124:29, Boruch She'omar

I didn't understand this well. There are two vavs in "Uvaruch", and I don't
know which one it refers to or why one has to be especially vigilant to
pronounce either one of them.

I tried to "nachgeschau". I don't know a book called Piskei Teshuvot and
neither does hebrewbooks.org. It has four called Baruch She'Amar, and with
no page or chapter reference I don't know where to begin looking.

The Kaf Hachaim I do have, and it says something rather different which
makes much more sense LAD:  "velo keminhag rabbim me`amei ha'aretz she'omrim
'Baruchu uvaru shemo' ki ein ze mevarech".

Can anyone provide a source and/or a reason for the halacha as stated in the
Daily Halacha?
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http://www.jewishideas.org/print/304

The article (written by a member of a local LWMO shul) deals with the
following five questions relating to "Carlebach Minyanim":

1) Should we associate the name of Rabbi Carlebach with these types of
prayer services as a tribute to his contribution to Jewish prayer, or
choose another name?

2) Is it permissible to modify the liturgical music of a community or
synagogue?

3) If permissible, may we draw inspiration from non-Jewish sources?
And if so, from which ones?

4) Is it permissible to lengthen the time of prayer services? ?And if
so, by how much?

5) May music dominate the words of the tefillot, allowing distortion
and repetition?

KT,
Aryeh

Somehow, I turned a discussion Rabbi Tzadok into a discussion of
post-modernism. I will now bring the discussion full circle:

Something similar to this post-modernism would be apparent from the
philosophy of Rabbi Tzadok haKohen of Lublin. In "R. Zadok Hakohen on
the History of Halakha" (Tradition 21:4, Fall 1985), Professor Yaakov
Elman describes how according to Rabbi Tzadok, the Oral Law is such
that although Moshe received the whole Torah at Sinai, it was all in
potentia (b'koah), and only later did Rabbi Akiva (based on Menahot
29b) bring it out into actuality (b'po'al). Elman then writes,

(Quote) The process [of bringing that which was inchoate (b'koah) out
into actuality (b'po'al)] did not end here [with the writing of the
Talmud]. Each successive effort of codification of Oral Law added to
the Written Torah, and each code, as it became part of Written Torah,
generated still more layers of innovation in Oral Torah. In practical
terms, each portion of Oral Torah as it was reduced to writing
generated new commentaries whose authors approached the newly
incorporated work as the sages of Oral Torah had approached the
original Written Torah. Thus, if we may be permitted to draw out the
line ofreasoning a step further, the Amoraim applied to Mishnah
methods similar to their creative reinterpretation (derasha) of
Written Torah, the Rishonim continued the process on Talmud as a
whole, and the Aharonim used the works of the Rishonim as a point of
departure and treated them the same way. And the process continues
apace. Progressive revelation continues through the medium of sage and
text.
(End Quote)

In other words, just as Rabbi Akiva brought the Oral Law into
actuality from its being potential in the Written Law, so too the
Amoraim did to the Mishnah, the Rishonim to the Amoraim, and the
Aharonim to the Rishonim. Each generation brings potentiality to
acutality, koah to po'al. Some sort of post-modernism is clearly
demanded.

Michael Makovi

Somehow, I turned a discussion Rabbi Tzadok into a discussion of
post-modernism. I will now bring the discussion full circle:

Something similar to this post-modernism would be apparent from the
philosophy of Rabbi Tzadok haKohen of Lublin. In "R. Zadok Hakohen on
the History of Halakha" (Tradition 21:4, Fall 1985), Professor Yaakov
Elman describes how according to Rabbi Tzadok, the Oral Law is such
that although Moshe received the whole Torah at Sinai, it was all in
potentia (b'koah), and only later did Rabbi Akiva (based on Menahot
29b) bring it out into actuality (b'po'al). Elman then writes,

(Quote) The process [of bringing that which was inchoate (b'koah) out
into actuality (b'po'al)] did not end here [with the writing of the
Talmud]. Each successive effort of codification of Oral Law added to
the Written Torah, and each code, as it became part of Written Torah,
generated still more layers of innovation in Oral Torah. In practical
terms, each portion of Oral Torah as it was reduced to writing
generated new commentaries whose authors approached the newly
incorporated work as the sages of Oral Torah had approached the
original Written Torah. Thus, if we may be permitted to draw out the
line ofreasoning a step further, the Amoraim applied to Mishnah
methods similar to their creative reinterpretation (derasha) of
Written Torah, the Rishonim continued the process on Talmud as a
whole, and the Aharonim used the works of the Rishonim as a point of
departure and treated them the same way. And the process continues
apace. Progressive revelation continues through the medium of sage and
text.
(End Quote)

In other words, just as Rabbi Akiva brought the Oral Law into
actuality from its being potential in the Written Law, so too the
Amoraim did to the Mishnah, the Rishonim to the Amoraim, and the
Aharonim to the Rishonim. Each generation brings potentiality to
acutality, koah to po'al. Some sort of post-modernism is clearly
demanded.

Michael Makovi

On Thu, 25 Jun 2009 09:17:44 -0600 Simon Montagu 
<simon.mont...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>From the Daily Halacha emails which appear in my inbox:
>> 966. One should be mindful to carefully pronounce each word when
>responding "Boruch Hu U'voruch Shemo", and be especially vigilant 
>to pronounce the letter "Vuv" of U'voruch. Piskei Tshuvos 124:11, 
Kaf 
>Hachaim 124:29, Boruch She'omar
>
>I didn't understand this well. There are two vavs in "Uvaruch", 
and I don't
>know which one it refers to or why one has to be especially 
vigilant to
>pronounce either one of them.

I would assume the first one.  It is all to easy and common, in my 
experience, to slur the two words together: Baruch Hu-varuch Shemo.

--
Daniel M. Israel
d...@cornell.edu

Simon Montagu wrote:
>  From the Daily Halacha emails which appear in my inbox:
> 
> 966. One should be mindful to carefully pronounce each word when 
> responding "Boruch Hu U'voruch Shemo", and be especially vigilant to 
> pronounce the letter "Vuv" of U'voruch. Piskei Tshuvos 124:11, Kaf 
> Hachaim 124:29, Boruch She'omar

> Can anyone provide a source and/or a reason for the halacha as stated in 
> the Daily Halacha?

AIUI Shabtai Tzvi followers would deliberately omit the first vav
of "uvaruch", because without it the phrase adds up to the same
gematria as their leader's name.  I don't know a source for this.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 at 09:53:18AM -0400, R' Eliyahu Gerstl wrote:
: I am very grateful to have had the opportunity to read RMB's beautiful
: description of the development of our knowledge of Halacha and his analogies 
: to developments in our knowledge of Physics.

I realized during an off-list conversation that my including physics
details may have obscured my point for people who aren't interested
in physics. So, let me state it a different way.

There are three things: the physics experiment (Michelson Morley), the
formula that unifies the data (Lorentz), and the theory that further
explains the formula (Einstein). Halakhah, gemara and rishonim, lomdus.

The mashal doesn't work 100% (but every mashal has limits), since the
authority of a poseiq isn't only to discover what's there, but also to
define which of the valid shitos ought to be followed. They aren't just
"eidei birur", they have a role in qiyum.

Lomdus thus describes the logic inherent in someone's description of a
bit of Torah, and can do so in ways the person who made the description
never realized. Because it's an analysis of the Torah, not the rishon's
thought patterns.

Now I'm not insisting this kind of reasoning was actually what RYYW
actually meant. I think it's the straightforward interpreation of saying
that Brisker Torah are chiddushei Torah even when the Rambam thought
the explanation lay elswhere, but that's personal taste for what's the
most straightforward.

What's more significant in what I wrote is that alternate explanations
to deconstructionism exist. We have no other indication in the mesorah
that gives credance to the approach. It's therefore the extraordinary
claim, and bears a heavy burden of proof. Giving me one explanation of
a paragraph in the Seridei Eish doesn't really prove the point.

Especially after I've seen what deconstructionism has done in the hands
of the Reconstructionist (sorry, I couldn't refrain from the wordplay),
I find it very hard to believe an O poseiq would consider it a worthwhile
part of the toolset.

On Thu, Jun 25, 2009 at 08:02:52PM +0300, Michael Makovi wrote:
: In other words, just as Rabbi Akiva brought the Oral Law into
: actuality from its being potential in the Written Law, so too the
: Amoraim did to the Mishnah, the Rishonim to the Amoraim, and the
: Aharonim to the Rishonim. Each generation brings potentiality to
: acutality, koah to po'al. Some sort of post-modernism is clearly
: demanded.


How do you get that? R' Aqiva made the experiments, Ravina and R'
Ashi found the unifying formulas, etc.. Bringing koach to po'al
isn't post-modern, it's a simple description of "midgets atop giants"
accumulating knowledge.

(BTW, I recall someone on list mentioned that that phrase is offensive to
little people. I spent time trying to remember a rephrasing that didn't
offend, but gave up. "Little people atop giants" wasn't it, and wouldn't
clearly let the reader know which metaphor I meant. My apologies to the
list member whose feelings were hurt, and hope that this explanation
mitigates that.

(Also, a note to the other regular posters about how diverse our list
of readers is. You really can't assume much about what would or wouldn't
give personal offence, because we have no idea what everyone is battling
in their lives.)


Bask to REG's post:
: However, please see Rav Moshe's Teshuva in Igrot Moshe[1], 
: Yoreh Deah 1, No. 101, that I submit provides the best 
: THEORETICAL understanding.

: Thus we are told that in rare cases of a great posek having "raayyot nechonot"
: (and such certainly would not include the use of sociology of knowledge but
: true halachic raayot) the opinion of the posek (which 
: might include such a minority opinion) may yet
: become more than merely a snif lehakeil. 
: Rav Moshe brings the caveat that such must not be against the SA given
: the accepted status of the SA. (See similarly SA:CM25)  

I don't see this as an exception. What I said was that it's possible
for a minority opinion to be rejected to the point of being closed. RMF
says this WRT those opinions rejected by the SA (and I assume the Rama,
what about other nosei keilim).

I said that RMAngel's task, as I see it, is to show how the criterion for
considering a question closed has not been met. Bringing up precedents
from posqim, no matter how chashuv, who lack the impact on the flow of
halakhah of those who hold the majority, doesn't do it. That would be
of interest to the historian, but it doesn't prove that the idea should
be of greater significance to the contemporary poseiq.

In this case, BTW, it is a pesaq in geirus that differs from that of
the SA and the nosei keilim on the standard page. Nor does RMA have
raayos nichochos; rather he says that since the pesaq once existed, we
can't fault those who follow it. But the conclusion isn't a necessary
consequence of the premise.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy,
mi...@aishdas.org        if only because it offers us the opportunity of
http://www.aishdas.org   self-fulfilling prophecy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                              - Arthur C. Clarke


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