Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 110

Wed, 10 Jun 2009

• 1. Re: Stam yeinam of Giyur Candidates (Michael Makovi)
• 2. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (Yitzchok Zirkind)
• 3. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (Yitzchok Zirkind)
• 4. Re: can a navi make a mistake (Richard Wolpoe)
• 5. halacha v. govt laws re: abusers, murderers, etc., (harveybenton@yahoo.com)
• 6. halacha v. govt laws re: abusers, murderers, etc., (Eli Turkel)
• 7. Yeast isn't chameitz - But is Gluten? (Richard Wolpoe)
• 8. mavriach ari (Eli Turkel)
• 9. Re: Yeast isn't chameitz - But is Gluten? (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: mavriach ari (Chana Luntz)
• 11. Re: halacha v. govt laws re: abusers, murderers, etc., (Rich, Joel)
• 12. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (David Riceman)
• 13. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (hankman)

(1)

Rn' Chana Luntz sent a lengthy critique of what I had said, and I
thank her. One particularly important point seems to have been that we
are not concerned only with idolatry, but also with intermarriage.

One musing of mine is that often, we need not be concerned with
intermarriage. That is, practically speaking, if the person is
committed to doing giyur, we have no concern with marrying either him
or his daughter; he will be kosher very soon, and his daughter, when
she comes of age twenty or thirty years from now, will be a frum Jew
as well! Similarly, regarding a certain supposed heretic, someone
quipped that his daughter was a perfectly frum Jew with whom we have
no concern of intermarriage. Of course, I know halakhah generally does
not take what I've just said into account; a non-Jew is a non-Jew, and
he is prohibited for us to marry, and we don't consider the fact that
in another X months he'll have finished his giyur; lo plug. Be all
this as it may, I thank Rn' Luntz for reminding me of this factor of
intermarriage. I of course meant (not the M'doraita concern of true
yayin nesech but rather I meant) the Rabbinic hasash of yayin nesech,
and the Rabbinic stam yeinam for fear of intermarriage; I thank her
for this clarification.

She brings the kashrut issues of being allowed to bring in one's own
food; I cannot argue here. I will note, however, the yeshiva itself
stocks only pasteurized grape juice, so the issue is "only" those who
bring in their own food from outside.

(2)

She notes that amira l'akum is permitted where there is real true
suffering (the aged and infirm, etc.); should the personal feelings of
a giyur candidate take precedence over the needy? Should not he be
willing (if not proud!) to help these individuals by violating
Shabbat? Is this not also a bein adam l'havero?
---
This point is true, but I will emphasize again how profound the
emotional pain can be of a giyur candidate. I remember when I finally
got to the stage when I myself stopped taking a car on Shabbat to
shul. I remember that I'd actually get psychosomatic pains in my chest
from opening the car door. For a few weeks, I'd try to time matters so
that my mother would open the car door first (turning on the light)
and close the door last (turning off the light), with myself opening
and closing my own door in between, so that I did not actually
(de)activate any lights. She, of course, did the driving as well. But
not only did I quickly realize this was simply morally wretched to
exploit my mother so, but also, I knew that I wasn't fooling anyone,
and that I simply couldn't continue taking a car on Shabbat; the pains
in my chest, if nothing else, would be decisive.
---
What is my point in the previous story? I hadn't yet done my giyur,
and my mother also had only done her Conservative giyur. So
technically, neither of us was Jewish. But did this assuage my
feelings of guilt? Did it assuage the pain in my chest (which was a
real very tangible pain)? Not in the slightest bit. The knowledge that
I was technically not a Jew was a whisper in the back of my mind; my
own Jewish upbringing more that threatened to drown out that fact. As
for giyur candidates who were not raised Jewish, they have
nevertheless entirely and drastically changed the courses of their
lives, moving from their countries of origin to Israel, moving to a
place fraught with terrorism and an unfamiliar language, working with
an Israeli Rabbinut that hardly tolerates their existence, much less
acknowledges their convictions, and we expect these individuals to
graciously accept a reminder that they are still goyim gamurim??!! To
ask them to perform melacha is simply a slap in the face; it is to
remind them that despite all their endeavors so far, they are still
nothing, that they haven't accomplished anything.
---
This point needs emphasis. We had a fellow, for example, who was in
the process of training for a job that he'd yet several hundred
thousand dollars yearly for, and he abandoned this training in the
middle, in order to make aliyah and begin giyur. When he got to
Israel, the Rabbinut dragged his giyur on for months, saying that they
were afraid he had made aliyah for material gain! He finally got his
giyur completed, and then, after he married his fiance, Rabbi Sherman
annuled his conversion! (Interestingly, the Rabbinut still recognizes
his marriage to a Jewish woman, even though they simultaneously say he
is a gentile. His marriage is still considered kosher by the Rabbinut,
even though his giyur has been annuled.) We had another fellow that
the Rabbinut insisted he was mentally ill and did not deserve giyur,
and even when he produced testimony from a psychologist and testimony
from all his rabbis that he was sane, the Rabbinut continued to insist
that he was not competent, based on their own psychological expertise.
The candidates here are given so much suspicion, and are treated with
so little compassion and understanding, that I think the least they
deserve is to be treated NOT as Shabbos goyim.

I'd like to add something else: several individuals in my yeshiva and
its associated sister midrasha have claimed that the yeshiva is paid
by the Israeli government monthly for its giyur candidates, and that
the rabbi (whose job is to send candidates to the Rabbinut, where the
actual beit din investigation occurs) has an interest to retain these
candidates as long as he can. Once they convert, they often leave, and
so the rabbi has a vested interest in keeping them unconverted as long
as possible. Several converts have said that if they pay the rabbi
himself, he'll expedite the conversion, since he no longer has an
interest in retaining them as long as he can. (The Israeli Rabbinut is
still in charge of the actual giyur, and in investigating the
candidate's sincerity, etc. The rabbi's task is simply to prepare the
candidates, and send them to the beit din for investigation.)

Given these stories, I'm hardly inclined to be open to any suggestion
that the pain of these candidates is not legitimate, that it ought to
be accepted in stride.

I'll accept the halakhot regarding hashash of intermarriage and stam
yeinam, even though they perhaps should not logically apply in all
cases (lo plug). But regarding the notion that they should accept
their suffering in good stride and good grace, I will not budge one
nanometer.

Perhaps some people's suffering is greater in magnitude than other's,
and the candidate's own shame - legitimate as it is - is outweighed.
An old woman who will freeze unless the heat is turned out would be a
case in point; her suffering outweighs the candidate's, to be sure.
But my personal litmus test would be: if the need is great enough that
a Jew himself would be permitted to violate Shabbat (or at least, a
D'rabanan), then the candidate also should be willing to violate
Shabbat. But if no Jew would deign to involve himself in the present
matter, then neither should the candidate himself be expected to
involve himself. I say this based on my personal experience with the
magnitude of the candidate's own shame and discomfort.

Michael Makovi

On Tue, Jun 9, 2009 at 8:57 AM, David Riceman <drice...@att.net> wrote:

>   You claim, on the contrary, that it doesn't misunderstand the nevuah but
> is extraneous to the nevuah.  See H. AZ 5:8, which does not require
> implementing an extraneous bit to be guilty.


He didn't say the Nvuoh (it was a Nvuoh for him personally).

Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20090609/ad69be56/attachment-0001.htm>

On Tue, Jun 9, 2009 at 11:54 PM, Yitzchok Zirkind <y...@aol.com> wrote:

>
>
> He didn't say the Nvuoh (it was a Nvuoh for him personally).
>

Just to add, had he repeated it (as he did to HKB"H) he would have used the
exact same words that was said to him (as Rashi says he said to HKB"H).


>
> Kol Tuv,
> Yitzchok Zirkind
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20090609/70c9173c/attachment-0001.htm>

Due to technical issues I have stayed out of this debate.

If we disregard Hazal and the Rambam, what would our read of Tanach alone
teach us about Nevi'im?


   1. Haftara's Bo. Yirmiyahu states that Nevucharezzar will whack
   Mitzrayim.  What happened?
   2. When Yona said Ninve is "nehepeches" did he KNOW the double entendre
   implication before he stated it? Or did he just know to use this term and
   the double entendre only became apparent after the fact?
   3. It is assur to Test a Navi too much [Hinuch Parahs Vo'eschanan]  So
   once a Navi is established who says he cannot err?  The proof of a navi emes
   is that BEFORE he has an established Hazzakah he may not fail otherwise he
   would be a Navi Sheker.  But who says that an established Navi has to have
   the same level of infallibility?  once HKBH told Avimelech that Avraham was
   a legit Navi why couldn't he miss a symbol or two?  After all, lichora, the
   litmus test applies according to Miqra ONLY before a Navi is established?
   4. Is the The fact that Avraham spoke to his son Yitzchak as a navi re:
   the Aqeida have the same parameters as a public nevuah?  Or are there
   different standards for public nevuah and privafe nevuah?
   5. Wasn't Shemu'el engaged in private Nevuah when he helped Sha'ul find
   his lost flock?
   6. Was Rivka's Treatment of Ya'akov a public function or a private one?
   Was the prophecy converyed to her sufficient to motivate Ya'akov to action
   even though it was not a national prophecy?
   7. What about the shtuyos embedded in Yosef's dreams?  Didn't even
   legitimate dreamers have extraneous material?
   8. If every navi is infallible then how is Moshe superior to brother
   Aharon and siter Miriam?  Yet this is precisely what the Torah says in the
   is week's parsha!  But how is that shayach when EVERY navi bats one
   thousand!?    What's the nafka mina of peh el peh vs. Mar'ah?



-- 
Kol Tuv - Best Regards,
RabbiRichWol...@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Nishma-Minhag/
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20090610/bf702b33/attachment-0001.htm>

1. Do any these halachic rules (brought down by rturkel besheim r. zilberstein) violate the halachos of the country
that we live in? 2. could obeying the halacha cost the therapist his or
her license; (if so, is one still obligated to give up his/her parnassa
to protect a potential abuser, murderer, rapist, etc)? 3. why the
difference in point 3 (between a "regular" murderer and a "serial
killer"); does the number of potential death(s) at the hands of a murderer (1 or 2 or 3
victims chas veshalom) vs. numerous potential victims (serial killer)
make a difference in how we should act??? 4. what is
the lay person to do (e.g.; one who is not bound by his particular
trade's ethical standards, like a doctor, therapist, etc....???) 5. should
one not work in a hospital or as a policeman (ambulance driver/ hatzolah
personnel wherein cases of child/spousal abuse may have to be reported by
law to the authorities???; 5a. should people currently working in those
industries, and/or in those capacities resign their jobs due to a potential
conflict of interest between dina d'malchuta and halacha on these matters??
HB
r turkel:


rt: I gave a shiur on shabbat afternoon basen on teshuva of R. Zilberstein
The case was a psychiatric patient who told his therapist he was
1. sex offender
2.
 thief
3. murderer

His conclusion
1. If the psychiatrist feels the sex offender will continue his actions
he should let the neighborhood parents know. The fear of the children is akin to
pikuach nefesh

2. One shouldn't believe the patient for any corporeal punishment including jail
If he says this in front of 2 witnesses he has to pay money
Even if he sees the patient steal but believes he can cure the patient
he cannot infom the authorities

3.? One cant believe the patient and so one cant tell the authorities
If the psychiatrist is sure he is a murderer he cannot hand him over
to the authorities if
they will execute him but one shouldn't hide the patient? (based on
story with R. Tarfon Nidah 61)
If he feels the patient is a serial killer he can hand him over to the
authorities on condition
there is no death penalty

-- 
Eli
 Turkel

Let me just answer a few points

1. R Zilberstein does not refer to secular law.
In other shiurim he does account for losing ones license. However, in this shiur
we see from R. Tarfon they he hesitated even at personal risk

In this cases dina demalvhuta does not apply as it affects only
monetary matters.
As I said in some cases losing one's job is a factor and that needs to
be decided by a posek for each individual case.

2. The difference between a "regular" murder and a "serial" murderer
concerns the future. A regular murderer implies this happened in the past for
specific reasons and we dont assume it will reoccur. For a serial
murderer we account for
saving future victims. The point is not how many people were killed
but rather are we afraid for future
cases or was this a one time passion murder

On Wed, Jun 10, 2009 at 1:57 AM, <harveyben...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> 1. Do any these halachic rules (brought down by rturkel besheim r.
> zilberstein) violate the halachos of the country that we live in? 2. could
> obeying the halacha cost the therapist his or her license; (if so, is one
> still obligated to give up his/her parnassa to protect a potential abuser,
> murderer, rapist, etc)? 3. why the difference in point 3 (between a
> "regular" murderer and a "serial killer"); does the number of potential
> death(s) at the hands of a murderer (1 or 2 or 3 victims chas veshalom) vs.
> numerous potential victims (serial killer) make a difference in how we
> should act??? 4. what is the lay person to do (e.g.; one who is not bound by
> his particular trade's ethical standards, like a doctor, therapist,
> etc....???) 5. should one not work in a hospital or as a policeman
> (ambulance driver/ hatzolah personnel wherein cases of child/spousal abuse
> may have to be reported by law to the authorities???; 5a. should people
> currently working in those industries, and/or in those capacities resign
> their jobs due to a potential conflict of interest between dina d'malchuta
> and halacha on these matters?? HB

--
Eli Turkel

On Tue, Jun 2, 2009 at 6:06 AM, Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Jun 02, 2009 at 03:39:32AM +0000, rabbirichwol...@gmail.com wrote:
> : What is the proposed alternative to oats in the 5 species?
>
> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha
>
> --


Given: Yeast isn't chameitz

Then what I was suggesting in an earlier post is:
Could GLUTEN be the common denominator of the species that produce
Chameitz?.

And if so what would this imply about the "oat" controversy?

IOW if "Oats" fails as a form of  barley/wheat, could it passanyway because
after all it has a significant amount of Gluten?

Furthermore is that Rashi's position?
And therefore could this be Chazal's position?


-- 
Kol Tuv - Best Regards,
RabbiRichWol...@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Nishma-Minhag/
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20090610/c1f0e591/attachment-0001.htm>

<<But a concept like Mevarech Ari surely shouldn't only be produced by
interaction with non frum Jews, should it? >>

I dont have an answer to Chana's question. However, early generations could
certainly have discussed the case of someone killing a lion on shabbat
which then allowed
a permissible act - is one allowed to get this indirect benefit.
The gemara already discusses getting direct benefit from chillul
shabbat and so recognizes
that people do sins.

A related question (not identical) which is discussed is getting
benefit from someone
putting out a fire on shabbat

Thus for example I assume that everyone agrees that if someone changes
a shabbat clock
(even through an averira) so that a light that was supposed to go off
remains on that there
is no problem of benefitting from the light. In practice the light
simply remains on all
shabbat and we dont take into account that it was meant to go off and
someone sinned and
changed those facts.

Indeed R. Zilberstein simply takes it for granted without sources that
mavriach ari has to
allow benefit from the action

-- 
Eli Turkel

On Wed, Jun 10, 2009 at 12:30:13AM -0400, Richard Wolpoe wrote:
: Could GLUTEN be the common denominator of the species that produce
: Chameitz?.

I replied that the 5 species appear to be defined by gezeiras hakasuv.
That really there are only 2 types of grain, chitah and se'orah, which
are named among the 7 minim of EY. However, these 2 types are broad,
and contain 5 actual species. The gemara makes it a gezeiras hakasuv
and that idea is carried forward by the Tur et al.

Given that, if oat isn't one of the 5, and isn't even wheat-like or
barley-like, how could it be included in the gezeiras hakasuv? And as
plants, wheat and barley are more similar to each other than they are
to oat. Both grow their seeds in rows at the end of the stalk, oats grow
in small bunches off little stems. Rashi says those little stems are
like fox tails -- thus "shibboles shu'al".

Also, oats are lower in gluten than wheat or barley -- that's the whole
reason they pose less of a problem for celiacs. Rice also is lower in
gluten. If your theory were to stand, having gluten isn't enough, there
is some minimum shiur of gluten that is above the amount contained in
rice. Even if we addressed the gezeiras hakasuv issue, do oats have
enough to qualify? (Does it even have more gluten than does rice?)


RMM asked about the Rambam. He defines "shibboles shu'al" as "se'orim
midbarim" (Kelayim 1:1). "Se'orim" is a given, since we're looking
for a species of the type "se'orah". Nothing about the number of rows,
unless wild barley is called "two rowed barley". The Bartenura, however,
calls shibboles shu'al both "se'orim midbarim" and "avena" -- he assumes
the Rambam also meant oats. Which even stands to reason -- oats were
originally a weed farmers would pull from their grain fields, until they
realized oats too were usable. They are plausibly "midbari". So it might
not even be a machloqes, and the mesorah is clearly that oats are one
of the 5.

I just don't know how to be meyasheiv that with the gezeiras hakasuv.
Clearly the kinds defined by chitah and se'orah can't be botonical
taxonomy for that to work. But as I noted above, even visually, it's
hard to see how se'orah was defined in a way that excludes chitah
yet includes oats.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Our greatest fear is not that we're inadequate,
mi...@aishdas.org        Our greatest fear is that we're powerful
http://www.aishdas.org   beyond measure
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Anonymous

RET writes:

> Thus for example I assume that everyone agrees that if 
> someone changes a shabbat clock (even through an averira) so 
> that a light that was supposed to go off remains on that 
> there is no problem of benefitting from the light. In 
> practice the light simply remains on all shabbat and we dont 
> take into account that it was meant to go off and someone 
> sinned and changed those facts.

Is this so clear?  Take the case brought in the second half of si'if 4
Shulchan Aruch siman 276  - where a NJ puts more oil into a lamp that is
already lit, and the halacha is that one is permitted to use the lamp until
the time it would have stayed alight on the oil that was already there, and
after that it is forbidden.  Now this is of course a case of a NJ, but I do
not believe the din vis a vis a Jew acting b'mazid and adding more oil is
not any different.  

In fact in that teshuva of RSZA that I referred you to (Minchas Shlomo
chelek 1 siman 5) he gets a bit worried about why one is allowed to use the
light until the point when it would have gone out on the old oil, as the
oils mix immediately, but argues that it is a zeh v'zeh gorem situation, and
zeh v'zeh gorem is mutar - and he adds that perhaps this is true even if the
oil was added b'mazid by a Jew - indicating that where it is not zeh v'zeh
gorem it would seem to be assur.

Now what is usually different about a shabbas clock is that if one changes
it, usually one is actually doing nothing that can be described as an averah
(moving a knob from here to there or pressing a few bits of plastic that
were in position out to in - well not totally sure about mukza, but other
than that) ie he is not, as you describe it above, doing it "through an
averira".  It is only subsequently that that action, when the clock moves
around to where the knob or bit of plastic is (or would have been if you had
not taken it away), that you action has caused something to happen - or in
this case not to happen.  This is prime Tzomet territory - you do something
that in and of itself is a mutar act, but only later because of the way the
electronics have been designed to detect patterns at various intervals, does
it cause the system to act (or even better, not to act).  Even if you hold
that a pure circuit is d'orisa (which of course is a minority opinion) then
by including the delay, you have a grama situation, which with shinui and
various other things to support, may well make it OK for use for a choleh
etc.  And if in fact you only have a d'rabbanan, plus you add in grama, plus
shinui, then you should be fine, especially with the tzorech gadol hospital
and medical equipment type scenario. 

But let us say that this particular shabbas clock is not manual, ie that the
way of adjusting it is indeed to connect up a circuit with flashing lights,
so that when you adjust it, you do it by programming new numbers in in place
of the old - and let us say we hold this is an issur d'orisa.  Why is this
different from the case of adding more oil?  It does seem to get us over
RSZA's worry about the immediacy of it - the power flowing down the circuit
during the intermediate time is indeed only the power that would have been
there before - no need for zeh v'zeh gorem, but after the time when the
light would have cut out, why is what has been done not the equivalent of
adding more oil?

So anyway having a hunt around a bit I see that ROY addresses the (mutar
type of) shabbas clock in Yabiat Omer chelek 3 siman 18.  And he brings
initially a machlokus between Tosphos and the Rosh, first on the case of
taking away oil, and then on the case of adding oil.  First on the case of
taking way oil, Tosphos says it is assur because immediately on taking it
away, he extinguishes the light a little bit, but the Rosh says it is assur
because causing extinguishment is assur, and similarly he say that the
reason Tosphos assurs adding oil, it is because if you do that immediately
it starts to burn better and this is considered madlik b'yadaim.  He then
says whether one can move a dial on a shabbas clock so as to extend the
light would be dependent on this machlokus between the Rosh and Tosphos,
because by extending the time on the shabbas clock, one is not making the
light burn more brightly, so according to Tosphos it would just be grama and
permitted b'makom mitzvah. But according to the Rosh, and that the Mechaber
holds like him, to continue it to be lit would itself be like lighting with
one's hands and would be assur.  Except that, putting in oil is a direct act
of lighting while turning the dials on the Shabbat clock is not a direct
act, and all the Shabbat clock is doing is causing it to go out (garom
l'kabui) and even more so to is it OK to turn it so as to allow the light to
continue.

And indeed ROY goes on to say that there is not the same kind of
consideration in bone even according to the Rosh, because when we are
dealing with bone, it is not like extinguishing, where the Rosh holds that
gorem kibui is k'kibui, but agrees that with bone, the issur is on doing a
new act immediately, so gorem helps.

[Oh and he says there that is not in this an issur of muktza (which was my
other worry above) - because one can have taken it away completely.  I
confess I do not understand this though - well I do if he is talking about a
kind of shabbas clock that shuts everything down and stops working, but most
of those I know keep on working and moving around, hence allowing for
multiple settings, so I am not sure how this helps.]

In terms of dealing with gorem kibui, (ie moving the dial on the shabbas
clock earlier, rather than later)) which is the more problematic of the two,
he does refer to the importance of the fact that the shabbas clock is a dvar
acher and external to the light, and not like the oil or wick which can be
considered intrinsic.

But all this is in relation to a situation where the actual act being done
is in and of itself mutar, the only issue is what it causes (ie the grama).

But in the case you describe, there seems to me to be a fundamental
difference.  Because the act itself is assur.  And not only that, however
you construct the issur on the act, the intention of the person doing the
act is to cause extinguishment or continuing lighting (the shabbas clock has
no other purpose).  If you follow the opinion of the Rosh, that gorem kibui
is ossur then it really doesn't seen so far fetched to say that this case is
just like adding the oil, ie you have done a forbidden act which then causes
an issur of continued lighting after time, and hence this is like you did it
b'yadaim.  And even if you follow Tosphos, - it would seem possible to say
that Tosphos does not just assur the use of the light immediately upon
adding the oil, but later on as well (ie it is not just at the immediate
moment when the oil is added and the light burns better that it is assur)
you just need an immediate act of chillul shabbas to trigger off the issur,
and here you would have that.

But one of the differences between this case of the time switch and the case
of chasing away a lion is that this time switch's purpose (almost certainly
sole purpose) is to regulate the lighting and extinguishing of lights.  And
when a person fiddles with it by way of an issur d'orisa, his intention in
doing so is either extinguishing or lighting the lights, albeit after a
predefined time.  It is not so hard to see the time clock and the light and
its circuitry as really all of a unit.  Whereas, I would have thought in
most cases of killing a lion, there is a fair chance that the intention of
the person has nothing to do with the benefit so enabled of being able to
access the road, which may or may not occur (not clear anybody wants to go
anyway).  There is no necessary connection between the desire to do that act
and the benefit (although there may be, if the person only killed the lion
in order to pass by the road).  That to a large extent gets to the heart of
my concern about the application of the lion case elsewhere.  The lion case
seems at one extreme (two objects with no necessary connection), this case
of the assur shabbas clock in the middle (two objects but with a direct
connection), and the door case even further the other way (so bound up with
one another that most people would refer to them as one object), with it
being clearer they are one item and not a dvar acher chutza lo.
> -- 
> Eli Turkel

Regards

Chana

 

        
        
        
1. Do any these halachic rules (brought down by rturkel besheim r.
zilberstein) violate the halachos of the country that we live in? 
------------------------------


pure dinei mamanot.Probably goes to an underlying debate of the force of
dina dmalchuta but consider the following - the king decrees anyone who
brings in agricultural products as chayav bnafsho due to a threat of a
terrible pandemic. What is an individual or community's responsibility
if it knows of a violator? Is the violator doing an aveira?
KT
Joel Rich 

THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE 
ADDRESSEE.  IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE.  Dissemination, 
distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is 
strictly prohibited.  If you received this message in error, please notify us 
immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message.  
Thank you.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20090610/646652f0/attachment-0001.htm>

Yitzchok Zirkind <y...@aol.com <mailto:y...@aol.com>> wrote:
>
>     He didn't say the Nvuoh (it was a Nvuoh for him personally).
>
How did he get Yitzhak's consent?
>  Just to add, had he repeated it (as he did to HKB"H) he would have 
> used the exact same words that was said to him (as Rashi says he said 
> to HKB"H).
Mimah nafshach? If so, he would have misinterpreted his nevuah.  If, as 
you argued previously, "he [thought] MORE then was meant", he was oveir 
the issur.  Misunderstanding seems to be the preferable choice.

David Riceman

RYZ wrote:
Proof? The Ramabam seems to say that the Novie always understands the
Pisron, no where does the Rambam say that the reason he relates one or the
other or both is because that is all he got, he seems to say IMHO that the
Novi understands what is meant to be said and what not (not based at all on
what he was shown, the wording in the Rambam LAN"D does not support this,
rather as I argue that he always gets a Pisron)

CM responds:
Any proof to your reading of the Rambam? Bemechilas kvodcha, that is not
how I understood the Rambam. The novi understands that which Hashem wishes
him to understand and relates that which hashem tells him to relate, not
just based on the novi's assumption of what is for publication. Part of my
reasoning is that it would be hard to be mechayav the novi for kovesh
nevuoso when he is the determinant (on his own) of what is for publication,
as opposed to there being a tsivui (part of the nevuoh) to the novi as to
what exactly to publish.

RYZ wrote:
if the lack of Pisron is what defines what part the
Novi relates. in that case a Nvius without a given Pisron means it need
not be said, and the Novie cannot be called Kovesh Nvuosoi, so why did the
Novi give it over?

CM responds:
No, lack of pisron is not what defines what the novi relates. Again, the
novi can receive moshol or moshol with its pisron or a combination of both
within one mareh nevuoh which also makes clear which parts of the mareh are
for publication. Thus the Rambam concludes with his 3 possible cases of
what gets published.

Kol Tuv

Chaim Manaster
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-ai
shdas.org/attachments/20090610/62d93a58/attachment.htm>

------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 26, Issue 110
***************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."