Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 109

Tue, 09 Jun 2009

• 1. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (hankman)
• 2. can a navi make a mistake (hankman)
• 3. NishmaBlog : Source Reconcilliation (Rabbi Rich Wolpoe)
• 4. sex offender (Eli Turkel)
• 5. Re: goy or chiloni (Arie Folger)
• 6. Re: goy vs chiloni (Eli Turkel)
• 7. Re: goy vs chiloni (Chana Luntz)
• 8. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (David Riceman)
• 9. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (hankman)
• 10. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (David Riceman)
• 11. Scalia quotes Pirkei Avoth (Zev Sero)
• 12. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (Yitzchok Zirkind)
• 13. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (David Riceman)
• 14. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (Yitzchok Zirkind)
• 15. Stam yeinam of Giyur Candidates (Chana Luntz)

RYZ wrote:
I don't see here that when the Moshol itself is
said that it is because the meaning was not revealed to him

CM responds:
I agree. It  may have been revealed to him, but it was made clear to the novi that this was not for publication but for him only.

RYZ wrote:
II would tend to think that the Novie understands what
is meant to him to relate Moshol Pisron or both
CM responds:
I agree, except that "understands" may be a little weak. I think that this
is part and parcel of the nevuoh as to what is for publication. (I really
think we essentially agree here just I am using slightly more emphatic
terminology).

RYZ wrote:
Koveish Nvuosoi is when he
says nothing (or not saying the Pisron or both when that was the intention
of HKB"H).

CM responds:
I disagree. Koveish nevuoso is more encompassing. It includes leaving out any part of the nevuoh intended for publication.

RYZ wrote:
Further according to your reasoning a Novie that was Kovesh a Nvuoh witout a
Pisron would not be Over. 

CM responds:
No. A novi that is kovesh any part of his nevuoh is over. If the nevuoh was
just the moshol and he was kovesh that, he would be over. What gave you the
impression that I wrote any different?

RYZ wrote:
Also all nvous that were given witout Pisron
would have to be from such a class,  and they could have not been said

CM responds:
I am not clear on exactly what you mean here. Certainly a nevuoh, could be
either for publication or not even without a pisron, why should they not
have been said? Apparently there is value in the moshol alone even if you
and I (and the novi) do not get it. Perhaps at some time the meaning will
eventually become clear?

Kol Tuv

Chaim Manaster

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I apologize. I was a little sloppy with the wording of my response to RET in my previous posting. 
Where I wrote: "Whether the nevuoh comes to pass as the novi predicts is
another parsha and is not an indicator as to whether the novi
misinterpreted his nevuoh." this should have read: "Whether the nevuoh
comes to pass as the novi predicts is another parsha and is not always or
necessarily an indicator as to whether the novi misinterpreted his nevuoh
and is therefore a novi sheker. It will depend on the Rambam below.

See Rambam Yesodei HaTorah 10:1-3 when the nevuoh must come to pass and
10-4 where the nevuoh does not necessarily need to come to pass.  The
latter was obviously the case for Yona.

Kol Tuv

Chaim Manaster
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Rabbi Rich Wolpoe has sent you a link to a blog:
A new spin on the Ancient Technique of Source Reconcilliation
Blog: NishmaBlog
Post: Source Reconcilliation
Link: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/2009/06/source-reconcilliation.html

I gave a shiur on shabbat afternoon basen on teshuva of R. Zilberstein
The case was a psychiatric patient who told his therapist he was
1. sex offender
2. thief
3. murderer

His conclusion
1. If the psychiatrist feels the sex offender will continue his actions
he should let the neighborhood parents know. The fear of the children is akin to
pikuach nefesh

2. One shouldn't believe the patient for any corporeal punishment including jail
If he says this in front of 2 witnesses he has to pay money
Even if he sees the patient steal but believes he can cure the patient
he cannot infom the authorities

3.  One cant believe the patient and so one cant tell the authorities
If the psychiatrist is sure he is a murderer he cannot hand him over
to the authorities if
they will execute him but one shouldn't hide the patient  (based on
story with R. Tarfon Nidah 61)
If he feels the patient is a serial killer he can hand him over to the
authorities on condition
there is no death penalty

-- 
Eli Turkel

On Sun, Jun 7, 2009 at 7:51 PM, Saul Mashbaum<saul.mashb...@gmail.com> wrote:
> All poskim agree that a chu"lJew may benefit from m'lacha done
> for him on YT sheni by an Israeli Jew of his own volition. In
> practice, here in Israel , even for those who are stringent regarding
> a direct request, the chu"l Jew simply hints at what it is he would be
> very happy if it were done for him, and the Israeli goes ahead and
> does it. The chu"l Jew may benefit from this action without qualms.

That reminds of how during my EY yeshiva days, one year, on Shavu'ot,
we walked into the neighboring makolet and wished the store owner gut
yomtov. By the look on his face he immediately understood (well, he
was right next to a gigantic yeshiva full of foreigners), and we
proceeded to take a bunch of items and walked out, having greeted the
owner again. The next day, we bought some more items and added our yom
tov "takings" to the total.

-- 
Arie Folger
http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
http://www.ariefolger.googlepages.com

>
> With most Israeli stairwells, the lights turn themselves off after a
> relatively short time - so arguably if you stand still you get no benefit
> from the light, and you keep going after it goes out. ?If the lights are
> more permanent, however, then it is even more problematic - surely though
> you are an ones, certainly if you are in the midst of the stairwell.
>
The question is whether one needs to wait until they go out.
If fact R. Zilberstein paskens one doesnt have it. One can walk at the same
pace as before one just shouldnt walk/run faster because the chiloni
turned on the lights


-- 
Eli Turkel

RSM writes:

> The concept  is hasarat hamoneah, a form of gramma.
> This basic idea is that of preventing something from preventing
> something else. Two negatives make a positive, and the desired action
> is performed, albeit very indirectly. In the case cited, the chiloni
> prevented the door from preventing the person's entry.
> 
> This concept is the basis of the gramma instruments of Machon Zomet.
> For example, a photoelectric beam periodically prevents current from
> flowing  in an instrument. Blocking the beam, in and of itself a
> non-melacha, will (inderectly) enable the current to flow after  short
> time, enabling the instrument to function.
> Poskim of Machon Zomet consider this "negative gramma" the ideal form
> of gramma for the instruments it designs for hospital and military
> use, where there is ample halachic basis for leniency in HS.

This seems to be a bit different from the term mevarech ari as used by Rav
Zilberstein.  In this case, as you indicate, "blocking the beam is in and of
itself a non-melacha" and anything that happens after that is, at most,
gramma.  It seems to me that what you describe is indeed a form of gramma,
and Tzomet does not appear to be claiming any different

Rav Zilberstein is describing a scenario where in fact a direct act of
chillul shabbas d'orisa, has been done (eg killing a lion) - by somebody
other than the person who is then deriving the benefit.  The issue is how
far the ripples of a direct act of chillul shabbas spread, in terms of
benefit.

What is puzzling me about this concept of Rav Zilberstein is this:  Some
areas of halacha are, one can argue, underdeveloped, generally because galut
has meant we have not had a great deal of practical experience with them.
But hilchos shabbas is not one of them.  And yet, when I did a Bar Ilan
search on the term Mevarech Ari, it only came up in any of the classic
meforshim under Choshen Mishpat. Now I only have version 8, but it really
does have most of the traditional sources there.  It is possible I missed
some references in the shutim - I subsequently found the reference in
Minchas Shlomo in relation to Shabbas when I was looking for other aspects -
but still, the absence seems to me to be noteworthy.  Why did we not need
Rav Zilberstein's concept before now?

Tzomet's situation is a bit different - because while hilchos shabbas itself
has a lot of commentary on it, trying to devise machines that are shabbas
compatible are obviously something that is relatively new, and you might
expect some new expressions out of that search.  Certainly exploring the
limits of grama for this purpose is something that I would expect them to
do.  But a term like hasarat hamoneah, doesn't strike me as anything more
than descriptive, it doesn't really seem like it is new halacha, but new
application of technology to something which is reasonably obvious from the
halacha (but maybe I am wrong).

Meverech Ari strikes me as different.  It seems to me to be encapsulating a
halachic concept regarding the reaches of the concept of benefit in hilchos
shabbas.  And I suppose I am just a bit surprised to find a new one of those
popping up at this stage in history.

The only thing I can think of as possibly being radically new about our
current situation is the way we are living cheek by jowl with non frum Jews.
I would guess that the minim of more historical times, once they separated
from the Jewish people, didn't want to have anything to do with them, and
benefitting from their hilchos shabbas was probably a relatively rare
occurrence.  

But a concept like Mevarech Ari surely shouldn't only be produced by
interaction with non frum Jews, should it?

> Saul Mashbaum

Regards

Chana

RDR wrote:
> So the nevuah can't be the mareh alone; it has to include the
> pitaron, and the prophet does not invariably understand it correctly.
>  
> CM responds:
> I do not agree with these assertions you make.
> Why not; why; absolutely not.
I thought I explained this, but I will do it again in excruciating 
detail.  God told Avraham to "ha'aleihu sham l'olah".  Avraham tries to 
slaughter his son.  God says "don't do that".  Rashi's narrative 
continues: Avraham says "but you told me to do this".  God replies "No, 
I told you only to put him on the altar, not to slaughter him".

Your claim is that Avraham fully understood his first nevuah; and the 
part he didn't understand had no pitaron (no precise meaning).  How, 
then, could God have replied as he did? Surely God should have said, no, 
that initial nevuah was just a mashal without a pitaron, and it didn't 
have any meaning.  Instead God ascribed it meaning ("I never told you to 
slaughter him").

How, according to you, can this Rashi make sense?
>  RDR wrote:
> We can test only some nevuot - - how would Yeshayahu's
> contemporaries have tested nevuot about the Messianic era?
> CM responds:
> I think you misunderstand RYZ's point. If mistake is admissible in 
> nevuoh, then you could NEVER punish a novi sheker, so why would the 
> Torah provide such a punishment. But in the instance of your query, 
> perhaps not every nevuoh (from a novi muchzok) must be subject to test 
> and punishable.
Some nevuot are falsifiable and some aren't.  RYZ implied that every 
nevuah has to be falsifiable.
>  
> RDR wrote:
> Rambam rules (Mamrim 2:1) that Sanhedrin may overrule a
> previous Sanhedrin's deductions from the Torah.  Similarly the
> authenticity of prophecy can be distinguished from the authenticity of
> its interpretation.
> CM responds:
> You are mixing apples and oranges. One does not follow from the other.
The pattern of logic is the same.  I criticised RYZ's proof, not his 
conclusion, in this paragraph.

David Riceman

RMB wrote:
The Ramban asks, were Sodom et al then not destroyed, and Lot not saved?
The Abarbanel answers that the Rambam would say that the mal'akhim saved
Lot AND they were only seen bederekh nevu'ah. Nevu'ah according to the
Rambam is seeing things going on on higher planes of reality. Thus,
Avraham and Lot only saw the mal'akhim bederekh nevu'ah because they
were actually there.

CM asks:
To enlarge a bit on the question of the Ramban: How does the Rambam
understand the anshei s'dom asking for the visitors. One could imagine that
Lot had a mareh nevuoh, but certainly the anshei s'dom did not have a mareh
nevuoh? Furthermore, what sort of mareh was it that showed Lot offering his
daughters to the s'domites? So the S'domites never did these things. This
was all just in the mareh? (I have not seen the Rambam or the Ramban
inside.)

I would appreciate a hesber in the Rambam.

Also, trying to understand the Ramban who according to you holds that a
novi could misinterpret his nevuoh. This implies, that even though Hashem
wished to communicate a message to the novi, sometime he fails do
communicate as He desires due to the frailties of the novi. Would this not
be contrary to our understanding of Hashem the he is "kol yochol"? so the
Ramban needs a hesber as well.

Kol Tuv

Chaim Manaster
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Micha Berger wrote:
> This matter involves the Ramban's questioning the Rambam saying that
> much of parashas Vayeira was a nevu'ah. The Rambam famously writes in
> the Moreh that it must have been so, since mal'akhim are incorpoeral and
> therefore whenever they are seen it must be the description of nevu'ah.
> The Ramban asks, were Sodom et al then not destroyed, and Lot not saved?
> The Abarbanel answers that the Rambam would say that the mal'akhim saved
> Lot AND they were only seen bederekh nevu'ah. Nevu'ah according to the
> Rambam is seeing things going on on higher planes of reality. Thus,
> Avraham and Lot only saw the mal'akhim bederekh nevu'ah because they
> were actually there.
You might want to reread that Abarbanel.  He holds that the Rambam held 
that Avraham, not Lot, had the prophetic vision, and the entire parsha 
up to 19:26 when Avraham wakes up is a retelling of Avraham's vision.  
The objective Biblical narrative (after the vision ends) says "b'shaheth 
elokim eth arei hakikar", but it doesn't describe how they were 
destroyed.  According to the Rambam you cannot predicate place of 
disembodied beings (I can find the citation in MN if you really need it) 
and therefore you can't literally mean "the angels were actually 
there".  I don't know what you do mean.
>  The Ramban seems to assume that nevu'ah is a
> message relayed to the navi, and thus the things in it are metaphors,
> not real entities.
>   
Do you mean Rambam here? This is a reasonably accurate summary of his 
position, but it's not accurate for the Ramban, who held that angels (as 
well as dead people like rebbe) can use and discard pseudo-physcial 
bodies (though, admittedly, he says that seeing these bodies is not 
nevuah, it's a lesser state).

David Riceman

Justice Antonin Scalia has long shown an interest in Jewish law.  In
his dissent from today's decision in _Caperton v Massey Coal_, which can
be found at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/08-22.pdf ,
he concludes with this paragraph:


A Talmudic maxim instructs with respect to  the Scripture: "Turn it
over, and turn it over, for all is therein." The Babylonian Talmud,
Tractate Aboth, Ch. V, Mishnah 22 (I. Epstein ed. 1935).  Divinely
inspired text may contain the answers to  all earthly questions, but the
Due Process Clause most assuredly does not.  The Court today continues
its quixotic quest to right all wrongs and repair all imperfections
through the  Constitution.   Alas, the quest cannot succeed -- which is
why some wrongs and imperfections have been called nonjusticiable.  In
the best of all possible worlds, should judges sometimes recuse even
where the clear commands of our prior due process law do not require it?
Undoubtedly.  The relevant question, however, is whether we do more good
than harm by seeking to correct this imperfection through expansion of
our constitutional mandate in a manner ungoverned by any discernable
rule.  The answer is obvious.



-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

On Sun, Jun 7, 2009 at 7:10 AM, Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:
> . The Ramban's shitah, OTOH, more readily supports
> the possibillity of the navi misunderstanding parts of the message.

Please give exact examples, so that I can understand where you are leading
with this.

[Email #2. -mi]

On Fri, Jun 5, 2009 at 10:14 AM, Eli Turkel <elitur...@gmail.com> wrote:
> We must first distinguish between private actions of a navi and receiving a
> prophecy. Obviously a Navi can make personal mistakes.

See opening comments of the Minchas Chinuch on Mitzvah 516. (also WRT Yonah
towars the end).

[Email #3. -mi]]

On Sun, Jun 7, 2009 at 3:02 PM, hankman <sal...@videotron.ca> wrote:
>  RYZ wrote:
> Koveish Nvuosoi is when he
> says nothing (or not saying the Pisron or both when that was the intention of HKB"H).

> CM responds:
> I disagree. Koveish nevuoso is more encompassing. It includes leaving out
> any part of the nevuoh intended for publication.

Proof? The Ramabam seems to say that the Novie always understands the
Pisron, no where does the Rambam say that the reason he relates one or the
other or both is because that is all he got, he seems to say IMHO that the
Novi understands what is meant to be said and what not (not based at all on
what he was shown, the wording in the Rambam LAN"D does not support this,
rather as I argue that he always gets a Pisron)

> RYZ wrote:
> Further according to your reasoning a Novie that was Kovesh a Nvuoh witout a
> Pisron would not be Over.

> CM responds:
> No. A novi that is kovesh any part of his nevuoh is over. If the nevuoh was
> just the moshol and he was kovesh that, he would be over. What gave you the
> impression that I wrote any different?

I didn't misunderstand you, I am asking for proof in the words of the
Rambam.  IOW if there is a possibility that a Novi should not understand the
Pisron (after the Nvius is finished) and the reason being as that it is
shown in a Chida, how come the Rambam does not write that anywhere?

> RYZ wrote:
> Also all nvous that were given witout Pisron
> would have to be from such a class,  and they could have not been said

> CM responds:
> I am not clear on exactly what you mean here. Certainly a nevuoh, could be
> either for publication or not even without a pisron, why should they not
> have been said? Apparently there is value in the moshol alone even if you
> and I (and the novi) do not get it. Perhaps at some time the meaning will
> eventually become clear?

Let me explain my point, if the lack of Pisron is what defines what part the
Novi relates. in that case a Nvius without a given Pisron means it need
not be said, and the Novie cannot be called Kovesh Nvuosoi, so why did the
Novi give it over? The rambam clearly writes that Miktzas Divrei Yechezkel
fall in to this category. (and to split hairs that if it has no pisron
whatsoever then it must be said, if it is partially understood then he need
not say the rest, I think is overdoing it).

[Email #4, adding to the previous email. -mi]

Just to add, Yechezkel should have understood it was not meant to be said,
or at least not neccessery to be said (A chidush in Nvuoh that would need
proof), so why did he say it? and how does it become a "Nvuoh SheHutzracha
Ldoros"?

[Email #5. -mi]

On Sun, Jun 7, 2009 at 1:27 PM, hankman <sal...@videotron.ca> wrote:
>  I think you misunderstand RYZ's point. If mistake is admissible in
> nevuoh, then you could NEVER punish a novi sheker, so why would the Torah
> provide such a punishment. But in the instance of your query, perhaps not
> every nevuoh (from a novi muchzok) must be subject to test and punishable.

Correct in my meaning.  And the Rambam states clearly (in previous
mentioned M"M 10:4) that not every Nvuoh must come bPoel, hence no
punishment as he is  not a Novi Sheker.

[Email #6. -mi]

On Mon, Jun 8, 2009 at 8:23 AM, David Riceman <drice...@att.net> wrote:
> I thought I explained this, but I will do it again in excruciating detail.
>  God told Avraham to "ha'aleihu sham l'olah".  Avraham tries to slaughter
> his son.  God says "don't do that".

One main ingrediant is missing he fullfilled "Ha'aleihu Sham" which was the
Nvuoh.

>  Rashi's narrative continues: Avraham says "but you told me to do this".
>  God replies "No, I told you only to put him on the altar, not to slaughter
> him".

> Your claim is that Avraham fully understood his first nevuah; and the part
> he didn't understand had no pitaron (no precise meaning).  How, then, could
> God have replied as he did? Surely God should have said, no, that initial
> nevuah was just a mashal without a pitaron, and it didn't have any meaning.
>  Instead God ascribed it meaning ("I never told you to slaughter him").

The part that he needed to do he understood fully, HKB"H had a Kavana (which
we don't find and therefore cannot put in by other Nvi'im) that he should
think MORE then was meant, as he would stop him anyway.  Torah reveals us
this.

> How, according to you, can this Rashi make sense?
>   RYZ implied that every nevuah has to be falsifiable.

I apologise for giving the wrong impression (that is one of the reasons that
I normaly don't go into lentghy disussions in english, a language I am a
Kvad Peh in).

> Rambam rules (Mamrim 2:1) that Sanhedrin may overrule a
> previous Sanhedrin's deductions from the Torah.

Yes! since Torah Lo Bashomayim He, it is based solely on Sanhedrin's
interpertation, so while the Method is authentic the results are dependent
on Sanhedrin

>  Similarly the
> authenticity of prophecy can be distinguished from the authenticity of
> its interpretation.

However, Nvuoh is different, because it is out of the hands of Humans and
totaly relied on as being Dvar Hashem, (that is why in can be Oker a
Mitzvah in case of Horoas Sha'a) if human error can accur, you compremised
it's whole strentgh.

Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind

[Originally from email #1. -mi[

PS  I can't guarantee continuance of this discussion as B"H the information
and M"M's are out there, and the time it takes I can't afford
now. vHabocheir Yivchar.

> Me:
>>  Rashi's narrative continues: Avraham says "but you told me to do this".
>>  God replies "No, I told you only to put him on the altar, not to slaughter
>> him".
>>     
>> Your claim is that Avraham fully understood his first nevuah; and the part
>> he didn't understand had no pitaron (no precise meaning).  How, then, could
>> God have replied as he did? Surely God should have said, no, that initial
>> nevuah was just a mashal without a pitaron, and it didn't have any meaning.
>>  Instead God ascribed it meaning ("I never told you to slaughter him").
>>     
> RYZ:
> The part that he needed to do he understood fully, HKB"H had a Kavana (which
> we don't find and therefore cannot put in by other Nvi'im) that he should
> think MORE then was meant, as he would stop him anyway.  Torah reveals us
> this.
>
>   
I think this is the kernel of our argument in this case.  He understood
that God wanted him to slaughter Yitzhak.  I claim that that is an example
of misunderstanding a nevuah.  You claim, on the contrary, that it doesn't
misunderstand the nevuah but is extraneous to the nevuah.  See H. AZ 5:8,
which does not require implementing an extraneous bit to be guilty.

David Riceman

I just noticed that in the Meam Loeiz Bamidbar 12 (this weeks Parsha) he
says that some were "shown" only the Moshul, different then what I see in
the Rambam, one can also learn that way Pshat in Rashi Bamidbar 12:8 D"H
uMareh vLo bChidos "v'einee sosmoi loi bchidos" also the Loshon in the
Migdal Oz of the Yavatz one can learn different Pshotim (so I found a Tanoh
Dimisayo (partialy) to RCM).

Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind
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Anyhow, in terms of theory: 

> At my yeshiva, there is a situation of many people in the process of
> doing giyur. Now then, we have an issue of yayin nesech;

I doubt very much you are talking about yayin nesech (ie wine that has been
poured as a libation to avodah zara) vis a vis giyor candidates.  To cut a
very long story short the din is that wine used for avodah zara is, of
course, not just assur to drink, but assur b'hana'ah (ie to get any kind of
benefit from, eg to sell) d'orisa.  

There are also gezeros instituted by the chachamim on stam yenam, ie wine of
a non Jew, including where they touched our wine.  The simplest explanation
of this, to my mind, is as sent out in the Taz on Yoreh Deah siman 123 si'if
aleph si'if katan aleph. The Taz writes: (on the phrase in the Rema "mishum
kezeras") "the explanation is because of their daughters it is forbidden
from drinking and and because of the gezera of yayn nesach it was forbidden
even b'hana'ah".  Similarly the Shach writes there  to say tahtt it is
forbidden d'rabbanan because of Yayin nesach to idol worship that is
forbidden d'orisa and so because of the gezera of their daughter as is
brought in shas and the poskim." [The source in Shas for the gezera of their
daughters is Avodah Zara 36b]  Note that the Taz goes on to explain that
because today one does not find bone fide idol worshippers, and yayin nesech
is not common, there is a heter to get a benefit from such wine.  The
prohibition on drinking, however, remains in force. 

RMB asked about the question of a ger toshav.  The gemora brings differing
opinions on this in Avodah Zara 64b - which included one opinion that wine
touched by them was permitted for drinking, but other opinions that it was
not, and it may be yayin neseach. The Mechaber holds in the SHulchan Aruch
(Yoreh Deah siman 124 si'if 2) that while hana'ah is permitted, drinking is
forbidden, and the Rema brings (the Tur in the name of the Rosh) that by a
ger toshav, if he touched our wine, it is permitted even to drink, but their
wine is still assur to drink.  One reason given for the Mechaber's position
(which is based on the Rashba, as brought by the Tur) by the nosei kelim is
that since the gezera on stam yanam was because of intermarriage, gerei
toshav, are within it being prohibited in intermarriage.

In that same si'if, the Mechaber brings another type of person, a
prospective ger who has had mila, but not yet tevila - and holds that the
status of his wine too is permitted in hana'ah and forbidden in drinking.
This too follows the Rashba.  It is not entirely clear from the wording of
his exclusion allowing wine touched by a ger toshav to be drunk, whether the
Rema is referring to a ger toshav only, or to a ger toshav and a person who
has done mila but not tevila.  The Tur when brings the Rosh refers to both
of them, and the Beis Yosef has a certain amount of discussion as to why a
person who has done mila and not tevila might be in a better situation than
a ger toshav.  On the other hand, both the Shach and the Taz understand the
Rema as referring only to a ger toshav, and not to a person who has only had
mila, but not yet tevila.  This is supported by the fact that the Rema
earlier comments that a person who has not had proper tevila is considered
to not have had tevila at all in this respect.

> Later, I was speaking to a rabbi of mine, and he told me that Rabbi
> Nathan Lopes Cardozo had showed him, a few years ago, a teshuva of
> Dayan Grossnass of England, Shu"t Leib Arye volume One or Two (he
> didn't remember which, and I haven't had a chance to investigate),
> that ruled that once a person commits to doing giyur, his yayin is no
> longer a halachic issue; he is a yehudi as far as his yayin is
> concerned.

Well it would be interesting to see the teshuva - but are you sure that
"commits to doing giyur" does not mean mila but not tevila?  As you can see
from what I have written above, even allowing this for mila but no tevila
goes against the Shulchan Aruch, and would seem to be against the most
straightforward reading of the Rema, and as understood by the two major
commentators - on the other hand, you can see where there is some support
for this position.

To have a step earlier than mila but not tevila seems even more problematic,
unless - perhaps you are talking about somebody who in the course of
committing to do giyur, had some sort of acceptance before beis din of the
sheva mitzvos benei noach. 

> A question that's occurred to me, and which I have sent to Rabbi Angel
> (so his reply is pending): what of people who have not committed to
> doing Orthodox giyur, but only because they already (wrongly) believe
> themselves to be Jews. That is, people with a Jewish father, people
> with non-Orthodox giyur, etc. These people honestly believe they are
> Jewish, and were they to be convinced that they truly are NOT Jewish,
> they'd of course commit to doing Orthodox giyur. The only reason they
> don't pursue Orthodox giyur is that they don't realize they need it to
> be Jewish. Now then, should these people be any worse than a stam
> non-Jew who's committed to giyur? It seems to me that these people's
> wine should be kosher just as the Orthodox giyur candidate's is.

If you follow the most straightforward and simple understand of the gezera,
which fits with the Mechaber and the Rashba's position, then the issue here
is intermarriage.  If you can marry them (or your daughter's can) you can
drink wine they have touched, if not, not.  Since you cannot marry somebody
on giyur track until they have actually gone through with the conversion,
then you cannot drink their wine.  The same is true of people who think they
are Jewish but they are not.

If you take the Ran's position (as  brought in the Shach), the issue is not
so much intermarriage, but whether they have accepted upon themselves in
front of beis din not to be involved in idolatry.  He held that a person who
had done mila but not tevila was more problematic than a ger toshav, because
a ger toshav had made a commitment in beis din to accept the sheva mitzvos
benei noach, including the no idol worship, and a person who had done mila
but not tevila had not. Given that a person who thinks they are Jewish but
are not has not made any commitment in front of beis din, then the same
would clearly be true for them.

BTW, your typical person who thinks he is Jewish but is not, may quite well
have had mila (this may get into the question of whether mila done by a non
frum mohel is mila, and may depend on who did it) - so you might in fact
have a mila but not tevila scenario here.  And a mila but no tevila
situation is one discussed by the poskim.  To go yet a further step back and
talk about somebody on giyur track, whatever that means, really seems to be
pushing the envelope. 

Like everybody else on this thread, it seems to me that he simple solution
is for the yeshiva to insist, as a matter of policy, that all wine brought
into the yeshiva is mevashel, which will completely solve the problem
(Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah siman 123 si'if 3 if you want the source).
Leaving aside the issue of students on giyur track, are you telling me that
every single person who works in the yeshiva kitchen/cheder ochel is a frum
Jew?  If you have non Jews around working in the kitchen, cleaning up the
cheder ochel etc it seems to me that it is just too complicated to have non
mevushel wine around.

You further write on this:

> As for using yayin mevushal: the problem is that students bring in
> their own wine on Shabbat, and the rabbis aren't around to say
> anything.

Are people free to bring food into the yeshiva without any concern about its
kashrus?  More than anything else this is a kashrus issue.  If they choose
to come to a yeshiva that takes giyur candidates, or that employs non Jews
in the yeshiva kitchen, then they ought to abide by standards that ensure
that the yeshiva maintains a high level of kashrus.  Having wine here there
and everywhere that may well be treif (don't forget there are issues about
leaving an open bottle around without supervision, there are issues in
relation to the kellim etc etc) would seem to indicate very lax kashrus
standards (and note also that there are potential issues with wine by non
frum Jews as well - is every Jew in the yeshiva clearly shomer shabbas -
there are teshuvos to rely upon when faced with a problem, but this is not
the sort of situation that a yeshiva should be getting itself into).  As a
simple matter of kashrus I can't understand how they can allow this.

 Actually, the rabbis aren't very concerned with the shame
> caused to the giyur candidates. (Believe you me, the candidates DO
> feel great shame at this, but no one but them seems to care. Even the
> rabbis don't seem to care when I discuss this with them. I never said
> I like the rabbis at my yeshiva.)
 
Do the candidates also feel shame that they cannot marry your daughter?
Will they feel that it is problematic, once they have converted, that they
cannot marry the daughters of those who are yet to convert?  As I have
indicated, I don't think this ought to be going on for kashrus reasons, you
are quite legitimately on eggshells to avoid kashrus violations, but you
shouldn't be eating like that.  But on the other hand, it is very clear from
the sources that this has been created as a heker, a symbol, to remind
everybody that relationships are prohibited.  You haven't got to this yet,
but during the period when a husband and wife are not permitted to be
together (ie she is in nida), it is also traditional to have some sort of
sign on the table when they eat alone, known to the two of them that
indicates that they are not permitted to be together. Similarly there are a
whole bunch of other restrictions, arguably very embarrassing to perform (or
not to perform) in public which distance the couple.  You can argue the same
principle, one of shame, but the halacha doesn't view it like that.  
 
> (While on the subject of people doing giyur: many Israelis seem to
> think it is perfectly alright to treat these people as shabbos goyim,
> asking giyur candidates to turn on their lights. I hope I don't need
> to explain why I find this utterly disgusting, revolting, wretched,
> and putrid. These people exploiting the giyur candidates have no
> derech eretz, have no humanity. I have spoken to giyur candidates
> about this; almost invariably, they find this extremely embarrassing.
> I cannot understand why these people will come to my yeshiva and ask,
> "Do you have any non-Jews here?"; it's absolutely horrible, and as far
> as I'm concerned, these people are rejecting the mitzvot bein adam
> l'havero bichlal; these people, as far as I'm concerned, may as well
> come up to the faces of these giyur candidates, spit, kick, throw mud,
> and taunt and laugh and mock and deride; it's all the same in the end.
> I do not understand how anyone who fears G-d can behave in such a
> manner.)

Well the obvious solution is for you to make yourself an expert on amira
l'akum, and when anybody comes and asks - dissect what they want to do to
find out whether it is mutar.  My guess is that most of the time it isn't.
In many cases it may be forbidden to then benefit from what they have asked
the non Jew to do.  Even if you don't know exactly the halacha, you could
always try asking - are you sure that this is mutar?, and point out this
consequence (ie that they are not allowed to benefit until the period of
time it takes to perform the melacha after shabbas) if it isn't.

And yet, you write:

> To use a gentile, a pureblood gentile, is a real serious question of
> amira l'akum. But to use someone doing giyur is moreover an averah
> bein adam l'havero.

The reality is that most of the permissible cases of amira l'akum involve
things like helping the sick, disabled or vulnerable or assisting the
community as a whole.  What you appear to be saying is that better that a
sick or disabled person suffers than that a healthy bodied giyur candidate
is asked.  Is that really the right priority?  Putting yourself into their
shoes for a moment - helping the sick and disabled is a mitzvah.  You can
argue where it fits into the sheva mitzvos benei noach, but I think you
could find enough evidence if you searched hard enough that it is a mitzvah
not just for a Jew but for a non Jew. And even if not, it is certainly one
of the things one is hoping that the giyur candidate is training themselves
in, no less than in shabbas.  You are suggesting that a mitzvah be diverted
from this giyur candidate and sent the way of a non giyur candidate (if any
available, which there may not be).  This is arguably one mitzvah that they
can only do before they convert, is it right to run away from it?  Of
course, while it is not clear that lifnei iver exactly applies to a non Jew,
it is certainly not a good thing for them to be enabling a Jew to violate an
issur d'rabbanan like amira l'akum, so it might not be a bad thing if they
also learnt the halachos really well, not just so they know what not to do
when they convert, but so they know what not to do now.  I agree this would
need to be handled sensitively, but is your response actually the right one?
If they cannot keep shabbas properly, is it right to also not permit them to
perform mitzvos ben adam l'chavero?  Is it so shameful to be able to perform
mitzvos ben adam l'chavero that a Jew cannot perform?

> 
> Michael Makovi

Regards

Chana



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