Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 103

Tue, 02 Jun 2009

• 1. Re: Learning on Shavuos - Two Scenarios (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 2. Re: Stam yeinam of Giyur Candidates (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 3. Re: eruv tavshilin (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 4. Re: Yeast isn't chameitz (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 5. Re: Yeast isn't chameitz (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (hankman)
• 7. Five Minnim and Oats (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 8. Re: Five Minnim and Oats (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (David Riceman)
• 10. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (Daniel Eidensohn)
• 11. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (Yitzchok Zirkind)
• 12. Fw: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak (rabbirichwolpoe@gmail.com)
• 13. goy vs chiloni (Chana Luntz)

R' Rich Wolpoe wrote:
> FWIW on erev shabbos YT sheini Beth Aaron Teaneck had a 7 PM
> mincha and an 8 pm mincha as well.

And we had them in Elizabeth too. And a pre-Plag mincha at 6:40 for those who were able to leave work extra-early :-)

But all this is irrelavant to the topic. The only people who would want to
delay maariv on the second night of Shavuos are the people who are worried
about Temimos for the second night of Shavuos. And those people would have
been counting twice m'safek for the whole seven weeks. And AFAIK there
aren't any such people.

Akiva Miller

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R' Michael Makovi wrote:
> ... many Israelis seem to think it is perfectly alright to
> treat these people as shabbos goyim, ... I hope I don't need
> to explain why I find this utterly disgusting, ...

and R' Zev Sero asked:
> Why?  These are people who have to do one act of chilul
> shabbos anyway. Why should they object to turning that
> act into a positive mitzvah of helping a Jew?

Yes, indeed they do have to do an act of chilul Shabbos. But that is not
something they do happily. It is often difficult, sometimes even painful.
They are in the process of training themselves to avoid these acts, yet
they have to do it anyway. I suppose their brains understand the reasoning,
but what is happening in their hearts? Boy, talk about cognitive
dissonance!!!

And then, in the middle of this, along comes a Jew. No matter how
delicately he might try to phrase it, the request is still a reminder that
the gerus is still incomplete, that he is still an outsider, not yet a
member of the tribe. And often, it is *not* phrased so delicately.

Akiva Miller

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It turns out that the poskim do discuss the idea of whether shechting and maasering are mere hachanos, or whether they are full mitzvos.

Before I begin, I'd like to mention a totally irrelevant discussion. Rambam
(Maaser 2:1) and many others discuss the situation of a farmer who - at the
time of miruach - plans not to eat his crop, but to sell it or use it for
some other purpose; is there a chiyuv to maaser that crop or not? This is
an important question, but it is irrelevant to our discussion, and I'm
mentioning it so that no one will get distracted by it. Our thread is
working under the presumption that the farmer did plan to eat the crop, or
even if he did not, that the crop is full-fledged Tevel for whatever other
reason. Now, given that situation, suppose he maasers the tevel with the
intention of not using the chullin (nor the maaser nor the trumah) for any
purpose whatsoever. Was his bracha on the hafrasha a bracha l'vatala? THAT
is the situation which is analogous to making an eruv tashilin with plans
to do no melacha in preparation for Shabbos.

Back to our topic... I found two sources which might be very relevant to
this discussion. I don't fully understand them, and I'd prefer to review
them a few more times and try to understand them better, but by that time
this thread will be long forgotten, so I'm posting what I can at this
point, in the hopes that someone with better learning skills will correct
any errors.

In Yoreh Deah, Taz 1:17 discusses people with various hearing or speech
problems, and whether they might shecht an animal if someone else says the
bracha. Can we split it up, so that one says the bracha and another does
the act? Is shechita like Kiddush, which applies to everyone, or is it like
Hamotzi, which applies only to the person who is eating?

About halfway through (in my edition, at the end of the bottom line of the
first page) he writes: "The bracha on shechita is not for the shechita
itself, because there's no chiyuv of shechita unless he wants to eat. But
the real kavana is to praise Hashem for forbidding us to eat unshechted
meat. And in this, all Jews are shayach to that bracha, for all of them
have that prohibition. It's just that there's no situation where one can
say this praise, except when shechting some animal. It's just like what the
Bais Yosef said ... about the bracha of L'hachniso at a bris, which is
praise and thanks at all times for this kedusha. It also fits with the
Birkas Erusin, where the chasan does the erusin and the rav says the
bracha; there too, the bracha is on the issur of arayos which He forbade to
all Jews. -- But by separating Trumah, the ikar of the bracha is on the
mitzvah of hafrasha, not the issur of eating tevel, because the mitzvah of
hafrasha is a chiyuv on him, even if he doe
 s not want to eat the produce yet." (The Taz goes on to conclude that the bracha must be said by the person doing the hafrasha.)

I must wonder about the last phrase, "afilu im ayno rotzeh le'echol min
hatevuah adayin." Why did the Taz add that last word, "adayin - yet"? How
is the timeframe relevant? Surely there is no difference in the halacha
whether he wants to eat the produce now, or whether he does not want to eat
the produce now. But the halacha could well be different if he does not
want to eat the produce *ever*, and that is exactly what this thread is
about.

It is clear to me that the Taz puts Al Hashechita, L'hachniso, and Al
HaArayos all into one category, and L'hafrish in another category. It is my
wild guess -- and I will eagerly defer to others more learned than I --
that the Taz holds that one can maaser his produce with a bracha only if he
plans to eat (or use) it someday. In contrast, he seems to say that one can
shecht with a bracha even if he plans never to eat that animal, because,
after all, the bracha isn't really on the shechita at all, the shechita is
merely an occasion to say the bracha.

If the above is accurate, then how can we apply it to Eruv Tavshilin? My
guess is that just like the issur of eating tevel is not worthy of a
bracha, so to the issur of doing melacha on Yom Tov without an Eruv is also
not worthy of a bracha. And just like one can maaser with a bracha only if
he plans to eat it, one can make an eruv tavshilin with a bracha only if he
plans to rely on it for melacha.

I also found a Chazon Ish which - at first glance - seems relevant to this
discussion. In Demai 4:2 (2nd paragraph), he writes that "it seems that the
ikar is according to those who say that maaser is a mitzvah chiyuvis." -
Hafrasha is a mandatory mitzvah, not an optional mitzvah. One has to do it,
whether he plans to eat the produce or not.

However, one must not stop there, but continue. The Chazon Ish explains
that Biur Maasros imposes a deadline by which the hafrasha must be done.
*That* is why one's intentions are irrelevant.

I do not know whether this Chazon Ish helps us understand Eruv Tavshilin or
not. It is very tempting to say that Hafrashas Trumos uMaasros is a mere
hachana just like Netilas Yadayim. Granted that it is a "mitzva chiyuvis",
but that is just a practical result imposed by a separate mitvah (namely
Biur Maasros), and it doesn't mean that Eruv or Shechita are similarly
chiyuvim.

Alternatively, one could also say that these mitzvos *are* interrelated,
and that this deadline does impact on the nature of the hafrasha itself,
making it a mitzvah chiyuvis. If so, then Hafrashas Trumos uMaasros is NOT
a mere hachana. It is in a totally different category than the Eruv,
Netilas Yadayim, and Shechita mentioned in my last post, and again, it
cannot shed any light on them.

Akiva Miller

PS: It just now occurred to me that this question can be asked not only
about Eruv Tavshilin, but about the other two Eruvin as well: Can I make a
bracha on an Eruv Chatzeros if I plan on *not* bringing anything into the
chatzer? Can I make a bracha on an Eruv Techumin if I plan to walk no
farther than I usually do? Sounds exactly like the Eruv Tavshilin question
to me.

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: Oats: The Gemara says the five grains are all types of wheat or
: barley. However, oats are not a type of either.

I have several friends who have "celiac" in their family

 From what I can tell gluten is common to all 5 grains including oats
There are a few others such as triticale that have gluten, too.
So even though oats are a bit different there is a common denominator
with wheat, barley, rye, and spelt.

What is the proposed alternative to oats in the 5 species?

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

On Tue, Jun 02, 2009 at 03:39:32AM +0000, rabbirichwol...@gmail.com wrote:
: What is the proposed alternative to oats in the 5 species?

Rashi, the Meiri, the Rosh and the Bartenura translate "shibboles shu'al"
as "avena" (oats). that appears to be the majority, so if it weren't for
the scientific issues (it's not closely related to either wheat or barley,
in fact it is further than wheat is from barley; it's not indigeneous
to the Middle East), that would be open-and-shut the way to go.

The Rambam has "se'orim midbarim -- wilderness barley".
The Arukh (11th cent) says it's either "avena" (oat) or "secale" (rye). 

So, I think the answer to your question would be rye matzah.

That said, if the celiacs in question are so sensitive to gluten they
can't handle spelt or oats, there probably isn't anything they can eat
for matzah without getting sick. Gluten is needed to make dough, it's
the fiberous molecule that makes dough one big lump. If the grain were
entirely gluten free, it wouldn't be possible to make matzah out of it.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of
mi...@aishdas.org        heights as long as he works his wings.
http://www.aishdas.org   But if he relaxes them for but one minute,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      he plummets downward.   - Rav Yisrael Salanter

In response to the comments of RHB and RRRW below it has been my
understanding (Although I can not cite a specific mekor) that the
understanding by a Novi of his Nevuha is in fact infallible. The
infallibility stems from the infallibility of Hashem to communicate the
exact message he wishes to impart to the Novi, not metsad the Novi himself.

Kol Tuv

Chaim Manaster

RHB
> 2. Even if Avraham was a true Novi, do/did Novis ever make (potentially
> fatal or otherwise) mistakes?

RRRW wrote:
And if a judge convicts someone to die is his word law? - Or do we say
that since "he is not infallible" we cannot execute?

This conflation of authority with infallibilty sounds like a
quasi-anarchistic call to dismiss all authority since humans are
admittedly fallible!
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Michael:
> yeast and
> gluten is what makes hametz, but halakha knows nothing of gluten and
> yeast; halakha just knows that wet wheat/barley (oats is a serious
> question, AFAIK) is hametz

I am pondering out loud:

Q: could the 5 minim be defined as those plants that have signifcant
gluten?

Q: Rice and millet produce sirchon not himmutz - what is the
difference? Could it be lack of Gluten?

Q: To which "grains" are Celiac sufferers allergic? Could those form
the category of what can become hametz or matza?

Q: Could Hazal have been grouping grains by gluten content withou having
any direct knowledge of gluten itself? IOW they knew it had a common
component w/o knowing the specifics?

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

On Tue, Jun 02, 2009 at 06:56:04PM +0000, rabbirichwol...@gmail.com wrote:
: Q: could the 5 minim be defined as those plants that have signifcant
: gluten?

They could, but I think the gemara (Pesachim 35) is saying that the
5 minim are really 5 subtypes of the two grains that are among the 7
minim. The Tur makes this point as well.

Chitah expands to include chitah (wheat), and kusemes (spelt),
and
se'orah includes se'orah (barley), shifon (rye) and shibboles shu'al
(oats / rye / wild barley).

It's therefore gezeiras hakasuv.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             One who kills his inclination is as though he
mi...@aishdas.org        brought an offering. But to bring an offering,
http://www.aishdas.org   you must know where to slaughter and what
Fax: (270) 514-1507      parts to offer.        - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv

hankman wrote:
> In response to the comments of RHB and RRRW below it has been my 
> understanding (Although I can not cite a specific mekor) that the 
> understanding by a Novi of his Nevuha is in fact infallible. The 
> infallibility stems from the infallibility of Hashem to communicate 
> the exact message he wishes to impart to the Novi, not metsad the Novi 
> himself.
>  
See Daniel 12:8, Rashi and Ibn Ezra ad. loc.

David Riceman

hankman wrote:
> In response to the comments of RHB and RRRW below it has been my 
> understanding (Although I can not cite a specific mekor) that the 
> understanding by a Novi of his Nevuha is in fact infallible. The 
> infallibility stems from the infallibility of Hashem to communicate 
> the exact message he wishes to impart to the Novi, not metsad the Novi 
> himself.
>  

*Sefer HaIkkarim^ ** (3:17):* Even though that all the words of the 
prophets are true with out any doubt, nevertheless according to the 
greatness of the prophet and his level of prophecy will the truth that 
comes from his words be stronger. Because many prophets due to the 
weakness of their comprehension did not comprehend the clear facts 
properly. This is because what happens to the perception of the prophets 
is that which happens to perception of our physical senses. One whose 
senses are healthy and strong perceives things the way they truly are 
and one whose sense are weak will not perceive things the way they truly 
are but will only be aware of the general type or category and not the 
full details. Someone with healthy vision will see things according to 
the way they really are for example red or green and will perceive the 
hue of red or green. However the one who has weak vision will only 
perceive things in general. Even if he perceives the category i.e., red 
or green he will not perceive which hue or red or green. This is true 
also with the sense of hearing and the other senses.

This exact thing occurs also with the prophets and their perceptions. 
One who has strong perception will perceive things the way they are 
without illusion and his words will be clear without vagueness and thus 
his understanding will be true the way things are. A prophet who is on a 
lower level will perceive things as vague or as a puzzle or metaphors 
that are unclear. Therefore he won't see the truth as it is but only 
according to the appearance of the metaphor. He will thus confuse the 
metaphor with that which it alludes to and thus will fail to be aware of 
actual reality i.e., the message that he was sent. [Ohel Yaakov: for 
example Zecharya saw a man riding on a horse...That in itself was 
meaningless...what was to be seen by the prophet in this vision was that 
he was being sent by G-d to travel all over the land.]

Thus we find Yechezkeil whose prophecy took place after the destruction 
of the Temple speaking in metaphors and parables which could not be 
taken to be literally true until they complained as Yechezkiel said to 
G-d, /They say to me that I am just a spinner of parables (21:1)/.

And similarly Zechariya who was at the end of the period of prophecy - 
had all his prophecy in visions that were not true in of themselves but 
only for what they alluded to. He said he saw horses, women, and golden 
menorahs with olives. The menorah and olives were not true in themselves 
but only to what they alluded to. In contrast, Yirmiyahu who was prior 
to the destruction of the Temple - all his prophesies were extremely 
clear as to what they actually were.

G-d has already described the uniqueness of Moshe Rabbeinu's prophecy. 
The Torah (Bamidbar 12:8) states /mouth to mouth I spoke to him in 
vision but not parables./ This was in contrast to all the other prophets 
who received prophesy through the medium of parables and metaphors that 
were not self-evident and were not the message themselves. Therefore the 
words of all the prophets are of necessity subordinate to that of Moshe 
Rabbeinu. In other words the prophesy of a lesser prophets needs to be 
made totally consistent with that which a greater prophet said.

To clarify this matter we find for example that Yeshaya (6:1) said /And 
I saw G-d sitting on a throne elevated and transcendent/. In contrast 
Moshe said /G-d said that no man can see Me and live./ If we didn't know 
the relative greatness of these two prophets we might have thought that 
the words of Yeshaya are correct. We would have assumed that because of 
his great prophetic ability that he perceived from G-d that which he was 
capable of seeing and therefore his words are to be taken literally /And 
I saw G-d./  We would have assumed that Moshe had not reached the level 
of Yeshaya and therefore could not perceive G-d to any significant 
degree and thus he said /No one can see G-d and live./

But now that we know that Moshe was the epitome of the prophets...we 
know that Moshe's statements have to be taken as literally true and the 
words of Yeshaya are on a lower level and are not literally true. In 
fact according to his lower level the words /I saw G-d/ which indicated 
he thought he saw G-d are not correct and are the result of his 
imagination. Moshe in contrast did not utilize the power of imagination 
in his prophecy at all. His prophecy was to report things exactly as 
they were and thus /No one can see G-d and live/ is literally true.

Yeshaya who utilized his power of imagination in his prophecies that is 
called by our sages (Yevamos 49b) the unclear lenses - was brought to 
err by means of his imagination to think that he actually saw G-d. The 
explanation of this is that the physical essence of Yeshaya was not as 
refined as that of Moshe as Yeshaya (6:5) said /I am a man of impure 
lips/. Even his moral qualities were not proper as he said (6:5) /In the 
midst of a people of impure lips I dwell/. Dwelling amongst people with 
made moral qualities degrades the moral qualities of a good person. That 
is why he said (6:5) /Woe is me that I have imagined/. In other words I 
have been brought to error by my imagination I didn't prophesize with a 
clear lens like the prophesy of Moshe who heard the voice speaking to 
him without needing the image in from of his eyes. But I - said Yeshaya 
- prophesize with an unclear lens which is through the power of 
imagination I am not able to proper comprehend what I hear without 
seeing what I am being told and this causes me to be /a man of impure 
lips /and that /I dwell amongst a nation of impure lips/. And I know 
that this activates my imagination because concerning G-d it is 
impossible to associate any clear description or image even in a 
prophetic vision for one who has a clear lens.

This is what our sages (Yevamos 49b) say that Menashe killed Yeshaya 
because he had said /I have seen G-d/ while Moshe Rabbeinu had said it 
is impossible to see G-d... He could however have defended himself by 
saying that even in the time of Moshe the people said /they saw the G-d 
of Israel (Shemos 24:10)/ because the people also did not have a 
comprehension through a clear lens.

What is learned from all this is that a prophet can never disagree with 
a prophet who is on a higher level. Instead he must interpret his own 
words in such a way that there is no conflict between them. Since the 
Torah has stated that the prophecy of Moshe Rabbeinu was on the highest 
level of all the prophets, it is impossible for any prophet to disagree 
with him or nullify his words. However if it is possible to reconcile 
the apparent disagreement by saying that there were



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On Tue, Jun 2, 2009 at 2:30 PM, hankman <sal...@videotron.ca> wrote:

>  (Although I can not cite a specific mekor) that the understanding by a
> Novi of his Nevuha is in fact infallible.
>

See Rambam Yesodei HaTorah 7:1-3

Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind
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> In response to the comments of RHB and RRRW below it has been my
> understanding (Although I can not cite a specific mekor) that the
> understanding by a Novi of his Nevuha is in fact infallible. The
> infallibility stems from the infallibility of Hashem to communicate
> the exact message he wishes to impart to the Novi, not metsad the Novi
> himself.
> Chaim Manaster

And so if I understand this correctly then we'd say: Miriam=Aharon=Moshe
regarding infallibilty?
And if not why not?

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

RET writes:

> I gave a shiur on shabbat on a halacha of . Zilberstein that to me had a
> surprising chiddush

I confess that I do not understand this chiddush at all - can you help me
here:

> The question was if a chiloni opened the front door by pushing an
> electronic button could one enter the building? (lets assume CI for
> electricity)
> He answer was that yes because one did not have direct benefit from
> the chillul shabbat but what he call "mavriach ari",

This is the first bit I don't understand.  The term mavriach ari I am
familiar with as a concept within Baba Kama and the laws of compensation, ie
if somebody chases a lion away from your property (or similar threatening
occurrence), do you have to pay them or not?, if they get injured in the
process, what is the din?, if an animal gets injured in the process what is
the din? etc etc.

What does this have to do with hilchos shabbas?  Where is it found used it
in hilchos shabbas?

The term I am familiar with in use vis a vis shabbas when one is talking
about more indirect situations is gramma.  Now I can see a distinction that
perhaps Rav Zilberstein is trying to draw here.  Because mostly gramma is
something that is caused indirectly, whereas the chiloni who opened the
front door opened it directly, and what I assume he is trying to say is that
it is only an indirect benefit to you because what the chiloni has done is
remove an obstacle in the way of entering the building (equivalent to a
crouching lion).

But even so, I don't understand.

Let's go back to first principles:  The Shulchan Aruch rules in Orech Chaim
siman 318:1 that one who cooks food on shabbas b'mazid, the person who did
the act is forbidden to eat the food forever, but other people can eat it
right after shabbas. If b'shogeg it is forbidden both to him and others on
shabbas and permitted immediately after shabbas (I know the Gra disagrees
and permits it on shabbas both to him and others if b'shogeg, but let's
stick with the more standard position for the moment). 

The Rema adds (not that I think this is generally taken to be a machlokus,
but an explanation) that this applies to any other melacha.

Now, why is this different from our case?  If a chiloni cooked food b'mazid
(or b'shogeg for that matter) on shabbas, are we not getting only indirect
benefit?  After all, the food before was raw, the chiloni took away the
rawness of the food and made it edible, thus effectively scaring away the
lion that is preventing us from eating the food.  Why, according to this,
cannot one eat it on shabbas?

Now the Chayai Adam does draw a distinction in Hilchos Shabbas klal 9:11
between a situation b'davar shena'aseh ma'asah b'guf hadvar, shenishtanna
mikmos shehaya k'mevashel v'chayotzei bo aval hamotzi mereshus l'reshus
shelo nishtana hadavar mikmos shehaya im beshogeg mutar afilu lo afilu
b'yom.  Now this would cover your lion case (to the extent that scaring away
a lion could be construed to be an issur d'orisa - which as far as I can
think of might be trapping it or carrying it daled amos b'reshus harabbaim)
because the lion is not changed, it is just now away from where you want to
go.  However, *if* you assume the CI on electricity, then what the chiloni
has done here is to destroy the circuit - ie soser and thus is changing the
nature of the item from a built building to a partially unbuilt one (ie
minus a circuit).  And you are then getting benefit from a now partially
unbuilt building, by going into it, when previously you could not.  It seems
to me that this fits within the Chayai Adam's sena'she am'asah b'guf hadvar
precisely.

So, let's think about some other cases.  OK, yes I can see that lighting a
candle or light perhaps could be characterised as more direct than this - in
the sense that you are then getting direct benefit from the light, because
something has been created that wasn't there before.  But surely all of the
destructive melachos would fall into the same category as this one - ie if
somebody turned out the light, then you are only getting benefit from the
absence of light, and if the building case is to be considered like chasing
away a lion, why is this not also.  If anything this case seems more direct
than switching off a light, since you could now characterise the building
you can now enter as a building suitable for entering, and a changed
building, which is was not previously.  So if this case is one which is not
considered direct, it would mean, it seems to me, that the din set out in
siman 318:1 should surely have another qualifier - instead of the Rema (or
some of the other meforshim) saying "or one of the other melachos" he should
be saying, "or one of the other constructive melachos" - because in the case
of the destructive melachos, there would seem to be no case where it could
be applied, because how could you have a situation where you got direct
benefit?  

So where is this said?  And especially given someone like the Chai Adam who
is so careful to distinguish between changes in the body of the item.  So
where is this sourced?  I would have thought so fundamental a distinction
would need to be somewhere - can you find it for me?

 > He then asked asked
> a
> question from a MB who disallows using the contents of a put when a
> Gentile
> opened the cover on shabbat for a Jew. Why should it be different?
> 
> His answer was that the was a decree against amira le-akum and so a knas
> if one did request (or was done for his benefit). There is no such decree
> against a nonobserving Jew.

This too I don't exactly understand.  It is generally agreed that the reason
that here the Shulchan Aruch rules that the food is permitted *immediately
after shabbas* and when discussing a situation where a goy did it, he says
that one has to wait the time bichdei sheyasu - ie the time it would take to
cook the food or whatever is a knas (see eg both the Magen Avraham and the
Taz here, who explain the reason for the knas slightly differently).   But
in these cases they are all talking about having to wait a period of time
after shabbas finishes compared with it being permitted immediately after
shabbas, not about being able to use it on shabbas itself.  Where do we see
that this knas applies to distinguish between after shabbas and on shabbas
itself?  Or rather, if we have knas to make one wait from immediately after
shabbas to bichdei sheyasu, is it not postulating yet a further extension of
the knas to say that one is required to wait from immediately to bichdei
sheyasu?

Of course, if you do hold like the position of the Gra, who holds like Rabbi
Meir that in fact if the act is done b'shogeg then it is mutar both to him
and others on shabbas itself.  Then if you compare that with the situation
vis a vis a goy, you do indeed get this really wide distinction.

BUT if you are going to say that you are holding like the Gra, then to get
to this position do you not need to be saying that the chiloni is to be
considered acting b'shogeg - which presumably is only possible if you want
to say he is a tinok shenishba or some similar consideration? I guess I
would like a lot more evidence that this concept of mevarach ari is out
there and works to alter the basic halacha in siman 318, because so far, I
confess I have not run into it - but of course that could be my ignorance.

> The upshot is the action of a Jew on shabbat can be kulah then that of a
> goy
> (Of course one cannot benefit from a direct chillul shabbat but here it
> is indirect - mavriach ari)
> 
> I thought of a similar case were according to most poskim a chutz learetz
> Jew
> can ask an Israeli Jew to fo melachah on the second day of yomtov but he
> cant ask a goy.
> 
> Nevertheless it seems strange that a goy doing benefit on shabbat is more
> chamur in some cases than a chiloni doing work

Now this bit does not seem so strange to me, because of the halacha that one
can use an item, such a food, immediately after shabbas applies to food
cooked by a Jew on shabbas, but when cooked by a non Jew on shabbas you have
to wait bichdei sheyasu - which in the case of cooking might well be several
hours, so it is pashut to me from the Shulchan Aruch and all of the
meforshim pretty much all the way back that the situation with a goy is more
chamur than that of a Jew.

Nor does the case of the second day yom tov seem really that odd.  Because
what the Israeli Jew is doing is mutar for him.  This is actually more like
the situation where, lets say, the accepted halacha is different for a
Sephardi and an Ashkenazi.  Is it mutar for the one to ask the other to do
something that they cannot do but the other can (eg putting food directly on
the blech, if a Temani, putting cold soup onto the blech etc etc)?  Is it
mutar to benefit - eg if invited for lunch?  Are you obligated to refuse a
lunch invitation because you know the minhag of the family is to do things
that according to their poskim are mutar, and accepted by all to be mutar,
but are assur to you, eg because you are Sephardi/Ashkenazi - especially
knowing that he will do more of it because you are coming for lunch? 

The tricky thing to explain is not really that, but why is it assur when
done by a goy, for whom the act is mutar, and that is why, inter alia, the
Taz and the Magen Avraham both feel the need to explain, that this is a
specific gezera of chazal because of concern that a person is likely to
consider amira l'akum as something rather trivial and be tempted to do it
either next time or in order to get even the slight benefit of having the
item available immediately after shabbas.  All these explanations would not
be necessary were it not that it is on first blush, a slightly surprising
halacha.  But given its primacy in learning hilchos shabbas, I guess I have
long since ceased to be surprised by it.

> --
> Eli Turkel

Regards

Chana



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