Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 80

Thu, 07 May 2009

• 1. Re: Love/Mercy as a Factor in Halakhic Decision making - Rabbis Uziel and Halevy (Yitzhak Grossman)
• 2. Re: Yitzchak Allowed?? (Akeida) (Yitzhak Grossman)
• 3. Re: (Neviim & Possible Mistakes); Akeidah & Yizchak Follow-Up; (Zev Sero)
• 4. Re: Love/Mercy as a Factor in Halakhic Decision making - Rabbis Uziel and Halevy (Chana Luntz)
• 5. Arayot and Mitat Beit Din (Gals...@aol.com)
• 6. Re: water and electricity (Danny Schoemann)
• 7. electricity (Eli Turkel)
• 8. Chazon Ish and electricity (Shlomo Pick)
• 9. Re: [Areivim] tzioni dayenu (Rich, Joel)
• 10. Re: [Areivim] tzioni dayenu (Zev Sero)
• 11. R' Haim David Halevy on Shemittah (Michael Makovi)
• 12. Re: Arayot and Mitat Beit Din (Zev Sero)
• 13. Re: electricity (Liron Kopinsky)
• 14. Re: [Areivim] tzioni dayenu (Zev Sero)
• 15. Species, Genera, and Families (Jay F Shachter)
• 16. Re: Yeast isn't chameitz (Michael Makovi)

On Wed, 6 May 2009 00:11:21 +0100
"Chana Luntz" <ch...@kolsassoon.org.uk> wrote:

> RYG writes:
> 
> > I think that Justice Holmes would be horrified at the insinuation that
> > his jurisprudence did not qualify as "emet l'amito" and "btzedek
> > tishpot amitecha" :)
> 
> Sorry?  You quote the story as follows saying:
> 
> " I [Judge Hand] remember once I was with [Justice Holmes]... I said to him:
> "Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!" He turned quite sharply and he said: "Come
> here. Come here." I answered: "Oh, I know, I know." He replied: "That is not
> my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules."
> 
> Now every English translation I have seen of the Torah translates tzedek as
> justice (is not Justice, Justice you shall pursue up in a number of famous
> American courtrooms?).  And I would extremely surprised if Justice Holmes
> was not conversant with the King James version of the bible and/or similar
> translations.  And yet here you have Justice Holmes emphatically stating
> that he does not do justice - he plays by the rules.  In other words, he has
> stated unequivocally to Judge Hand that btzedek tishpot is not his job.

"Justice" has many shades of meaning:

Justice Jus"tice (j[u^]s"t[i^]s), n. [F., fr. L. justitia, fr.
   justus just. See Just, a.]
   [1913 Webster]
   1. The quality of being just; conformity to the principles of
      righteousness and rectitude in all things; strict
      performance of moral obligations; practical conformity to
      human or divine law; integrity in the dealings of men with
      each other; rectitude; equity; uprightness.

I think it is clear that Holmes objects to a (human) judge ruling in
accordance with "conformity to the principles of righteousness and
rectitude in all things", but not to "practical conformity to human or
divine law".

> In yet another quote you have Justice Holmes saying that he "hates justice".
> Not that he hates compassion, which would at least be slightly closer to
> what Rav Uziel is saying, but that he hates justice.

You ignore Holmes's very next words, which explain exactly what he
means!

"I have said to my brethren many times that I hate justice, which means
that I know if a man begins to talk about that, for one reason or
another he is shirking thinking in legal terms."

Of course he does not hate justice per se.

...

> What he does say, it seems to me, is that there are times when it is wrong
> and incorrect to use rachamim in judgement, and if you do so, you will not
> then get to tzedek.  
> 
> Now the key wording in the paragraph above is "there are times".  Your
> interpretation appears to be to drop that wording - ie that what he is
> saying is that "it is wrong to use rachamim in judgement, and if you do so
> you do not then get to tzedek" - at least if you understand judgement to
> mean when judging between litigants (ie ben adam l'chavero).

You're once again putting words into his mouth; I see nothing there
about "times", but rather, a series of categorical adjurations against
invoking rahamim while sitting in judgement.

> Whereas I am not convinced this is in the text you have provided, which is
> why I have added in the words "there are times".  I could not see in the
> piece you provided a statement that it is *never* correct to use
> considerations of rachamim, but only that there is certain situations where
> one might be tempted to use rachamim and where the Torah warns us off it.
> If it were correct that one *never* used rachamim in din, then it would have
> been enough for him to say "ain m'rachamim b'din" - the k'lomar is
> unnecessary.  But what he does say is "ain m'rachamim b'din l'ish al
> cheshbon chavero".  So then the question becomes, what is meant by "cheshbon
> chavero"  and what is enough to make the din burur c'voker.

It is inherent to the nature of Din that tendentiousness will generally
be 'al heshbon havero'; I disagree with your reading. 

Yitzhak
--
Bein Din Ledin - http://bdl.freehostia.com
A discussion of Hoshen Mishpat, Even Ha'Ezer and other matters

On Tue, 5 May 2009 14:11:56 -0700 (PDT)
harveyben...@yahoo.com wrote:

>  How/Why/Was
> Yitzchak Avinu allowed to sacrifice (or potentially sacrifice) his own
> life on the word of his Father?? Is this/was this allowed??? [Yitzchak
> did not, as far as we know, receive a direct tzivui from Hashem to give up his
> life.] 
> 
> If we perhaps hold that Shaliach K'Moitu, and that Avraham was an
> authentic Shaliach of Hashem, (on this and other? matters?) which
> would therefore perhaps obligate Yitzchak, would/should Yitzchak have
> required definitive proof from Avraham's as to the authenticity of his
> Shlichus??? 
> 
> [And of course, if Avraham was not considered a direct/authoritative
> Shaliach, vis a vis this paticular (Akeida) matter, then why would
> Yitzchak have been allowed to listen to him??]

Resp. Hasam Sofer (OH 208 and Pituhei Hosam (introduction to YD))
argues that it is precisely this Emunas Hachamim of Yitzhak that is his
great merit in the affair, and the reason that we refer to it as
"Akeidas Yitzhak", as opposed to emphasizing Avraham's role.

Yitzhak
--
Bein Din Ledin - http://bdl.freehostia.com
A discussion of Hoshen Mishpat, Even Ha'Ezer and other matters

harveyben...@yahoo.com wrote:
> 
> RGDubin:
> Avraham Avinu was a navi and Yitzchak was therefore required to listen 
> to him.

> HB:
> 1. What qualifies as a Novi (Dovid? Yehoshua?) In Avraham's Time The 
> Rambam's (or other presently codified rules mistama did not apply)
> 1b: Whatever rules may/may not have applied; did Yitzchak properly 
> investigate them???

Once you know someone is a novi it is FORBIDDEN to question him.


> 2. Even if Avraham was a true Novi, do/did Novis ever make (potentially 
> fatal or otherwise) mistakes?

It doesn't matter.   One MUST obey a novi.  If he mistakenly thinks
he got a nevuah when he didn't, that's his cheshbon.


> 3a; case 1; Dovid took a census he (aparentyl) shouldn't have; 
> subsequently thousands died.

a) I don't think Dovid was a novi; b) He acted al daas atzmo.


> 3b; case 2; Yehoshua wasn't careful enough that his troops/men not 
> partake of forbidden spoils; again, many died.
> 3c. Moshe was a Novi, and made mistakes with accepting the eruv rav (acc 
> to Chazal) and many died because of it with the incident of the Eigel;
> Moshe also made a mistake (hitting v. speaking to the rock) and was 
> therefore not able to gain entry into Eretz Yisrael.

In all these cases they acted on their own initiative, not by nevuah.


> 4. Given all of the above, even if Avraham was a verified and true Novi, 
> should/was Yitzchak allowed to have listened to him??

If he said "Hashem told me to do this" then he must obey.  No question.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

RYG writes:

> "Justice" has many shades of meaning:

Agreed.

> Justice Jus"tice (j[u^]s"t[i^]s), n. [F., fr. L. justitia, fr.
>    justus just. See Just, a.]
>    [1913 Webster]
>    1. The quality of being just; conformity to the principles of
>       righteousness and rectitude in all things; strict
>       performance of moral obligations; practical conformity to
>       human or divine law; integrity in the dealings of men with
>       each other; rectitude; equity; uprightness.
> 
> I think it is clear that Holmes objects to a (human) judge ruling in
> accordance with "conformity to the principles of righteousness and
> rectitude in all things", but not to "practical conformity to human or
> divine law".

Agreed - and Rav Uziel is in favour of a human judge ruling in accordance
with "conformity to the principles of righteousness and rectitude in all
things".  However he believes that the principles of righteousness and
rectitude in all things are set out in the Torah, which is emet and belongs
to G-d. He thus believes that bringing rachamim into the equation where the
Torah tells the dayan not to is therefore not, by definition just, and
tzedek would not be done if this were to be done.

> You ignore Holmes's very next words, which explain exactly what he
> means!
> 
> "I have said to my brethren many times that I hate justice, which means
> that I know if a man begins to talk about that, for one reason or
> another he is shirking thinking in legal terms."
> 
> Of course he does not hate justice per se.

No, I was not ignoring his words.  But you see, Rav Uziel would never, ever,
say he hated justice, even if he then explained after that what he meant.
That would be like saying he "hated G-d" or "hated Torah" and then
explaining what he meant by that.  If justice is an aspect of G-d and
belongs to G-d, then "v'ahavta et H' Elokecha" - you are forbidden to hate
justice - and you just could not say it that way.  A frum person would never
say - "I hate G-d which means that, I know if a man begins to talk about
that, for one reason or another he is shirking thinking in halachic terms".
You might say - well truly G-d is encapsulated in the halachic terms, and
one cannot (it is not correct to) talk of G-d outside halachic terminology -
but you could not say it the way Justice Holmes says it if you are frum.
Justice is a godly principle.

Similarly Justice Holmes sees justice as something out there, not applicable
to the court room, where he is required to play by the rules and thinking in
legal terms. G-d should not be in the courtroom.  And hence he hates it if
somebody tries to bring questions of justice into his courtroom.  Rav Uziel
believes that justice is fundamental to what he is enjoined to do, and that
rachamim can distort justice.  But the idea that G-d should not be in what
he does is a complete anathema.
  
> It is inherent to the nature of Din that tendentiousness will generally
> be 'al heshbon havero'; I disagree with your reading.

Not sure of your use of tendentiousness here.  In the case of the rich and
poor litigant, rachamim on the part of the judge will most likely result in
injustice to the rich litigant, and any exceptional case where it would not,
would still risk opening up the floodgates to the majority cases where it
would.  But where, for example, the question is how widely to spread the net
- such as is the case a husband and wife, where one could look strictly at,
say the monetary dispute, or more widely at other aspects of the
relationship, you may get a more just result if you use rachamim in din.  It
would then be difficult to say that the application of rachamim is "al
heshbon havero" with the assumption of innocence that that implies.  You
appear to have assumed that Rav Uziel is against justice in favour of strict
legal principles, and therefore both cases are ruled out, whereas he can
just as well be in favour of justice, just against rachamim where it leads
to injustice, and is guided by the Torah as to when that does or does not
occur.  

> Yitzhak

Regards

Chana

My understanding is that Mitat Beit Din is more severe punishment than
Karet. Reading the peirush Rashi in Devarim 23 pasuk 1-4, and Rambam
"Isurei Bi'ah" Perek Alef, I understand that in Arayot whenever one gets
Mitat Beit Din, he gets also Karet.  My questions are:
1. Do I understand this right?
2. Is it only in Arayot?
3. Is it not contcredit the rule of not having two punishments on one 
aveira?
 
galsaba
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R' David Riceman asked:
> The question came up over Shabbos whether Rabbi Karelitz,
> who prohibited opening and closing (as they say in modern
> Hebrew) an electrical circuit on Shabbos because of binyan
> and stirah, said the same thing about a water circuit (e.g.,
> opening or closing a tap in the sink).  We could think of
> no logical distinction between the two cases.

I fail to see the parallel:

In electricity there's a circuit ("A path or route the complete traversal of
which without local change of direction requires returning to the starting
point.") which the electricity seems to flow around in.

Where is the circuit with water? It flows in from the river/Kinneret,
through the pipes and out down the drain.

In electricity you seem to be making/breaking this circular route.

In water you are simply preventing/causing the Kinneret to empty out.

(That said, I heard Rav YY Neuwirth (the ShShK) say (some 25 years ago in
shiur) that RSZA (who was still alive) would have permitted (non-Bishul)
electricity but felt incapable of disagreeing with the CI.)

- Danny
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There was an exchange of letters between CI and RSZA sothe opinion of each one
should not be that mysterious.
CI actually mentioned 2 reasons that he considered electricity to be Boneh.
One that it is completing a circuit (and RSZA objected based on the
water plumbing
analogy) and another that one is turning a dead matter in something
"living" (chai).
IMHO this is a major chidush of the CI that this constitures boneh
which has little
precedent.
I have been told that several gedolim before CI suggested electricity
is prohibited because of
boneh and they all rejected it. To the best of my knowledge it is
still considered a
daas yachid but respected at leats lechatchila because of the stature of CI.

<<I also don't know of the CI would prohibit closing a circuit that doesn't
do anything>>

This is actually a machloket of later poskim interpreting the CI. i.e.
can one plug in
an appliance (according to CI) while the shabbat clock is off and then
use it aqfter the
preset shabbat clock goes on.
When one plugged in the appliance nothing happened because there was
no electricity
and so there is nothing "live". However, if one considers it as
closing a circuit is would
still be prohibited since one closed a usable circuit even though
currently there is no
electricity.
I think that this point point was even raised by RSZA according to the CI.

Similarly CI doesnt make any differentiation between actively closing
the circuit and
removing a resistor that allows electricity to flow through an existing circuit.

A question that did not exist in the days of CI is completing a
wireless circuit. If the
prohibition is making the circuit "live" one doesnt need physical
wires however, if
it depends on closing a circuit one may need a physical circuit ie real wires

-- 
Eli Turkel

before further discussion should be done on the chazon ish's position on
electricity, one should see the Kovetz Ma'amarim beInyanei Chashmal
BeShabbat by RSZA (jerusalem, 5738), the Meeluim section entitle Berurim
beInyan Melekhet Boneh veSoter beSegeerat uPetichat Ma'agal Chashmali
beShabbat, which includes letters from the CI to RSZA on this topic and the
latter's discussion of them. in the next section entitled BeInyan madlik
veMechabeh menorat chashmal beshabat, see there p.  85, fn. 3 describing
RSZA's personal encounter with CI and the discussion between them.
the latter has been republished and is found in Minchat Shlomo, Vol I, siman 12, in a footnote at the begenning of section 2.
the former has been republsihed and is found in Minchat Shlomo, Vol I, siman 11.
any meaningful discussion would entail reading these reports from the CI himself and perhaps even RSZA's analysis.
i would also point out that the CI's family, e.g. nephew, R. Meir Greiniman
(in his Imrei Yashar) have published their discussions of the CI's view and
are representative of the family's messorah of what the CI held.
bebirchot hatorah
shlomo pick
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Bishlama the question from Shlomoh, I understand; surely the Navi
wouldn't call him 'Friend of G-d' had he sinned so grievously, but
what's the problem with Shimshon?  Perhaps he was indeed a great sinner,
but as a factual matter, he saved Israel!


Yitzhak
====================================
Whereas Shlomo Hamelech didn't????
KT
Joel Rich
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Rich, Joel wrote:

>> Bishlama the question from Shlomoh, I understand; surely the Navi
>> wouldn't call him 'Friend of G-d' had he sinned so grievously, but
>> what's the problem with Shimshon?  Perhaps he was indeed a great
>> sinner, but as a factual matter, he saved Israel!

> Whereas Shlomo Hamelech didn't????

First of all, no, he didn't.

Second, even if he had, what has that got to do with it?  The proof
of his tzidkut isn't from this hypothetical rescue of Israel, but
from the navi calling him "Yedid Hashem".


-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

I just read the following passage in Rabbi Marc Angel's Rabbi Haim
David Halevy: Gentle Scholar and Courageous Thinker, pp. 216f. Rabbi
Angel notes that Rabbi Halevi thought the heter mechira to be
disingenuous, even if it did technically work. Rabbi Halevi sought a
better solution. Quote from Rabbi Angel:

Rabbi Halevy offered what he thought was a reasonable solution. Before
each sabbatical year, a panel of rabbis, agriculturalists, and
economists should meet. These experts should determine, based on the
economic conditions prevailing in Israel, what percentage of the land
needed to be cultivated in order to maintain the agricultural industry
and the national economy. If, for example, it was determined that
seventy percent of the land must be cultivated, then the Chief
Rabbinate - on an ad hoc basis - should pronounce that all farmers
could cultivate seventy percent of their fields. (There was a Talmudic
precedent for rabbinic cancellations of the rules of the sabbatical
year when dire economic conditions demanded such radical measures.
[Footnote: "Sanhedrin 26a."]) The remaining thirty percent would lay
fallow, in fulfillment of the Torah law. While this suggestion surely
was not perfect, yet it provided a compromise position: it allowed
farmers to cultivate the land needed to provide their livelihoods, and
it also left some land entirely fallow in fulfillment of Torah law.
[Footnote: "MH [Shu"t Mayyim Hayyim] 2:61. He also discusses other
issues related to the sabbatical year. See also MH 3:32."] Rabbi
Halevy's suggestion has not been adopted.

(End quote.)

Personally, the question I'd raise is: what if an individual farmer's
own personal individual economic needs were more or less than the
state's? For example, what if the state needed only 70% of its land to
be cultivated (in order to maintain the state's overall economy), but
this individual's own needs demanded 60% or 80%? But the basic
proposal sounds very intriguing and fantastic to me.

Michael Makovi

-- 
Michael Makovi
????? ???????
mikewindd...@gmail.com
http://michaelmakovi.blogspot.com

Gals...@aol.com wrote:
>  
>  
> My understanding is that Mitat Beit Din is more severe punishment than 
> Karet. Reading the peirush Rashi in Devarim 23 pasuk 1-4, and Rambam 
> "Isurei Bi'ah" Perek Alef, I understand that in Arayot whenever one gets 
> Mitat Beit Din, he gets also Karet.  My questions are:
> 1. Do I understand this right?
> 2. Is it only in Arayot?
> 3. Is it not contcredit the rule of not having two punishments on one 
> aveira?

A person can't be punished twice for the same avera, but who ever said
that the same avera can't carry a variety of possible punishments?
On the contrary, every avera that is punished by karet is also punished
by malkot if the person happens to be convicted in BD.  If the person
does end up getting malkot he can't also get karet, because he's already
been punished and is now "achicha", so the karet never happens.  In the
case of someone who has been executed we don't even need that reasoning;
what would karet *mean* to someone who is already dead?


-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

<<I also don't know of the CI would prohibit closing a circuit that doesn't
do anything>>
If closing a circuit that doesn't do anything is assur then touching any two
pieces of metal or wire is also assur as those two cases are identical in my
mind.

This is actually a machloket of later poskim interpreting the CI. i.e.
> can one plug in
> an appliance (according to CI) while the shabbat clock is off and then
> use it aqfter the
> preset shabbat clock goes on.
> When one plugged in the appliance nothing happened because there was
> no electricity
> and so there is nothing "live". However, if one considers it as
> closing a circuit is would
> still be prohibited since one closed a usable circuit even though
> currently there is no
> electricity.
> I think that this point point was even raised by RSZA according to the CI.

This doesn't seem valid to me. When the timer is off and the appliance isn't
plugged in, you just have a circuit that is broken in two places. once you
plug in the appliance, until the timer ticks (if it is a mechanical timer
for sure and even an electrical timer probably) the circuit remains broken
and should not be considered boneh.

>
>
> Similarly CI doesnt make any differentiation between actively closing
> the circuit and
> removing a resistor that allows electricity to flow through an existing
> circuit.
>
This seems to me to be more analogous to the water flow case. The current
already has a path to flow and you are just adding or removing resistance to
it. (A practical example of this is a dimmer switch (on a non-incandescent
bulb to avoid any bishul issues).) Is there any reason why this could be
considered boneh?
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On Areivim, Ben Waxman wrote:

>> We see from here, that a man who eats neveilos and treifos, who
>> publicly desecrates the Shabbas, "der mentsch ken nisht zayn moshian
>> shel Yisrael [that man cannot be the savior of Israel]"!

> I would answer the Brisker by stating that he made a straw man 
> arguement. No one claimed that Herzl or BG or anyone as of today was the 
> savior of Israel. A messenger yes, saviour no.

As a factual question, did DBG in fact do less saving of Israel than
did Shimshon?  The original language about Shimshon is not "moshi`an
shel Yisrael", but "shehoshia` et Yisrael".  It's not a title but a
description of what he did.  In what way can we distinguish between
what Shimshon and DBG actually did, in the field of "saving Israel"?
And since it is an incontrovertible fact that DBG was a sinner, what
becomes of the Rambam's proof that Shimshon was not?


Here's my suggestion: the Rambam is not *proving* that Shimshon
*couldn't* have been a sinner.  He is saying that Shimshon saved Israel,
and therefore we owe him the courtesy of assuming him to have been a
tzadik unless we have incontrovertible proof otherwise.  Since it is
possible to read the story in Tanach in a way that absolves him of sin,
we must read it that way.  Were that impossible, we would have no choice
but to acknowledge what the evidence told us.  Similiarly, were we to
have no more information about DBG than we do about Shimshon, we would
be obligated to assume that he too was a tzadik, and to dismiss any
vague indications we might have that it was not so.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                    - Margaret Thatcher

On Sat, May 02, 2009 at 09:31:54PM +0300, Michael Makovi wrote:

>
> Oats: The Gemara says the five grains are all types of wheat or
> barley. However, oats are not a type of either.
> 

Neither is rye.  The categories of modern speakers of English are not
the categories of the Amoraim, just as biologists' categories are not
the same as farmers' categories.  Does it bother you that the Torah
categorizes a bat as a bird, in Leviticus 11:19?  A bat is a bird, in
the language of the Torah; a bat is not a bird, in the language of a
modern speaker of English who took biology in high school.

There is a certain kind of person who likes to say things like, "a
whale is not a fish".  Such statements are nearly meaningless.  It
would be more meaningful to say: a whale does not have gills, a whale
does not have a two-chambered heart.  In the former case you are
making a statement about words; in the latter case you are making a
statement about things.

In the language of the Amoraim, the five grains of Israel were either
in the wheat group or the barley group.  This translates best into
modern English as the wheat group and the nonwheat group.  Jews who
observe Jewish law, and whose native language is not Hebrew, are
accustomed to making such translations.  In English a rosebush is a
bush, not a tree, and a grapevine is a vine, not a tree, but we know
that we have to say "boreh `atzey vsamim" when we smell a rose, and
"boreh pri ha`etz" when we eat a grape.

Now, a far more interesting question, is not whether rye belongs in
the barley family, but why the Amoraim thought that it does, and
modern speakers of English think that it does not.  You can learn much
about a culture from its language.  For example, English (and Hebrew)
has one word for an African elephant and an Asian elephant, but
English (and Hebrew) has different words for a horse and a donkey,
even though the difference between an African elephant and an Asian
elephant is much greater than the difference between a horse and a
donkey.  The languages tell us clearly that elephants were of little
importance to the original speakers of English and Hebrew, whereas
horses and donkeys were of great importance, and must have been
domesticated since ancient times.  Anything you could do with an
African elephant you could also do with an Asian elephant, so you did
not need your language to distinguish between them, but you did a lot
more things with horses and donkeys than you did with elephants, and
you did different things with horses than with donkeys, so you did
need your language to distinguish between them.  For another example,
one can question how widespread was the observance of the Torah among
our Hebrew-speaking ancestors, but one thing that is clear is that the
aboriginal Hebrews at least observed Leviticus 22:24, because there
are no specialized words in Biblical Hebrew for castrated animals,
unlike English, which has words like "steer", "gelding", "barrow", and
"wether" that attest that castration was a common farming practice
among the ancient English-speaking people.  You may recall the scene
in The Thin Man (which didn't make it into the movie, although the
movie was remarkably faithful to the book) where Nick Charles was
asked, "is there much incest?" and he answered "there's some -- that's
why there's a word for it".  If it didn't need to be named, there
wouldn't be a word for it.  Moreover, if we can puzzle out why the
Amoraim considered rye to be a member of the barley group, we might
determine whether oats belong in that group too, or whether the word
must have denoted another grain, not oats.  So the question is of
crucisl importance to us.

Incidentally, a modern taxonomic classification of the five grains
of Israel and of the five fruits of Israel can be found at
http://m5.chicago.il.us/docs/tu.pdf.


                        Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter
                        6424 N Whipple St
                        Chicago IL  60645-4111
                                (1-773)7613784
                                j...@m5.chicago.il.us
                                http://m5.chicago.il.us

                        "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur"

I don't understand how anyone could discount the science in this area.

Now, I understand the question of when the Gemara's p'sak is contrary
to our present science. For example, regarding killing lice, the
various answers are:
1) Following Rambam regarding treifot, we say that Hazal derived the
halakhah from the scientific knowledge they had, based on general
halakhic guidelines. For example, Sinai said a damaged vital organ in
general is treif, and Hazal figured out exactly how much of an
animal's liver it needs. If they erred, we only have what they said;
the Talmud was generated by human knowledge, but it is sealed.
2) Following Rashba regarding treifot: science is wrong, stick with mesorah.
3) Rabbi Aryeh Carmel and Rabbi Dessler (I think...?) - Hazal paskened
based on a received masorah, and the scientific explanation was
post-facto.
4) Sometimes, we can in fact update the halakhah to fit the science,
whether because the new halakhah is l'humra (no more killing lice), or
because it involves human health that we'd never allow to be violated
(premature infants that the Talmud tells us not to violate Shabbat
for), or other assorted reasons.

But in our present question, it is different. It is not a question of
the Gemara paskening A, and science today paskening B. That (viz.
contrary A and B possibilities) is what I summarized just above, and
it is a serious question.

Our present question is rather a question of the Gemara saying X, and
we're using science to figure out what X means. Therefore, we're not
using science to possibly go *against* the Talmud, which is a serious
question. Rather, we're trying to determine the Gemara's own
intentions via science. Thus, if the science is correct, there's
absolutely no chance whatsoever of violating the Talmud's intentions,
or going against Hazal, or any other such danger.

How could anyone object to using modern linguistics, textual analysis,
etc., to determine what the Gemara originally said? Would anyone
seriously (besides a few unfathomable individuals) object to our using
modern collections of manuscripts to determine the correct reading, as
the rishonim did all the time? Would anyone object to our consulting
experts of the Aramaic and Greek languages? Experts of Middle Eastern
realia?

I do not understand the objection. Let us examine whether Rashi or
Rambam is correct in the historical definition of shibbolet shual. Is
not the Gemara important enough to ask what it itself actually
originally meant here?

Michael Makovi

-- 
Michael Makovi
????? ???????
mikewindd...@gmail.com
http://michaelmakovi.blogspot.com


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