Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 56

Thu, 26 Mar 2009

• 1. Re: [Areivim] Ramban and Ibn Ezra (Yitzhak Grossman)
• 2. Re: Q re tonight's RYReisman shiur on the chamah (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Q re tonight's RYReisman shiur on the chamah (Zev Sero)
• 4. Re: Q re tonight's RYReisman shiur on the chamah (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 5. Re: Rambam's naturalism (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: Q re tonight's RYReisman shiur on the chamah (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: Rambam's naturalism (David Riceman)
• 8. Some Interesting Remarks About Birchas HaChama (Yitzchok Levine)
• 9. Or Sameiach on HaKol Tzafui (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: Some Interesting Remarks About Birchas HaChama (Rich, Joel)
• 11. Birkat HaHamah in 3 nusachot (Chanoch (Ken) Bloom)
• 12. Machlokes Leshem Shomayim (Shmuel Weidberg)
• 13. Fwd: Reshut Hyachid (Gals...@aol.com)

On Fri, 20 Mar 2009 07:57:08 -0400 someone asked on Areivim (redirected
here at Moderator request) about Ramban's purportedly considering Ibn
Ezra an Am Ha'Arez with respect to Talmudic learning:

I don't know about Ramban, but Maharshal (Introduction to Yam Shel
Shelomoh, Bava Kama) does *initially* say pretty much that:

"... the scholar Ibn Ezra, who was not a "ba'al Talmuda" ... and he was
impertinent ("hisris") in many places toward the sages of the Torah and
the Talmud, either from lack of care or lack of knowledge"

But this is immediately followed by a partial retraction:

"His honor remains in its place, for he was a great scholar, and we
don't criticize the lion, since we don't follow his commentary, neither
to obligate nor to exempt, neither to prohibit nor to permit.  For he
has written ("asah") many times against the Halachah, even against the
sages of the Mishneh, and innumerable times against the Talmudic
Amoraim.  And in truth I have heard it said about him, that thus would
he announce, and publicize to the masses, that he did not wish to show
deference, but to explain until the point that his intellect would
reach, without the tradition, as he has hinted in several places in his
commentary to the Torah, "if not for the tradition I would have said
etc. ..." But still, his words are not correct in my eyes, and in my
opinion, "kevar nasan alav es ha'din", for he he has given assistance
to the Minim and Zeddukim, and to those of lax ("kalei") faith, and I
have seen this myself ("va'ani ha'gever asher ra'ah ani ami")"

Yitzhak
--
Bein Din Ledin - http://bdl.freehostia.com
A discussion of Hoshen Mishpat, Even Ha'Ezer and other matters
Yitzhak
--
Bein Din Ledin - http://bdl.freehostia.com
A discussion of Hoshen Mishpat, Even Ha'Ezer and other matters

On Mon, Mar 23, 2009 at 02:26:12PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
:>                                                                 (BTW,
:>R' Eliezer Ehrenpreis suggests this underlies the machloqes about the
:>halachic date line.)
: 
: The only shita I know of that relates the dateline to the creation is
: Shu"T Benei Tzion by R David(?) Shapiro (vol 1, Jerusalem 1930), which
: is a very rare sefer.   But he doesn't quote anything about sunrise;
: he quotes a medrash that the me'orot were installed into the sky at 9am,
: and another one that the sun was directly over Gan Eden, from which he
: deduces that Gan Eden is 45deg east of EY (and presumably on the equator).
: He then puts one edge of the dateline 90deg east of that, which is where
: it was shkia at that moment, and the other edge a varying number of
: degrees east of THAT, where it was tz"hk....

R' Eliezer (Dr Leon) Ehrenpreis assumes that the sun was "installed"
based on the Even haShesiah, not Gan Eden.

He traces it to the machloqes about Adam's apparant age at the time
of creation. If we hold like R' Eliezer, then Adam, saplings and eggs
were created in infancy, and presumably the sun was too -- IOW, at dawn
over the Har haBayis. This means that the only way each part of the
globe would have gotten sunlight for the first time on day 4 is if the
date line is 180 deg opposite Y-m. (Try doodling it out for yourself,
I can't post a diagram.)

Whereas if we hold like R' Yehoshua, then Adam, trees and chickens were
created fully developed, the parallel for the sun would be to be created
at noon Y-m time. A similar bit of math would put the date line 90deg
off from Y-m.

Within the 2nd shitah, you now have a second machloqes as to whether we
allow the confusion of the dateline crossing a land mass, or if it hugs
the coast that is further from Y-m.


Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When memories exceed dreams,
mi...@aishdas.org        The end is near.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - Rav Moshe Sherer
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Micha Berger wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 23, 2009 at 02:26:12PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> :>                                                                 (BTW,
> :>R' Eliezer Ehrenpreis suggests this underlies the machloqes about the
> :>halachic date line.)
> : 
> : The only shita I know of that relates the dateline to the creation is
> : Shu"T Benei Tzion by R David(?) Shapiro (vol 1, Jerusalem 1930), which
> : is a very rare sefer.   But he doesn't quote anything about sunrise;
> : he quotes a medrash that the me'orot were installed into the sky at 9am,
> : and another one that the sun was directly over Gan Eden, from which he
> : deduces that Gan Eden is 45deg east of EY (and presumably on the equator).
> : He then puts one edge of the dateline 90deg east of that, which is where
> : it was shkia at that moment, and the other edge a varying number of
> : degrees east of THAT, where it was tz"hk....
> 
> R' Eliezer (Dr Leon) Ehrenpreis assumes that the sun was "installed"
> based on the Even haShesiah, not Gan Eden.

So does Bnei Tzion, hence his assumption that the medrash about the time
having 9am refers to EY; the other medrash explicitly mentions Gan Eden,
so no assumptions are necessary.


> He traces it to the machloqes about Adam's apparant age at the time
> of creation. If we hold like R' Eliezer, then Adam, saplings and eggs
> were created in infancy, and presumably the sun was too -- IOW, at dawn
> over the Har haBayis. [...]
> Whereas if we hold like R' Yehoshua, then Adam, trees and chickens were
> created fully developed, the parallel for the sun would be to be created
> at noon Y-m time.

It's a bit of a stretch to call the sun an "infant" at dawn and "fully
developed" at noon, since the sun itself is exactly the same.  We do use
that sort of language about the moon moving through its phases, but that
actually does affect the moon itself, at least somewhat.  An observer on
the moon would know what phase it's in, though he wouldn't put it in those
terms; but an observer on the sun would only know whether it was dawn or
noon at any point of the Earth by looking at it.


-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

R' Micha Berger wrote:
> Cycles don't have an intrinsic "start". There is no meaning
> to "although the sun and moon may have been created in
> Tishrei, the beginning of their cycles was actually the
> equinox before - but it was a 'theoretical' equinox."
> Without it being the actual time of creation, what makes
> one point in a circle (oval, really) the beginning over
> another?

I suppose you are correct that a cycle doesn't have an *intrinsic*
beginning point. But on the other hand, I think we can say that it does
have a *specific* beginning point, and that this specific point can be
defined by halacha, or agreed by convention, or both.

The cycle of the moon does have a specific beginning point, as reflected in
the halachos of the calendar. Granted that this point is a function of
three bodies (moon, earth, sun) rather than just two (the orbiter and the
orbited), but still, in the context of halacha and the calendar, it *is*
possible to say that the moon's cycle has a specific beginning point, and
that the moon was created at some point other than beginning of that sycle.

The sun is a bit different. I'm not sure, but I think the four tekufos of
the solar year are conventions, designed for agricultural purposes, such as
when to pray for Tal Umatar. It is entirely reasonable for these
conventions to conventions to be based on the equinoxes and solstices.
Having agreed upon that convention, it *is* possible to say that the sun's
cycle has a specific beginning point, and that the sun was created at some
point other than beginning of that cycle.

On the other hand...

> Besides, the idea is a return of the sun to where it was
> created. Not to where it was hypothetically. How is one
> commemorating maaseh bereishis by commemorating a
> hypothetical pre-bereishis event?

Now *this* piece of logic is unassailable. In my mind, at least. Very well put!

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Protect your home before it is too late.  Click here for homeowner insurance information.
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Beqitzur, I see two differences in language. The first is that you're
using Providence and HP interchangably. I am positing multiple kinds of
hashgachah, such that nature can be providential -- if a set of events
will always have the same consequence as determined by laws that express
Hashem's Wisdom.

The second is that we differ on our usage of the word "random". I am
using random to mean something not fully determined by its causes. Those
causes could be human, could be HP, could be nature.

On Mon, Mar 23, 2009 at 12:34:17PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: Me:
:>: As far as I know, there are two models which describe God running each 
:>: detail of the world.  One is the model the Rambam attributes to the 
:>: Kalam, which is that each thing that happens in an individual expression 
:>: of God's will....    The other is the model of the world as a clockwork 
:>: mechanism, which I think is due to Descartes, and certainly was 
:>: advocated by no Rishon (I don't know whether it remains tenable after 
:>: quantum mechanics).

: RMB:
: >I believe RDR's is a false dichomoty.

: >The most common amongst the rishonim is actually a mixture of the two:
: >HP for humans or only for deserving humans, and hashgachah kellalis
: >(HK; Divine Wisdom as expressed in nature) for everything else. The line
: >between HP ("an individual expression of G-d's will") and the clockwork
: >(HK) therefore shifts with the person, baasher hu sham.

: I tried to avoid discussing hashgaha in that post.  In the Rambam's 
: model hashgaha works via prophecy, and hence is irrelevant to how God 
: runs the world.

I don't think you can avoid a discussion of hashgachah when discussing
"G-d running each detail of the world"; you can only avoid the word.

Second, if by "hashgachah" you mean HP in particular, RMM made a similar
claim about the Rambam a couple of weeks ago, and I don't think it's
tenable. While the Ralbag says something along these lines, the Rambam
doesn't. (And while the Ralbag gets condemned for it, the Rambam doesn't;
it would seem that later baalei mesorah saw the Rambam's position as I
did.)

Look at Moreh III ch 17-18. In ch. 17, he brings theories about
providence. (All quotes taken from Friedlander's translation, since it's
in the public domain and available on the web for easy cut-n-paste.)

1- There is none (Epicurus, although the Rambam doesn't name names)

2- Aristotle: Part is subject to Providence, part is abandoned and left
   to chance. "Providence sends forth [from the spheres to the earth]
   sufficient influence to secure the immortality and constancy of the
   species, without securing at the same time permanence for the
   individual beings of the species." What I've been calling HK -- a
   teva that is Providencial. "The portion of the materia prima which is
   still more refined, and is endowed with the intellectual faculty,
   possesses a special property by which each individual, according to
   the degree of his perfection, is enabled to manage, to calculate, and
   to discover what is conducive both to the temporary existence of the
   individual and to the preservation of the species. All other
   movements, however, which are made by the individual members of each
   species are due to accident; they are not, according to Aristotle,
   the result of rule and management; e.g., when a storm or gale blows,
   it causes undoubtedly some leaves of a tree to drop, breaks off some
   branches of another tree, tears away a stone from a heap of stones,
   raises dust over herbs and spoils them, and stirs up the sea so that
   a ship goes down with the whole or part of her contents."

3- Ashariyah: Determinism and EVERYTHING is caused by G-d. No bechirah.

4- Mu'tazilah: There is HP and bechirah only. All tragedy is for the
   sake of future reward. (All tragedy -- both human and animal.)

5- Torah: People get HP, others get HK and the individual animals,
   plants or objects are subject to chance.

Then in chapter 18 he presents 

5b- While all people get HP, a homo sapien can be more or less a
    "person" in this respect based on his knowledge of G-d.

Given that the Rambam is refining a position on how Hashem conducts
events (although it really looks like he's shoehorning his own position
into the words of Chazal), it's hard to say that the earned HP in ch 18
is anything but in contrast to the other positions in ch 17 -- planned
vs random events.

Also the Rambam's prooftexts aren't limited to Hashem offering
information. Such as one person being protected from a plague, and
another not.

The nearest I could find was (from about 1/5th of the way into pereq 18):
> This benefit is very great in the case of prophets, and varies
> according to the degree of their prophetic faculty: as it varies in
> the case of pious and good men according to their piety and
> uprightness.

But notice he's saying that HP is in proportion to their nevu'ah (or to
chassidus and tzidqus), not that it actually is their nevu'ah.

: I was unclear in my opening sentence in the cited paragraph: what I 
: meant to convey was that most rishonim reject the idea that God runs 
: each detail of the world (henceforth "determinism")....

I understand. I'm saying that there are multiple kinds of hashgachah. It
could well be that HK is the clockwork universe, to the extent that
Aristo's physics is compatable with such an idea. And if most events are
caused by the sikhiliim nivdalim we call mal'akhim and they have no free
will, it is pretty deterministic based on pre-established rules.

However, the fate of a bird isn't a product of what's most appropriate
for that particular bird. Unlike the case of events that occur to people,
or at least to those who get HP. It's hashgachah minis or hashgachah
kelalis, depending on whether the rishon is looking to the fate of the
species (HM) or to the Divine Wisdom inherent in natural law (HK) --
but it's still hashgachah. (In reality the two terms when used at all
appear to be used interchangably.)

...
: >However, one needn't add miqreh or bechirah and still have a mixture, not
: >either extreme. This one-or-the-other that RDR presents is false. Second,
: >even with only bechirah chafshi added to the mix, we still have a universe
: >without randomness.

: I don't understand this paragraph.  I was using "randomness" to mean 
: "not predetermined by God", which is how its used by rishonim.  Clearly 
: RMB has another definition, but I don't know what it is.  Behirah 
: requires mikreh (actually Spinoza tried to be machria, but he was after 
: Descartes).

I was using randomness to mean not determined by anything previous to
itself. Causeless. Thus, something that happens because I decided to do
it isn't "random", as I think of the word.

:>I'm not sure, therefore that *every* rishon believes in a random
:>element. It could be that everything is either clockwork, HP or another's
:>bechirah.

: No! Clockwork is an anachronism.  It's not that rishonim considered it 
: and rejected it.  It is a concept which had not yet been formulated.  In 
: the middle ages intermediaries (laws of nature) implied randomness, and 
: determinism implied the absence of intermediaries.

Whereas I'm arguing that the debate between Epicurus and Aristotle
was about this exact point. Epicurus thought that there were events
that "just happened", whereas Aristotle believed that events come
from intellects turning the potential into the actual, and therefore
everything can ultimately be traced back to Divine Wisdom. The only
thing is, that Wisdom usually is that there should be a rule, and not
that this particular case should have this particular outcome.

E.g. from the Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy (@ Georgia State U)
<http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/epicur.htm#SH3d>:
> One important aspect of Epicurus' philosophy is his desire to replace
> teleological (goal-based) explanations of natural phenomena with
> mechanistic ones. His main target is mythological explanations of
> meteorological occurrences and the like in terms of the will of the
> gods. Because Epicurus wishes to banish the fear of the gods, he insists
> that occurrences like earthquakes and lightning can be explained
> entirely in atomic terms and are not due to the will of the gods.
> Epicurus is also against the intrinsic teleology of philosophers like
> Aristotle. Teeth appear to be well-designed for the purpose of chewing.
> Aristotle thinks that this apparent purposiveness in nature cannot be
> eliminated, and that the functioning of the parts of organisms must
> be explained by appealing to how they contribute to the functioning of
> the organism as a whole. Other philosophers, such as the Stoics, took
> this apparent design as evidence for the intelligence and benevolence
> of God. Epicurus, however, following Empedocles, tries to explain away
> this apparent purposiveness in nature in a proto-Darwinian way, as the
> result of a process of natural selection.

When seen in contrast to Epicurus, because Aristo believed in teleological
causes (things happening for a purpose), he did have a non-random
universe. All of nature was the product of someone's will. It's not quite
clockwork, since that presumes that intellect doesn't change things
once the "clock" was built. Which is why I said "clockwork ... or"
in my earlier post.

In Aristo's worldview, natural events are the product of Divine Purpose
on the species or constant-law scale. Which is why I spoke of it in
Hebrew as HM or HK. Such events aren't random, in the sense of their
being deterministic. But they aren't HP, in the sense of being what's
appropriate for this perat.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Man is capable of changing the world for the
mi...@aishdas.org        better if possible, and of changing himself for
http://www.aishdas.org   the better if necessary.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning

On Tue, Mar 24, 2009 at 12:30:29AM +0000, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
: I suppose you are correct that a cycle doesn't have an *intrinsic*
: beginning point. But on the other hand, I think we can say that it does
: have a *specific* beginning point, and that this specific point can be
: defined by halacha, or agreed by convention, or both.

Or there are points that have significant events, such as the new moon.
A month could have been full moon to full moon, but half-moon to half
or some other point in the cycle is less probable. The new moon is the
obvious point, although I guess it could be the time total absence begins
(to the naked eye), ends, or the midpoint.

So, HQBH said it was the end of total absence that defines the time Rosh
Chodesh should average.

...
: The sun is a bit different. I'm not sure, but I think the four tekufos
: of the solar year are conventions, designed for agricultural purposes,
: such as when to pray for Tal Umatar...

They are also significant events in the cycle, or approximations thereof:
the time the sun is its most north, the time it's its most south, and
the two times it's in betweeen over the equator.

Yes, I'm sure someone could dream up other significant points, but it's
not entirely arbitrary.

All that said, RAM wrote the above in reply to my words:
:> Cycles don't have an intrinsic "start". There is no meaning
:> to "although the sun and moon may have been created in
:> Tishrei, the beginning of their cycles was actually the
:> equinox before - but it was a 'theoretical' equinox."
:> Without it being the actual time of creation, what makes
:> one point in a circle (oval, really) the beginning over
:> another?

What makes a vernal equinox a *beginning* of the cycle? Even given that
we have more reason to pick the starting point of a tequfah, why that
tequfah rather than the actual tequfas Tishrei that you're saying beri'ah
concluded on?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Man is a drop of intellect drowning in a sea
mi...@aishdas.org        of instincts.
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Micha Berger wrote:
> The nearest I could find was (from about 1/5th of the way into pereq 18):
>   
>> This benefit is very great in the case of prophets, and varies
>> according to the degree of their prophetic faculty: as it varies in
>> the case of pious and good men according to their piety and
>> uprightness.
>>     
>
> But notice he's saying that HP is in proportion to their nevu'ah (or to
> chassidus and tzidqus), not that it actually is their nevu'ah.
>   
See Ibn Falaqera, Moreh HaMoreh, at the end of 3:18 (he cites 3:52 and 
2:12).
> However, the fate of a bird isn't a product of what's most appropriate
> for that particular bird. Unlike the case of events that occur to people,
> or at least to those who get HP. It's hashgachah minis or hashgachah
> kelalis, depending on whether the rishon is looking to the fate of the
> species (HM) or to the Divine Wisdom inherent in natural law (HK) --
> but it's still hashgachah.
Universals are a problem for the Rambam.  See Falaqera again, at the 
beginning of 3:18, summarizing Plato and Aristotle (unfortunately 
without specific references).
> Whereas I'm arguing that the debate between Epicurus and Aristotle
> was about this exact point. Epicurus thought that there were events
> that "just happened", whereas Aristotle believed that events come
> from intellects turning the potential into the actual, and therefore
> everything can ultimately be traced back to Divine Wisdom. The only
> thing is, that Wisdom usually is that there should be a rule, and not
> that this particular case should have this particular outcome.
>   
You need to add qualifiers here.  Epicurus thought that all events just 
happened; Aristotle thought that many events come from physical law.
> When seen in contrast to Epicurus, because Aristo believed in teleological
> causes (things happening for a purpose), he did have a non-random
> universe. All of nature was the product of someone's will.
This is inaccurate.  Not all of nature; much of nature.  Some of it is 
random.  Descartes was the first (since the Kalam) to deny randomness.

David Riceman

One of the people on my list sent me the comments at the end of this 
message to me. He is someone with an avid interest in and a good 
knowledge of astronomy.

When he sent me these comments, I asked him if I could send them out. 
He replied, "If you don't think this will cause some people who 
accept b'emuna p'shuta that the sun will be in the exact position 
that morning that it was at briyas haolom - and that they will feel 
their emuna challenged and damaged, then it is okay with me.  But 
please consider this issue carefully.  I sent you the note because I 
knew you could handle it.  It any event, please don't use my name, so 
I will not be attacked."

I am assuming that anyone on my list can handle the comments below 
without losing their faith. >:-}

The fact that he did not want his name attached to this out of a 
concern for being personally attacked says much too much about the 
environment in certain Orthodox circles. YL

"I think the 'early as possible' thing is because the actual correct 
time is supposed to be immediately after nightfall the day before, 
when the sun can't be seen.  So this is the first chance!   In any 
event, it can't be said at hanetz, because the full orb of the sun 
takes 3 minutes to rise!

It is worth noting that anyone who is familiar with the gemara 
discussion on this, and knows a drop of astronomy or celestial 
mechanics understands that the whole calculation is based upon the 
gross approximation that the year is 365.25 days long, which of 
course it is not, which is why this event is coming out on April 8 
instead of at the vernal equinox, tekufas Nisan - that slippage is 
equivalent to the slippage of Tal umatar from 60 days after the 
autumnal equinox (tekufas Tishrei) to December 5, which uses the same 
calculation.
Other issues emerge, because if it indeed would have come out at the 
equinox at the time of the gemara, then at briyas haolom, 
extrapolating back, it would come out somewhere in February, which 
makes no sense.

We thus see that the entire exercise is actually symbolic, because 
the reality differs with the facts of astronomy, as the chachomim who 
chose this calculation (rather than the more exact one which is used 
to keep Pesach in season, for example) certainly understood.  But if 
the more exact calculation were used, there would almost never be a 
time when the sun could be said to be at the same position as it was 
that first yom revii.  (See R'Bleich's discussion in the ArtScroll 
volume.)  The chachomim exercised this discretion to give us an 
opportunity to thank Hashem for the orderly continuance of the orbits 
of the celestial bodies (think of it as thanking Hashem for passing 
the law of conservation of angular momentum), which otherwise would 
not have been possible.

Possibly for the hamon am, the physical realities were not deemed of concern."

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On Sun, Mar 22, 2009 at 08:26am EDT, I wrote:
: I found this week's VBM email  from R' Yitzchak Blau very interesting.
: On the centrality of bechirah chafshi in the Or Sameiach's worldview.
: See <http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/modern/19modern.htm>.

On a totally different topic, I reread the essay in the Or Sameiach in
Hil' Teshuvah pereq 4 titled "HaKol Tzadui vehaReshus Nesunah". I still
see it differently than RYBlau did.

To quote:
> The very fact that R. Meir Simcha penned a lengthy analysis of this
> topic in the Ohr Sameach is noteworthy and quite unusual among modern
> halakhic giants. Furthermore, the discussion reveals knowledge of the
> philosophy of Rambam, Ralbag, R. Hasdai Crescas, Maharal, kabbalists
> and others. R. Meir Simcha read widely and thought deeply about the
> ideas he encountered. Meshekh Chokhma also reveals a similar range of
> reading interests.

> R. Meir Simcha provides many arguments on behalf of free will. As noted,
> some of the arguments begin with religious assumptions about God. Humans
> experience their freedom to choose. Why should a person toil to succeed
> if God's knowledge predetermines success? If people do not truly choose,
> why did God create the evil of immoral behavior? Why would God create
> wicked people? In a world of compulsion, mitzvot become pointless, and
> reward and punishment lack justification. What kind of glory could God
> receive from righteous people who act due to compulsion?

> He anticipates objections to a few of the arguments and responds.
> Regarding the last proof, a critic might point to the angels that act from
> necessity and yet contribute to God's honor. R. Meir Simcha counters
> that the angels are not compelled by divine foreknowledge. Rather,
> they are purely spiritual beings who comprehend God's grandeur to the
> extent that they can only adhere to His command. That kind of necessity
> reflects divine glory. However, a flesh and blood human who simply acts
> without freedom due to what God already knows contributes nothing.

> One potential response limits divine providence and foreknowledge, but
> R. Meir Simcha rejects this approach. He states that all of Tanakh teaches
> an acute sense of individual providence, and if he started to cite verses
> to prove this point, he would have to copy the entire Tanakh. Once we
> accept this pervasive level of providence, denying foreknowledge leads to
> the idea that God changes over time as He accumulates knowledge. This,
> too, flies in the face of traditional beliefs as taught in Tanakh and
> Chazal, so R. Meir Simcha cannot accept it.

> Earlier authorities receive sharp critique from R. Meir Simcha. Maharal
> argues that we cannot say anything positive about God's essence. We cannot
> identify God's essence with knowledge, as the philosophers did. Therefore,
> talking about God's knowledge changing does not indicate that His
> essence changes. In an analogous fashion, God acts in various ways at
> different times but this does not entail a change in God's essence.[17]
> R. Meir Simcha denies this analogy. God's actions are truly not physical
> movements on God's part but rather manifestations of His will. His will
> does not change over time; it carries out actions according to the
> eternal providential plan based on what is happening in contemporary
> human history. Therefore, the different actions do not reflect a change
> in God. Shifts in the accumulation of knowledge, on the other hand,
> would indicate that God changes.

> R. Meir Simcha also evaluates the resolution based on the idea that
> God transcends the boundaries of time. According to this approach, we
> do not make choices because of divine foreknowledge. On the contrary,
> God knows what will happen because we will choose it. He correctly
> finds this answer in Tosafot Yom Tov and mistakenly attributes it to
> R. Sa'adia Gaon as well. Though he shows some appreciation of this
> approach, R. Meir Simcha ultimately finds it lacking.

> At the end of the day, he sides with Rambam's answer. God's knowledge
> is not something external to Him but part of His essential being. We
> cannot comprehend how divine knowledge works; therefore, it is not
> surprising that we cannot resolve this dilemma. Ra'avad criticized Rambam
> for introducing a challenging question and not offering an answer, but
> R. Meir Simcha counters that Rambam did provide an answer. We can prove
> that something we cannot understand exists, even though we are left not
> understanding it. Thus, he ultimately affirms full freedom along with
> compete foreknowledge.

I think that at the end of the day, RMShKmD doesn't fully reject all
those answers. He explains the difficulties, but then also shows how
far each works. In particular, the Tosafos YT's answer, that Hashem's
Knowledge is outside of time, and therefore His Knowledge of the future
doesn't compell the present any more than His Knowledge of the past. He
raises a problem, but still AFTERWARD writes of its merits.

In the end, the OS writes that the answers are like trying to keep two
people warm in a jacket that barely fits one. It's simply not large
enough. When you pull it over to cover one, you uncover the other. It's
not a metaphor for falsity, but incompleteness. An answer that is correct,
but incomplete because our minds can't get it.

Therefore the OS doesn't end up with the Rambam's answer. Yes, the Rambam
says that we don't get it because we don't understand what it means
that He, His Knowledge and the Knowing are one. But the OS seems to say
what we can't understand is more tangible -- how these semi-answers fit
together. IOW, the mystery is about how the Timeless interacts with time,
not unity of G-d and time.

(I find this distinction important because of another religion making
a Diiving Mystery out of the unity of God and Logos (and a third guy).)

Personally, I think the Tosafos YT's answer is more solid than the OS
gives it credit for. It's not only that Hashem relates to the future
the way He relates to the past. It's also that Hashem doesn't know "now"
what we will do tomorrow, because He has no "now". We can't tie a "when"
to the tzipiyah.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "The worst thing that can happen to a
mi...@aishdas.org        person is to remain asleep and untamed."
http://www.aishdas.org          - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm
Fax: (270) 514-1507

 

We thus see that the entire exercise is actually symbolic, because the
reality differs with the facts of astronomy, as the chachomim who chose
this calculation (rather than the more exact one which is used to keep
Pesach in season, for example) certainly understood.  But if the more
exact calculation were used, there would almost never be a time when the
sun could be said to be at the same position as it was that first yom
revii.  (See R'Bleich's discussion in the ArtScroll volume.)  The
chachomim exercised this discretion to give us an opportunity to thank
Hashem for the orderly continuance of the orbits of the celestial bodies
(think of it as thanking Hashem for passing the law of conservation of
angular momentum), which otherwise would not have been possible. 
 ====================
In the shiur on YUTORAH he makes the same point but expands the thanks
to include all "natural miracles" 
KT
Joel Rich
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I've typed up (and done a lot of copy-pasting) to put together 3
versions of Birkat HaHamah.

According to the Ben Ish Hai:
http://www.iit.edu/~kbloom1/birkat-hahama-bih.odt
According to the Petach HaDevir:
http://www.iit.edu/~kbloom1/birkat-hahama-phd.odt
According to Rav Ovadia Yosef:
http://www.iit.edu/~kbloom1/birkat-hahama-yy.odt

Use it for whatever you want.

These are OpenOffice documents which (since they are standardized)
should hopefully still be readable in 28 years, I guess this will be the
first test of that claim. Anybody want to mirror these somewhere more
permanent than my website?

--Ken

-- 
Ken (Chanoch) Bloom. PhD candidate. Linguistic Cognition Laboratory.
Department of Computer Science. Illinois Institute of Technology.
http://www.iit.edu/~kbloom1/

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The mishna in avos says: Kol machlokes shehi leshem shomayim sofo
lehiskayem vesheino leshem shomayim ein sofo lehiskayem.

Every disagreement that was entered into for the sake of heaven will
last and any disagreement that was not entered into for the sake of
heaven will not last.

Why is that?

I would like to propose the following pshat:

Whenever there is a machlokes where one of the sides entered into it
in bad faith, that side will ultimately admit that it was wrong.
Whether in this world or in the Olam Haemes. As a result the machlokes
will simply disappear because one of the sides of the machlokes will
no longer exist.

However, if both sides of the machlokes entered in good faith. Neither
side will ever admit that it was wrong because neither side made an
error in insisting they were right. As such the machlokes will last
forever because eilu vaeilu divrei Elokim chaim.

Regards,
Shmuel

I wonder if the term "Reshut Hayachid" is a defentioion, describing an arae,
or if the term just describe Din of an area, depends on the context.
If "Reshut Hayachid" is a defention of an area, then I would assume that the 
same area would be called "Reshut Hayachid", no matter if we are dealing about 
Dinei Shabbat, Nezakim, or Tumeah.
 
How would I translate "Reshut Hayachid"? when I refer to Hilchot Shabbat, can 
I translate it "Private Domain"?
How would I translate "Reshut Hayachid" when I refer to Hilchot Nezakim, can 
I translate it "Private Property"? For example, if there is an area more than 
4 tefachim by 4 tefachim (and less than Beit Sea'tayim), and the area is 
surrounded by four mechitzot, more than 10 tefachim hight, and the area does not 
belong to anyone, (or belong to the City), and there is a Safek Tumeah there, 
will I judge the Tumea as Tumea Bereshut Hayachid? 
And if my Shor Hezik someone's else shor in that area, would it be considered 
as Heizek Bereshut Hayachid, or Heizwk Bershut Harabim?


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