Volume 26: Number 55
Mon, 23 Mar 2009
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 18:15:25 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Choshen
On Wed, Mar 18, 2009 at 06:00:42PM -0400, Yitzhak Grossman wrote:
:> Not at all. Cognates require that things didn't drift too far in this
:> particular word, not that the words are static. After all, cognates are
:> often found between languages that diverged millenia ago.
: In your previous message, you wrote:
:> Definitely not "come from other languages"! Rashi on Bereishis 1:11
:> reads "'Safah achas' - leshon haqodesh."
:> Clearly Rashi felt the bilbul leshonos was incomplete, leaving traces
:> of similarities in some words from the original leshon haqodesh.
Note that the first quote of me in this post I am talking about my
own position, since I was questioned about language drift during the 2
millenia pre-migdal. The second (and chronologically earlier) quote was
from when the topic was Rashi's position.
But you failed to note that the first is my own feelings (as informed
by a rebbe-chaveir who also has a PhD in linguistics), and the latter
is my understanding of Rashi.
I don't see Rashi saying anywhere that LhQ drifted between Adam and
Avraham (the generation of the hapelagah). It may be implausible given
modern theories of language, but there is no reason to believe that
Rashi thought it did.
I therefore don't think Rashi believed there were words in LhQ borrowed
from elsewhere. I would assume from his silence (and because language
evolution wasn't a topic of discussion in his day), LhQ was unchanged
from Adam to well after Moshe.
My own opinion is more difficult (and therefore likely to be flawed); I
think the only borrowed terms in LhQ are for concepts that didn't exist in
Adam's day. Words may evolve, within the qadosh worldview. But to require
a new word means that the other culture was the first to encounter a
new realia. And then the borrowed word may have to drift in meaning to
fit the categorization of the world that better brings one to qedushah.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger A person must be very patient
mi...@aishdas.org even with himself.
http://www.aishdas.org - attributed to R' Nachman of Breslov
Fax: (270) 514-1507
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Message: 2
From: "Chana Luntz" <Ch...@kolsassoon.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 22:16:27 -0000
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Avodah] reasons for torah loopholes in dinei
RDR writes:
> Of course generally we use market value to determine value (I
> don't know what "intrinsic value" means). Does this mean that market
> value doesn't apply when the market is distorted by halacha?
In a society made up of two groups: frum Jews and non Jews (whether they be
Jews and gerei toshav, or Jews and the non Jews amongst whom the tanaim and
amoraim lived), in certain cases Torah values create two different markets-
one amongst the Jews and the other amongst the non-Jews. And in the case of
hezek sheaino nikar, the market value of the item amongst the non Jews
generally will not change, ie there is only a reduction in value when you
consider the item as assessed in the market amongst Jews. In many other
cases, however, there is only one market (eg the value a Jew and a non Jew
places on an animal who can or cannot work to a certain level is likely the
same) and hence only one market value can be placed on the item as it
stands. The position that there is no remedy halachically in damages for a
person whose item is only damaged in a way that would lessen its value in
the market of the Jews, and not in the market of the non Jews is fascinating
- as it seems to give a certain priority in terms of assessment of damages
to the non Jewish world. Of course there is more of them than us, so on the
one hand perhaps it is logical, on the other hand one might have thought
that a Torah system would give priority to what might be considered the
Torah market, even if it is a small one.
> What if I physically
> destroy a piece of kosher meat? Why can't I replace it by an equally
> appealing piece of non-kosher meat?
The question is not so much your replacing it, but whether, given that this
is a case where the value of the item destroyed is worth more in the market
of the Jews than in the market of the non Jews, should you have to pay to
the Jew whose meat you destroyed the value of a kosher piece of meat or of a
treif piece of meat.
I think this needs deeper analysis. In particular, I suspect that "value"
is a red herring, and
> you need to think harder about what constitutes "damage".
I am not sure I understand this statement. Value is at the heart of the
assessment of damages - well it is in both the Torah and common law systems
- I guess it does not have to be, you could theoretically have a damages
system that works on a replacement basis - ie the defendant is required to
go out and purchase a replacement and give it to the plaintiff, an act which
would then presumably permit him to take away the damaged goods - but I am
not aware of any legal system that works that way (although insurance
contracts sometimes do). I suspect it would be just too difficult to
enforce, and lead to far too many arguments that the replacement does not
adequately match the original, and it would take too much time of the courts
if they were required to effectuate the purchase. Hence the usual way of
dealing with damages is for the court to make some sort of assessment, and
of course they have to turn to the market (or a market at any rate) to do
that and to determine that the value of the item has indeed been diminished.
> David Riceman
Regards
Chana
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Message: 3
From: David Riceman <drice...@att.net>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 19:40:28 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Avodah] reasons for torah loopholes in dinei
Me:
>> you need to think harder about what constitutes "damage".
>>
RCL:
>
> I am not sure I understand this statement. Value is at the heart of the
> assessment of damages <snip>
It's easier to understand "hezek she'eino nikkar lav shmaih hezek"
literally. You haven't damaged the object by making it tamei (see H.
Hovel UMazik 7:1); you have damaged the owner's ability to use the
object (admittedly this presumes the Rambam's opinion that tumah is a
legal status rather than a physical status). Here's another example: as
I understand it (and I know almost nothing about common law so please
correct me if I'm wrong) if someone slanders me I can sue him for the
damage he's done to my reputation. In halacha no such resort exists.
He hasn't damaged me; he's damaged my relationship with others.
Rather than postulating the existence of multiple markets (which would
be subject to arbitrage) I think it's easier to postulate that there's a
preliminary step before assessing damage: determining whether damage
occurred.
David Riceman
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Message: 4
From: "Jonathan Baker" <jjba...@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2009 20:18:05 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: [Avodah] The Truth about Milk and Cookies
Someone pointed this article out to me, and I thought it looked interesting,
if not particularly groundbreaking:
http://www.floridajewishnews.com/site/friend/1280/
when is DE dairy and when not? how much contamination affects the
allergic vs. bittul? how does the OU-D designation for DE foods
relate to Cholov Yisroel adherents (particularly the strict Chasidic
kind the article talks about without noting that really only Chasidim
have that standard - CY being an issue of tref/kosher vs. chumra/kula.
--
name: jon baker web: http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker
address: jjba...@panix.com blog: http://thanbook.blogspot.com
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Message: 5
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 02:17:20 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] The Truth about Milk and Cookies
Jonathan Baker wrote:
> Someone pointed this article out to me, and I thought it looked interesting,
> if not particularly groundbreaking:
>
> http://www.floridajewishnews.com/site/friend/1280/
That URL doesn't bring up the page. This one does:
http://www.floridajewishnews.com/site/a/The_Truth_About_Milk_Cookies/
--
Zev Sero The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name eventually run out of other people?s money
- Margaret Thatcher
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Message: 6
From: Saul.Z.New...@kp.org
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 07:31:58 -0700
Subject: [Avodah] matzmiach keren yeshua
http://parsha.blo
gspot.com/2009/03/who-causest-jesus-to-flourish-unlikely.html?showComment=1
237397220000#c5298213772863160476
on a theory that yeshua is not a what but a who in the amidah bracha...
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Message: 7
From: "Chana Luntz" <ch...@kolsassoon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 15:30:16 -0000
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Avodah] reasons for torah loopholes in dinei
RDR writes:
> It's easier to understand "hezek she'eino nikkar lav shmaih hezek"
> literally.
I am not sure that you are in fact translating it any more literally than I
am. You are translating this as "Damage that cannot be detected *is not*
damage", I am translating it as "Damage that cannot be detected is not
considered [in the courts] to be damage". I would argue that my translation
is as literal, if not more so, than yours - given that the opening word
makes it clear that what we are dealing with is indeed is a form of damage.
And I think that can also been seem by the formulation of the Shulchan Aruch
on this (this is Choshen Mishpat siman 385 si'if 1):
Hamazik es chavero hezek sheano nikkar ... min hatorah hu patur aval
hachachmim kansu l'shalem nezek shalem me'hayafa shebenichnasav k'din kol
hamazikim ...
You haven't damaged the object by making it tamei (see H.
> Hovel UMazik 7:1); you have damaged the owner's ability to use the
> object (admittedly this presumes the Rambam's opinion that tumah is a
> legal status rather than a physical status).
Either way you are assuming (that is what is so interesting about this case)
that tumah or whatever is a legal status rather than a physical status (ie
that despite this being a biblical situation, that it is really quasi din
gavra rather than cheftza).
Here's another example: as
> I understand it (and I know almost nothing about common law so please
> correct me if I'm wrong) if someone slanders me I can sue him for the
> damage he's done to my reputation. In halacha no such resort exists.
> He hasn't damaged me; he's damaged my relationship with others.
Are you sure about there being no remedy in halacha? What about the
discussion in the Rema in Choshen Mishpat siman 420 si'if 38 which certainly
seems to give rise to the possibility of remedy, depending on the case. The
Sde Chemed has a whole mareches on this called Mareches Chirufin (Vol 8
pp165-179) in which he goes into great detail about those forms of name
calling which are potentially actionable and those which aren't. The issue
seems often to indeed be about reputation (the difference between being
called a "mamzer" and being called "like a mamzer", would surely seem to
hinge on that question).
But leaving all that aside, one of the things for which payment is made if
damage to the person is determined is for embarrassment. The fact that
embarrassment on its own, without physical damage, does not allow somebody
to pursue a claim in damages would thus seem not to mean that embarrassment
is not considered a form of damage, but merely that it is not one that is
actionable in the courts without there being a physical aspect as well.
> Rather than postulating the existence of multiple markets
It is not a matter of postulating multiple markets - multiple markets were
and are a fact of life. An equally appealing kosher and treif piece of meat
has the same value in the market of the non Jews, it does not in a market of
Jews. You just can't make those markets the same. The question is thus not
about multiple markets, but about which market should be used as the basis
for any assessment of damages.
> (which would be subject to arbitrage)
Its called the Monsey butcher scenario - that is precisely what he did,
arbitraged between the kosher and general market.
> I think it's easier to postulate that there's a
> preliminary step before assessing damage: determining whether damage
> occurred.
But what does it mean to say that no damage has occurred to an item when
before time X it could be sold for 100 units in a given market, and now it
can only be sold for 50? How do you describe this item? Much more
straightforward to say that the item is indeed damaged, but damaged in a way
that may or may not actionable in the courts (ie any person who caused this
is patur).
It is of course also interesting that of the d'orisa positions outlined by
the previous poster, this is the one that the chachamim saw as needing to be
fixed (as made clear in the Shulchan Aruch I quoted above).
I had a thought (although it is kind of sort of drush really) that one could
argue that by imposing matan Torah on us, Hashem could be said to have
inflicted hezek sheaino nikar on our property. After all, before Matan
Torah, the produce of our crops had a certain value in the general market,
as did our animals etc etc. After Matan Torah, that value suddenly
diminished. After all, the crops were now tevel that needed to be metaken
by taking trumos and ma'asros, at a cost to us, our animals needed to be
ma'asered etc etc and so we would receive less for them on the general
market than we would have before. If hezek sheaino nikar was chayav, then
technically would we not have a damages claim against Hashem (especially
given the har hagiga)? Of course one might say that our property decreased
in physical value and increased in spiritual value (as it can now be used in
the performance of mitzvos such as being metaken tevel, ma'asering behamos
etc) but since one cannot take spiritual value into account in terms of
hezek, maybe you need hezek sheaino nikar to be patur to make the equation
work. On the other hand, when a person (rather than Hashem) engages in
hezek sheino nikar, generally they are decreasing, not increasing, the
mitzvah potential of the item, hence the need for the rabbinical fix.
> David Riceman
Regards
Chana
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Message: 8
From: David Riceman <drice...@att.net>
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 14:29:59 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Avodah] reasons for torah loopholes in dinei
Chana Luntz wrote:
> And I think that can also been seem by the formulation of the Shulchan Aruch
> on this (this is Choshen Mishpat siman 385 si'if 1):
>
> Hamazik es chavero hezek sheano nikkar ... min hatorah hu patur aval
> hachachmim kansu l'shalem nezek shalem me'hayafa shebenichnasav k'din kol
> hamazikim ...
>
It certainly is interesting that he doesn't use the Rambam's formulation.
> Are you sure about there being no remedy in halacha? What about the
> discussion in the Rema in Choshen Mishpat siman 420 si'if 38 which certainly
> seems to give rise to the possibility of remedy, depending on the case. The
> Sde Chemed has a whole mareches on this called Mareches Chirufin (Vol 8
> pp165-179) in which he goes into great detail about those forms of name
> calling which are potentially actionable and those which aren't.
I don't own a Sdei Hemed. My impression of the Rama is that the Beis
Din has the authority to award a fine in its capacity as keeper of
communal peace, rather than in its capacity as remedying monetary damage.
> But leaving all that aside, one of the things for which payment is made if
> damage to the person is determined is for embarrassment. The fact that
> embarrassment on its own, without physical damage, does not allow somebody
> to pursue a claim in damages would thus seem not to mean that embarrassment
> is not considered a form of damage, but merely that it is not one that is
> actionable in the courts without there being a physical aspect as well.
>
Boshes is a weird din because it requires intention, unlike the standard
cases of nezikin. Again I think it is better understood under a
different rubric.
> It is not a matter of postulating multiple markets - multiple markets were
> and are a fact of life. An equally appealing kosher and treif piece of meat
> has the same value in the market of the non Jews, it does not in a market of
> Jews. You just can't make those markets the same. The question is thus not
> about multiple markets, but about which market should be used as the basis
> for any assessment of damages.
>
On the contrary there is one market, and kosher and non-kosher meat are
different things which carry different prices. Multiple markets means
that the same thing sells for different prices in different markets in
the same town (i.e. the differences aren't attributable to cost of
access). That can't happen because of arbitrage, and that is what I
understood you to postulate in your initial post.
> But what does it mean to say that no damage has occurred to an item when
> before time X it could be sold for 100 units in a given market, and now it
> can only be sold for 50? How do you describe this item?
See the Rambam I cited last time: "hoil vl'o nishtanah hadavar vlo
nifsdah tzuraso ... aval midivrei sofrim amru hoil v'hifhis d'maihem
harei zeh hayyav". The item hasn't been damaged; it's market value has
been reduced.
David Riceman
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Message: 9
From: Saul.Z.New...@kp.org
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 16:01:17 -0700
Subject: [Avodah] minhag eretz yisrael
http://menachemmendel.net/blog/ see here for an article analyzing
whether minhag EY and psak RYKaro are synonymous....
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Message: 10
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2009 08:26:37 -0400
Subject: [Avodah] Held the Mountain over Them
I found this week's VBM email from R' Yitzchak Blau very interesting.
On the centrality of bechirah chafshi in the Or Sameiach's worldview.
See <http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/modern/19modern.htm>.
Within the shiur is something about the nature of Yahadus before Purim
that entirely surprised me:
: .... The gemara (Shabbat 88a) famously states
: that God suspended a mountain over the head of the Jewish people and
: intimidated them into accepting the Torah. R. Meir Simcha explains that
: God did not literally hold up a mountain; rather, the experience of
: direct and overpowering revelation removed their free choice. God did
: this on a momentary basis to ensure the Torah's acceptance, but
: immediately afterward the people reverted to the freedom that reflects
: the true goal of creation. "Return to your tents" (Devarim 5:27)
: refers to the soul returning to the tent of physicality, a place with
: temptation, struggle and choice.[12]
: In that gemara, Rabba says that the Jewish people have a
: ready excuse for their violation of Torah laws. After all, they were
: coerced into accepting the Torah, so the covenant should not bind them!
: The gemara answers that the Jews freely reaffirmed their commitment at
: the time of Achashverosh. Does the gemara truly intend to suggest that
: the Jews were not held liable during the time of the First Temple?
: Didn't God punish them for transgressions during this time? Ritva
: argues that the gemara did not actually mean that the Jews were coerced;
: it only brings in the later commitment as a response to heretics.
: Ramban says that even before the Purim episode, living in the Land of
: Israel carried with it certain responsibilities and the potential of
: punishment. The original covenant did not bind them, but the lease
: agreement of the Land of Israel did.[13]
: R. Meir Simcha takes the Jewish people's excuse very
: seriously. If coerced, they cannot be responsible. However, an
: exemption regarding the broader responsibility of the covenant does not
: exempt them from the Noachide laws. God punished the people during the
: First Temple period for sins such as murder, idolatry, and sexual
: immorality. Such sins were punishable even without the covenant at
: Sinai, since they represent the basic moral decency demanded of every
: human being.[14]
: The people at Sinai understand that freedom reflects the human ideal.
: They request that Moshe tell them the rest of the Torah because they
: want to reclaim their ability to choose. If the direct divine
: revelation proves so overwhelming that it dissolves freedom, then they
: want a human prophet to transmit the divine message. Better to forego
: direct communication from God in order to hear the word of God in a way
: that still allows for free will.[15]
: [11] Meshekh Chokhma introduction to Shemot.
: [12] Ibid.
: [13] Ritva and Ramban's interpretations appear in their commentaries on Shabbat 88a.
: [14] Meshekh Chokhma Shemot 19:17.
: [15] Meshekh Chokhma Devarim 5:25.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
mi...@aishdas.org your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter
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Message: 11
From: Achdut18 <achdu...@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2009 00:38:00 -0500
Subject: [Avodah] Psukim tacked on to Shir ha-Ma'alot
At the end of Shir ha-Ma'alot, some have the minhag of adding several p'sukim,
beginning with "t'hillat ha-shem y'daber pi."
What is the origin of this?
One rabbinic scholar told me that it was chassidish, going back to
the last quarter of the 18th century, reflecting chassidic tendencies
to personalize prayer and create a more initimate connection to G-d.
Another scholar has suggested that it may have been a desire to tone
the Zionist theme of Shir ha-Ma'alot.
Are there any sources that discuss this?
//Avi
Avram Sacks
Skokie, IL
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Message: 12
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2009 09:34:53 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Psukim tacked on to Shir ha-Ma'alot
Achdut18 wrote:
> At the end of Shir ha-Ma'alot, some have the minhag of adding several p'sukim,
> beginning with "t'hillat ha-shem y'daber pi."
>
> What is the origin of this?
>
> One rabbinic scholar told me that it was chassidish, going back to
> the last quarter of the 18th century, reflecting chassidic tendencies
> to personalize prayer and create a more initimate connection to G-d.
>
> Another scholar has suggested that it may have been a desire to tone
> the Zionist theme of Shir ha-Ma'alot.
The set of pesukim {Avarcha, Sof davar, Tehilat Hashem, Vaanachnu}
appear in all versions of Siddur HaAriZal, Pri Etz Chayim, and Mishnat
Chasidim. Therefore they are older than chassidus, and certainly cannot
be a reaction to Zionism.
I don't know the origin of the set {Tehilat, Vaanachnu, Mi yemalel, Hodu}
which is used in Nusach Ashkenaz, but surely neither of these suggestions
can apply to it, since it's not used by chasidim and it surely predates
Zionism too.
--
Zev Sero The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name eventually run out of other people?s money
- Margaret Thatcher
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Message: 13
From: Avram Sacks <achdu...@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2009 23:13:59 -0500
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Psukim tacked on to Shir ha-Ma'alot
Hello R. Sero,
Thank you very much for your response.
All of the sources you cite, appear to be Kabbalistic sources. The Ari
wrote Pri Etz Chayim, and Mishnat Chasidim is Kabbalistic, written by a
contemporary of the Baal Shem Tov, although I don't know if they were aware
of one another. Chassidut was heavily influenced by Kabbalah. So, while
chassidism may not have originated the custom of reciting the verses
T'hillat, etc., if it originated in kabbalah, then it makes sense that
chassidim would have adopted it, although this doesn't explain why. Given
how far back this goes, I would agree that it cannot be a reaction to
Zionism. Your answer begs the question, "So when did Mi yemalel and Hodu
get added and why?"
And, if the set "T'hillat, Va'anachnu, Hodu, and Mi Yimalel" is decidedly Ashkenazic, why do we not see it in more Ashkenazic bentschers?
Kol tuv,
//Avi
Avram Sacks
Sunday, March 22, 2009, 8:34:53 AM, R. Zev Sero wrote in response to my
question about the origins of the p'sukim at the end of Shir Ha-ma'alot
(T'hillat, Va'anachnu, Hodu, Mi Yimalel):
ZS> The set of pesukim {Avarcha, Sof davar, Tehilat Hashem, Vaanachnu}
ZS> appear in all versions of Siddur HaAriZal, Pri Etz Chayim, and
ZS> Mishnat Chasidim. Therefore they are older than chassidus, and ZS> certainly cannot be a reaction to Zionism.
ZS> I don't know the origin of the set {Tehilat, Vaanachnu, Mi yemalel, Hodu} which is used in Nusach Ashkenaz, but surely neither of these suggestions
ZS> can apply to it, since it's not used by chasidim and it surely predates
ZS> Zionism too.
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Message: 14
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2009 11:36:27 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Rambam's naturalism
On Sun, Mar 15, 2009 at 05:40:48PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: As far as I know, there are two models which describe God running each
: detail of the world. One is the model the Rambam attributes to the
: Kalam, which is that each thing that happens in an individual expression
: of God's will.... The other is the model of the world as a clockwork
: mechanism, which I think is due to Descartes, and certainly was
: advocated by no Rishon (I don't know whether it remains tenable after
: quantum mechanics).
I believe RDR's is a false dichomoty.
The most common amongst the rishonim is actually a mixture of the two:
HP for humans or only for deserving humans, and hashgachah kellalis
(HK; Divine Wisdom as expressed in nature) for everything else. The line
between HP ("an individual expression of G-d's will") and the clockwork
(HK) therefore shifts with the person, baasher hu sham.
Then there's the question of bechirah and the consequences others feel
of my choices. The famous (at least in our chevrah) Or haChaim on why
the brothers threw Yoseif in a pit rather than kill him outright. If
they killed him outright, he would die because of their bechirah and
they wouldn't know if it was really Retzon haBorei.
To those three, the Kuzari (5:20) adds miqreh. (Although I should note
that he considered HK to be more about indirect causation than General
Providence.) His examples of miqreh, though, are all cases of human
action without complete planning. Quoting from
<http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Kitab_al_Khazari/Part_Five>, Dr
Hartwig Hirschfield's 1950 translation:
As regards the arbitrary actions, they have their roots in the free
will of man, when he is in a position to exercise it. Free will belongs
to the class of intermediary causes, and possesses causes which reduce
it, chainlike, to the Prime Cause. This course is not compulsory,
because the whole thing is potential, and the mind wavers between an
opinion and its opposite, being permitted to turn where it chooses. The
result is praise or blame for the choice, which is not the case in the
other classes. An accidental or natural cause cannot be blamed, although
some of them admit a possibility. But one cannot blame a child or a
sleeping person for harm done.
However, one needn't add miqreh or bechirah and still have a mixture, not
either extreme. This one-or-the-other that RDR presents is false. Second,
even with only bechirah chafshi added to the mix, we still have a universe
without randomness.
I'm not sure, therefore that *every* rishon believes in a random
element. It could be that everything is either clockwork, HP or another's
bechirah. And, since most events have are from a convergence of many
causes -- some combination of all three. (Although I don't know of a
rishon who discusses this added level of complexity rather than speaking
of an event having /a/ proximate cause; looking at a chain of causes
rather than a net.)
: Consequently all Rishonim accept that randomness exists in this world
: (see Ramban's commentary on Iyov 36:7 and see Kuzari 5:20). That's why
: (or at least the first paragraph of why) many Rishonim held that
: hashgaha over animals extends only to species....
But that too could be Clockmaker-level hashgachah over nature. Not
random, as everything can be traced back causally and
determinallistically to events that
: Raavad (in H. Tshuva 5:5) can distinguish between Divine knowledge and
: Divine causation (cf. KLaH Pithchei Hochmah #28).
I'm not sure I personally would distinguish between Divine knowledge
and the existence of the known. IOW, I (as a product of a post-Besht
generation) do not find the Raavad's position as appealing as some
others'.
: Unfortunately "mikreh" ("accident") is a technical term with two
: meanings, and often the meaning "random" gets drowned out by the more
: prevalent meaning (the opposite of "essence").
Miqreh as happenstance
vs
miqreh as an attribute that's not a defining feature.
Nice chiluq. Thinking out loud:
I think the former meaning is primary, c.f. the tokhahah "vehalachta imi
beqeri". Then it grew to include things that happen to be true of an item.
Also related is the Kantian concepts of analytic vs synthetic.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic-synthetic_distinction> defines them
as "Analytic propositions are those which are true simply by virtue of
their meaning while synthetic propositions are not." IOW, "All triangles
have three sides" is an analytic proposition. "This triangle is black" is
a synthetic statement, and would be true if I had a particular triangle
in mind and it did indeed happen to be black. It's an accident in the
sense of non-defining attribute of one particular triangle.
A modern might define miqreh in the second sense as a synthetic
proposition, rather than a non-essential one.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger I long to accomplish a great and noble task,
mi...@aishdas.org but it is my chief duty to accomplish small
http://www.aishdas.org tasks as if they were great and noble.
Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Helen Keller
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Message: 15
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2009 13:09:48 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Q re tonight's RYReisman shiur on the chamah
On Sat, Mar 14, 2009 at 11:30pm EDT, R Michael Poppers wrote:
: One of RYR's Qs essentially was "If 'B'Tishri nivra ha'olam,' why do we say
: Bircas haChamah in Nisan?" w/ his answer being (based on a Tos'fos in BT
: Rosh haShanah 27) that we hold like R'Eliezer (b'Tishri) in the world of
: machshavah and like R'Y'hoshua (b'Nisan) in the world of ma'aseh...
First, let me HIGHLY recommend
<http://www.dafyomi.co.il/rhashanah/halachah/rh-hl-011.htm>
Also, we mix our usage of tequfos, Shemu'el and R' Adda. Mas'as Binyamin
Points this out, and links the two mixtures. He simply says that you
see from one (the use of two different approximations depending on
context) that the other is okay as well.
BTW, looking at the Rambam pointed to there (Berakhos 10:18), we see
that the event is sunset the night before. As is also the shitah of
Rabbeinu Yonah (DH haRo'eh Chamah). The berakhah is made on the first
sunrise AFTER the tequfah is back where it was (approximately).
As for it being at sunrise, that would be shitas R' Eliezer, that things
were created in their initial state. Thus the first sunrise in a year
where the tequfah began at the beginning of the night is a repeat of
maaseh bereishis. R' Yehoshua holds the sun was created at noon. (BTW,
R' Eliezer Ehrenpreis suggests this underlies the machloqes about the
halachic date line.) Notice that we're being inconsistent even within
this one machloqes -- the time of year according to R' Yehoshua, but
the time of day according to R' Eliezer.
Li nir'eh the whole thing is being treated mythically. I don't mean to
reopen the whole literal Bereishis 1 question. Not "myth" in contrast to
actual events. I mean that the concepts are being used as concepts with
no concern as to whether it matches history. Or even, for that matter,
internal consistency.
The whole think is just a way to construct a zeicher (zechar? <g>)
maaseh bereishis. It's the fact that these ideas are bouncing around in
our heads that's relevent, not which idea corresponds to history or
is consistent with our estimates for dinim that require more precision.
: My Q is: don't we calculate the average molad
: going back to Tishri rather than Nisan? Now, Googling a bit, I see that
: R'Micha had some comments a few years ago re the starting point for molad
: calculations (see http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol14/v14n071.shtml#19 ;
And I still am convinced of them.
: (http://www.hamodia.com/inthepaper.cfm?ArticleID=143 ) as having an answer
: for my Q, and I quote: "Other commentaries offer different explanations for
: the fact that we reckon the astronomy-based halachos from Nisan but count
: years from Tishrei, with some explaining that although the sun and moon may
: have been created in Tishrei, the beginning of their cycles was actually
: the equinox before - but it was a 'theoretical' equinox. Similarly, the
: animals were created fully matured and the trees fully grown, and the sun
: and moon were also created in the middle of their cycles. So even though
: they may have been created in Tishrei, their cycle had theoretically
: started on the previous (theoretical) equinox, in Nisan. The Rishonim use
: this reasoning in regard to the first molad (phase) of the moon, taking
: into account the theoretical molad that 'happened' before the actual
: creation of the moon (see Tosafos Rosh Hashanah 8b litekufos)."...
Clearly the molad we were given was that of the Nissan before yetzi'as
Mitzrayim. Said so in yesterday's haftorah. I assume therefore that molad
Tohu was back-calculated for its (relative) ease, so that the year offset
to the benchmark is the year number, AM. That was the answer I gave before.
(It also answers how there are tannaim who imply a different age of the
universe in their parshanut [eg by changing the age of someone at an
event the SO uses in his calculation]. The molad isn't proof of the Seider
Olam, it was reverse-engineered assuming the SO.)
That isn't similarly true of birkhas hachamah. The berakhah is derabbanan,
and it was tannaim who had to decide what kind of "full cycle of the
sun" would be noted by it. There was no pre-existing number for them
to reverse-engineer. How does one simply assume the parallel?
Also, I'm not sure I agree with this description of the Tosafos. Tosafos
seem to be speaking of "sof maaseh bemachashavah techilah" and when HQBH
planned it all. (Throw in numerous kavayachol's as appropriate.) The
author for Hamodia is rendering it as being about human thought, and our
creating a theoretical start date.
Cycles don't have an intrinsic "start". There is no meaning to "although
the sun and moon may have been created in Tishrei, the beginning of their
cycles was actually the equinox before - but it was a 'theoretical' equinox."
Without it being the actual time of creation, what makes one point in a
circle (oval, really) the beginning over another?
Besides, the idea is a return of the sun to where it was created. Not to
where it was hypothetically. How is one commemorating maaseh bereishis
by commemorating a hypothetical pre-bereishis event?
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger A person must be very patient
mi...@aishdas.org even with himself.
http://www.aishdas.org - attributed to R' Nachman of Breslov
Fax: (270) 514-1507
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Message: 16
From: David Riceman <drice...@att.net>
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2009 12:34:17 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Rambam's naturalism
Me:
> : As far as I know, there are two models which describe God running each
> : detail of the world. One is the model the Rambam attributes to the
> : Kalam, which is that each thing that happens in an individual expression
> : of God's will.... The other is the model of the world as a clockwork
> : mechanism, which I think is due to Descartes, and certainly was
> : advocated by no Rishon (I don't know whether it remains tenable after
> : quantum mechanics).
>
RMB:
> I believe RDR's is a false dichomoty.
>
> The most common amongst the rishonim is actually a mixture of the two:
> HP for humans or only for deserving humans, and hashgachah kellalis
> (HK; Divine Wisdom as expressed in nature) for everything else. The line
> between HP ("an individual expression of G-d's will") and the clockwork
> (HK) therefore shifts with the person, baasher hu sham.
>
I tried to avoid discussing hashgaha in that post. In the Rambam's
model hashgaha works via prophecy, and hence is irrelevant to how God
runs the world.
I was unclear in my opening sentence in the cited paragraph: what I
meant to convey was that most rishonim reject the idea that God runs
each detail of the world (henceforth "determinism"). Instead they claim
that God built a certain amount of randomness into the world (reread the
citations to Ramban and Kuzari I gave last time). What RMB calls HK is
incompatible with determinism. That paragraph cites the only two models
of determinism that I know of. I presented the more common opinions in
a later paragraph.
> However, one needn't add miqreh or bechirah and still have a mixture, not
> either extreme. This one-or-the-other that RDR presents is false. Second,
> even with only bechirah chafshi added to the mix, we still have a universe
> without randomness.
>
I don't understand this paragraph. I was using "randomness" to mean
"not predetermined by God", which is how its used by rishonim. Clearly
RMB has another definition, but I don't know what it is. Behirah
requires mikreh (actually Spinoza tried to be machria, but he was after
Descartes).
> I'm not sure, therefore that *every* rishon believes in a random
> element. It could be that everything is either clockwork, HP or another's
> bechirah.
No! Clockwork is an anachronism. It's not that rishonim considered it
and rejected it. It is a concept which had not yet been formulated. In
the middle ages intermediaries (laws of nature) implied randomness, and
determinism implied the absence of intermediaries.
>
David Riceman
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Message: 17
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2009 14:26:12 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Q re tonight's RYReisman shiur on the chamah
Micha Berger wrote:
> As for it being at sunrise, that would be shitas R' Eliezer, that things
> were created in their initial state. Thus the first sunrise in a year
> where the tequfah began at the beginning of the night is a repeat of
> maaseh bereishis. R' Yehoshua holds the sun was created at noon. (BTW,
> R' Eliezer Ehrenpreis suggests this underlies the machloqes about the
> halachic date line.)
The only shita I know of that relates the dateline to the creation is
Shu"T Benei Tzion by R David(?) Shapiro (vol 1, Jerusalem 1930), which
is a very rare sefer. But he doesn't quote anything about sunrise;
he quotes a medrash that the me'orot were installed into the sky at 9am,
and another one that the sun was directly over Gan Eden, from which he
deduces that Gan Eden is 45deg east of EY (and presumably on the equator).
He then puts one edge of the dateline 90deg east of that, which is where
it was shkia at that moment, and the other edge a varying number of
degrees east of THAT, where it was tz"hk. (He's the only shita I know
of that has a dateline with substantial thickness, and says that inside
the dateline it's officially safek, like bein hashmashot.)
--
Zev Sero The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name eventually run out of other people?s money
- Margaret Thatcher
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