Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 375

Tue, 04 Nov 2008

• 1. childbirth (Eli Turkel)
• 2. Re: Virtual Glyph Theory (T6...@aol.com)
• 3. hyprocrisy in halacha (Eli Turkel)
• 4. Re: Hypocrisy in halakhah (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 5. gzalas akum (M Cohen)
• 6. hypocrisy in halacha (Eli Turkel)
• 7. Re: hypocrisy in halacha (Zev Sero)
• 8. Re: Hypocrisy in halakhah (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: gzalas akum (Zev Sero)
• 10. Re: Hypocrisy in halakhah (Zev Sero)
• 11. Re: Some thoughts on Shemonah Perakim (Micha Berger)

<<And yet it is a ma'aseh b'chol yom (or should I say, b'chol shabbas) that we
are mechallel shabbas for the sake of a woman in childbirth.

Now I agree that Rav Moshe here is tackling one of the fundamental questions
I have had for a long time, which is, how is it that women are allowed to
let themselves get pregnant, given that they know that by so doing they will
be placing themselves in a matzav of a chola sheyesh bo sakana, and without
even an obligation to do so (or at most a rabbinic obligation)?  And
likewise how can a man get a woman pregnant, knowing he will be putting her
into such a matzav, mitzvah or no mitzvah?  Does not pikuach nefesh
override? >>

1. In fact many commentaries say there is a difference between
childbirth and other
sakkanot in terms of shabbat. For other pikuach nefesh we override
shabbat and one
can do whatever is necessary without hesitation. However, for
childbirth one is required
to start with the least problematical work (ha-kal ha-kal techila).
The reason given is that
childbirth is a natural danger

2. In the medical shiurim of R. Zilberstein he has several times dealt
with the question
whether a woman can get pregnant when she has a serious disease that
the pregnancy will
aggravate even to the point of pikuach nefesh. His standard answer is
that the woman is
not required to but is allowed to get pregnant if she wishes. Her
desire for children
overrides putting herself into danger.
Though he does not mention it a similar situation occurs when one's
job entails danger
that we pasken that can is allowed to take on a dangerous profession,
eg Nodah BeYehuda
allows one to become a hunter (he has side problems that are not relevant here).

3. Do we assume  Rachel Immenu violated one of the 3 sins that cause
death in childbirth.
More generally there were many righteous women who dies in childbirth
throughout the ages.
It was in fact one of the major causes of death for women in the middle ages.
Do we assume they were all violating niddah, challah or candle lighting?

-- 
Eli Turkel

 
 
From: "Jay F Shachter" _...@m5.chicago.il.us_ (mailto:j...@m5.chicago.il.us) 


>>One  would expect, however, that this paired change would proceed in the
following  manner: The yod in "Sarai" decays into two h's, one of which
remains bound to  the other two letters while the other is emitted.  The
emitted h is then  captured by Avram, who absorbs it and becomes
Avraham.<<
 
>>>>>
Don't forget that Sarah's yud was later "captured"  by Hoshea bin Nun when 
his name was changed to Yehoshua.  I assume that,  like electrons that can be 
used over and over in different chemical reactions,  her yud can be used 
repeatedly, but then, I am neither a chemist nor a  mathematician, so I could be 
wrong.
 
           

--Toby  Katz
=============





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In an article published a dozen years ago, Marc B. Shapiro, "Rabbi
David Zevi Hoffmann on Torah and Wissenschaft," Torah u-Madda Journal
6 (1995-1996): 129-137,
available at YUTorah.org, noted that Rabbiner Hoffmann, who would
later begin publishing his collection of she'elot u-teshuvot in 1926,
authored an 1885 volume that is apologetic in nature, "an entire work
in defense of the Jewish attitude towards Gentiles" (130), and that

    "[t]his is a very interesting book and deserves careful study...
What needs to be determined is whether Hoffmann's misrepresentations
are intentional
or simply reflect his honestly held belief that Jewish sources have a
strongly favorable view of Christianity and its adherents" (136n5).

-- 
Eli Turkel

R' Zev Sero wrote:
> We owe them only the basic duty that every person owes
> every other: not to harm them, not to steal from them,
> not to defraud them.  But we have no positive obligation
> to help them in any way; we do have such a duty to our
> brothers, precisely because they are our brothers.

So, theoretically, if we see someone in a sakanah on Shabbos, doing a
melacha to rescue him is *not* among the basic duties which we owe to
people in general, but is only something which we'd do for a brother. In
practice, of course, we *would* rescue even a non-brother, but only to
insure that he'd rescue us if the situation were reversed, *not* because it
is a "basic duty". Is that what you're saying? 

If so, I can accept it as a halacha, because we understand how important
Shabbos is. But it seems to me that the goal of this "basic duty /
brothers" explanation is to explain things in a manner which would sound
fair to the non-brother. But it won't. He will not accept it as fair unless
his religion is similarly discriminatory against us.

Akiva Miller
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RSZ writes ...this explains nearly all the differences in halacha between us
and them.
We owe them only the basic duty that every person owes every other:
not to harm them, not to steal from them, not to defraud them.  But we have
no positive obligation to help them in any way; we do have such a duty to
our brothers, precisely because they are our brothers.

This is true. 

however, given the above I have never understood hashkofically the rishonim
(& din) that gzalas akum is only asur m'drabbon.

why should gzalas akum (on a d'oraisa level) be mutar?
what about "..the basic duty that every person owes every other, not to harm
them, not to steal from them.."

Mordechai cohen

In an article published a dozen years ago, Marc B. Shapiro, "Rabbi
David Zevi Hoffmann on Torah and Wissenschaft," Torah u-Madda Journal
6 (1995-1996): 129-137,
available at YUTorah.org, noted that Rabbiner Hoffmann, who would
later begin publishing his collection of she'elot u-teshuvot in 1926,
authored an 1885 volume that is apologetic in nature, "an entire work
in defense of the Jewish attitude towards Nochrim" (130), and that

   "[t]his is a very interesting book and deserves careful study...
What needs to be determined is whether Hoffmann's misrepresentations
are intentional or simply reflect his honestly held belief that Jewish sources
 have a strongly favorable view of X and its adherents" (136n5).


-- 
Eli Turkel

Eli Turkel wrote:
>> 1- There is a difference in one's responsibility to a brother
>> and one's responsibility to others. To take a clear case,
>> ribis. The pasuq refers to the borrower as achikha. If your brother is
>> stuck needing cash, charging him interest is a little callous. When it's
>> a stranger, interest is more acceptable. The pasuq explicitly tells you
>> that ribis isn't immoral, it's a matter of ahavas Yisrael and achdus.

> I think ribis is a bad example. The normal activity is to charge ribis and
> the prohibition of ribis is a chiddush and so applies only to Jews.
> I don't think that in the middle ages there were complaints that Jews
> lent with interest instead of a giving the King a free loan.

Of course there were.  Not from the kings, who could just default on the
loan and kick the Jews out if they wanted, but ordinary borrowers would
regularly complain about the Jews demanding interest from them -- and
often about the Jews demanding repayment altogether!  Every so often
they'd just kill the Jew and keep the money.



> I think the main criteria is how would feel if the situation were
> reversed.  If a Jew died because a Xtian doctor who was on the spot
> said he doesn't work on sunday except to save other Xtians  I assume
> there would be a great outrage over the antisemitic attitude.

And yet the SA (OC 330:2, YD 154:4) - and even the MA! - expect them to
accept this from us, and *doesn't* permit it mishum eiva.  The mishum
eiva heter came later (how late?), when they saw that in practise it
did provoke eiva, perhaps as they became less religious themselves.
The ChS (on the side in OC 330, and quoted at a bit more length by the
Pitchei Tshuva in YD 154) permits it "im yesh be'eva zu cheshash sakanat
nefashot"; it seems that this was a relatively new sha'alah in his days,
and not settled halacha.


> Both Moslem and Xtian countries in the middle ages (and sometimes
> today) had laws discriminating against Jews. I doubt that many modern
> day people feel that is entirely appropriate.

But what implications should this have?  So what if people feel that
way?

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
z...@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

On Tue, Nov 04, 2008 at 01:26:30PM +0000, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
: So, theoretically, if we see someone in a sakanah on Shabbos,
: doing a melacha to rescue him is *not* among the basic duties which
: we owe to people in general, but is only something which we'd do for a
: brother. In practice, of course, we *would* rescue even a non-brother,
: but only to insure that he'd rescue us if the situation were reversed,
: *not* because it is a "basic duty". Is that what you're saying?

See <http://www.aishdas.org/student/shabbat.htm>

Shabbos is entirely different. Shabbos is ke'ein kol haTorah kulah, and
therefor should be yeihareig ve'al yaavor. The only override is "chalel
alav Shabbos achas kedei sheyishmor Shabasos harbei" (Yuma 85b). (Or
even, sheyishmor 2 more minutes of Shabbos.) It's not yehudi vs nachri,
it's shomer Shabbasos vs non. See the Peri Megadim OC MZ 328:6 about
mechalelei Shabbos.

Gezeilas aku"m is more telling. The very fact that there can be a
machloqes about whether it's deOraisa or whether only actual aku"m
are excluded or all nachriim shows an assymetry in halachic treatment.
A given pesaq that shows more equality doesn't disprove the fact that
it's not simply taken for granted.

Back in http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol04/v04n347.shtml#11 (check out
the whole discussion, we had some well-informed posts there) RMDrarch
points to the Yam shel Shelomo (BK ch 10 # 20) that the spelled out laws
of bein adam lachaveiro are like the mitzvos bein adam laMaqom that are
particular to Yehudim -- they relate specifically to the beris. Gezeilah
is about an orderly society of benei beris. (RMM's head is probably
nodding in the background so vehemently, the chevrah in EY can probably
hear it.<g>) However, the YsS says gezeilas aku"m is no less assur,
just that it's not gezeilah.

If it's derabbanan, it is because they codified the consequence of a
fuzzy (vehalakhta bidrakhav) deOraisa.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision,
mi...@aishdas.org        yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view.
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507

M Cohen wrote:
> RSZ writes ...this explains nearly all the differences in halacha between us
> and them.
> We owe them only the basic duty that every person owes every other:
> not to harm them, not to steal from them, not to defraud them.  But we have
> no positive obligation to help them in any way; we do have such a duty to
> our brothers, precisely because they are our brothers.
> 
> This is true. 
> 
> however, given the above I have never understood hashkofically the rishonim
> (& din) that gzalas akum is only asur m'drabbon.

It's not at all clear that this is the din.  The Rambam and Smag and
SA all seem to hold that it's d'oraita.  The Kesef Mishna is medayek
from the Rambam otherwise, but almost everyone else doesn't see it.

The shita that it's only midrabanan (if that) is based on a Rashi in
Sanhedrin 57a (dh Yisrael Bekuti Mutar) and Sukkah 30a (dh Mai Ta'ama).
Rashi learns this from the pasuk "lo ta`ashok et re`acha velo tigzol";
apparently he applies the "et re`acha" to both oshek and gezela.  Li
hakatan it seems that on the contrary, if this were so the pasuk should
have said "lo ta`ashok velo tigzol et re`acha", or "lo ta`ashok et
re`acha velo tigzelenu"; since the pasuk puts "et re`acha" between the
two it seems to me that it's explicitly saying that oshek hagoi is
mutar but gezel is assur.  (Refraining from oshek can really be seen
as a kind of hashavat aveida, particularly the kind of passive oshek
that remains mutar even d'rabanan.  If someone makes a mistake in my
favour, why should it be my duty to correct him, unless I love him?)

At any rate, the GRA points out both in Sanhedrin and in CM 348:8 this
Rashi is very strange and contradicts almost every other source we can
find.  The Shach CM 359:2 is also puzzled by this, and says the Rambam
and the Smag both seem to pasken that it's d'oraita, but says that
ledina the Maharshal paskened like Rashi.  Also see Shach 348:2.

Another place all this is discussed is Ramo EH 28:1, and the nos'ei
kelim there.  But it's not clear there that the Ramo holds it's
mutar mid'oraita; maybe he only holds that mid'oraita once the avera's
been done one doesn't have to return it.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
z...@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
> R' Zev Sero wrote:
>> We owe them only the basic duty that every person owes
>> every other: not to harm them, not to steal from them,
>> not to defraud them.  But we have no positive obligation
>> to help them in any way; we do have such a duty to our
>> brothers, precisely because they are our brothers.
> 
> So, theoretically, if we see someone in a sakanah on Shabbos, doing a
> melacha to rescue him is *not* among the basic duties which we owe to
> people in general, but is only something which we'd do for a brother.

Not just on Shabbos.  At no time do people have a positive duty to
rescue each other -- that's why the pasuk says "lo taamod al dam *re`echa*.
A non-rea` has no claim on one, that would compel one to rescue him.
This is also reflected in the common law, which does not recognise any
duty to rescue a person in danger, unless one is in some way responsible
for that person, or for his danger.



> In practice, of course, we *would* rescue even a non-brother, but only
> to insure that he'd rescue us if the situation were reversed, *not*
> because it is a "basic duty". Is that what you're saying?

No, I'm saying there's no duty at all.  That we *would* rescue someone,
all else being equal, comes from our natural benevolence, not from any
moral or legal duty.

 
> If so, I can accept it as a halacha, because we understand how
> important Shabbos is.

Nothing to do with Shabbos.  The difference on Shabbos is that one is
not *allowed* to break Shabbos merely out of a wish to do good.


> But it seems to me that the goal of this "basic duty / brothers"
> explanation is to explain things in a manner which would sound fair to
> the non-brother. But it won't. He will not accept it as fair unless his
> religion is similarly discriminatory against us.

No, it isn't intended as apologetics.  I believe it's the real reason
for the distinction (not on Shabbos, during the week).  But it should
also be accepted by any fair-minded stranger, because it makes sense.
Of course we can't guarantee that anyone will be fair-minded, and
sometimes we have to do things because of fear of a unfair-minded mob,
but I will point out that when it comes to medical care it seems that
through most of the ages, right down to the beginning of the modern
era, the einam-yehudim were expected to accept that we only break
shabbos to heal our own and not them.  The modern heter mishum eiva
is not mentioned in the SA, or even in the MA, and the ChS seems to
deal with it as a new question that had never come up before.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
z...@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 06:29:48PM +0200, Michael Makovi wrote:
: wish for him to elaborate: (direct quotes)
: 1) "This goes to the core of my objection with this tendency among some
: in "Academic O" (as RYGB calls the subtype of MO) circles to consider
: halakhah a law with little or no motivational basis."
: 2) "This notion that it's primarily to be viewed as contract law is new,
: whether in its AO or "Rambamist" forms. Although the Rambam himself
: dedicates half of the Moreh cheileq 3 to an opposing viewpoint, it's
: clearly the stance of people like R' Chait."

Why does one observe mitzvos:

- To acheive sheleimus
- To acheive deveiqus
- Because Hashem said so, with no reason beyond that -- it's just the
   terms of the contract.
etc...

There is a tendency in some circles of O academics toward #3, not seeking
meaning or value in the enterprise of mitzvos. By which I mean beyond not
looking for taamei hamitzvos, not looking for a taam for observance in
general, on the level of the sample end-goals I listed above. Halachah
is contract law, and meaning is shelved. Typical of this trend is R'
Yeshayahu Leibowitz (who may have been the formulator).

There is, in parallel, a tendency in two circles of people who follow the
Yad as their final halachic guide to do the same -- the extreme branch
of neoBrisk (typified by R' Chait and his talmidim) and a subsection of
the Chardal community that looks up to the traditionalism and cultural
purity of Darada'i Teimanim.

: I do not understand your position.

I deleted what you didn't understand because it doesn't matter. It
wasn't my position as much as my not seeing your model as properly
conveying your own position. The discussion would get bogged in where
in the chain of reglection between us the message was lost.

: REB is not speaking of mitzvot instilling virtue; he is saying that
: halakhah is concerned with the practical temporal effects of our
: deeds, because he sees the purpose of halakhah as effecting a
: practical temporal sociological tikkun olam, in the same way which I
: have attributed to Rav Hirsch.

Rav Hirsch sees halakhah as impressing values. His educational system
of symbols is a temimus based philosophy, an intellectualist sibling to
Litvish thought.

REB sees the laws as expressing values, not impressing them on the
individual. And he sees those values are actually primary; the law is an
approximation. That is what motivates his more fluid than most rabbanim's
understanding of halachic process. To him, it's more about mapping the
value to the realia than historical rov poseqim, the acceptance of the
SA, or the other formal rules of pesaq. Those rules anchor the process,
not define it. (The question of whether what's left is stable, or is
bound to decay in the lack of clarity between Torah ethics and zeitgeist,
is left to the reader.)

: Rambam, although I do not claim to fully understand the precise
: nuances of his position ..., he seems to be saying that
: halakhah's purpose is to affect our own personal moral and rational
: virtues, whether indirectly (hukim) or directly (mishpatim).

Impress knowledge of G-d. An even more intellectual approach than RSRH.
RSRH saw attitudes and midos as primary, but that mitzvos impressed them
through symbology, an intellectual channel. The Rambam writes that
knowledge of G-d is primary, and acting like Him is a road to (or
perhaps facet of) that. There must be more there as well, his derekh
based on yedi'ah must somehow be closely related to dei'os as in Hilkhos
Dei'os.

: Thus, for REB, the halakhah would most certainly be davka expressing a
: value, and more, be attempting to give this value practical worldly
: effect...

And this notion that halakhah's goal is the expression of value rather
than a transformative life, is novel. I can't think of a pre-20th cent
seifer to present the idea. In aggadita, though, that's not sufficient
grounds for rejection, just suspicion.

However, there are consequent pragmatic differences.

If G-d wanted good to happen (expression of good), as opposed to wanting
people people who were good (impression), why wouldn't He have made
everything perfect to begin with?

Does REB disagree with the Rambam that giving $1 to 100 people is better
than giving $100 once? Isn't the halakhah pesuqah based on the impressive
power of this expression of generosity?

:         (A caveat: sometimes halakhah is itself behind the Torah's own
: internal ethos. If so, then halakhah must itself be updated. But in
: the end, halakhah still enshrines the ethic and seeks to give it
: practical effect.)

At this point I think most of the readers would put down their pencils
for the excercise I gave above. RMM seems to show how REB's fluidity
invites more change than most of us would consider proper.

Here's a quote allegedly from REB that I found by Google:
    [Rabbis] who are seriously concerned and troubled by the inadequate
    regard for the problems of contemporary Jewish life ... will introduce
    the halakhic changes that are required in recognition of the human
    dignity of the Jewish woman.

The contrapositive, that the lack of actual change reflects a lack of
concern, was stated in Blu Greenberg's famous quip about a rabbinic will
and halachic way.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur
mi...@aishdas.org        with the proper intent than to fast on Yom
http://www.aishdas.org   Kippur with that intent.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                       - Rabbi Israel Salanter


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