Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 374

Tue, 04 Nov 2008

• 1. Re: Hypocrisy in halakhah (Zev Sero)
• 2. Re: Hypocrisy in halakhah (Zev Sero)
• 3. Re: Hypocrisy in halakhah (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: Hypocrisy in halakhah (Zev Sero)
• 5. Re: Hypocrisy in halakhah (Micha Berger)
• 6. Mitzvat Talmud Torah (Liron Kopinsky)
• 7. Lech L'cha Evil and Sinful (Cantor Wolberg)
• 8. Virtual Glyph Theory (Jay F Shachter)
• 9. Re: Hypocrisy in halakhah (T6...@aol.com)
• 10. Re: childbirth as a time of sakana (T6...@aol.com)

Micha Berger wrote:
> I think that our treatment of unzerer vs nachriim is different can be
> explained by at least 2 factors:
> 
> 1- There is a difference in one's responsibility to a brother
> and one's responsibility to others. (As RRW noted last January in
> <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol25/v25n023.shtml#03>, not that I
> would approach the idea with the same emphasis.) To take a clear case,
> ribis. The pasuq refers to the borrower as achikha. If your brother is
> stuck needing cash, charging him interest is a little callous. When it's
> a stranger, interest is more acceptable. The pasuq explicitly tells you
> that ribis isn't immoral, it's a matter of ahavas Yisrael and achdus.

I'm glad to see that you agree with this point, since it's the one I've
been making here for years, apparently to your disapproval.  IMHO this
explains nearly all the differences in halacha between us and them.
We owe them only the basic duty that every person owes every other:
not to harm them, not to steal from them, not to defraud them.  But
we have no positive obligation to help them in any way; we do have such
a duty to our brothers, precisely because they are our brothers.

All the ways in which we must treat our fellow BY are ways in which we
would naturally treat an actual brother whom we genuinely loved; the
Torah doesn't even need to tell us that.  But what the Torah does tell
us is that if for some reason we do not have such feelings for a BY
we should act as if we had them, in these specific ways; doing so may
lead us to develop that feeling of brotherhood that we ought to have.
When it comes to the others, however, they aren't our brothers, so
there's no reason we ought to feel anything for them, and thus no
reason we should behave as if we did.  If we happen to like one of them
we're not forbidden to do them favours, but if we don't we don't have to.

That's all I've been saying, so if you agree then I don't know why
we've been at odds.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
z...@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

Micha Berger wrote:
 
> Li nir'eh, though, the taqanah was about something else. Not that we
> necessarily wanted to assimilate Xian marriage ethos, but in reflection
> of the fact that we already did. IOW, once the norm and expectation was
> to have a monogynous marriage, Rabbeinu Gershom might have felt that the
> few violations still left were cruel to the wife who came to be expect /
> assume exclusivity.

If it's simply a matter of the wife's expectations then surely he would
have left it up to her, as the Sefardim did, by making it a tnai ketuba
not to take a second wife without the first one's permission.  Since
ChDRG applies even with the wife's permission, it can't have been made
only for her benefit.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
z...@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

On Mon, Nov 03, 2008 at 02:39:04PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
: >1- There is a difference in one's responsibility to a brother
: >and one's responsibility to others...

: I'm glad to see that you agree with this point, since it's the one I've
: been making here for years, apparently to your disapproval...

There is a difference between increasing our responsibility to brothers,
and minimizing our general responsibility to tzelem E-lokim, or reducing
the scope of those words.

There is also a difference between making ontological statements about
the nature of various umos, and making statements about how we ought to
relate to them.

These are two distinct issues that divide us. E.g. the Kuzari says the
difference is ontological, not due to lack of common beris and eidah,
and yet does so by aggrandizing the Yehudi's nature, not playing down
the others'.

See the second half of my post at
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol25/v25n360.shtml#08 , where I note
pretty much the same position as yours is in the Tanya, pereq 1.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The waste of time is the most extravagant
mi...@aishdas.org        of all expense.
http://www.aishdas.org                           -Theophrastus
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Micha Berger wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 03, 2008 at 02:39:04PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
> : >1- There is a difference in one's responsibility to a brother
> : >and one's responsibility to others...
> 
> : I'm glad to see that you agree with this point, since it's the one I've
> : been making here for years, apparently to your disapproval...
> 
> There is a difference between increasing our responsibility to brothers,
> and minimizing our general responsibility to tzelem E-lokim, or reducing
> the scope of those words.

Let's leave the ontological question aside.  Ontology has never been
that important to me.  WRT to the practical issue, what exactly is the
difference between us?  You seem to assume an absolute scale, and a
"default state" from which I am "demoting" einam-yehudim, whereas you
leave them in that state and raise yehudim above it.  But where do you
get that absolute scale or that default state from?  And without one,
if we simply describe the difference between us and them, and the
consequences of that difference, who is to say whether we are "demoting"
one or "promoting" the other, or perhaps demoting or promoting both,
but one more than the other?


> These are two distinct issues that divide us. E.g. the Kuzari says the
> difference is ontological, not due to lack of common beris and eidah,
> and yet does so by aggrandizing the Yehudi's nature, not playing down
> the others'.

Again, what is the difference here?  Mere semantics?  

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
z...@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

On Mon, Nov 03, 2008 at 06:02:57PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
: Let's leave the ontological question aside.  Ontology has never been
: that important to me...

But it is to me, and therefore it's part of what I took exception to.

:                        WRT to the practical issue, what exactly is the
: difference between us? ...

The difference is the amount of greater consideration for nachriim than
for beheimos. IOW, our difference in attitude toward a current events
story I don't want to discuss on Avodah derives from our difference in
definition of the rights of the alleged victims. Similarly our dispute
about chatzi Hallel during most of Pesach, etc, etc, etc...

:                         You seem to assume an absolute scale, and a
: "default state" from which I am "demoting" einam-yehudim, whereas you
: leave them in that state and raise yehudim above it....

I would instead say the difference between us is whether we spend our
time thinking about this person being down, or that person being up. In
that earlier post, I likened it to the difference between arur Haman
and barukh Mordechai. In both cases, Mordechai ends up more blessed
than Haman; but am I trying to raise one or lower the other? Where is
my attention, where do my efforts go?

:>These are two distinct issues that divide us. E.g. the Kuzari says the
:>difference is ontological, not due to lack of common beris and eidah,
:>and yet does so by aggrandizing the Yehudi's nature, not playing down
:>the others'.

: Again, what is the difference here? Mere semantics?

The Kuzari could give the same peshat in "chaviv adam shenivra betzelem"
as the TY. You, OTOH, invoked "atem keruyim adam". With all the
differences mentioned above both ontological and attitudinal.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A person must be very patient
mi...@aishdas.org        even with himself.
http://www.aishdas.org         - attributed to R' Nachman of Breslov
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A person must be very patient
mi...@aishdas.org        even with himself.
http://www.aishdas.org         - attributed to R' Nachman of Breslov
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Hi all,
I am currently learning the 8th Perek of Yuma (PehDaled amud Alef) where
there is a sugyah which deals with a cure that a non-jewish (female) doctor
prescribed to be taken on shabbat. A few amoraim have different opinions
about what that cure is (yeast water, olive oil and salt, yeast itself,
olive oil, and salt etc.).
The question raised is "Is there a kiyum of mitzvat talmud torah by learning
the sections of Gemarrah that have cures that don't apply today?" The sugyah
as a whole (whether you can take medicines on shabbat etc.) obviously is,
but is there for studying the refuot themselves?

Kol Tuv,
~Liron
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> 13:13   "And the people of Sodom were evil and sinful toward Hashem  
> exceedingly."  There are various explanations of why both "evil" and  
> "sinful" are used.  One explanation is that they were "evil" with  
> respect to their money, and "sinful" in their bodies (Sanhedrin 109a).
>
> Another explanation was that they were "evil" in this world; and  
> "sinful" in respect to the next world (Sanhedrin 107b).
>
> And yet another explanation is "evil" to each other; and "sinful"  
> through adultery (Yerushalmi, Sanhedrin 10:3).
>
> My own explanation is that they were evil toward each other and  
> exceedingly sinful to God.  Also, evil was a permanent state and  
> sinful referred to different incidences.
>
>
> 12:1  Vayomer HaShem el Avram: "Lech L'cha," etc.
> The gematria of Lech L'cha is 100. So Avram was being told that life  
> is a compromise: 50/50. And if he lives with give and take (50/50),  
> he ends up with 100%.
>
> ri
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Toward the end of this week's parasha, the name Avram is changed to
Avraham, by acquiring the Hebrew letter "h?", and the name Sarai is
changed to Sarah, by replacing the Hebrew letter "yod" with the Hebrew
letter "h?".  Our Sages have taught us (Palestinian Talmud, Tractate
Sanhedrin, Chapter 9, Halakha 6) that this paired change illustrates the
law of conservation of gematria, which asserts that in a closed system
gematria can be neither created nor destroyed.  The change in Avraham's
name, which involved a +5 change in gematria value, is offset by the
change in Sarah's name, which involved a -5 change in gematria value.

One would expect, however, that this paired change would proceed in the
following manner: The yod in "Sarai" decays into two h?s, one of which
remains bound to the other two letters while the other is emitted.  The
emitted h? is then captured by Avram. who absorbs it and becomes
Avraham.  The point is that, in all frames of reference, the change in
Sarai's name must precede the change in Avram's name, as the h? capture
which results in the formation of Avraham is made possible only by the
prior yod decay involved in the formation of Sarah.  Empirical evidence,
though, contradicts this theory.  Avram became Avraham sometime after
Genesis 17:5, but no later than Genesis 17:9, whereas six verses later,
at the beginning of Genesis 17:15, Sarai was still Sarai, and she did
not become Sarah until the end of the verse.  Thus, in at least one
frame of reference, the h? capture preceded the yod decay, which is a
violation of the conservation law.

Apparently, the law of conservation of gematria can be violated for
small numbers of verses.  The h? that Avraham absorbed was not emitted
by Sarah.  Rather, it was a virtual glyph.  Virtual glyphs can exist
for a small number of verses, but then they must disappear; the
product of the gematria of the glyph, and the number of verses, must
be less than or equal to Shachter's Constant.  Virtual glyphs can
become real only if the increase in gematria is made up elsewhere
through the annihilation of a glyph, or glyphs, of equal gematria.

I am currently exploring the idea that the attraction between Avraham
and Sarah may be caused by the constant exchange of virtual glyphs,
which cannot otherwise be detected.  I cannot predict yet where the
equations will lead but I expect that the results will be cause for
laughter in certain quarters.


                        Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter
                        6424 N Whipple St
                        Chicago IL  60645-4111
                                (1-773)7613784
                                j...@m5.chicago.il.us
                                http://m5.chicago.il.us

                        "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur"

 
 
From: Micha Berger _micha@aishdas.org_ (mailto:mi...@aishdas.org) 




>>Li nir'eh, though, the taqanah was about something else. Not  that we
necessarily wanted to assimilate Xian marriage ethos, but in  reflection
of the fact that we already did. IOW, once the norm and  expectation was
to have a monogynous marriage, Rabbeinu Gershom might have  felt that the
few violations still left were cruel to the wife who came to be  expect /
assume exclusivity.

This portrays the change as being a  change in din reflecting a change
in realia, rather than changing the din to  reflect a change in desired
morality. >>
 
 
>>>>>
There was always in Torah an implicit understanding that monogamy was the  
norm, the ideal, and that polygamy was the exception or the fall from the  
ideal.  One wife was created for Adam. Noach and his sons each took one  wife into 
the teivah.  Lemach had two wives, about which Rashi comments  with a distinct 
tone of disapproval, "That's how the people of the Dor Hamabul  behaved, they 
would have two wives, one for  procreation and one for sexual  pleasure. [my 
paraphrase] The one for pleasure would take potions to make her  sterile, 
would be dressed up like a bride, feted and cosseted, while the mother  of his 
children would be neglected and scorned and left alone like a  widow."
 
Each of the Avos had one predestined soul mate.  Yitzchak, the olah  temimah, 
lived at the highest level of spirituality and never took a second  wife, 
even when his wife proved infertile.  The relationship between Sarah  and Hagar 
was fraught, as was the relationship between Rochel and Leah -- even  though in 
each of those cases the "real" wife, the real zivug, was instrumental  in 
enabling her husband to marry the second woman.  Chana and Peninah is  another 
famous example of a strained relationship between two co-wives.   The very word 
for a co-wife in Hebrew, "tzarah", tells  you exactly how it  feels to a woman 
to have a co-wife.
 
It wasn't in the Middle Ages that Jews first discovered the drawbacks to  
polygamy.  It was there in the Torah all along.  Permitted but  recognized as far 
from ideal.




--Toby  Katz
=============



**************Plan your next getaway with AOL Travel.  Check out Today's Hot 
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In Avodah Digest, Vol 25, Issue 337 dated 9/22/2008 R' Daniel Eidensohn  
quoted R' Moshe Feinstein:

Igros  Moshe (Y.D. 2:74): Concerning inducing premature childbirth.

"In my  humble opinion it is prohibited to induce premature childbirth 
because  childbirth in its natural time in the natural way is not 
considered a  danger at all....  We must 
conclude that there is absolutely no  danger in childbirth at all. That 
mean that G-d promised that there would  never be danger in childbirth. 
This that it happens that women die during  childbirth is only because 
they were liable to punishment as is stated in  Shabbos (31). "There are 
three sins for which women die during  childbirth". According to this 
reasoning it is only when childbirth is in  its natural time that there 
is a promise that there is no inherent danger.  The punishment that is 
the result of the sin of the Tree of Knowledge is  only to have birth 
pains and not death chas v'shalom! However when they  want to induce 
premature labor there is no guarantee of safety....  "


-------
 
 
 
In Avodah Digest, Vol 25, Issue 373 dated 11/3/2008 "Chana  Luntz" 
_Ch...@kolsassoon.org.uk_ (mailto:Ch...@kolsassoon.org.uk)  wrote:






>>After all, it is completely accepted in the sources that a  yoledet hi
k'chola sheyesh bo sakana (as stated explicitly in Shulchan Aruch  Orech
Chaim siman 329 si'if 1) with the consequence that, as stated in  the
following words of the Shulchan Aruch "umechalelin aleha b'shabbat  l'kol
mashetztricha".  And the gemora in shabbat 128b clearly regards  the fact
that we are mechallel shabbas for such a woman as a  p'shita.<<



>>>>>
In Time magazine, dated Sept. 29, 2008, there's a  four-page article entitled 
"Death in Birth," complete with haunting  photographs, e.g., of an African 
man holding his motherless  newborn.    Here's an excerpt:
 
--quote--
 
Death in childbirth is not just something you find in a Victorian  novel.  
Every year, about 536,000 women die giving birth.  In some  poor nations, dying 
in childbirth is so common that almost everyone has known a  victim.  Take 
Sierra Leone, a West African nation with just 6.3 million  people: women there 
have a 1 in 8 chance of dying in childbirth during their  lifetime.  The same 
miserable odds apply in Afghanistan.  In the U.S.,  by contrast, the lifetime 
chance that a woman will die in childbirth is about 1  in 4,800....In 20 years 
-- two decades that have seen spectacular medical  breakthroughs -- the ratio 
of maternal deaths to babies born has barely budged  in poor 
countries....Though many die in hospitals, researchers say the riskiest  births are those 
without any nurse, midwife or doctor in attendance -- about 35%  of all the world's 
births.  
 
--end quote--
 
PS They're not saying that one third of all the world's births end in  
maternal death, but that a third take place without benefit of any medical help  -- 
and those births are very risky.  A one in eight chance of dying is  pretty 
high and certainly doesn't sound like childbirth is just a "natural  process" 
with little danger.  





--Toby  Katz
=============




**************Plan your next getaway with AOL Travel.  Check out Today's Hot 
5 Travel Deals! 
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