Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 323

Tue, 09 Sep 2008

• 1. Y'fas To'ar (Cantor Wolberg)
• 2. Re: HaShem as God's Name (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Question on parasha (Micha Berger)
• 4. HaShem as God's Name (Minden)
• 5. Re: Y'fas To'ar (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: More Philosophy, If Anyone's Up to It (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: HaShem as God's Name (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: Geirut (Meir Shinnar)
• 9. Chumros (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 10. Re: Y'fas To'ar (Zev Sero)
• 11. Re: More Philosophy, If Anyone's Up to It (Ira Tick)

The common thread of most responses regarding my being bothered by the  
laws of the y'fas to'ar is that it is beyond the soldier's control.
So my question is:  Are you all saying that every soldier will be  
unable to control himself?  And how do you explain the soldiers who DO  
control their yetzer hara,
assuming you believe there are some who can control their yetzer hara?

Following that logic, don't you think there are those who are unable  
to control their yetzer hara in another situation having nothing to do  
with the y'fas to'ar?  I'm sure there are other situations that would  
be comparable to the y'fas to'ar. Nevertheless, this is the only one  
where the Torah allows it with all of its restrictions. Actually, the  
eating of meat was supposedly allowed because it was thought that man  
could not control his impulse to eat meat. Well, I'm here to tell you  
that there are many vegetarians who don't even have a yetzer to eat  
meat.
Rav Kook was a vegetarian. Do you think that if eating meat was assur,  
most people would violate that halacha? I doubt it very much. To say  
that we were allowed to eat meat in order to give in to our aggressive  
impulses just doesn't fly.

I think the answers given regarding the y'fas to'ar are too pat.   
There was only one other person who said that it also bothered him. I  
would guess there are others out there who are also bothered by it but  
won't admit it in a public forum.

Kol tuv.
ri

On Mon, Sep 08, 2008 at 11:18:20PM -0400, Moshe Y. Gluck wrote:
:> People today have become averse to using the word "G-d" in normal
:> conversations.

: Because it could be Assur? Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 6:3 (yes, the same
: one I cited before, but earlier in the Se'if).

Personally, I'm not thrilled to call HQBH by a term invented for the
Xian trinity.

On scjm, where I sometimes have no choice, I'll use the hyphen distinguish
between references to "G-d" and their deity, "God".

This is about the point in the converation where someone who went to
Maimonides as a child would remember the class where the teacher was
discussing the problem of erasing the word "God" and therefore the
use of the hyphen. RYBS was walking by, and without a spoken comment,
walked into the room, wrote "God" without the hyphen, erased it, and left.

One Jewish Philosophy web site uses "Gcd", which math majors might
recognize as "Greatest Common Denominator".


Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Mon, Sep 08, 2008 at 10:25:06PM -0400, Gershon Dubin wrote:
: Someone asked me the following:  The pasuk in this week's parasha tells
: us that one may not leave a body unburied overnight.  However, last
: week's parasha ended with a body being left for as long as 4 weeks while
: the ziknei Beis Din are informed of the need for them to come and then
: they actually come to measure.  How could this be?

I don't think the question stands on a halakhah level. Asei dokheh lav.

That said, on the underlying principle of kavod hameis level, it still
could use explanation. It's bad enough the guy lost his life, we add to
the indignity?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet
micha@aishdas.org        about things most people don't watch even on
http://www.aishdas.org   Yom Kippur.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                       - Rabbi Israel Salanter

RAK wrote:
> Yes, it's gotten to that point, but I think it has actually advanced
> even further beyond that point: I've seen some write it as "H-shem" or
> as "Hash-m" so as to avoid desecrating it when the writing is
> discarded. [?] Those who would make fun of the spelling "Hash-m"
> surely feel that way because it is not among the Names of G-d. And I
> agree that it is not a Name in the English language, certainly not in
> Lashon Hakodesh, and not in Yiddish either.
>
> But perhaps it *IS* a Holy Name in the language (dialect, creole,
> whatever) known as "Yeshivish". Those who speak Yeshivish certainly
> use it in that sense: "Hashem said this. Hashem did that."

But today, it's so common to write H-shem or Hash-m and similar forms that
these should maybe be considered holy names by now, and one should deform
them somehow. What options does we have? Some symbol? The Aibershter
Formally Known As H*sh#m -> TAFKAH -> T-FKAH? (Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taf
kap ) God, that's difficult!

A suspicion offers itself: People said God/Got, but the question wasn't so
pressing anyway, because they said it much less often than people refer to
God today. Connected to the difference that there was emune pshute (in the
best sense), but less stress on hashgoche protis, and that people lived
according to the T?re, but they lived a Jewish *life*, instead of occupying
themselves 24/7 with Judaism.

Another note: 18th century sforem indicate that people said, as a farewell
formula similar to "God speed you", "Lech beshem el?hei Yisroel" - not
"el?kei". And formerly, they certainly didn't distort the names in zmires,
AFAIK not even when a line was repeated.

LPhM


-- 
http://lipmans.blogspot.com

On Mon, Sep 08, 2008 at 06:56:26PM -0400, Cantor Wolberg wrote:
: The common thread of most responses regarding my being bothered by the  
: laws of the y'fas to'ar is that it is beyond the soldier's control.

Well, beyond the control of those soldiers who follow through the whole
procedure.

To paraphrase Francis Mulcahy (the priest on the 70s TV show M*A*S*H,
a sit-com about a surgical unit in the Korean War), "We are around so
many violations of the [sixth] commandment, some of the others start
falling off as well."

As a parent, I sometimes have to choose my battles. If getting a teenage
son up and out of bed to be in shul before Barekhu is a challenge,
then perhaps I may choose not to comment on what he's wearing when he
gets there.

I thought of eishes yefas to'ar in similar terms. When someone was asked
to put their neck on the line for one mitzvah, maybe fighting them about
another issue right then isn't well timed.

One item that changes the whole mental image of the thing. Recall who
was left fighting. These are people who already passed the call "Mi
ha'ish hayarei verakh leivav" (Devarim 20:8). Those who weren't sure
their spiritual affairs were reasonably in order wouldn't have been at
the front to meet the yefas to'ar to begin with.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Mon, Sep 08, 2008 at 05:45:32PM -0500, Ira Tick wrote:
: I like what you said about unity being able to refer to the "interlocking"
: parts of the soul, that rotate and reconfigure but remain interconnected.

Also inter-operating. I called it a process. There is only one soul
because the soul is the interaction of the parts; not merely a puzzle
of multiple pieces.

Just as there is only one car engine, even though I can distinguish
spark plug, cylinder and piston. Or just as there is only one computer,
and a CPU without memory or a bus controller or .... isn't a functioning
anything.

    The various components of the tzaddiq are all inter-connected, nefesh
    with ruach and ruach with neshamah; and the neshamah is connected
    with the Holy One (blessed by He) so that [even] the nefesh is bound
    up bitzror hachaim.
                                    - Zohar, Acharei Mos

: As to G-d's Oneness, I would have thought that the unity of the soul would
: be the only real available precedent, if G-d has the attributes ascribed to
: Him....

But who said He does?

: end, we believe in G-d and paint Him as an actor in our lives with abilities
: and actions and faculties analogous in some way to our own.  As I said,
: despite their frustrations and caveats, the Rishonim seem to say this
: clearly, especially R Saadia Gaon in Emunos V'Deos...

Actually, RSG speaks of three kinds of attributes WRT A-lmighty:
1- negative attibutes (what He isn't)
2- attributes of His relationship to us, rather than of He Himself
3- descriptions of how His actions make Him appear to us.

(The Rambam seems to fold the latter two categories together.)

Hashem reveals Himself to us in a manner that teaches of what to
emulate. It doesn't imply that the revelation is His Essence, or that
which we are to emulate is anything but an approximation of Hashem
Himself to the best of our comprehension.


    We are commanded to go in these middle ways, which are the good
    and upright ways, as is says "and you shall go in His Ways"
    (Devarim 28:9).
    So was taught as an explanation of this mitzvah, that just as He is
    called Chanun, you too should be chanun; just as He is called Rachum,
    so to you should be rachum; just as He is called Qadosh, so to you
    should be qadosh. Along these lines the nevi'im called G-d by these
    kinuyim, "Erekh Apayim veRav Chessed", "Tzadiq", "Yashar", "Tamim",
    "Gibor" and the like. To let you know that these are the good and
    straight ways, and a person must conduct himself according to them,
    and resemble them according to his ability.
                                        - Hilkhos Dei'os 1:11

See also halakhah 13, a/k/a end of 7. "Since these NAMES are what the
Creator are called by, they are the Derekh Beinonis which we are
obligated to walk by. This path is called "Derekh Hashem".

I want to point out two things.

Relevent to this discussion, not that the Rambam writes "mah hu NIQRA
'Rachum', af atah HEIYEIH rachum". Hashem is *called* by some middah
which we actually act according to. The Rambam actively avoids saying
that Hashem /is/ Rachum.

Second, relevent to past conversations on Avodah, the Rambam identifies
"hatov vehayashar" with "vehalakhta dirakhav" by saying that all we know
of His derakhim are the examples of tov and yashar for us to follow.



: I like very much your last point about the emotions themselves being enough
: reality [for a person to be motivated by (?) ]...

That wasn't exactly what I was trying to say. Rather, I'm identifying the
higher metaphysical entities with emotion. You asked (roughly) whether
qedushah is a metaphysical state or an emotion. I'm answering with the
suggestion that they are the same thing. Human emotions are metaphysical
entities; the state called qedushah is a real and ontological entity.
It's also the feeling of qedushah.

This is how the tradition of the Gra and developed by the baalei mussar
asserts that repairing one's soul is the same thing as repairing one's
middos and desires.

Also, note that numerous rishonim on both sides of the scholastic-qabbalah
divide explicitly identify these higher entities with sichliim nivdalim.


Also, REED (MmE vol I pp 304-312) identifies the higher olamos with more
noble ways of perceiving reality. (I wrote about this at more length at
<http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/beshalach.pdf>.) Not quite the same
thing, but IMHO part of the same larger picture. The idea that these
metaphysical realities and psychological ones aren't quite distinct.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Dale Carnegie

On Tue, Sep 09, 2008 at 12:54:12PM +0200, Minden wrote:
: But today, it's so common to write H-shem or Hash-m and similar
: forms...

I've seen some do it, but "common"? Not in my circles.

But before we simply dismiss the trend, isn't this exactly what happened
to replacing sheim havayah with the triple yud (eg Siddur R' Saadia Gaon)
which became yud yud which in time became the purvey of siddurim only
and now treated as sheimos after all?

Maybe this is actually the way things are /supposed/ to go.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabindranath Tagore

>
> On Thu, Sep 04, 2008 at 11:58pm EDT, R Meir Shinnar wrote:
> : I think we all come with our preconceptions.  I think that RMB comes
> : with preconceptions that kabbalat ol mitzvot must be in the rambam -
> : and I am sure that I have my own preconceptions...
>
> That last clause is why RMS is a pleasure to disagree with.
>
> Yes, I have a prconcieved notion that if the gemara requires it, we
> require it, and the Rambam is confusing, we should find a way to read
> the Rambam that doesn't assume he disagrees with the gemara.
>
The question, of course,  is the statement that the gmara requires it.
 That is in itself a preconception - that is hard to justify on pshat
of the gmara.

To clarify - there are two separate issues:
a) What are the type of gerim that a bet din should accept?
b) What happens if a bet din is megayer someone who doesn't fit those criteria?

It is quite clear that the optimal ger is someone who has QOM - and
the gmara in bekhorot 30 about eyn mekablin oto is about that issue -
the bet din should reject any candidate who is not fully mekabbel ol
mitzvot (whether we paskin that way is a different way - but that is
the pshat of the gmara)

The question is someone who is megayer without QOM - and the simple
pshat in the gmara about the machloket about whether gere arayot and
gere mordechai are gerim is that we wouldn't have accepted them
lecatchila - but once they underwent gerut they become gerim - but
because they lacked real QOM, they remained problematic.
There is a shitta in the gmara that gere arayot are not considered
gerim - but that is rejected halacha lema'ase by the gmara and
poskim..
(yes, I know one can learn the gmara that gere arayot did have in the
end QOM - but that is not the simple pshat - it reads back into it
preconceptions)

This distinction - between lecatchilla accepting and what to do once
being megayer - is explicit in the rambam 13:12

> I therefore took it for granted that in trying to avoid the Rambam's
> apparent self-contradiction, one should assume his conclusion includes
> QOM.
>
> : References are to the mechon mamre edition - everything in issure
> : biah ch 13.
>
> But it isn't. In the 2nd half of ch 12 the Rambam discusses who may be
> megayeir. In 12:13 (12:17) he writes:
>> Kol hagoyim kulam shenisgayru veyiqablu aleihen kol hamitzvos shel
>> Torah ... harei hein keYisrael lekhol davar.
>> Shene'emar "Haqahal, chuqah achas lakhem" (Bamidbar 15:15)
>> Umutarim lehikaneis beqehal Hashem miyad...
>
> So, someone who did both geirus and QOM are (1) Jews WRT every mitzvah
> and (2) can marry any other Jew immediately (later excepting for those
> geirim from Amon, Mo'av, Mitzrayim or Edom).
>
> This to me seems to be a clear statement that the Rambam requires QOM.
> Not technically as part of geirus; but that it and geirus are required.
> I find the word order difficult. I would have assumed, given this
> halakhah's placement in a discussion of pre-conversion (pereq 12),
> that QOM is a precondition. But the wording in the halakhah itself
> places it second.
Precisely.  The rambam in 12:13 is a  "clear statement that the
Rambam"  does not require  QOM as an intrinsic part of the gerut.
(again, preconceptions) - QOM is part of becoming  a member in good
standing of the community- rather than merely a member who is
problematic.  A ger who does not do QOM does  not have the  hezkat
kashrut of a Jew - he has to demonstrate his obedience - but it is
clear that gerut lechud and QOM lechud - that is what the wording in
the halacha means.....

This is clearly related to the chosheshin lo - the notion that once
one is mitgayer, if one didn't have QOM or there is a perceived
problem in the motivation, one watches to determine before full
embrace into the community - but they have the halachic status of jews
- they are gerim.

This seems the halachic equivalent of the midrashic ambivalence
towards gerim - between a major zchut and a sapachat - and is here
formulated in the nature of the gerim's QOM and full integration into
the halachic community - but both types of gerim are gerim....
>
> But in any case, his speaking of "kol hamitzvos shel Torah" is similar
> to the gemara's excluding the convert "haba leqabeil divrei Torah chutz
> midavar echad" (Bekhoros 30b). The question remains why he shifts out
> of the gemara's negative statement of the din. And why "mitzvos" rather
> than "davar"? But it's pretty close, regardless of subtle differences
> in implication.

It is actually talking about completely  different issues - the gmara
is talking about the bet din's decison whether to accept the candidate
- the rambam is talking about relationship to the individual after
gerut..



> : The problem that the rambam starts this section with is (hal 10) -
> : that it is impossible that  shlomo and shimshon marry goyot - which
> : is an avera.  Therefore, the read of the rambam must end up that
> : those women were not goyot...
>
> In 13:10 (14) the Rambam necessitates checking for ulterior motive. It
> need not conclude that they were not goyos. It could instead conclude
> that Shimshon and Shelomo haMelekh did everything they were supposed to,
> and therefore weren't culpable for marrying goyos.

again, as in previous go rounds, this is not a sustainable pshat -
because the rambam works hard to make sure that we understand that
this was not an error, and even if we think that there was an initial
error - in the end, ( 13:14) ulefichach, kiyam shimshon ushlomo
neshotehen, ve'af al pi shenigla sodan - explicit that even after it
was known to everyone, including shimshon and shlomo,  the truth, so
even if they might have been initially fooled, they now knew the
truth, they could still keep their wives - and not be over on being
bo'el a goya - because  they were still gerim...
the rambam, by his language, seems to explicitly reject the notion
that shlomo and shimshon were fooled - and that, at least in the end,
they were fully aware of what they had converted and married - but the
conversion (and therefore the marriage) was still valid...
>

> That's not my position. I argue that they were non-Jews who succeeded
> in fooling their husbands into thinking they were giyoros who were meQOM
> (mequbalos ol mitzvos).

see above
> In fact, it would seem that you would have to conclude that Shimshon's
> parents were prejudiced against giyoros (Shofetim 14:3), whereas I could
> say they simply weren't fooled.

the difference is before hand and after - the difference is between
opposition to converting people who may be insincere - versus whether
the gerut is actually chal..
>
>
> ...
> : (BTW, as RMB notices, hochiach sofan et techilatan  - if it means
> : that by knowing later improper actions tells us about earlier actions
> : - and that therefore the gerut is invalid - is directly contradicted
> : by the notion of (hal 14) that chazar ve'avad avoda zara hare hu
> : keyisrael meshumad -  but there is no contradiction if hochiach sofan
> : allows us to evaluate the individual - but it does not invalidate the
> : gerut (as in my pshat))
>
> I see 13:14 (17) as distinguishing between the cases where later
> behavior is because they never did QOM vs those where the geir returned
> to the practices of their youth. This is kind of difficult, and often
> impossible. So, we are left with having someone we /think/ is a Jew but
> we're allow to harbor cheshash about until we see where they actually
> stand.

> Otherwise, 13:14 (17)'s "afilu chazar ve'avad AZ, harei hu keYisrael
> meshumad" would contradict "ve'od shehochiach sofan al techilasan" of
> the previous halakhah.
no - shehociach sofan means that we (and Shlomo and Shimshon after the
beginning of the marriage) now are able to understand their true
motives - and judge them as individuals - but as to legal status, hare
hu keyisrael meshumad....


> I resolve this as above. In 10 (14) we are told what should be done
> and the husbands did. That need not mean they weren't assuros; it could
> simply mean the husbands didn't realize they were assuros.

This is against the explicit rambam that we shouldn't think that
shimshon and shlomo married goyot - you are trying to say that means
that they married people they didn't know  were goyot - quite
difficult.....

>
> : However, the rambam doesn't say that they were goyot uveisuran omdot-
> : this phrase is part of subordinate clause - hishvan hacatuv keilu hen
> : goyot uveisuran omdot -
> : tanach treats them as if they were goyot uveisuran omdot = but he
> : does not say hishvan hacatuv shehen goyot - tanach treats them as
> : goyot - a a crucial distinction...
>
> It is, and I admit I don't know what to do with the distinction.
some agreement.....
> However, I feel that to explain the Rambam otherwise requires ignoring
> 12:13 (17) and makes a hash of the contrast between "ve'od shochiach
> sofan", which isn't part of "chashvan hakasuv" and "chazar ve'avad".
>
> Bottom line is that I don't like either of our takes on pereq 13.
> They're both flawed. But concluding that the Rambam requires QOM along
> with geirus doesn't require understanding that stretch of pereq 13,
> since it's stated outright in 12.
actually - 12 states the opposite....
> : Lastly, again, simple pshat of hal 14 is as follows:
> : 1) ger shelo badku acharav o shelo hodiu - first cases of inadequate
> : examination before conversion - hare ze ger.
>
> : 2) vefafilu noda shebishvil davar - the afilu tells us that this is a
> : worse case - not merely inadequate examination, but the examination
> : reveals improper motivation - ho'il umal vetaval yatza miklal hagoyim
> : - but then hoshehsim lo ad sheyitbaer zidkuto.
>
> It's possible to convert for ulterior motives, but still accept ol
> mitzvos. Not likely, but possible. The guy believes in Torah miSinai,
> but would have remained in his current lifestyle if it weren't for that
> pretty Jewish girl...
yes, it's possible - but the rambam's language suggests that gerut
ledavar is even more problematic.
Meir Shinnar

R' MB (on Areivim):
> I think chumrot are great -- if people would retain the line between 
> baseline halakhah and chumrah, so that they could know when they're 
> being machmir on someone else's cheshbon, and when they are violating 
> ikkar hadin BALChaveiro to fulfil a chumrah in BALMaqom.

I agree with you in principle, but in practice, don't Chumros and Minhagim
often have a Din Neder? So, yes, someone might be acting inflexibly, but
only because he doesn't have a Chacham right there to be Shoel his Neder...

KT,
MYG

Cantor Wolberg wrote:
> Rav Kook was a vegetarian.

No, he wasn't.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 9:22 AM, Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:

> But who said He does?
>
> : end, we believe in G-d and paint Him as an actor in our lives with abilities
> : and actions and faculties analogous in some way to our own.  As I said,
> : despite their frustrations and caveats, the Rishonim seem to say this
> : clearly, especially R Saadia Gaon in Emunos V'Deos...
>
> Actually, RSG speaks of three kinds of attributes WRT A-lmighty:
> 1- negative attibutes (what He isn't)
> 2- attributes of His relationship to us, rather than of He Himself
> 3- descriptions of how His actions make Him appear to us.
>
> (The Rambam seems to fold the latter two categories together.)

I'm sorry, I'm not an expert on Emunos V'Deos, but I read explicitly a
translation in R J David Bleich's book "With Perfect Faith,"  wherein
RSG discusses the problems of attributes and characteristics of G-d
vis-a-vis His role as Creator, namely Life, Power (Ability ?), and
Knowledge.   Now even the Rambam, with His doctrine of negative
theology (which has its problems, mainly that its an avoidance
tactic...for example to say that G-d is not knowledgeable, just not
ignorant) describes G-d as "the Knowledge, the Knowing, and the
Knower" all at once (seems a lot like the state of existence of the
soul...)  Knowledge is not external or relationship based; it is not
an observation of activity caused by the mind -- it is the mind.  Life
is more than the absence of death, as the Rambam claims.  In fact, the
only conceivable notion of death is the absence of life -- of
activity, of function, of experience and awareness...

Sometimes I think that Medieval Jewish Philosophers were so anxious to
combat the blasphemies of Christianity and Paganism, that they reduced
G-d to something He is not in the Talmud -- a completely paradoxical,
unidentifiable, abstract idea that somehow correlates with the
Personal G-d of Scripture.  The Gemara in Brachos 10a instead compares
G-d to the soul of man, making Him more the sort of Soul of the
Universe, Who's Will sustains and directs the spiritual and physical
world which we inhabit. If man is holy, then G-d is Holy, in an
absolute way that transcends us, just as His Will (and its effects)
and His Machshavos transcend ours.  This is the G-d I believe in.

> I'm identifying the
> higher metaphysical entities with emotion. You asked (roughly) whether
> qedushah is a metaphysical state or an emotion. I'm answering with the
> suggestion that they are the same thing. Human emotions are metaphysical
> entities; the state called qedushah is a real and ontological entity.
> It's also the feeling of qedushah.
>
> This is how the tradition of the Gra and developed by the baalei mussar
> asserts that repairing one's soul is the same thing as repairing one's
> middos and desires.
>
> Also, REED (MmE vol I pp 304-312) identifies the higher olamos with more
> noble ways of perceiving reality. (I wrote about this at more length at
> <http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/beshalach.pdf>.) Not quite the same
> thing, but IMHO part of the same larger picture. The idea that these
> metaphysical realities and psychological ones aren't quite distinct.

I still like this part, but its novel to me that kedusha (forgive me,
but the "q" thing drives me insane)  and the experience of kedusha
would be one and the same.  I think I can get used to that idea,
except that when I'm asleep, is my soul no longer holy?  Also, is it
G-d's perception / feeling of kedusha (presumably associated with
Himself, a sort of sense of self-worth) that makes Him Holy?  (I know
you don't believe that G-d has perception or feeling, but humor me
here, because frankly, your conception of G-d is close to meaningless
for me, unless you're saying that G-d is just some Spirit of Holiness,
without any other dimensions, including knowledge of His Creation,
which would bother me.  And don't try to claim He has knowledge, but
not experience, because precedent calls for both if any one is
present, unless G-d has the instinct of a snail--which is greater
blasphemy to me)

I myself believe that "higher olamos" are an enlightened sense of
perception or experience, because I have trouble believing in realms
of angels, etc.  However, I always believed that my emotional
perception of people and G-d reflected something more about them than
the fact that they too experience those emotions in association with
me...

Am I not making my concerns clear?  Please avoid countering with more
Medieval Philosophy, unless it really resolves the problems I'm
discussing...  My G-d will never be some unconscious Holy Spirit or
the "Seichal HaPoel" of Aristotle or anything like that...  I really
don't know where they got that from.  This is not, by the way, because
I consider myself an simpleton, unable to process philosophic ideas.
I'm not a hyper-rationalist and I am able to deal with the abstract,
but I don't appreciate unnecessary paradoxes that are created to
explain away real ones...

Forgive me if I'm being caustic, but these issues are very important to me.

Look forward to hearing from you again,

IJT


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