Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 301

Wed, 20 Aug 2008

• 1. Re: Is there an issur in smoking marijuana? (Rich, Joel)
• 2. Re: Is there an issur in smoking marijuana? (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 3. Re: Is there an issur in smoking marijuana? (Rich, Joel)
• 4. Re: [Areivim] jews? (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: Is there an issur in smoking marijuana? (David Riceman)
• 6. Re: Geirus (Chana Luntz)
• 7. Re: [Areivim] jews? (Rich, Joel)
• 8. Re: bracha on megilla (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: Tefillin On and Off (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: [Areivim] Hanheg Bahen Minhag Derech Eretz (Yitzhak Grossman)
• 11. Violate Shabbat to Save a Jentile (Michael Makovi)

 

        
         

                Hi there,

                Was speaking to a non-relig. co-worker who asked if
Halacha forbids smoking marijuana?
                
                

                Can anyone share sources? Answers?

                thank you,

                 Avroham


________________________________

                In addition to Iggrot see Piskei Din - Yerushalayim
dinei mamanot ubrurei yuchsin zayin - peh samech daled bamud 537 which
holds that it is in the rabbinic category of "hergel ldvar aveira vkalut
rosh" (me- like alcohol, too much tv??)
                
                KT
                Joel Rich
                 

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R' Avroham Yakov asked:
> Was speaking to a non-relig. co-worker who asked if
> Halacha forbids smoking marijuana?
> Can anyone share sources? Answers?

(This reply is similar to R' Zev Sero's post. I have copied it from my post
of five years ago in Mail-Jewish 38:48; it received no responses at that
time, so I hope the moderator will not mind my asking these questions again
in this forum.)

Rav Moshe Feinstein wrote about this in Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 3:35. He
begins: "Regarding the fact that some boys from the yeshiva have begun to
smoke hashish (marijuana), it is clearly forbidden by several basic laws of
the Torah. First..."

There can be no doubt which drugs Rav Feinstein was referring to. He spells
them "ches shin yod shin (mem ayin resh alef vav vav alef nun alef)" -
parentheses his.

He then gives his reasons. I found it interesting that violating the local
civil laws is NOT among them. Of course, it is best to study his actual
words directly, but my summary of his reasoning is:

-- It is physically harmful.
-- It damages the mind so that one cannot think straight, which prevents one from learning Torah properly, and also prevents one from prayer and other mitzvos.
-- It leads to a desire (addiction?) which some are unable to keep in check, which is the prohibition faced by the Ben Sorer uMoreh.
-- The reason given for the Ben Sorer uMoreh also applies to this case: He will eventually come to rob others.
-- The anguish which the smoker gives his parents is a violation of honoring them.
-- It also violates Kedoshim Tihyu as explained by Ramban.
-- It also leads to many other prohibitions.

These arguments sound pretty reasonable to me, but I wish I knew whether he
was referring only to a frequent or heavy marijuana user, or even to an
occasional or light user. Somehow, I can't help suspecting that he would
hold that even occasional and light use is forbidden.

But if that is so, then what would he say about occasional and light use of
alcohol? Which of Rav Moshe's arguments would apply to a few puffs of a
marijuana cigarette, but not to a few shots of whiskey? Does anyone know if
he ever spoke or wrote about this?

Akiva Miller


____________________________________________________________
Click for free information and quotes for interest only loans.
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc
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These arguments sound pretty reasonable to me, but I wish I knew whether
he was referring only to a frequent or heavy marijuana user, or even to
an occasional or light user. Somehow, I can't help suspecting that he
would hold that even occasional and light use is forbidden.

But if that is so, then what would he say about occasional and light use
of alcohol? Which of Rav Moshe's arguments would apply to a few puffs of
a marijuana cigarette, but not to a few shots of whiskey? Does anyone
know if he ever spoke or wrote about this?

Akiva Miller


____________________________________________________________
I think your summary is fairly accurate.  The other source I quoted said
it's a chilukei deyot as to whether it is harmful and thus left it in
the drabbanan of hergel. IMVHO the issue of addiction cuts across many
possible venues (e.g. liquor, money, sex....)and R'MF was following his
lev shel torah in this ban.  I gave a yahrtzeit shiur on smoking which
tied to addictions and closed with the chinuch in 387  "ubchlal ze shelo
lrdof achar taavat haolam hazeh"  and the Rambam in Peirush hamishnayot
sanhedrin 3:3 "vyesod hu btorateinu shein rauy ladam lhaasik et atzmo
bolam hazeh ela bechad mishnei dvarim o bchachmah lhashlim ba et atzmo,
o besek sheyoil lo bkiyum haolam kgon umnut o meschar"

KT
Joel Rich 
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On Mon, Aug 18, 2008 at 09:35:25PM +0100, Chana Luntz wrote:
: RZS writes:
:> Why?  AIUI, we (the BD or the parents) accept ol mitzvot on the minor's
:> behalf. 

: The adoptive parents have no halachic status vis a vis this non Jewish child
: - so how do you get to what is effectively a form of shlichus in which they
: act on behalf of this child?  And Beis Din - look at how complicated the
: issue is for Beis Din to separate a Jewish child b'yadam from treifos and
: neveilos -  and this goes way beyond that.  

The KOM is not done by BD. It's done by the child upon reaching an
adult. It's delayed al daas BD, and BD can agree to the chovos ha'eivarim
(milah, miqvah and qorban) for him on the ground of zakhin le'adam sl. The
adoptive couple would serve as apotropei BD, without whose chinukh the
geirus would not qualify as a net positive, and thus there can be no
zakhin le'adam. After all, a 12 yr old who accepts ol mitzvos but she
wasn't raised in a way that it's easy for her to follow through on it,
would be Jewish but an avaryanis.

(BTW, RSRiskin once told us in HS that when he officiates at a geirus,
he requires that money be set aside for the olah. Animal sacrifice is
something the modern mind balks at, but is part of qabbalas ol mitzvos
even though we currently can't do them. Therefore RSR wants it to be
made real. I think, though, that this opens up halachic problems with
heqdeish. And all our questions about fiat money, particularly when the
money may just be wired from one account into an escrow with no physical
object involved at all.)

:> We assume that if he had daat he would have agreed to accept
:> it, so we do it on his behalf, subject to his approval when he grows up.

: BTW though, even this opens up a relatively simple way of dealing with the
: issue faced by the State of Israel - get Beis Din to convene every year and
: accept ol mitzvos for every minor born to an Israeli who came in under the
: law of return (or whatever criteria you want to use to make sure you catch
: whomsoever you want to catch).  If they had been doing this since the
: creation of the state - we would have a *much* more limited problem today.

Such a child would not be apiring to the ideal of keeping mitzvos upon
turning 12 or 13, and thus we would not have an [implied] KOM. The geirus
would not be chal unless the parents provide chinukh.

:> Or, in the case of the father, he has total reshut over his child, and
:> can accept ol mitzvot on his behalf, substituting his own daat for his
:> child's.

: A non Jew does not have this halachic status vis a vis his child (after all,
: in many ways halachically, we don't even recognise his child as his) and
: adoptive parents have even less, probably at most a dina d'malchusa dina
: form of reshus.

I would argue that parents who adopt a non-Jew, as apitropei BD, have
been given reshus and hischayvus for the child beyond the rest of Kelal
Yisrael. MIGHT even justify barukh shepatrani.

:> They don't have to make a formal protest, they just have to not be
:> keeping mitzvot. By continuing to live as if they were obligated in
:> mitzvot, they signify their assent to the commitment that was made
:> in their name.

: Source? - the Shulchan Aruch seems to say precisely the opposite:

: Yoreh Deah siman 268 si'if 7 "And whether he was a minor megayered by his
: father or by beis din he is able to protest when he becomes a gadol and
: [then] his din is not like a Yisroel mumar, but rather like a non Jew".

: Si'if 8:  "in regards to what are we speaking, when he does not conduct
: himself as a Jew [noheg minhag Yahadus] when he becomes a gadol, but if
: conducts himself as a Jew when he becomes a gadol then he is no longer able
: to protest."

Se'if 8 seems to go beyond what I said -- we require both implied
acceptance through behavior and a lack of formal renunciation. It's not
so much the opposite as not dealing with the impossibility of knowing
when would be that time when machaah is possible.

My source, BTW, was the BD consisting of R' Zvi Flaum, R' Matis Blum
(Torah laDaas) and R' Dovid Scheinfeld (or: my LOR of the time, my
rebbe-chaver, and my father's LOR). Our case was messier, as the birth
mother's mother told us that she was happy that he was going to a Jewish
home, because her mother was born Jewish. Not quite grounds for saying
it's only tevillah as we are nohagim after shmad, but not quite the
certitude of saying we're dealing with geirus, either.

...
: However you want to go on kabbalat ol mitzvot, there is no question that one
: of the outcomes of the sugya in Yevamos 45a and following is that for a
: valid conversion you need three kosher dayanim.  That, BTW seems to be the
: basis for the nullifications that has sparked all of this off - if the
: dayanim in question are not kosher, then all the conversions they do are not
: valid, no matter whether there was in other ways the most perfect of
: requirements.  A conversion beno u'bein atzmo (ie a private conversion, no
: matter how sincere, involving tevila and mila) is not a conversion.  And
: similarly a conversion in front of somebody not kosher to be a dayan does
: not count for anything.

As well as the problem that three non-O rabbis aren't going to insist
on parents who raise the child O, and thus the child won't be noheig
minhag Yahadus.

I can't touch RnCL's question in the other post about defining KOM.o
However, while:
> As the Shach puts it in Yoreh Deah siman 268 si'if katan 23 - "from
> here [ie the case of Hillel accepting the convert] can be learnt that
> all is according to what is seen by the eyes of the beis din" (see the
> sources he quotes there). On the other hand, explicit statements in the
> gemora, whether then brought explicitly in the Shulchan Aruch or not,
> carry quite a lot of weight.

The Mararsha has the maaseh as Hillel accepting the person into his
geirus class, and that the geirus didn't occur until after the person
completed a lot more education.

We discussed this in March, when the geirus controversy was in the news.
(RnCL cited the same Shach, and there also notes that his source is
Tosafos.)

At the time I asked whether the machloqes was about the etzem need for
KOM, or in defining it. Perhaps the Shach is saying like Rashi (Shabbos
31a) that a BD can decide that KOM is satisfied even with an objection
that is likely to fall away. That is Shitas

I should repeat RSB's suggestion:
> I would suggest that anyone interested in reviewing the sources on Kabalas
> HaMitzvos as an essential element begin with the sugya in Yevamos 46-47
> and the Rishonim, especially the Mossad HaRav Kook edition of the Ritva
> and the footnotes there as well as the Encyclopedia Talmudis entry
> on Gerus...

In v25n115, RDE gives sources that show a very maximal definition of
KOM, starting with Bekhoros 30b. I recommend the copy at
<http://lists.aishdas.org/htdig.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org/2008q1/006718.ht
ml>,
which won't have all those question-marks the digest turns Hebrew into.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Here is the test to find whether your mission
micha@aishdas.org        on Earth is finished:
http://www.aishdas.org   if you're alive, it isn't.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Richard Bach

Rich, Joel wrote:
> the Rambam in Peirush hamishnayot
> sanhedrin 3:3 "vyesod hu btorateinu shein rauy ladam lhaasik et atzmo
> bolam hazeh ela bechad mishnei dvarim o bchachmah lhashlim ba et atzmo,
> o besek sheyoil lo bkiyum haolam kgon umnut o meschar"
>   
I don't think this implies issur; it merely implies censure.

David Riceman

RMB writes:

> Qabbalas ol mitzvos is required of the geir qatan. "Ve'im higdilu
> yekholim limchos" (Kesuvos 11a).
>

Firstly, you are either conflating two different concepts here - or you are
defining Kabbalas ol mitzvos differently from the way most people here are
defining it.  

The ability to reject what was done to the katan while they were a katan, is
one thing and an agreement to keep the mitzvos is another.  The fact that
they are two separate concepts can be seen by the modern day separation that
occurs - a person (eg take a modern day Israeli of Russian descent) wants to
be a Jew and identifies themself as a Jew.  They do not however want to be
shomer mitzvos.  If such a person was converted as a katan, they would
unquestionably not protest on reaching majority (and would use every
opportunity to proclaim that they are a Jew).  They would also keep on
eating pork, being mechalel shabbas etc.  The statement you bring in Kesubos
above therefore does not fit to them, they are not in the slightest going to
protest.  Or alternatively, you will have to define KOM as being not wanting
to protest being called a Jew.

Secondly, as I have pointed out in a previous posting - there is no act of
positive acceptance by such a katan on becoming a gadol.  Even if we were
able to identify the precise moment of majority, such a person remains a Jew
by being passive.  In order to not be a Jew they have to actively shlug off
the Jewish status by protesting. By acting positively as a Jew what they do
is then lose even that option of shluging off the conversion.

> There is a logistic problem making it impossible to time this, since
> geirus would require the deOraisa standard of 2 sa'aros. And once chal,
> it's binding forever so the window of opportunity is all of tokh kedei
> dibur from growing that second sa'ar. The gemara says "sha'ah achas",
> which here means "one point in time" not an hour, but there is no
> pragmatic difference in terms of the impossibility of determination.
> 
> This is why lemaaseh we assume that a child in that situation who acted
> as a member of the shomer Torah umitzvos community from before that time
> until after is a valid geir.

True, but that is the easy case - as we know they have lost their
opportunity to protest.  Take a more tricky case.  Let us say that a child
was brought to Beis Din by its non Jewish parents who were themselves
converting and at the time were clearly sincere and shomer mitzvos.  Let us
say that such parents remained shomer mitzvos for a period of years after
the conversion of both themselves and the child, but then later lapsed - and
the child's behaviour lapsed with them.  There is no question according to
everybody that the parents are Jews, no matter that they have disappeared
back into their non Jewish society.  What about the child?  According to you
- since there has to be a positive kabala, then without such a kabala, by
acting as a non Jew from before the time of galus until after, without more,
this child is not a valid convert.  But the language is not mashma like that
(although I think there are rishonic opinions like that).  Rather, the
language both of your gemora and in the Shulchan Aruch seems to be going in
accordance with the view that you need a formal renunciation to eliminate
the status of Jew, rather than needing a formal act of kabala to confer it. 

If you are going to call that KOM (or QOM) then you are defining KOM as a
passive act of non rejection of Jewishness (which sounds awfully like R'
Uzziel's view - well actually, is more radical than Rav Uzziel's view. He at
least wants an active acceptance of Jewishness, albeit that that can
presumeably be satisfied by voluntarily coming to beis din).  If you want to
retain the more classic definition of KOM and postulate it as a requirement
for adults, then it seems to me you need to differentiate between katanim
and adults, and say that KOM is a requirement for adults but not for
children. (BTW, for those who came into this discussion via a snipet of a
posting of mine from Areivim- please note that the discussion on Areivim was
started off with the question as to whether there any poskim today who held
one did not need KOM, and a further posting saying they did not understand
the logic of those who held that KOM was not necessary.  All I said was that
I thought most poskim held you did not need KOM for minors - and by
generalising from the minor case to the adult case, one could understand
REB's view of no KOM for adults.  What I did not say was that one
*necessarily* had to go that route - ie one could well hold no KOM for
minors but yes for adults.  What I also did not discuss was the definition
of KOM, because this whole discussion on Areivim was predicated on a certain
understanding of the meaning of KOM. As per above, an alternative view is
that KOM is a requirement, but what is meant by that is some fuzzy joining
the Jewish people).

> 
> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha

Regards

Chana

(BTW, RSRiskin once told us in HS that when he officiates at a geirus,
he requires that money be set aside for the olah. Animal sacrifice is
something the modern mind balks at, but is part of qabbalas ol mitzvos
even though we currently can't do them. Therefore RSR wants it to be
made real. I think, though, that this opens up halachic problems with
heqdeish. And all our questions about fiat money, particularly when the
money may just be wired from one account into an escrow with no physical
object involved at all.)
=========================

Hmmm. My recollection was that right after the churban this was the
practice and it was stopped for exactly the reason you outlined.
KT
Joel Rich
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On Tue, Aug 19, 2008 at 02:59:46PM +0000, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
: R' Eli Turkel wrote:
:> I don't think we ever say a beracha on a minhag that
:> is not mentioned in the gemara.

: This question comes up every once in a while on these pages. I has
: vague memories of these brachos being mentioned:

I didn't recall.

: -- Al Mitzvas Tefilin

Is this a berakhah on a minhag, or a minhag to say a 2nd berakhah?

: -- L'hadlik Ner Shel Yom Hakippurim

Agreed. (As is my case of menorah in shul on Chanukah.)

: -- Al Mitzvas Tzitzis

If tallis qatan is minhag; machloqes rishonim.

: -- Baruch Hashem L'Olam / Yiru Eineinu (in maariv)

Again, I think this is a minhag to say a berakhah, not a berakhah oveir
la'asiyas minhag.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             With the "Echad" of the Shema, the Jew crowns
micha@aishdas.org        G-d as King of the entire cosmos and all four
http://www.aishdas.org   corners of the world, but sometimes he forgets
Fax: (270) 514-1507      to include himself.     - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On Fri, Aug 15, 2008 at 1:15pm EDT, R Gil Winokur wrote:
: 2) "Leos [al yadecha]" is singular, while "Totafos [bein einecha]"
: is plural, indicating that the shel yad is put on alone, and that one
: should have both tefillin on while wearing the shel rosh. Of course,
: this pasuk also refers to the multiple parshiyot in the shel rosh.

This would be a maqor, not a ta'am for why the yad is put on first and
taken off last.

The Maharal (I forgot where) asks about Nishmas, why is there mention of
"*Nishmas* kol chai" and "*veru'ah* kol basar", but no mention of the
third element of Naran, the nefesh?

Second, he asks why do we refrain from tefillin when the day itself is
an os, but we don't refrain from tzitzis?

The Maharal answers that the shel rosh is keneged neshamah, and the shel
yad -- ru'ach. Tzitzis is keneged the nefesh.

The os of shevisas melakhah is on the levels of ru'ach and neshamah,
but not nefesh. Therefore, no conflict with tzitzis, and Nishmas doesn't
refer to nefesh.

My problem is that Yom Kippur does have a shevisah for the nefesh too --
"ve'inisem es *nafshoseikhem*". Leshitaso, how does the Maharal explain
our wearing a tallis on YK?

In any case, this model would make the tefillah shel yad a basis without
which one can't reach the level of the tefillah shel rosh. Which would
explain the sequencing.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of
micha@aishdas.org        heights as long as he works his wings.
http://www.aishdas.org   But if he relaxes them for but one minute,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      he plummets downward.   - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On Wed, 13 Aug 2008 20:42:07 +0300
"Doron Beckerman" <beck072@gmail.com> wrote:

...

> [ Reminds me of the story about the Netziv, who said that had he not begged
> his parents not to turn him into a shoemaker's apprentice he would have been
> asked after 120 "where is your Haamek Sheela/Beracha/Davar etc. I forgot who

This story appears to have no credible source.

Yitzhak
--
Bein Din Ledin - bdl.freehostia.com
An advanced discussion of Hoshen Mishpat

In [Avodah] Violate Shabbat to Save a Jentile,
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol25/v25n147.shtml#07, the following
exchange occurred:

(spelled with a J to avoid antisemitic Googles)

**Henceforth: All individuals who are not Jewish, will be called ixlplatyls.**

This post is answering a previously unanswered question from that old thread.

> > > Personally, it seems to me that if we can say that Shabbat was given
> > > to us and not us to Shabbat, kal vachomer ixlplatyls were not given to
> > > Shabbat (to lose their lives on its account).
> > > Mikha'el Makovi

[I.e., if we can justify a Jew-A violating Shabbat to save Jew-B
because Jew-B was not given over to Shabbat, then surely the same
logic would allow Jew-A to violate Shabbat for Mr. Ixlplatyl, who also
wasn't given over to Shabbat.]

> > Without reference to the, AFAIK, settled halacha that one does save the
> > life of an ixlplatyl on Shabbos, the above kv"ch doesn't work.  IIUC, this
> > limud says a Jew doesn't give up his life for Shabbos, so the kol
> > v'chomer is that an ixlplatyl doesn't have to die to avoid violating
> > Shabbos.  Which is clearly true: in fact an ixlplatyl is chayiv misah
> > (bidei shamayim, I assume) for keeping Shabbos.  Nothing can be implied
> > about whether a Jew should violate Shabbos to save him.
> > R' Daniel M. Israel

[I.e., it's great that my kal vahomer establishes an ixlplatyl victim
doesn't have to give his life up. But how does this help the Jewish
rescuer? We're trying to justify the Jewish rescuer being m'halel
Shabbat, and so excusing the ixlplatyl victim doesn't help!]

> B'vadai an ixlplatyl doesn't have to die to avoid Shabbat. But the
> Gemara, AFAIK, uses this limud to prove that Jew A doesn't have to die
> because of Jew B keeping Shabbat. Jew B can break Shabbat to save Jew
> A, and Jew A doesn't have to die, because Jew A wasn't given to
> Shabbat, but rather Shabbat was given to Jew A, and therefore, Jew B
> can violate Shabbat.
>
> It seems to me that if so, then all the more so, Ixlplatyl A doesn't
> have to die by Jew B's shomer Shabbat-ness.
>
> Yes, my logic is very quirky and my kol vachomer is suspect, I'll
> admit. But is the Gemara's limud any less quirky? Because Jew A was
> not given to Shabbat, this gives permission for Jew B to violate it? I
> would think that it would give only permission to Jew A himself.
>
> Mikha'el Makovi

[My answer is that true, it isn't logical, but what can I do, for
Chazal rule like this? If Chazal decided that releasing a Jewish
victim from Shabbat releases the Jewish rescuer too, then why
shouldn't releasing an ixlplatyl victim from Shabbat also release the
Jewish rescuer? I don't know why releasing the victim releases the
rescuer too, but so Chazal decided. I would have thought that
releasing the victim from Shabbat would only permit himself to
violate Shabbat to save himself, but somehow Chazal extended this to
the rescuer too; how, I don't know.]

I am now delighted, because I just found a solution for my dilemma: "A
Halakhic View of the Non-Jew" by Rabbi Nachum L. Rabinovitch,
Tradition 8:3 1966 & Le'ela 1:5 (18-23) 1979, http://tiny.cc/Wlpvw

There, in footnote 26 on page 38 (according to the page numbering of
the publication itself, i.e. in the lower-corner of the pages), the
footnote says:
"In a recent work, Rabbi Abraham A. Price disagrees with this
interpretation. [R' Rabinovitch has just argued that in "which if a
man do, shall live [and not die]", "man" refers to Jew and ixlplatyl
alike, for R' Meir drashed this to mean that an ixlplatyl who occupies in
Torah is like a kohen gadol. Therefore, he says, the authorization to
violate Shabbat (or any mitzvah besides murder, idolatry, sexuality)
to save a life, applies to saving Jew and ixlplatyl alike.] He [Rabbi
Price] argues that the verse "by doing which a man shall live"
releases only the victim who is in danger from the duty to keep the
Sabbath. In the case of an ixlplatyl, of course, no such permission is
required. In order to establish that another may another may break the
Sabbath on behalf of the victim, he argues, we must refer to "he shall
live with you" [Lev. 25:35-36; this is the famous two men in the
desert, one flask pasuk - Sifra says it includes both Jew and ger
toshav in the mitzvah to save a life - see Ramban thereon] which makes
it obligatory for me to do everything to save someone else that I
would do for myself. Since if my own life is endangered I may
transgress the Sabbath law [thanks to "which if a man do, shall
live"], the same may be done on behalf of anybody
else. In any case, the conclusion is identical that for a Ger Toshav
just as for a full Jew [because "shall live with you" includes the ger
tzedek and the ger toshav - see Ramban], the duty to save a life is
paramount. See
Mishnat Avraham, Toronto 5710 [?? text illegible], p. 3."

Evidently, Rabbi Price's logic is the same as mine - we are arguing
whether the *victim*'s life is to be given over to Shabbat or not.
Obviously, we cannot be arguing whether the rescuer's life is to be
given over, because his life isn't in danger in the first place! So we
are obviously arguing whether the victim is to be given to Shabbat,
and we conclude no. If this is for the Jew, certainly for the ixlplatyl.

Now, I had a difficulty, as shown by R' Israel: how does releasing the
victim help the rescuer? How does releasing the ixlplatyl (or Jewish,
for that matter) victim from Shabbat help the Jewish rescuer violate
Shabbat? My best answer was that Chazal's logic was what it was, and
what could I do?

But Rabbi Price answers beautifully: now that the victim may violate
Shabbat to save himself (based on "which if a man do, shall live"),
the rescuer may do whatever he'd do for himself were he himself a
victim (based on "he shall live with you"), and this applies
to both Jewish and ixlplatyl victims, as we've established.

Actually, it turns out then, that excusing the ixl platylvictim is
unnecessary. Since he's permitted (obligated) to violate Shabbat
anyway, we don't have to excuse him from Shabbat to save himself. We
need excuse only the Jewish victim. And once we excuse the Jewish
victim, he (the Jewish victim turned rescuer) can save another in
whatever way he'd save himself. And since "shall live with you"
includes the ixlplatyl (see Ramban), that's our justification to save
the ixlplatyl, right there. We don't need "which if a man do, shall
live" to refer to the ixlplatyl; even if it referred to the Jew only,
we'd still be able to violate Shabbat for an ixlplatyl because of
"shall live with you".

(But "shall live with you" includes only the ger toshav, not ben Noach
- Rabbi Rabinovitch then brings Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin that a ben
Noach is a ger toshav in all respects except domicile and livelihood
in Israel, so we can violate Shabbat for any ben Noach. Moreover, we
can violate Shabbat even for a rasha-non-ben-Noach, he says, for
darkhei shalom, i.e. we want to make a kiddush hashem and bring the
rasha to teshuva. He brings Bet Yosef Yoreh Deah 154, which brings
that Ramban himself would treat blatant antisemitic ixlplatyls on
Shabbat, saying that perhaps they'd do teshuva thanks to Ramban's love
and kindness. So it's not a fear of reprisal (mishum eiva), but rather
a positive and true desire for them to see our love and G-dliness. Of
course, Rabbi Rabinovitch also brings Meiri.)

I'm personally elated - now I know that I wasn't being an idiot!!

Mikha'el Makovi


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