Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 288

Tue, 12 Aug 2008

• 1. Re: aveilus of Nine Days is equivalent to Shloshim (Rich, Joel)
• 2. Re: EVEN WHEN THE MOON IS HIDDEN, IT IS STILL THERE (saul mashbaum)
• 3. Re: aveilus of Nine Days is equivalent to Shloshim (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: ID of chilazon vs. chagavim (Micha Berger)
• 5. a very crucial lesson (Saul.Z.Newman@kp.org)
• 6. Re: The halakhos of ecology (Zev Sero)
• 7. Hating a Fellow Jew (Meir Rabi)
• 8. 3 weeks and avelut (Eli Turkel)
• 9. Re: a very crucial lesson (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: a very crucial lesson (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: The halakhos of ecology (Micha Berger)
• 12. Re: Hating a Fellow Jew (Micha Berger)
• 13. Re: The halakhos of ecology (Zev Sero)

On Mon, Aug 11, 2008 at 01:15:41PM -0400, Rich, Joel wrote:
: Forced to assume? Wouldn't it be appropriate to assume kol dtakkun
: rabbanan K'ein duraita tikun and that "minhag" regarding aveilut for
: beit hamikdash would have originated (or been shaped) with the rabbis
: not the people?

Does minhag start with the rabbanan? If so, how do you distinguish
between minhag and a din derabbanan?

I thought that minhag was common practice as ratified by the rabbanan.
And that the Rambam (Mamrim 2:2-3) is a daas yachid in requiring
proactive ratification rather than considering shetiqah kehoda'ah
sufficient.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
----------------------------------------------------'
It always seemed to me to be an open question - see Taanit 26b which
seems to imply a rabbinic function of some type in minhag.
Oh and of course who would start a new minhag without asking daas torah
;-)
KT
Joel Rich
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RMB
>>
Actually Av is a Hebrification of the Babylonian Abu which in turn was
slurred from the Sumerian (Ur III) month "Aru" - lion, the mazal of
the month.
>>
There is a homiletical explanation of the Talmudic phrase  "acharei aryeh
v'lo acharei isha". One should do t'shuvah in Elul, the month following the
one whose mazal is the lion, rather than waiting for Tishrei, the month
following the one whose mazal is the virgin.
Saul Mashbaum
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On Mon, Aug 11, 2008 at 05:49:23PM -0400, Rich, Joel wrote:
:> Does minhag start with the rabbanan? If so, how do you distinguish
:> between minhag and a din derabbanan?

:> I thought that minhag was common practice as ratified by the rabbanan.
:> And that the Rambam (Mamrim 2:2-3) is a daas yachid in requiring
:> proactive ratification rather than considering shetiqah kehoda'ah
:> sufficient.

: It always seemed to me to be an open question - see Taanit 26b which
: seems to imply a rabbinic function of some type in minhag.

Which is why I spoke of the need for rabbinic ratification.

Tosafos say that teqi'os demeyushav aren't bal tosif because doing a
mitzvah twice is never bal tosif. This is in contrast to the Rashbah,
who says that since the chakhamim already required more than a minimum
of qolos, there is no maximum.

Neither invoke the Rambam's answer WRT dinim derabbanan, so they would
not seem to be instances of lo sasur. As opposed to the Rambam, Mamrim,
who repeatedly does use "lo sasur" for minhagim. So, a minhag need not
have "yagidu lekha".

Which is how I would conclude that it was specifically the Rambam's
requirement for active Rabbinic statement rather than allowing even a
passive fulfilment of whatever it is the gemara is describing at the
end of ta'anis.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The trick is learning to be passionate in one's
micha@aishdas.org        ideals, but compassionate to one's peers.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Fri, Aug 08, 2008 at 05:10:59PM -0400, Yitzhak Grossman wrote:
: Actually, the Radziner [0] seriously considers the possibility that dye
: derived from *any* animal species [1] is acceptable for Techeles, as
: long as it satisfies the crucial colorfastness criterion.
: 
: [0] Ma'amar S'funei T'munei Hol, end of 'Ha'ta'anah ha'shniah', pp.
: 18-19 in the YM 5743 edition

I didn't think this was his masqanah.

The Tif'eres Yisrael seems to say this in general -- that chilazon was
simply the only known source of a colorfast blue dye in antiquity.

R' Tzevi Hirsch Kalisher is medayeiq in the Rambam Tzitzis 2:1-2 and
concludes that the need for specifically a chilazon is a din in tzitzis.
For bigdei kehunah, he holds only the color and colorfastness are
me'aqvim. See Liqutei Halachos Zevachim ch 13 67a. As you would guess,
the majority disagree.

: [1] He says 'kol minei halazonos u'tolaim', but in context it's clear
: that he means any animal species

Yes, something to do with animal sticking to animal with a fastness that
vegetable dye wouldn't. Sounded like pre-modern chemistry, actually.

Both would have to conclude that qaleh ilan is not as colorfast. The
Baal Techeiles says so explicitly, and the TY must or else qaleh ilan
would not be a problem dye leshitaso. (RZHK has no such problem, as
the warning about qaleh ilan is made in the gemara WRT tzitzis.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Dale Carnegie

>Perhaps God is waiting for all of us to proclaim in unison, "I am a 
Jew." Plain and simple.

>Even more importantly, perhaps God is waiting for us to stop seeing 
others as "He's modern Orthodox." "He's Reform." "He's a Hasid." "He's 
secular." "He's Conservative." "He's yeshivishe."

-------  of course , when one holds that another's  religious practice is 
False, and they refuse to relent, there are limits on the co-operation 
that Torah judaism allows.....


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Micha Berger wrote:


> The value is functional, not really economic. Need is only one factor
> that goes into price. I would agree that the halakhah of bal tashchis
> doesn't speak of inherent value.
> 
> But if the enjoyment is short-sighted, and will cost far more in the
> long run than the short-term fun, wouldn't that still be bal tashchis?

Who's in a better position to determine the long- and short-term cost,
and to balance them properly, than the owner?  Time preference is also
subjective, and if the owner has a high one, and therefore heavily
discounts future benefits, who's to say he's wrong?  Whose business
is it?

 
> Think of is misvara: You're defining bal tashchis in a way such that
> by definition no one would want to do it.

Pretty much.  I think it's an issur that exists more in the theoretical
realm than the practical.  That's why, to find a practical application,
the Torah had to give us the case of the soldier.

In fact, since there were many more commons in those days than there
are today, and the Torah in fact explicitly mentions one example of a
commons -- the forest in which one may chop wood, but must take care
to keep ones axe properly maintained so one doesn't kill anyone -- why
does it tell us the din of bal tashchis in such an unusual situation?
I have to think that tells us something about how rare it is to find
a practical application.  Without TBSP telling us it's a general law
of bal tashchis, I'd have a simpler answer: I'd have said it was a part
of hilchos milchama, and had *no* everyday relevance.  But that's
clearly not the case.  It must have *some* relevance to our everyday
conduct, but not one that the Torah could have easily used as an
example.  IMHO that's because in most cases all bal tashchis means is
that before destroying something one should consider it carefully, and
weigh up the costs and benefits, and only go ahead if it makes sense;
and that's hard to state as a concrete din.


> Say someone wants the ease
> of cutting down the nearest tree, despite it having apples, instead of
> going another 30 yards to that oak. How do you avoid saying that that's
> subjective value, and thus not bal tashchis?

You can't avoid it, if it's true.  If the person says that after
careful consideration he considers it worth it, then we have no choice
but to believe him.  But he knows whether it's really true, and it's
up to him to be honest with himself.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

Following the posting of R Micha Fri, 08 Aug 2008 Subject: Re: [Avodah]
Hating a Meisis to Kefirah, Should be - Hating any Jew; I would like to
offer some elaboration.

Firstly RaMBaM makes it quite clear that if one discloses the hatred so that
it is no longer concealed in ones heart then one has not transgressed the
sin of Lo Sisnah. He says [DeOs 6:5] "anyone who hates a Jew in his heart
transgresses the sin of Lo SisNah...BilVaVeCha. The Torah only prohibits
hatred which is concealed, however one who hits or insults a fellow Jew
although this is not permitted one has not thereby transgressed Lo SisNah."

This reinforced in the Sefer HaMitzvos Lav 302 where he says: "The Sifri
states 'I [Gd] did not define the prohibition unless it is hatred which is
concealed.' However when one discloses that hatred and informs him that he
hates him, one does not transgress this prohibition. Nevertheless he does
transgress the sins of taking revenge, bearing a grudge and the positive
command of loving a fellow Jew. Even when compared to all these sins, the
sin of hating in ones heart is a much more serious sin."

I apologise if my earlier comment was misunderstood to suggest that one does
not transgress ANY sin at all.

The Kesef Mishnah [DeOs 6:5] explains the RaMBaM's source; that hitting or
insulting someone is not permitted. And he also provides a source, the Toras
Cohanim, for the RaMBaM's launch into the peripheral matter regarding other
prohibitions one transgresses when hitting or insulting. The TCohanim says,
"Lest one think that the prohibition of Lo SisNah applies only when cursing,
hitting or slapping a fellow Jew, the passuk therefore says, 'BilVaVeCha' it
is only when the hatred is [concealed] in ones heart."

The Yad HaKeTana DeOs Ch 7 page 206 a&b - a summary.
(1} One who hates a fellow Jew in his heart transgresses ...
(2) The Torah prohibits only hatred that is concealed in ones heart. If
however it is disclosed even through beating or insulting one does not
transgress ....
(3) Hatred in ones heart is a terrible sin. It causes all manner of
destructive consequences.
Lashon Hara, searching for devious means to cause damage, rejoicing in
another's difficulties, bearing grudges and taking revenge. It also leads to
avoidance of many positive Mitzvos.
More importantly it undermines the purpose of the Torah which is to promote
love and brotherhood amongst the Jewish people.
(4) The main feature of hatred in ones heart is when the hatred is not
displayed or communicated at all. Since if the hatred is concealed it will
fester and smoulder and will continue to drive the person to devise methods
and strategies of evil against his enemy. This will drive them further apart
and intensify the hatred. 
However if the hatred is displayed and communicated then eventually the
hatred will abate.
(5) Therefore when one sins against another one must not let that remain
buried in ones heart and remain silent. That is the way of evil people. It
is a Mitzvah to ask "Why did you do this to me? Why have you sinned against
me in this manner?" This is the Torah command of HoCheAch ToChiAch. This is
exceedingly important because it opens avenues for resolving the problem,
either there will be an apology and a request for Mechilah or an
understanding of the true nature of that deed and its justification.
(6) One may choose to remain silent, provided he grants full Mechilah, and
not pursue rebuking the aggressor if the aggressor is exceedingly crude or
his mind is confused. This is an admirable manner of behaviour (Midas
Chassidus) since the Torah prohibits only on one who buries but retains the
hatred in his heart. (Lo Hikpidah T Alo Ul MaMeSatemo)" [This is also in
RaMBaM DeOs6:10]

I have not noticed that any of these Poskim speak of SinAs Chinom. I would
offer "indifference" as an appropriate translation.

I have tried to keep this post limited to a Halachic discussion rather than
attempting to apply Derush to shape the outcome. Within this scope we can
comfortably direct our attention to Rashi's remark about Yosef and his
brothers; they hated him and could not speak peacefully with him. Rashi says
that from this nasty comment in the Torah we can observe the great integrity
of Yosef's brothres, they were not two faced - one persona in the mouth and
a diff persona in their minds. This is how the brothers avoided sinning;
they informed Yosef of their hatred and did not make a fake show of speaking
nicely with him.

Regarding the prohibitions of seeking revenge and bearing a grudge; they too
are permitted against those who have actively harmed either our physical or
our emotional well-being. The prohibitions apply only when we are
reciprocating against someone who has failed to do us a favour. They refuse
for example to lend us money or tools that we may even require with some
urgency.
But someone who actively caused harm and refuses to make restitution and
mollify his victims is a Rasha and we are not forbidden from seeking revenge
or bearing a grudge. It is a Mitzvah to hate a Rasha. We are not to help him
in any way unless his life is in danger.

Rabbenu Yona maintains that we are all instructed as judges are - to fear no
man. We are not permitted to be Chonef evil people reshaim. We may not show
them any form of endorsement even for very noble, generous and altruistic
Midos they display.

This can sometimes make life quite challenging.

Meir

I previously quoted RYBS as equating various parts of the 3 weeks
with portions of the avelut
For more details see
http://www.vbm-torah.org/3weeks/av64-rjbs.htm

SBA asked what about eating meat?

RYBS in the above article points to many differences between
avelut and the 9 days. Thus the halachot are similar but not
identical.
To explain the differences he introduces the gemara term of
avelut chadash and avelut yeshana (historical mourning)

Mourning for a relative is based on deep personal feeling of
loss and despair. Ir begins as an onen where the person
is overwhelmed with his loss. Over the period of shiva, shloshim
and the year it comes to terms with his loss.
Historical mourning is something we have to cultivate and so it
begins with the easy and only gradually comes to the depth of
our mourning.
RYBS uses these two ideas to explain differences is laws of
laundry and other differences.

Similarly not eating meat is related to the loss of korbanot.
It has no place in a personal mourning.

In summary the 3 weeks and shloshim  etc. have many
similarities and are based on similar principles but are
not identical


-- 
Eli Turkel

On Mon, Aug 11, 2008 at 03:34:00PM -0700, Saul.Z.Newman@kp.org wrote:
:> Even more importantly, perhaps God is waiting for us to stop seeing 
:> others as "He's modern Orthodox." "He's Reform." "He's a Hasid." "He's 
:> secular." "He's Conservative." "He's yeshivishe."

: of course , when one holds that another's  religious practice is 
: False, and they refuse to relent, there are limits on the co-operation 
: that Torah judaism allows.....

We all fail to fully live up to the Torah, some people more so than
others. Rather than looking at an R Jew as an "R Jew", one can still
simply see him as a "Jew".

RnTK doesn't think that her version of Austritt doesn't apply to
individuals as individuals. I don't see how this sentiment differs.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org        excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org   'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (270) 514-1507      trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

On Mon, Aug 11, 2008 at 03:34:00PM -0700, Saul.Z.Newman@kp.org wrote:
:> Even more importantly, perhaps God is waiting for us to stop seeing 
:> others as "He's modern Orthodox." "He's Reform." "He's a Hasid." "He's 
:> secular." "He's Conservative." "He's yeshivishe."

: of course , when one holds that another's  religious practice is 
: False, and they refuse to relent, there are limits on the co-operation 
: that Torah judaism allows.....

We all fail to fully live up to the Torah, some people more so than
others. Rather than looking at an R Jew as an "R Jew", one can still
simply see him as a "Jew".

RnTK doesn't think that her version of Austritt doesn't apply to
individuals as individuals. I don't see how this sentiment differs.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org        excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org   'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (270) 514-1507      trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

On Mon, Aug 11, 2008 at 06:41:33PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
: >Think of is misvara: You're defining bal tashchis in a way such that
: >by definition no one would want to do it.

: Pretty much.  I think it's an issur that exists more in the theoretical
: realm than the practical.  That's why, to find a practical application,
: the Torah had to give us the case of the soldier.

But lehalakhah, it includes wasting food rather than saving it for later
or sharing with others. Your description doesn't match the din.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

On Tue, Aug 12, 2008 at 09:50:02AM +1000, Meir Rabi wrote:
: The Kesef Mishnah [DeOs 6:5] explains the RaMBaM's source; that hitting or
: insulting someone is not permitted. And he also provides a source, the Toras
: Cohanim, for the RaMBaM's launch into the peripheral matter regarding other
: prohibitions one transgresses when hitting or insulting. The TCohanim says,
: "Lest one think that the prohibition of Lo SisNah applies only when cursing,
: hitting or slapping a fellow Jew, the passuk therefore says, 'BilVaVeCha' it
: is only when the hatred is [concealed] in ones heart."
: 
: The Yad HaKeTana DeOs Ch 7 page 206 a&b - a summary.

I learned the Yad haQetanah as you did. However, I see the Kesef Mishnah
as saying thee Rambam was only excluding yelling or hitting that didn't
come from the sin'ah. That if lo sisna is assur if not expressed, lo kol
shekein it would be assur if the person acts on it too.

And thus saw a machloqes as to how the Rambam understands the issur.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Take time,
micha@aishdas.org        be exact,
http://www.aishdas.org   unclutter the mind.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm

Micha Berger wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 11, 2008 at 06:41:33PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> : >Think of is misvara: You're defining bal tashchis in a way such that
> : >by definition no one would want to do it.
> 
> : Pretty much.  I think it's an issur that exists more in the theoretical
> : realm than the practical.  That's why, to find a practical application,
> : the Torah had to give us the case of the soldier.
> 
> But lehalakhah, it includes wasting food rather than saving it for later
> or sharing with others. Your description doesn't match the din.

Does it include that?  Makor?

Then one must ask why one is throwing the food out.  If it really is
suitable for storing for later, any normal person will do that.
Generally one throws food out if it will not be good by the time one
might next want to eat it, or if one has nowhere suitable to store it
until then.

And if there is someone who will accept it, again any normal person will
give it to them before throwing it out; however the cost and effort of
finding such takers, and transporting it to them, is often worth more
than the food itself, and therefore it makes sense to throw it out.

In what case do you assert that a normal person throws food out, and
yet the halacha says he shouldn't?

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas


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