Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 278

Fri, 01 Aug 2008

• 1. Re: Can you build a community around Halakhic Man? (David Riceman)
• 2. Re: Misayei'a L'Dvar Aveira - cashier situation (Samuel Svarc)
• 3. Re: Misayei'a L'Dvar Aveira - cashier situation (Zev Sero)
• 4. Re: Can you build a community around Halakhic Man? (Micha Berger)
• 5. Today, the 29th of Tammuz, is the Yahrzeit of Rashi, who died 903 years ago. (Cantor Wolberg)
• 6. Hating a Meisis to Kefirah [Areivim] (Doron Beckerman)
• 7. Re: Can you build a community around Halakhic Man? (David Riceman)
• 8. Re: Halachic Texts: More Background (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: Differences between Charedism and Modern Orthodoxy (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: what G-d can't do (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: what G-d can't do (Micha Berger)

Three preliminary comments:

1. I think you denigrate "the masses".  Looking up a halacha in Shemirat 
Shabbat K'Hilchatah is indeed paskening, and consulting an English 
translation to clarify what Rashi means is indeed hiddush.  That it is 
de rigeur nowadays to send kids to yeshiva both during the years of 
obligatory schooling and afterwards is sufficient evidence that most of 
the next generation will be capable of psak and hiddush.

2.  I don't think the author of Halachic man thought of himself as a 
halachic man.  "Halacha has a fixed a priori relationship to the whole 
of reality"(Kaplan's translation p.23)  Yet halacha has no concept 
corresponding to the Kantian "a priori".  That Rabbi Soloveitchik had to 
use a concept external to halacha to delineate it is adequate evidence, 
not only that he did not construe himself as a halachic man, but also 
that halachic man is not interested in a Torah UMadda type of 
synthesis.  He just doesn't care about Madda, since its categories are 
not those of halacha.

3.  I don't know what you mean by a community.  You can certainly set up 
an intentional community where you and your friends can study Rambam and 
Kierkegaard and play Rachmaninoff.  But I think Rabbi Soloveitchik is 
describing a personality, not an ideology.  What will you do if your 
kids decide to study Rabbeinu Tam and Lucretius and play Bach?  The 
problem with using a description of a personality as a guide to behavior 
is that personality may not be easy to transmit, either by genetics or 
by training.

David Riceman

> From: Zev Sero <zev@sero.name>
> 
> I'm not sure I understand the problem.  The customer took the product
> from the shelf himself.  The cashier is not giving it to him, all he's
> doing is making him pay for it.  I'm not sure how that's mesayea` to
> the eventual act of eating it.  It's not true that the customer couldn't
> eat it without paying; just as he's capable of eating treif he's also
> capable of stealing.  That he doesn't want to steal is to his credit,
> and by charging him the cashier helps him avoid the avera of stealing;
> what's wrong with that?

While I agree with RZS's conclusion (for the reasons given by RDB), I don't
understand his sevara. I don't agree that someone who buys treif would steal
and furthermore the halacha doesn't agree. From the very fact that if this
is the only place where it's available halacha says it's prohibited to sell
it proves conclusively that we don't assume that it will be stolen. Where
that to be a valid consideration there can never be a case where one is
prohibited from selling something; we will always say that the person
interested in buying the object has another way to obtain it, he could steal
this object.

KT,
MSS

Samuel Svarc wrote:
 
> While I agree with RZS's conclusion (for the reasons given by RDB), I don't
> understand his sevara. I don't agree that someone who buys treif would steal
> and furthermore the halacha doesn't agree. From the very fact that if this
> is the only place where it's available halacha says it's prohibited to sell
> it proves conclusively that we don't assume that it will be stolen. Where
> that to be a valid consideration there can never be a case where one is
> prohibited from selling something; we will always say that the person
> interested in buying the object has another way to obtain it, he could steal
> this object.


In an old-fashioned grocery, the shop assistant has to give the customer
the item beyadayim; the customer has no other way to get it.  Sure, he
could break in in the night, or else overpower the assistant and take
whatever he wanted, but in fact he isn't doing that, he's asking the
assistant to give it to him, and so the assistant has a problem.

The main chidush of a supermarket is that it's self-service; you take
what you want, and the only function of the assistant is to take your
money.  If you were a ganef you could simply walk out with the goods;
you might not get very far, but it is an option.  In this situation,
I don't see how the assistant helps the avera in any way.  All he's
doing is preventing a second avera.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

On Thu, Jul 31, 2008 at 01:49:03PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: 1. I think you denigrate "the masses".  Looking up a halacha in Shemirat 
: Shabbat K'Hilchatah is indeed paskening, and consulting an English 
: translation to clarify what Rashi means is indeed hiddush...

I disagree. I am not so much denigrating the masses as disagreeing with
your definition of pesaq and chiddush. In particular, that they serve
in the roles RYBS describes. (In general as well, but that's
irrelevent.)

RYBS is relying on the individual's tension between cognitive man and
homo religiousis to fuel creativity. This creativity finds its expression
in halakhic man. This creativity is also how man resolves the tension
between (what others call) Torah and Madda. Thus, the creativity is the
individual's unique way of resolving his personal tensions of conflicting
goals and callings. Conflict requires choice, bechirah motivates
creativity.

It's how man deals with his own encounters; not reading how others
resolved theirs. SSK's words aren't /his/ choices. He can choose whether
or not to follow them, but that's one side of the dialectic, the
submission of homo religious, not its resolution.

: 2.  I don't think the author of Halachic man thought of himself as a 
: halachic man.  "Halacha has a fixed a priori relationship to the whole 
: of reality"(Kaplan's translation p.23)  Yet halacha has no concept 
: corresponding to the Kantian "a priori".  That Rabbi Soloveitchik had to 
: use a concept external to halacha to delineate it is adequate evidence, 
: not only that he did not construe himself as a halachic man, but also 
: that halachic man is not interested in a Torah UMadda type of 
: synthesis.  He just doesn't care about Madda, since its categories are 
: not those of halacha.

Halakhic Man is an archetype. There is no person who fully embodies the
type. That's not the point. I'm sure RYBS felt he had some Halakhic Man
about himself; probably felt "not enough".

: 3.  I don't know what you mean by a community.  You can certainly set up 
: an intentional community where you and your friends can study Rambam and 
: Kierkegaard and play Rachmaninoff...

I mean a large group of people. The masses. A neighborhood that wasn't
consciously planned to be a hand-picked collection of benei aliyah.

:                                             What will you do if your 
: kids decide to study Rabbeinu Tam and Lucretius and play Bach?  The 
: problem with using a description of a personality as a guide to behavior 
: is that personality may not be easy to transmit, either by genetics or 
: by training.

If my kids were capable of becoming halachic men and women, both in
ability and in inclination, I would encourage it. But I am currently
of the opinion that doing so to a group of hundreds or thousands will
lead more people to compromising their observance and values than
to sanctity. That the gap between MO's theory and practice is more
fundamental than simply the limitations of real human beings. It's that
people below a certain point of personal development are actually worse
off trying to live by RYBS's words.

Creatively picking one's way through the conflicts when one lacks the
worldview and knowledge to do so gives the individual the autonomy to
make bad choices; trying for synthesis or harmonious coexistence of
ideals, he merely compromises them.

I laid out three categories of derekh. I'll explain by example:

1- In Mussar, one is given not only what the ideal looks like, but also
tools for how to get there.

2- In Chassidus, one is given the ideal, and a person is encouraged to
do it to the best of their ability. A person who acheives some measure of
deveiqus in 2% of his waking hours is better off than someone who doesn't.

3- In RYBS's worldview, it's all about creating and decisionmaking.
Halakhah maximizing autonomy by giving you a means of answering
conflicting callings. However, someone who doesn't know how to asses
those callings, or even much about their content, will make a travesty
of observance. In that way, it's unlike Chassidus's linear more-is-better.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             With the "Echad" of the Shema, the Jew crowns
micha@aishdas.org        G-d as King of the entire cosmos and all four
http://www.aishdas.org   corners of the world, but sometimes he forgets
Fax: (270) 514-1507      to include himself.     - Rav Yisrael Salanter

A wonderful story is told about the birth of Rashi: His father, Rabbi  
Yitzchak once found a rare diamond. "Now, there would be no more  
poverty," he thought and went to sell  
the                                         precious stone to the  
local jeweler. The jeweler hadn't enough money to pay for such a large  
diamond, and suggested to the bishop to buy it. Now the bishop had  
been looking for                                                such a  
diamond for he wanted to put it on his cross. He offered a huge amount  
of money for it. When Rabbi Yitzchak heard for what purpose the bishop  
wanted the stone, he  
refused                                              to sell it. He  
knew, however, that if he did not sell the stone, it would be taken  
from him forcibly, and so he threw it into the sea. A Heavenly Voice  
then resounded: "For this great  
sacrifice                                  you will be blessed with a  
son that will outshine all the precious stones in the world, and the  
light of his Torah will shine for ever." The following year a son was  
born to him,                                                    and he  
called him Solomon, saying, may God grant him wisdom like unto King  
Solomon.
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R' Micha Berger asks for a source that Meisis to Kefirah is worse than
Meisis to Avodah Zarah.

That Kefirah is worse than AZ is in the Rambam's Iggeres Hashmad and in the
Ibn Ezra to Parshas Yisro. That it is so regarding hating a Meisis, I have
some indirect sources based on the above, but it is Mefurash Yotzei Mipi
Kohen Gadol in Chofetz Chaim Hilchos Rechilus Klal 1 in Beer Mayim Chaim 9
that Moshe Rabbeinu hated Dasan and Aviram based on hating a Meisis - Al
Achas Kamah V'Kamah based on Ki Bikesh L'hadichachah. He is very explicit
that the Mitzvah D'Oraysa is not limited to AZ per se.

R' Micha Berger asks:

>>  Applicability? Who preaches that there is more than one god, but one
of them went to Moshe in the midbar, taught him kol haTorah kulah,
including TSBP, etc... and you must keep the deRabbanans, etc...
Everyone who incites to AZ also incites to other forms of heresy. <<

 I could think of forms of AZ B'shittuf, plus Stam inciting someone to give
in to his Taava in the times of Bayis Rishon.

Applicability L'maaseh - Daat Emet.
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Micha Berger wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 31, 2008 at 01:49:03PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
> : 1. I think you denigrate "the masses".  Looking up a halacha in Shemirat 
> : Shabbat K'Hilchatah is indeed paskening, and consulting an English 
> : translation to clarify what Rashi means is indeed hiddush...
>
> I disagree. I am not so much denigrating the masses as disagreeing with
> your definition of pesaq and chiddush. In particular, that they serve
> in the roles RYBS describes. (In general as well, but that's
> irrelevent.)
>   
psak: "Halakhic man, well furnished with rules, judgments, and 
fundamental principles, draws near the world with an a priori 
relationship. (p. 19)" See the entire paragraph.  Someone seeing a 
physical action, and cognizing its relationship with the a priori world 
of halacha by looking up an appropriate precedent in SSK, is doing 
precisely this.

hiddush: "Each and every sentence in the writings of R. Haim constitutes 
a flowing spring of creative insight and cognition. (p. 87)"  Yet R. 
Haim's hiddushim purport to be, not innovative creations, but 
reconstructions of the thoughts of the Rambam and his opponents.  
Despite R. Weinberg's comments (in p. 33 of the Hebrew section of 
Professor Shapiro's book "Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters"), 
I think the main definition of creation in HM has to be understood as 
reconstruction, since (as far as I can tell from a cursory rereading) 
every example of hiddush in HM is a reconstruction of a previously 
existing position.
> RYBS is relying on the individual's tension between cognitive man and
> homo religiousis to fuel creativity. This creativity finds its expression
> in halakhic man.
WADR to Socrates in the Republic, archetypes do not derive from each 
other through dialectic.  HM is a description of an archetype, and HR 
and CM are cited, not as sources, but as contrasts, to help the reader 
recognize the unusual nature of his personality.

> <snip> Conflict requires choice, bechirah motivates
> creativity.
>
> It's how man deals with his own encounters; not reading how others
> resolved theirs. SSK's words aren't /his/ choices. He can choose whether
> or not to follow them, but that's one side of the dialectic, the
> submission of homo religious, not its resolution.
>   
I don't see a large emphasis on choice in HM; it is you, not the author, 
who links creativity and free will.
> : 2.  I don't think the author of Halachic man thought of himself as a 
> : halachic man.  "Halacha has a fixed a priori relationship to the whole 
> : of reality"(Kaplan's translation p.23)  Yet halacha has no concept 
> : corresponding to the Kantian "a priori".  That Rabbi Soloveitchik had to 
> : use a concept external to halacha to delineate it is adequate evidence, 
> : not only that he did not construe himself as a halachic man, but also 
> : that halachic man is not interested in a Torah UMadda type of 
> : synthesis.  He just doesn't care about Madda, since its categories are 
> : not those of halacha.
>
> Halakhic Man is an archetype. There is no person who fully embodies the
> type. That's not the point. I'm sure RYBS felt he had some Halakhic Man
> about himself; probably felt "not enough".
>   
I was careful to refer to "the author of Halachic man" rather than to 
RYBS.  The book is not a book which cognizes real events through a 
priori halachic categories.  It seems paradoxical to suggest that it be 
taken as the central work of a community which does that.  Isn't the 
choice of this rather than a halachic work a hint that there is 
something lacking in HM's repertoire (I refer to the archetype, not the 
book).
> If my kids were capable of becoming halachic men and women, both in
> ability and in inclination, I would encourage it. But I am currently
> of the opinion that doing so to a group of hundreds or thousands will
> lead more people to compromising their observance and values than
> to sanctity. That the gap between MO's theory and practice is more
> fundamental than simply the limitations of real human beings. It's that
> people below a certain point of personal development are actually worse
> off trying to live by RYBS's words.
>   
Here I think is where push comes to shove.  You are identifying MO with 
HM (the book), and I think that is incorrect.  I agree with you that it 
would be hard to create a community of followers of HM, but that's 
because I buy the mussar critique of the ideal of HM (as I suspect you 
do).  HM rejects that critique (pp. 74-76).  If you accept the premises 
of the book, I think you need to accept that it can be actualized by 
anyone.  "Morasha Kehillas Ya'akov ksiv".  "Moshe, n'div lev ..."

David Riceman

On Sun, Jul 27, 2008 at 11:17:30PM -0400, Richard Wolpoe wrote:
: I'm not taking sides - accept to be open-minded to the possiblity of change.
: And I'm not saying R. Rackman has the facts. I am just saying he COULD
: construe the facts as having changed.

If we cared about how people could construe things, then eilu va'eilu is
altogether out. Once you allow plurality, anyone will argue that their
position is simply another "eilu".

Bottom line is that R' Rackman innovated two things that have no basis,
regardless of our differences in how to trate things that do:

1- Considering a later personality change, career failure, or other
issue to be "mekach ta'us" rather than "nistapkha sadeihu".

2- Hafka'as qiddushin where (1) the husband did no ma'aseh attempting
qiddushin or geirushin, and (2) on a casewise basis rather than a general
policy set in advance that whenever X, the marriage is annulled.

Both of us should agree that places his position objectively outside the
fold. There is no maqor. It's his own invention. Our debates over how do
decide between answers that actually have mechanics which trumps which
and how has nothing to do with this.

RER's belief that he has justification doesn't change the fact that
according to everyone else's rules, he doesn't.


: Or he could say that any woman protesting her fate vociferously is part of a
: minority that prefers isolation to suffering an abusive relationship.
...
: The point is taht RYBS said that tav lemseisav is an aboslute. WADR, I
: disagree.

The essential issue is NOT tav lemeisav, although that came up in part
of the mekach ta'us argument. Everyone discusses RYBS's reply about it
because his reply has philosophical content and is therefore more
interesting than the lomdus.

But according to RALichtenstein, the iqar of RYBS's objection is that if
one could simply invoke hafka'as qiddushin in this way, we could throw
out much of Yevamos, Gittin, Even haEzer, etc... The Chasam Sofer and CI
didn't simply resolve problems through hafka'as qidushin. Are we wiser
than them? RYBS described it as cutting off the branches of the very
tree one is sitting in. IOW, there is a basic problem of precedent and
halachic process here.

To put it in my own words: lo ra'inu eino ra'ayah doesn't apply to
cases where someone claims there is something 3 feet across sitting
three inches in front of your face.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabindranath Tagore

On Wed, Jul 30, 2008 at 05:35:21PM -0400, Rich, Joel wrote:
:> And WRT general advice: R' Dovid Cohen, certainly not MO, does not
:> believe that "the gedolim" have any guarantee of getting answers right.
:> Rather, he shows that without a melekh, some of the authority of
:> melukhah fell to the rabbanim. So RDC still says that we need to turn to
:> gedolei Torah to run a community but because of authority, not accuracy.

: I've heard R'HS say something similar but what is the source? ...

See R' Algred Cohen's paper on Daat Torah at
<http://jlaw.com/Articles/cohen_DaatTorah.pdf> (RJJ, Spring 2003)
and R' Yitzchak Kasdan's response at
<http://jlaw.com/Articles/observ-on-daat.html>.

RDC is in "Maaseh Avos, Siman Labanim" I, which Artscroll had translated
in "Templates for Ages" at page 33: "The Crown of Torah and the Crown of
Kingship; the Hasmoneans and the Concept of Daas Torah". (That's from
RYK's fn 14.)

RYK also points out:
>                                              For example, in Gitin
> 62a the gemara calls rabbanim, "melachim." See also "Harrirai Kedem"
> (R. Michal Shurkin's sefer based on the Torah of Rabbi Joseph B.
> Soloveitchk, the "Rav") at page reish samach hei (265), where (as my
> brother pointed out to me) the Rav zt'l compares a mara d'aatra to a
> melech. Finally, see"Keser Torah: Based on the Words of Rav Hutner zt'l"
> found at http://www.countryyossi.com/dec98/torah3.htm (anonymous author).

> Moreover, the linkage between Rabbis and royalty did not appear to
> be a controversial point to a reviewer in Tradition of a 1977 book by
> Rabbi Mendell Lewittes, "Religious Foundations of the State of Israel"
> (reprinted by Aronson Press in 1994). In his volume (at 87), Rabbi
> Lewittes bases himself upon the Ran in Drashot Haran when he states:
> "[I]n the absence of a kingdom, the religious authorities are able to
> assume the responsibilities of political leadership." Rabbi Lewittes
> also writes (at 56):

>     When the first Temple was destroyed and king and priest were
>     banished from Israel, the prophet assumed the whole burden of
>     leadership . . .but when, six and a half centuries later the Second
>     Temple was destroyed and again king and prophet were banished, the
>     chief scholar was able to assume the whole burden of leadership for
>     a vanquished but surviving people. Thus, R. Simon could now say that
>     in Israel 'there are three crowns: the crown of the Torah, the crown
>     of the priesthood, and the crown of kingship' (Avot 4:13); and
>     another Sage could add: 'Torah is greater [in its emoluments] than
>     the priesthood and kingship.' (Avot 6;5).
...
> In this regard, see also "Emes l'Yaacov," the writings of Rav Yaacov
> Kaminetzky zt'l, wherein he cites the Ibn Ezra on the pasuk in Shoftim
> (Deut. 17, 9) "U'vata" as the source for the prohibition of being "mored
> b'malchut" (rebelling against a king) because the "shofet" in the second
> verse there is the "melech."17 By his comment, the Ibn Ezra appears to
> indicate that the principle of "lo tasur"18 -- not deviating from the
> pronouncements of the "shofet" -- which appears only a few verses later,
> applies to royal pronouncements which must be obeyed regardless of their
> unreasonableness (and even, according to the Ran in Drashot HaRan, drasha
> 11, with some limitations, if they are inconsistent with the laws of the
> Torah itself)....

> One additional "source" for such a link between kinglike powers and Rabbis
> might also be found in lectures of Rav Soloveitchik including the drasha
> found in Rabbi Besdin's "Reflections of the Rav" (Vol. I) entitled "Who
> Is Fit To Lead The Jewish People?" at 133-37, which Hebrew version is
> found in "Haadam V'Olamo" ("Hamalchut b'Yisrael"). In that presentation,
> the Rav compared the quintessential Rebbe-teacher to a king.19 However,
> in the last paragraph in Rabbi Besdin's version -- which interestingly,
> but for reasons unknown to this writer, is not found in the Hebrew version
> -- the Rav distinguishes between a king and a Rebbe: "Kingship [because
> of its potentially autocratic nature] is,... sharply circumscribed. This
> does not prevail in the teacher-disciple relationship, where the exercise
> of authority is encouraged and submission to teachers is extolled." As
> the Rav explained (as found in both the English and Hebrew versions)
> "Why is this authority of man [i.e., the Rebbe] over his fellow man [the
> student] sanctioned?... [T]he authority of a teacher is not imposed;
> no coercion or political instrument is employed. A Torah teacher is
> freely accepted and joyfully embraced...."20

As I said in an earlier post, I see a growing tendency to recast the MO
- Chareidi divide from being about how to confront modernity to being
about the relative values of authority and autonomy. I do not believe
this division is as consistent with the sociological facts of who is
happy in which camp than the more obvious issue of maqdish es hachol vs
avoiding the ta'avos of chol.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness
micha@aishdas.org        which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost
http://www.aishdas.org   again. Fullfillment lies not in a final goal,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH

On Fri, Jul 25, 2008 at 01:36:39PM -0700, Eli Turkel wrote:
: According to all views he cannot make a 5 sided triangle or make 1+1=3.
: These are definitions and have nothing to do with logic. A five sided
: figure is defined
: as a pentagon not a triangle. Two is defined as the number after 1 and
: so the sum
: (assuming standard arithmetic) os one and one is two.

So let's reduce it until it's harder to point to the word being
applied to something other than its translation.

Can Hashem make a 3 sided object that has 5 sides? That's self
contradictory, not a word problem; a simple extension of asking whether
Hashem must comply to the law of contradiction or He can make both A
and not-A both true at the same time.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The waste of time is the most extravagant
micha@aishdas.org        of all expense.
http://www.aishdas.org                           -Theophrastus
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Fri, Jul 25, 2008 at 01:36:39PM -0700, Eli Turkel wrote:
: According to all views he cannot make a 5 sided triangle or make 1+1=3.
: These are definitions and have nothing to do with logic. A five sided
: figure is defined
: as a pentagon not a triangle. Two is defined as the number after 1 and
: so the sum
: (assuming standard arithmetic) os one and one is two.

So let's reduce it until it's harder to point to the word being
applied to something other than its translation.

Can Hashem make a 3 sided object that has 5 sides? That's self
contradictory, not a word problem; a simple extension of asking whether
Hashem must comply to the law of contradiction or He can make both A
and not-A both true at the same time.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The waste of time is the most extravagant
micha@aishdas.org        of all expense.
http://www.aishdas.org                           -Theophrastus
Fax: (270) 514-1507


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