Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 240

Thu, 03 Jul 2008

• 1. the cohen gadol and marriage to a pubescent girl (Minden)
• 2. Re: Taxes (Efraim Yawitz)
• 3. Re: the cohen gadol and marriage to a pubescent girl (Rich, Joel)
• 4. Re: the cohen gadol and marriage to a pubescent girl (Zev Sero)
• 5. Re: the cohen gadol and marriage to a pubescent girl (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: the cohen gadol and marriage to a pubescent girl (Zev Sero)
• 7. Zekhiras Yetzi'as Mitzrayim in Yemos haMashiach (David E Cohen)
• 8. Re: Vegetarianism (Zev Sero)
• 9. Re: Vegetarianism (Zev Sero)
• 10. T'uM (Joseph C. Kaplan)
• 11. Re: T'uM (Rich, Joel)
• 12. Re: T'uM (Micha Berger)
• 13. Re: Zekhiras Yetzi'as Mitzrayim in Yemos haMashiach (Zev Sero)

RMYG wrote:
>> (As an aside, physical maturity was probably even later in the time of the gemore, up to four or five years later.)
>
> What do you mean here?

Menarche, which dropped from about 17 years to less than 12 during the last
150 years. ( http://en.wiki
pedia.org/wiki/Puberty#Historical_shift ) It's difficult to extrapolate
to the time of the gemore, though - it depends on a list of factors such as
ethnic genetics, nutrition and the like. Still, chances are that at the
time of the gemore, girls were nubile at a higher age than today, thus even
widening the gap to today's societal standards.

Lipman Phillip Minden

-- 
http://lipmans.blogspot.com

On Thu, Jul 3, 2008 at 1:23 PM,  David Riceman wrote:
> Yitzhak Grossman wrote:
>> <citing RMB>
>>> DDD applies to the law as practiced, not as codified. And while there
>>>
>>
>> Source?  I've seen this claim, but I know of no authoritative source
>> for it.
>>
>>
> It's not exactly what you want, but see the citation of the Rashbam in
> Tshuvot Tashbetz 1:158, and see the opinion of the Ramban cited in Magid
> Mishnah H. Gezeilah V'aveidah 5:13-14.
>
I'm pretty sure the Urim v'Tummim says this somewhere, citing the
reason that otherwise all Dayyanim would have to be lawyers.

In any case, how do we distinguish between this concept and the
attitude that you can do "whatever you can get away with"?

(I wonder if I now have to go to the Yabetz's kever to ask mechila for
quoting the Urim v'Tummim.)

Ephraim (Yabetz)

 

I once heard that adulthood for mitzvos is a "shiur", just like a
kezayis of matza, or techum Shabbos -- and as such it is a Halacha
L'Moshe MiSinai.

Unfortunately I have no source.

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
The usually quoted source is breishit by shimon and levi (34:25) being
described as "ish".
I don't remember where or whether it was an asmachta (B"N I'll try to do
some research over the 7/4 holiday - while also reflecting on the medina
shel chesed that we are tarrying in)
KT
Joel Rich
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Micha Berger wrote:

> There are two questions, shenei sa'aros and age. Bar/t mitzvah ages are
> definitely deRabbanan, enacted based on rov, presumably so as to avoid
> embarassing and un-tzeniusdik checking.

Not so, because hair alone does *not* work; the requirement mid'oraita
is hair *and* age.  The reliance on age *without* checking for hair is
mid'rabanan.





-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

On Thu, Jul 03, 2008 at 02:37:45PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote:
: The Rambam clearly states in Hilchos Ishus 2:1-3 that it is a
: combination of simanim and shanim together that make a girl legally an
: adult, with the simanim being the main one. One without the other does
: not work.

Similarly, on Thu, Jul 03, 2008 at 08:54:59AM -0400, Zev Sero replied to
my post:
:>There are two questions, shenei sa'aros and age. Bar/t mitzvah ages are
:>definitely deRabbanan, enacted based on rov, presumably so as to avoid
:>embarassing and un-tzeniusdik checking.

: Not so, because hair alone does *not* work; the requirement mid'oraita
: is hair *and* age.  The reliance on age *without* checking for hair is
: mid'rabanan.

My understanding is that the shiur deOraisa is 2 sa'aros. Waiting until
normal ages for puberty is to insure the reality of the sa'aros, and
not some form of wart or a mole (Niddah 46a).

So it would seem to me:
The shiur deOraisa is 2 sa'aros. The shiur deRabbanan for dinim deOraisa
when lechumrah, is to also require age -- which is 12 for a boy and
11 for aq girl. The shiur for dinim deRabbanan is just one year later
without checking for hair, allowing the assumption that the sa'aros
would have grown in that year even if they might have fallen out unseen.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Here is the test to find whether your mission
micha@aishdas.org        on Earth is finished:
http://www.aishdas.org   if you're alive, it isn't.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Richard Bach

Ben Waxman wrote:

> Maybe a woman isn't married against her will but a girl can be. Her 
> father can marry her off (doreitta) or her brother and/or mother 
> (d'rabbanan).

They can do so without her active consent, but I doubt they can do it
over her explicit objection.  They can be mekadesh her, but they can't
send her to the chupah (etc.) if she refuses to go.


> In the latter case she can get out of it without a get, 
> but married she most certainly is.

Mi'un works retroactively; if at any point before her adulthood she
refuses him, she was never married in the first place.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

R' Micha Berger wrote:
> We follow ben Zoma's derashah for "KOL yemei chayekha". By saying there
> is a chiyuv bizman hazeh at night, we rejected the Chakhamim's derashah
> of "lehavi liymos hammoshiach".

We do hold like Ben Zoma regarding zekhiras yetzi'as Mitzrayim at night, and
it's true (see the Tosefta brought on Berakhos 12b) that Ben Zoma holds that
there will be no mitzvah of zekhiras yetzi'as Mitzrayim in yemos hamashiach.
In essence, both Ben Zoma and Chakhamim have the same starting point -- an
assumption, based on the pasuk in Yirmiyahu, that the mitzvah will not
apply.  Chakhamim override that with a derashah, which forces them to
reinterpret the pasuk in Yirmiyahu, but Ben Zoma uses the "kol" for
something else, so he's left as a maskana with the position that was the
hava amina of the chakhamim.

But is that starting assumption really so self-evident?  Most other mitzvos
don't have special derashos teaching that they will still be applicable in
yemos hamashiach.  Is it possible that we hold like neither Ben Zoma or the
chakhamim, but rather like a third shitah (not explicitly brought in the
context of this mitzvah, but perhaps implicit from positions elsewhere) in
which the "hava amina" never gets off the ground, since this shitah
maintains that mitzvos will never be abrogated, and therefore the pasuk must
be understood in a "watered-down" fashion -- much like the maskanah of the
Chakhamim, but without needing a special derashah to get there?

If this were the case, we could hold like Ben Zoma on the question of
zekhiras yetzi'as Mitzrayim at night, but like this third shitah on the
question of yemos haMashiach, and there would be no contradiction.

Alternatively, isn't it possible that we could simply accept the dinim of
both Ben Zoma (night) and Chakhamim (yemos hamashiach), even though we don't
know which one of them was correct to use the ribbui of "kol yemei
chaiyekha" as an asmakhta?

Chodesh tov,
D.C.

Doron Beckerman wrote:
> The link for Rav Kook on Korbanos is here, beginning line 12:
>  
> http://w
> ww.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=12939&;hilite=34e9a38d-855
> 0-4b11-8cb1-fc7bba4f95e2&pgnum=726 
> <http://w
> ww.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=12939&;hilite=34e9a38d-855
> 0-4b11-8cb1-fc7bba4f95e2&pgnum=726>
>  
> To be honest, I heard that Rav Kook held this way about a year ago, and 
> I has the same reaction as RZS. Someone pointed out an ambiguous source 
> for this idea in Rav Kook's siddur. But recently I found this link - it 
> sure seems like he did say it.

It's especially strange that his source is the maamar Chazal that
"leatid lavo kol hakorbanot betelin", but he doesn't cite the end of
the maamar, "korban todah eino batel", which contradicts his point.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

Doron Beckerman wrote:
> I would also add to what R' Micha wrote, a reference to Midrash Tehillim 
> 146, on "Hashem Mattir Assurim", that, L'Asid Lavo, Hashem is going to 
> be Mattir all non-kosher animals, or Niddah (!)

Which is easily understood as a change in nature rather than in halacha.
If the animals start chewing their cuds, and their hooves split, then
they will naturally be kosher.  And if women stop bleeding as part of
their cycles, perhaps because every egg is fertilised, then the issur
of nidah becomes hypothetical.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

Let's look at the issue about the LLC and its creditor from a real world
perspective.  A person is setting up a business.  He's comfortable, has a
nice house, some money put aside for his kids' yeshiva and college
education, and some other assets. He lives nicely but not ostentatiously,
and while not the biggest ba'al tzedakah, gives an acceptable amount. 

He thinks his new business will succeed but he's a realist and knows that
many businesses do not.  So he isn't willing to risk his home and assets on
the business other than to the extent he will be investing some assets in
the business.  So he sets up an LLC which, like a corporation, limits the
personal liability of the individual participant in the business.  so he'll
lose money of the business fails (the amount he invested) but his risk is
known and limited. And the business fails.  So the suggestion of some is
that all the businessperson's efforts were for naught from a moral
perspective.  All his assets were at risk "morally"; "morals" may demand
that he may have to put his kids on scholarship in their yeshivot because
his education savings account will be depleted; he may have to move to a
smaller house or apartment.

I understand that I'm presenting an extreme situation.	But if it's "the
right thing to do" to use individual assets to pay off the debts of a
business that was formed specifically to protect such assets, there are
going to be lots of negative ramifications to all sides of the transaction.
 Might a person consider using some of his assets to pay off such debts
from a lifnei meshurat hadin perspective?  Sure, depending on lots of
circumstances.	But to set it up that if one doesn't do so he is acting
legally but not morally is, I think, unfair, and I have yet to see any
citation to any halachic or moral source that would support such an
assertion.

Joseph Kaplan
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> or is that
> knowledge irrelevant, since the creditor, from a moral point of view, 
> can rely on the integrity of this ben Torah to pay his debts even if 
> there is no legal obligation to do so.

But why would he expect him to feel such an obligation?  RMB isn't
asking anything, he assumes without question that the borrower *has*
such an obligation, and I'm asking why?  They're not his debts, they're
the corporation's, and he set up the corporation for the explicit
purpose that its debts *wouldn't* be his.  So why should he suddenly
feel that they are his after all?

-- 
Zev Sero               
========================
Perhaps because halacha really doesn't recognize a corporation. Also
remember that halacha is a floor not a ceiling (as per R'YBS). For
example, if one pays cash for an object but does not perform an act of
kinyan and the vendor sells it to someone else, the first purchaser has
no right to the object but the vendor is subject to a mi shepara for not
"keeping his word".  Why? Shouldn't the buyer be expected to know the
sale is not complete until the act of kinyan?


KT
Joel Rich
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On Thu, Jul 03, 2008 at 12:58:06AM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
: But why would he expect him to feel such an obligation?  RMB isn't asking
: anything, he assumes without question that the borrower *has* such an
: obligation, and I'm asking why?  They're not his debts, they're the
: corporation's, and he set up the corporation for the explicit purpose
: that its debts *wouldn't* be his...

This is really where my head was, let's tell a different story...

Moshe and his son-in-law Baruch are in the shirt business. They commission
shirts to be made in China and sell to stores. One of their customers
goes under, while owing him $75,000. M&B Shirts is a small shop, and
will really be stressed by the loss. Barukh learns in shul that Avi, the
owner of the store, had known for a while that it was likely he would have
to close, and continued making orders from them. Wouldn't they be angry
about not getting as much forewarning as the store could have risked?

Aside from the fact that the person in question wasn't selling shirts,
that's roughly the same case, told from the other end.

And given the problem Baruch will now have making tuition (it's not
like he could ask his father-in-law <g>), didn't Avi have a moral duty
to inform B&M about the mounting problems?

Seeing the story from Baruch's angle makes Avi's moral duty self-evident
to me. Lifnei iver type thinking.

As for corporate entities in halakhah, RMJBroyde and R' SHResnicoff list
shitos in <http://jlaw.com/Articles/corporations.html> section V. IMHO,
worth reading. In section VI.A they discuss "Shareholders' Financial
Liability for Corporate Debts":
> ...                                                    Virtually all of
> the Jewish law approaches surveyed in this Article agree, although for
> different reasons, that this secular doctrine of limited liability is
> generally valid under Jewish law.

However, when applying this to Avi, realize that this means that if Avi
was off the hook, his friend Barukh the baker could say open over
Pesach! To quote from VIII:
> Assuming, for example, that the halakhic entity approach were correct
> across the board, it would enable the use of a corporate form to resolve
> countless Jewish law difficulties. The dilemma is that it might resolve
> too many problems. It would theoretically enable Boruch the Baker
> to form a corporation of which he is the sole shareholder, director,
> and officer. It would also allow the corporation not only to keep dough
> throughout Passover, but, if he hires non-Jewish bakers and salespersons,
> to sell dough throughout Passover as well as on the Sabbath and other
> Jewish holidays. Although it is possible that secular law creates the
> opportunity to use a corporation to circumvent Jewish law, this is an
> unsettling conclusion.

Why is that more unsettling than thinking he could borrow money and not
pay it back? Both are miSinai...

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When a king dies, his power ends,
micha@aishdas.org        but when a prophet dies, his influence is just
http://www.aishdas.org   beginning.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                    - Soren Kierkegaard

David E Cohen wrote:
> R' Micha Berger wrote:
>> We follow ben Zoma's derashah for "KOL yemei chayekha". By saying there
>> is a chiyuv bizman hazeh at night, we rejected the Chakhamim's derashah
>> of "lehavi liymos hammoshiach".

> We do hold like Ben Zoma regarding zekhiras yetzi'as Mitzrayim at night

No, we do not!  Yachid verabim halacha kerabim, and I'm not aware of
anything to indicate that this is an exception.  *Nobody* disputes that
we say yetziat mitzrayim at night; there's no svara at all *not* to say
it.  The mishna gives it as an undisputed statement.  The machloket
between Ben Zoma and the Chachamim is only about yemot hamashiach, and
we follow the majority, that we *will* say it.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas


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