Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 128

Wed, 09 Apr 2008

• 1. Re: Is having a good time ossur (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 2. Re: FW: Medicine for a Metzora (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: FW: Medicine for a Metzora (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: WTG (Micha Berger)
• 5. mechira (Saul.Z.Newman@kp.org)
• 6. Ul'chporas Pawha (cantorwolberg@cox.net)
• 7. Re: levayah minhagim (Esther and Aryeh Frimer)
• 8. sunday pesach (Saul.Z.Newman@kp.org)
• 9. Re: FW: Medicine for a Metzora (Daniel Israel)
• 10. Chinese repression in Tibet - al pi Torah? (SBA)
• 11. Re: FW: Chinese repression in Tibet - al pi Torah? (Eli Turkel)
• 12. Re: FW: Chinese repression in Tibet - al pi Torah? (Micha Berger)
• 13. Re: R' Angel & Geirus Redux (Daniel Eidensohn)

R' Richard Wolpoe wrote:
> I have heard besheim RYBS that only music that caused one
> to get up and dance [lich'ora even if one did not actually
> dance!] was the kind of music that is assur.  This dovetails
> well with what I'm saying. I would suspect that our esteemed
> moderator might also concur with this chiluk

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach would also concur with it.

From Halichos Shlomo on Bein Hametzarim 14:3 - "Hashira shenohagin bah
issur biymei bein hametzarim, eina ela misug hashirim ham'orarim l'rikud. =
The song which we avoid during the three weeks is only of the type which
inspires one to dance."

Footnote #8 mentions that he held the same way during sefirah. More
relevant to our thread, he goes on to specifically allow certain kinds of
music to combat certain negative situations:

"[RSZA] paskened regarding summer camps for girls, that all songs called
'shirei regesh' and the like are muttar for them to sing. Likewise, he
paskened leniently many times about listening to recordings [klatot] if the
matarah [subject? purpose?] is only to relieve [l'hafig] loneliness
[b'didut] or fear [pachadim], such as a widow who lives alone at home, and
similar cases. And he paskened the same way for a widow in the 12 months of
mourning for a parent."

How would one define "dance" in this context? The rule of thumb which I
have used (I have no idea whether I might have heard this from someone, or
whether I invented it myself) is that I allow myself to listen to music on
the radio when I am driving and in similar boring situation, but if I find
myself singing along -- and certainly if I start tapping my fingers in time
with the music! -- then I feel I've crossed the line, and I turn the radio
off for a while.

Akiva Miller
_____________________________________________________________
Stuck in a dead end job?? Click to start living your dreams by earning an online degree.
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On Sun, 6 Apr '08 2:47pm, R David Kishenevsky <dkish@jglinvestments.com.au>
wrote RSBA:
:> It seems clear that in those days, a person speaking Loshon Hara, Motzi Shem
:> Ra etc would end up becoming a Metzora.
:> So which normal bar-daas wouldn't refrain from LH, knowing that he'll get
:> on-the-spot punishment?

: Re your second question, in his sefer, Danny Ginsberg provides an answer
: from the Be'er Mayim Chayim. His answer is that not everyone who spoke LH
: would become a metzora. Rather, one had to be worthy enough to merit the
: punishment.?

So, then the only people who would speak LH is someone who not only
thinks little of others, but also underestimates his own worthiness?
Since tzora'as is also a punishment for ga'avah, that really leaves
someone between a rock and a hard place.

I would give a variant on RDG's theme, that tzara'as is not guaranteed
for the zokheh either. Rather, it has to be that HQBH decided that this
particular person in this particular instance would be best served by
the call to teshuvah. Tzora'as is a form of siyata diShmaya.

Which explains why a nega in a house could be a way of finding hidden
wealth. Even if caused by a cheit, it is more (since chata'im like LH
and ga'avah are commonplace) caused by having the merit to have HQBH
help one do teshuvah.

On Mon, Apr 07, 2008 at 12:20:20PM -0400, Michael Makovi wrote:
: I've seen some things that said that tzaarat is definitely not
: leprosy, but the various forms of tzaarat do appear similar to eczema,
: ringworm, and other skin conditions.

What about psoriasis, raised red and white skin where the discoloration
visibly goes deep into the skin? (Not to mention the phonetic similarity.
Proisasis comes from the Greek word psora, meaning "itch", but the
dictionary doesn't trace the origin of the Greek.)

Psoriasis can have a psychosomatic trigger, which allows me to quote
myself from last year's discussion of the parashah (v23n87):

> Today we have psychosomatic illness -- they aren't imaginary, but the
> origin of the physical issue is an emotional one. High blood pressure
> is often an example. Psychosomatic skin disorders are more common among
> Holocaust survivors shlit"a.

> I think of tzora'as as a spiritusomatic illness. But in order for such
> a thing to happen someone would have to be sufficiently unified in guf
> and neshamah for one to be able to impact another.

> If speaking LH doesn't stress mind or soul, how would either (assuming
> mind and soul were distinct) influence the body.

RZL in reply mentioned that he thought it's what the Kuzari says.

On Mon, Apr 07, 2008 at 12:59:57PM -0600, Daniel Israel wrote:
: Leaving aside the question of whether there is support in Chazal
: for the idea that tzaras manifests itself as a physical illness in
: some sense, I would say that the real question is not whether it is
: mutar to heal it, so much as whether it would be effective.

Doesn't the pasuq describe the appearance of the skin at length? If we
say that the cause is spiritual, wouldn't that mean it is perforce both?

I would have asked in the reverse -- what physical disease isn't
spiritual? Wouldn't the claim of a spiritual disease imply that HP must
be limited in a way that excludes other diseases?

All I see to differentiate them (assuming we don't roll back the clock
on the universal HP issue) is that tzara'as has a cure that invites
exploring a specific subset of chata'im. Much like RDI's nexct point:

: The difference between tzaras and the other examples you cite is
: that tzaras is specifically described in the Torah and a specific
: refuah given.  It would seem to me that, regardless of the physical
: characteristics, one could successfully heal tzaras by any medical
: means.

This too fits the "spiritusomatic illness" idea. At most, you would cure
the symtpom, allowing the cause of the disease to fester. Even if mutar,
would it be advisable?

Does it make sense to cure someone's high blood pressure and not address
his stress?

As for permissability, one would have to show not only that
1- it's not a violation of hishameir lekha 
but also that
2- verapo yerapei includes hishtadlus for illnesses for which HQBH
specifically gave a bitachon-related treatment.


Going back to RSBA's reply from RDK citing RDG's seifer:
> This is because the term "adam" is used regarding negaim, and not other
> phrases used for man, such as "nefesh", "ish" etc.? "Adam" is the most
> exalted of the terms used for man, since it relates to the idea of "adameh
> l'elyon", which is the height of man's achivement in this world. This is
> to teach us that only "adam hashalem vehameuleh" whose ways are straight
> will be punished with negaim. But a person on the level of "ish" (not
> on the highest level of "adam") will not receive a nega for his sin.

"'Adam ki yamus ba'ohel' - atem qeruyim 'adam', ve'ein umos ha'olam qeruim
'adam'." This would seem to imply that "adam" is a madreiga.

And if you limit HP on Rambam's terms, that not all homo sapiens are
equally members of the class of people (MN II:18) but all people get HP
(to the extent that they belong in the class), then it really is tempting
to identify "adam", the name of yetzir Kapav, with the HP meriting person.

However, while the parashah opens (13:2) with "Adam ki yihyeh ve'ior
besaro..." in pasuq 29 it's "Ve'ish o ishah ki yihyeh bo nega berosh o
vezaqan." Similarly v. 38. And in 40, it's just "ve'ish".

And interesting, in pereq 14, once the person is cured, he is a "metzorah"
(v. 2), or "ve'im dal hu" (21), a d not called a person by any term!

So, I don't see RDG's poing. It's only tzara'as, not the other nega'im,
which occurs to an "adam". Which is in and of itself a question.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When memories exceed dreams,
micha@aishdas.org        The end is near.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - Rav Moshe Sherer
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Tue, Apr 08, 2008 at 05:20:58PM -0400, I hit send a moment too soon.
I wrote:
: Going back to RSBA's reply from RDK citing RDG's seifer:
: >                                                ...? "Adam" is the most
: > exalted of the terms used for man, since it relates to the idea of "adameh
: > l'elyon", which is the height of man's achivement in this world...

R' Shelomo Wolbe in AS II writes that Adam can be adameh or adamah --
the choice is ours.

RSRH, OTOH, writes that it's related to "hadom Raglav".

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

On Thu, Apr 03, 2008 at 04:17pm EST, Stadlan, R Noam wrote:
: If a posek decides that the motivation of a shoel is wrong, he can decide
: all the halachic issues to the side of denying the shoel permission to do
: the act.  The decision regarding the motivation can be a result of
: historical circumstances, and those circumstances can change.  Motivations
: can change.  If the motivation was thought to be acceptable, and perhaps
: even admirable, the halachic balance can change.  Rav Gil Student, in his
: review of Rav Herschel Schachter's view's on WTG basically admits that RHS
: consistently rules l'chumra on all the issues precisely because RHS was
: against the WTG....

There are therefore two steps here:

1- RHS decided that WTGs defied some aggadic value and pasqened
accordingly. That's part of the mechanics of pesaq. Deciding otherwise
about the aggadic values or whether they are being violated is simply
pasqening differently. The fact that the motive is aggadic doesn't make
it less part of the halachic process.

2- You seem to say that it's possible the realia changed, and therefore
even if RHS's pesaq was valid, it doesn't apply to today's reality.
While this could be possible with RYBS's dislike for WTG's, it's much
harder to say when the speaker is alive and hasn't said so himself.

...
: In other words, RHS decided that WTG was wrong, and ruled accordingly on the
: halachic issues in question.  The obvious flip side is that if one thought
: that WTG was good, one could also rule accordingly on the halachic issues.

Yes, if there is grounds for a machloqes, one is permitted to have a
machloqes. Reduced to these terms, it's tautological.

The question is whether WTG can be determined to be a net good from the
Torah's perspective.

And thus RRWolpoe's notion that one of the greatest things C lacks in
their decisionmaking is yir'as Shamayim has some truth. When motivated
to find what I find good rather than what Hashem finds good, the system
is badly abused. (Although there are more blatant problems in C legal
process.)

Since important decisions involve conflicting values, it's not the
reality of the values that's at issue nearly as often as have a feel for
the magnitude of each.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur
micha@aishdas.org        with the proper intent than to fast on Yom
http://www.aishdas.org   Kippur with that intent.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                       - Rabbi Israel Salanter

http://yutopia.yucs.org/archives/2008/04/r_moshe_tendler_on_me
chirat_hametz.html 
 r tendler's documents and formalities of mechira

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I wonder why we say it only on Rosh Chodesh Cheshvan to Nissan, and not every Rosh Chodesh for the entire year. 

Most congregations recite it through the Second Adar because it is
obviously added AS A RESULT of the Second Adar. Hence, the feeling was that
was the leap year month is over, there is no need to continue saying it.
However, there are congregations that recite it for the whole year.
ri

In the United States, the general custom I observed at religious funerals
was to have all family members (male and female) go through the shura
together which was made up of men and women. At my first funeral in
Israel ca 1974, I noted that the Chevra Kadisha instructed only the
men to make a shura for only the male mourners. I asked the head of
the Chevra Kadisha and he indicated that that's what is found in Rav
Tackatchinsky's Gesher haChaim. Indeed, Rav Tuckachinsky indicates that
that was Minhag Eretz Yisrael, but he also notes that women don't go to
Funerals at all (Based on a Zohar in Pekudai the the Satan is Meraked).
Needless to say, the women mourners of our Anglo Saxon community in
Rehovot were very hurt and offended, especially since all knew that the
Minhag in the Galut was otherwise.

I then consulted with Rav Simcha Kook, Chief rabbi of Rehovot. On the
one hand, he didn't want to contravene the Minhag of the Chevra Kadisha;
on the other hand, he understood that the women needed the communal
Nihum Aveilum. We agreed that the men would make a shura for the men and
the women for the women. It took a few times for me to teach the women
of our community what to do and what to say, but it now occurs without
my intervention. When someone is buried at Eretz haChaim Cemetery near
Beit Shemesh, the same happens. The head of the Chevra Kaddisha makes his
announcement (Men for men), and - if the family wants it - we make sure
there is women's shura for the women. At Eretz haChaim Cemetery they also
don't have women Eulogizing. I spoke openly with the head of the Chevra
Kaddisha and he indicated that after they leave, "we can do as we like."
So I arrange for the women to speak at the kever then.

As far as keriah is concerned, women are Hayyavot just like men. In
Eretz Yisrael, one of the women (often from the Chevra Kaddisha) helps
the aveilot with the keriah and berakha, as do the men for the men. The
only difference is that because of tsniut, the cut in the dress or blouse
is immediately pinned up.

    Aryeh

--------------------------------------------------------
Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer
Chemistry Dept., Bar-Ilan University
Ramat Gan 52900, ISRAEL
E-mail: FrimeA@mail.biu.ac.il

http://tinyurl.com/629syz it is somehow dissatisfying that  motzei shabbos 
pesach is an agav urcha byproduct of when the next rosh hashana falls 
out.....


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On Tue, 08 Apr 2008 15:20:58 -0600 Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> 
wrote:
>On Mon, Apr 07, 2008 at 12:59:57PM -0600, Daniel Israel wrote:
>: Leaving aside the question of whether there is support in Chazal
>: for the idea that tzaras manifests itself as a physical illness 
in
>: some sense, I would say that the real question is not whether it 
is
>: mutar to heal it, so much as whether it would be effective.
>
>Doesn't the pasuq describe the appearance of the skin at length? 
If we
>say that the cause is spiritual, wouldn't that mean it is perforce 
>both?

P'shita.  Obviously it is both in the sense that it has physical 
characteristics that can be observed and that it can be treated by 
purely non-physical means, both as described in the pasuk.  I 
assume the the intention of the asking whether it is a physical 
disease or not is really a question of whether it manifests itself 
through physical symptoms that are otherwise beyond normal teva, or 
through a normal process of disease.  IOW, is the physical 
manifestation of tzaras a "miraculous" process, or is it simply 
that HKB"H picked one physical illness and put it under a special 
HP.  This is the question I was leaving aside.  (Personally, I 
would lean toward the former, since tzaras of houses and clothing 
do not seem to have any scientific explanation.)

The only nafka mina I see is that in the teva model, one could heal 
tzaras with a medical intervention, and it would require HP to 
cause the intervention to fail, assuming HKB"H didn't want the 
person cured.  As opposed to the miraculous explanation, in which 
medical treatment would fail derech hateva, so to speak.

>I would have asked in the reverse -- what physical disease isn't
>spiritual? Wouldn't the claim of a spiritual disease imply that HP 
>must be limited in a way that excludes other diseases?

Ain hachi nami.  To anticipate the next piece of the discussion, we 
know that any disease and any cure can only come if HKB"H allows 
it.  So what is the difference between tzaras and any other 
illness?  The only difference we know from the Torah is that there 
are a set of mitzvos associated with tzaras.  Chazal also tell us 
that there tzaras is associated with certain spiritual 
shortcomings, and its cure is associated with certain spiritual 
repairs.  As opposed to any other disease, where I don't know for 
sure why it came, nor why it left.

>: The difference between tzaras and the other examples you cite is
>: that tzaras is specifically described in the Torah and a specific
>: refuah given.  It would seem to me that, regardless of the 
physical
>: characteristics, one could successfully heal tzaras by any 
medical
>: means.
>
>This too fits the "spiritusomatic illness" idea. At most, you 
would 
>cure the symtpom, allowing the cause of the disease to fester. 
Even if 
>mutar, would it be advisable?
>
>Does it make sense to cure someone's high blood pressure and not 
>address his stress?

Here we are asking two different questions.  My question is, given 
that HKB"H gave us a spiritual means for healing tzaras, do we 
expect that he would allow someone a refuah without doing the 
necessary spiritual repairs?  I would expect not, regardless of 
whether the physical aspect of the disease is natural or not.  This 
is different from, say, a broken bone, where HKB"H presumably 
maintains a degree of hester panim and generally allows medicine to 
perform within its normal bounds.  (Perhaps He sends, e.g., a 
broken bone knowing that what the person needs is exactly the 
degree of suffering that will occur _with_ a normal medical 
intervention.)

You are raising a secondary issue: if one _could_ cure tzaras, is 
it a good idea?  An interesting question, but I doubt the premise 
sufficiently that I don't think it really matters.

--
Daniel M. Israel
dmi1@cornell.edu

I was wondering, if the Dalai Lama 'style' Buddhism is considered Avodah
Zara (and I'll leave that 'if' to the [surprising large number of] AZ
experts on this forum), may we say, that halachically, the Chinese
government's decade-long efforts in repressing and obliterating that
religion in Tibet should be considered a Mitzva of akiras AZ and ensuring
that the population (or at least their future generations) will not continue
to transgress against one of the 7 mitzvos bnei Noach? 

(I have previously asked the same question re Osoy Ish and Mohammed - whose
followers transformed much of the world from being 24-carat ovdei AZ to
something far less toxic.)

SBA

[RSBA:]
>  I was wondering, if the Dalai Lama 'style' Buddhism is considered Avodah
...

If they were doing the same against buddhism then it would be true.
However, going from the Dalai Lama to bringing fruit to an idol is
hardly akirat AZ

-- 
Eli Turkel

On Wed, Apr 09, 2008 at 09:37:38AM +0300, Eli Turkel wrote:
: If they were doing the same against buddhism then it would be true.
: However, going from the Dalai Lama to bringing fruit to an idol is
: hardly akirat AZ

Just to clear up the metzi'us:

The Dalai Lama is Buddhist. So, they aren't suppressing his religion in
favor of Buddhism.

Buddhists don't bring fruit to idols. In fact, they don't believe
they have a deity. I think that in our definition of terms, they are
panentheists -- they believe that all of the universe is Divine, but G-d
is greater than the universe. They believe in something called Buddha
nature, which all things have, and it's only an illusion that anything
else exists.

It sounds so much like the panentheism and acosmism (as RJJBaker called
it) of the Tanya, I can't see how "Buddha nature" wouldn't qualify
lehalakhah as monotheism.

If they bring fruit as a tribute to some effigy, it's not alst believing
that the Buddha was a god.

I do think many Chinese engage in ancestor worship, which may also
include such tributes.

The Chinese gov't is Communist, which means that while they have a
political interest in eliminating Tibet's religion and separateness,
they would replace it with atheism.

So from my understanding of the metzi'us, it's arguably the replacement
of monotheism with atheism.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of
micha@aishdas.org        heights as long as he works his wings.
http://www.aishdas.org   But if he relaxes them for but one minute,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      he plummets downward.   - Rav Yisrael Salanter

Concerning tinok shenishba we are dealing with social engineering which 
is largely dependent upon the evaulation of the posek regarding the 
impact on the society and the likelihood that a person can become more 
observant. The Rambam has described tinok shenishba as "like ones". 
Which means that in fact he is shogeg and yet he says that we shouldn't 
be so fast to kill them - even though they deserve capital punishment 
for their behavior. We can attempt to build the concept inductively from 
the sources starting from Chazal - but it simply doesn't work. Therefore 
we have to start from the contemporary poskim for the simple reason that 
they determine what we should do. Even so there is still an apparent 
conceptual inconsistency. The simple explanation is that the term is not 
used consistly except as a justification for leniency where it is 
believed that leniency will best serve the goals of the posek and his 
community. The nature of that justification varies.

Let me bring the Nodah beYehuda who asks why should the ignorant be 
punished. He states simply that shogeg is ones but an ones that must 
involve a mistake. The mistake could be the result of a ruling of beis 
din or it could be because of the errors of an educational system.

*Nodah BeYehuda[1] <#_ftn1> (Medora Tenina Y.*D. #96):? We need to note 
the halacha that if an individual sins as the result of following the 
psak of beis din ? he is obligated to bring a chatas as is stated in 
Horios (3a)?The Rambam (Hilchos Shegagos 3:1) brings this as halacha. 
This seems astounding. Why should an individual be obligated to bring a 
korbon?what did he do wrong? In what sense did he sin? There is no 
greater ones than this to follow the ruling of beis din as the Torah 
commands us to obey them (Devarim 17:11) because even if they say on 
right that it is left - their rulings  must be obeyed. Consequently an 
individual has no right to question their rulings. So why is this 
considered shogeg and not ones??We can answer that an individual who 
follows the rulling of the court is obligated to bring a korbon even 
though it is in fact ones because of the command of the Torah to listen 
to them. Nevertheless this ones is the result of a mistake because the 
court erred in their ruling. Therefore it is classified as shogeg ? 
except if every Jew erred then they are all exempt from a korbon. This 
is not because of ones - but because since the court itself is obligated 
to bring a korbon it exempts those who listen to them from a korbon. In 
contrast when some individuals follow their ruling the court is not 
obligated to bring a korbon but only the individual. Therefore this 
distinction [between whether the ones was the result of error and is 
thus called shogeg or whether there was no error and it is called 
halachic ones] gives some answer to the question of the Lechem Mishna 
(Hilchos Shegagos 5:5 and 14:3) where he asks on the Rambam(Hilchos 
Shegagos 14:3) who writes, ?If a court declares that Shabbos is over ? 
this is not a ruling but rather a mistake. And whoever does melacha is 
obligated and the court is exempt. Similarly if the court permits a 
married woman to remarry based on two witnesses that her first husband 
died and afterwards the first husband reappears ? this is not called a 
ruling but a mistake and the woman and her second husband must bring a 
chatas because of their error.?



Daniel Eidensohn


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