Avodah Mailing List

Volume 23: Number 187

Fri, 07 Sep 2007

• 1. Re: Davening for one's enemy (Doron Beckerman)
• 2. Re: Mi Sheberach for a Non-Jew (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Davening for one's enemy (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 4. Re: Davening for one's enemy (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 5. Re: lifnei iver/kanaus (Chana Luntz)
• 6. Re: Intuition - sources (Daniel Eidensohn)
• 7. Re: Time and Emunah (Richard Wolpoe)
• 8. Re: Time and Emunah (MPoppers@kayescholer.com)
• 9. Re: Standing for birchos hashachar (saul mashbaum)
• 10. Re: lifnei iver/kanaus (Chana Luntz)
• 11. Re: Is it better to have one person do a vadai mitzva... (saul mashbaum)

I think the key Sugya is BK 92, the Tefilla of Avraham for Avimelech.
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On Mon, September 3, 2007 9:47 pm, Meir Shinnar wrote:
: We are entitled to ask hashem.  We don't have the right to expect
: that our requests be granted...
: Your pshat is that the act of tefilla is a mitzva just like tzedaka -
: and therefore the two texts - both ba'avur she'anu mitpallelim and
: ba'avur she'eten tzedak - are congruent - but most understand ba'avur
: she'anu mitpallelim as reflecting the power of prayer - rather than
: just as a mitzva - and is therefore iyun tefilla.


I take it RMS's "most" are those who "asser". I fail to see, though,
why they interpret the phrase as they do. If "ba'avur she... notenim
tzedaqah" and "ba'avur she... mispallelim ba'adam" are used in the
same role, why would you think that they have a different dynamic?

I took it for granted that the "mispallelim ba'adam" was simply a
means of trying to get /some/ zekhus backing the tefillah even without
committing to spending money which may not be available.

And what about Unesaneh Tokef? Does "Utefillah ... ma'avirin es ro'ah
hagezeirah" escape similar criticism? If so, why? How about "Tefillah
le'ani ki ya'atof, velifnei H' yishpokh sikho"?

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On 9/6/07, Yonatan Kaganoff <ykaganoff@yahoo.com> wrote:
Other than the famous story in Gemara Brachos involving Rav Meir and
Bruriah, does anyone know of any sources about davening for one's enemies??
Or davening for someone whom you resent, are angry against, or dislike? 
?


Besides R' RW's two cases, there is another - Avrohom Davening for the
people of Sedom V'Amorah. 

KT and KVCT,
MYG

On 9/6/07, Yonatan Kaganoff <ykaganoff@yahoo.com> wrote:
Other than the famous story in Gemara Brachos involving Rav Meir and
Bruriah, does anyone know of any sources about davening for one's enemies??
Or davening for someone whom you resent, are angry against, or dislike? 
?

Oh, and one more: Moshe Davening for Par'oh - "Va'yitzak Moshe El Hashem Al
Devar Hatzefardi'im."

KT and KVCT,
MYG

RDB writes:

> RnCL writes:
> 
> >>Rav Henkin rejects this argument in the teshuva immediately 
> following  (siman 48 of Chelek Sheni of Benei Banim) (clearly his 
> correspondent had responded to this effect) holding that in his view
the one 
> has nothing to do with the other.  Starting from the language of the 
> Torah (where the one prohibition is phrased as lo signov 
> stam, while the other is pen  yosif) and working through the various
sources that discuss hitting a 
> talmid, he holds that while striking a talmid is mutar m'dina 
> and its justification, when done appropriately, can be found 
> throughout the sources, the taking of property has no source to permit
(and 
> he deems it  noteworthy that wherever the permission to strike a
talmid is 
> brought down in the various sources, this is not anywhere 
> coupled with a comment that the halacha of lo signov can as a kal
v'chomer be waived). << 
> 
> So if I were to ask R' Henkin, in a situation of a Rodef, 
> where I have a choice of either blinding him (Chavalah) or 
> taking his money Al Menas LeHachazir, to save the Nirdaf, 
> that these are equally good options? Or, based on the Pen 
> Yosif/Lo Signov distinction, that it is better to blind him? 

Is this a realistic example?  I suspect that if a person could be
stopped from doing something by the mere taking of his money, then
blinding him would be excessive use of force, and not permitted under
the pen yosif principle.  A (slightly) more realistic example might be
whether you could stop someone attempting to kill a person either by
taking away his money or by physically restraining him, and I would
assume in this case Rav Henkin would say that you should physically
restrain him until he causes no more danger rather than take away his
money.  But I just can't see how you could have a rodef situation where
mere physical restraint is not enough, and you need to go to the extreme
of blinding him, and yet where somehow taking away his money would
succeed in stopping him in his tracks (whereas bribing him, ie giving
him some of your money would not work, given that bribing him is not
only mutar but a mitzvah).  Of course, the actual (and realistic)
example used in the halacha (see eg Choshen Mishpat siman 380 si'if 3)
is where in the course of saving somebody's life from a rodef, property
(eg kelim) of the rodef are incidentally damaged.  It is there that the
statement is made: "shelo yiyeh mamono chamur m'gufo"  - but I don't see
that that gets you to where you want to be, firstly it is talking about
damaging property, not theft, and secondly all it says is that pikuach
nefesh is doche both.  Now you might eliminate the first objection by
quoting the Tur at the beginning of siman 380 where he seems to link up
the issur of damaging property with that of genava and gezela (seeming
to imply that this is the source of the issur of property damage), but
the meforshim seem to understand that statement as merely clarifying
that just as with genava and gezela, there is an issur even if one does
it with the intention to pay for the item taken, so there is an
intrinsic issur from the torah in damaging property, not withstanding
that one fully intends to pay for the damage caused (note in particular
that the Bach sources the essence of the issur of nezek mamon
elsewhere). Nor does this deal with my second objection re pikuach
nefesh.

All the above paragraph is my analysis, not Rav Henkin's.  I do note
however that Rav Henkin in the teshuva has an extensive discussion
about, inter alia,  a statement of Rabbi Meir which seems to suggest
that in fact gezela is yarog v'al yavor and that Rashi at least seems to
hold this way (he quotes Rashi on Baba Kama 60b d"h v'yitila) and other
statements which suggest it is problematic to save oneself via the
property of others, while the same cannot be said of hitting.  So in
some ways, he says, one might argue a kal v'chomer the other way, and
hence one cannot say that this is more chamur than that, or that is more
chamur than this, but that they are two separate dinim that apply in
their own spheres with their own chumros and kulos, and therefore just
because one is permitted to hit a talmid, does not mean one is permitted
to take his property.

Regards

Chana

Arie Folger wrote:
> On Thursday, 6. September 2007 03.38:13 avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org 
> wrote:
>   
>> I don't see the contradiction. Rav Moshe apparently first reacted on an
>> intuitive level which was based on his Torah learning. That intution was
>> supported by marshaling texts and sevoras. But the starting point was
>> the intution. This apparently was also the approach of the Chasam Sofer.
>> On the other hand the Tzitz Eliezar is saying that he doesn't have an
>> answer until he has examined the text and based on induction and
>> deductions from the text he will discover what the answer is. The psak
>> concerning artificial insemination was not text based since there is in
>> fact very little text on the subject. He was simply objecting to a
>> talmid chochom being concerned or even noting what the goyim say.
>>     
>
> How would you describe the Satmare Rebbe's opposition to AI in this model?
>
>   
 To reiterate I stated that daas Torah is the intuition that results 
from immersion and mastery of Torah. It is not universal commonsense. 
Nor is there only one daas Torah. Thus gedolim can legitimately disagree 
even though all sides are relying on their daas Torah

This highly trained intuition is what is known in the literature as 
being an expert and it is found in all areas of knowledge. See my "Daas 
Torah" page 168-173, "Descartes Error" and "Blink" for support for this 
from research literature. The Malbim calls it being yoshor - one who is 
intutive and spontaneous in his yiddishkeit as  opposed to tzadik who 
consciously has to force himself to follow the rules. The Rambam (Moreh 
Nevuchim 2:38) uses it to explain the fact that some people can 
accurately predict events without the aid of ruach hakodesh.

There are two basic issues 1) Both Rav Moshe and the Satmer Rav were 
basing themselves on their Daas Torah and the issue was not the result 
of specific texts. One can speculate that Rav Moshe, Rav Shlomo Zalman 
Auerbach and others who permitted it had a daas Torah that gave priority 
to the horror of not having children and this outweighed the negative 
aspects of the procedure while the Satmer Rav was arguing that it was 
obvious that it didn't and it was simply adultery. 2) I think that Rav 
Moshe was responding -not to the opposition to his psak per se - but 
rather the assertion that the procedure was so offensive that even 
non-Jews viewed it as prohibited. Rav Moshe asserted it was totally 
irrelevant what goyim think about halachic issues. One's daas Torah is 
to be entirely the product of Torah sources.

http://www.daat.ac.il/DAAT/english/ethic/grave_1.htm Dr. Richard V. 
Grazi and Rabbi Joel B. Wolowelsky
"Artificial insemination with a donor's sperm, as we noted, is not 
universally accepted. In fact, it was one of the issues that generated a 
most heated debate between two of the major /poskim/ of the previous 
generation. Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum (the Satmar Rav) considered donor 
insemination (DI) to be adultery pure and simple, while Rabbi Moshe 
Feinstein argued that a charge of adultery could not be sustained in a 
case where there was no physical intercourse. While Rabbi Feinstein 
argued that DI involved no technical halakhic violation, he too had 
serious reservations about it because it violated the exclusivity of 
relationships that should characterize a marriage. He was willing to 
allow it only in the case of a distraught woman who could not be 
reconciled to a childless marriage."

We can perhaps extend this type of daas Torah conflict to the dispute 
between Hillel and Shammai in Kesubos 17b. Do you praise a kallah as 
being beautiful when she it isn't or do you point out only those 
positive aspects that objectively exist? Hillel's position seems 
comparable to Rav Moshe Feinstein while Shammai's fits with the Satmer Rav.

In contrast in the case of abortion the Tzitz Eliezar was saying - after 
clearly examining the written sources - it was clear that abortion in 
certain circumstances was not murder and that one can not alter the 
sources to fit one's preconceived understanding.  Rav Moshe Feinstein 
felt that it was intuitively obvious [from his daas Torah] that abortion 
is murder and therefore he had every right to alter the text of Tosfos 
because obviously evidence to the contrary had to be the result of 
corrupted texts.

Daniel Eidensohn

On 9/6/07, Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:


> On Sun, August 5, 2007 7:55 pm, Moshe Y. Gluck wrote:
> :>From http://discovermagazine.com/2007/jun/in-no-time:
> : "Efforts to understand time below the Planck scale have led to an
> : exceedingly strange juncture in physics. The problem, in brief, is
> : that time may not exist at the most fundamental level of physical
> : reality....
> : "The trouble with time started a century ago, when Einstein's special
> : and general theories of relativity demolished the idea of time as a
> : universal constant. One consequence is that the past, present, and
> : future are not absolutes."
> (Going off on a tangent: This is useful metaphor for questions of
> science and Torah. Science explains how the world works, Torah, to
> provide meaning, purpose and values. The expectation when dealing with
> historical claims that they seem to contradict on is that that both
> are fundamentally right, there is only a minor lack of understanding
> on our part that creates an illusory contradiction in a corner case
> that neither was designed for. If scientists can live with a
> contradiction and engineers can use the data to design devices, why
> can't we simply shelve our question without having a crisis of faith?)
>
>
> Tir'u baTov! -mi


Going off on a tangent to Micha's tangent - in 1972 I took Physics at
University of CT in West Hartford.  The professor - a non-Jew but fairly
religious man - often waxed philosophical.  he discussed the concept that
photons were considered either/neither paritcles or waves, but rather had
properties of both. This was a paradiox taht sicentists at the time really
could not explain.

Nevertheless, this paradigm ws use to explain subsequently discovered
phenomena that had the same kind of paradox!  So after photons there came
oother particle/waves that were explained as photon-like.

================================================================

My point?  Back to Torah.  Sometimes a teirutz to a question or a stirah
maybe difficult to comprehend. But ONCE discovered, this chiddush may be in
turn used to explain OTHER Cases unforesen by the original metareitz!
Hiddush gorreres Hiddush!

We know the story of bringing down a chiddush on to the earthly plane that
sometimes becomes commonly known very quickly.  Simlarly, a paradigm - a
dugma - can come down and even if a bit fuzzy can be used to understand even
newer  problems!

I even have an example.
My daughter's school taught - based upon the chiddushim of R. Menachem
Mendel Kasher iirc - that Hametz was an Egyptian delicacy.  And that Semites
traditionally ate Matzah- [hence how Lot served matza to the mal'achim.]

Follow this thinking a bit to antoher case. Sefer haHinuch struggles with
the prohibition of dvash and s'eor on a korban minhah.  But following the
above hiddush it is easy to explain.  Se'or - as noted - was an Egyptian
bread enhancer.  And similarly, Egyptians had a bread and honey delicacy!

A simple explanation for this issur is that we are to avoid Egyptian rituals
in the process of Korbanos! [Simlar to Rambam's meat/milk explanation as an
avodah Zoro ritual!]]  This COULD explain how Hametz is ONLY assur on Pesah
- it is aftera ll Zecher yetizas Mitzrayim And Dvash/se'or in korban Minha
has a problem - because it would be like k'maaseh eretz mitzrayim!

How about lot baking matza BEFORE yetizas mitzrayim?  My best explanation is
that despite Lot's sojourn in Egypt with his uncle Avraham, he stuck to a
Semitic diet and this constituted conceptually OWN  mini-Yetzias
mitzrayyim.   IOW, maettaphorically Lot did not carry with him ma'aseh Eretz
Mitrayim.  But, unfortunately he DID learn from Sodom and Amorahh...

-- 
Kesiva vaChasima Tova
Best Wishes for 5768,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
Please Visit:
http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/
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In Avodah Digest V23#186, R'Micha wrote:
> However, we have a universal minhag to say qaddish for 11 months based
on the notion that the niftar, if he is not a rasha, spends a maximum
of that time in gehenom. Note that the niftar is outside of space, but
is assumed to still experience time, and not only that, but time
roughly the same as someone moving at usual speeds in relation to the
surface of planet earth.
> However, the existence of time need not be as an external reality. The
notion that time is a product of human perception of that reality
would be sufficient to support bechirah. And WRT what I called the
second question of time, that of its flow from past to future, REED
says just that -- that it's a product of our perceptions as shaped by
the eitz hada'as. See MmE vol II pp 150-154, the discussion at v14n11-
n67, or just cheat and get my summary of the ma'amar as per the end of
the discussion, at <http://tinyurl.com/3bqnjs>.
> IOW, it's not important whether our bodies experience time as we
perceive it. What the Torah discusses is the perception, time as part
of a soul's existence. <
In support of what small amount of Micha's thoughts I can bend my mind
over: can we not infer from Ma'aseh B'reishis that time preceded that which
is part of this world, even as it's a way (similar to anthropomorphism) in
which this-worldly creations can comprehend what essentially is beyond
comprehension?

A guten Shabbes and all the best from
--Michael Poppers via RIM pager
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RRichard Wolpoe wrote:
>For one of the best repositories of LITURGICAL customs see the Levush.
RDavid Miller gave a shiur on slichot recently at the YU center in Israel, and quoted the Levush. He then noted that the Levush is an example of the principle "Hakol talui b'mazal, afilu sefer Torah shebahechal";  the Levush is not learned nearly as much as his value merits.
He also noted that the Levush was a precursor of the Aruch HaShulchan, giving the background from the gemara and rishonim for the terse psak of the SA.
Shabbat Shalom and KvCT
Saul Mashbaum
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RDB writes:
> 1) The realism, or lack thereof, does not detract from the 
> absurdity of equating Chavalah and Gezeila (or making 
> Chavalah less serious)  in the aim of achieving a particular 
> desired result.

If an example is impossible, it does not strike me as a relevant
example.

 In the case of a desired result of Chinuch, I 
> find it exceedingly difficult to suggest that if a Rebbe hits 
> his Talmid to the point where he kills him B'Shogeg he is 
> Pattur from Galus, (Makkos 8) and yet that does not dictate 
> leeway in taking his away his property for acheiving the same result. 

And if by doing some other averah to achieve the same result ought there
also to be leeway - eg if the rav was boel the talmid's wife as a way of
bringing him to his senses, that would also be OK?  Ok that is a yarog
v'al yavor, but I am sure you can come up with an issur lav.

The point about a rav who strikes his talmid to the point where he kills
him is that the rav has no intent to kill him, it was an accident.  He
intended to hit him as is permitted by the halacha.  Nobody suggests
that we are talking about murder here, the only question is galus, ie
the question of shogeg.  But if the rav takes away his property then,
argues Rav Henkin, you do not have a halachic category into which you
put "taking away property in order to reprove which is handed over to
the individual".  Taking away property against the will of a person is
gezela, and so that is what the Rav intended to do.  The fact that he
was trying to do a mitzva haba b'averah, does not make it, according to
Rav Henkin, any less an averah.  Nor that he may not have other,
specifically sanctioned means to achieve the same result (maybe that
makes it worse).  Note of course that the beis din is able to take away
property in order to reprove an individual, but here you either have
specific source in the Torah, or hefker beis din hefker.

> 2) Restraining is not Chavalah.

Agreed - but the point is that in order to legitimately engage in
Chavalah in a rodef situation, restraint has to not be enough, so for
your comparison to have any practicality, you need a scenario where
restraint is not enough, and taking of property is, and that seems
logically impossible to me.

> 3) While the Tur is not a clear-cut source for the Issur 
> Hezek stemming from Gezeila,  the Rabbeinu Yonah to Avos 
> (1:1) is very clear in this regard, though I am aware of 
> other sources for this Issur (Yad ramah to BB 26 has two more) 
> 
> 4) The position that Gezeila is Yehareg V'Al Yaavor is 
> rejected by the vast majority of Rishonim, (though the Ramban 
> to Kesuvos 19 quotes such a possibility in interpreting the 
> Gemara there) and even though the Rashi to BK 60, B'Pshuto 
> does seem to say this, as pointed out by the Parshas Derachim 
> (who is incredulous that it is possible for Rashi to hold 
> this), many Acharonim (Yad David, Beis Aharon, et al) learn 
> Rashi differently.  

Rav Henkin does bring all this. The main point he is making though is
that one could not even start a discussion about whether gezeila is
yarog v'al yavor if you allow gezela as a kal v'chomer from hitting.
The whole argument goes away based on, well hitting is not yarog v'al
yavor, gezela is more kal than hitting, so therefore it cannot be yarov
v'al yavor, end of issue.  The fact that this line of reasoning is not
imployed in the yarog v'al yavor for gezela discussion, even by those
who hold that gezeila is not yarog v'al yavor indicates that in fact we
do not learn the kal v'chomer in this way.

> 5) The main reason the Gemara re Nirdaf breaking the Keilim 
> being Pattur doesn't do me any good is because there the Kal 
> VaChomer is from being able to kill him outright, not 
> necessarily from Chavalah.

I confess I don't think it reads that way, rather the kal v'chomer is to
chavla, which itself is a kal v'chomer from being able to kill him
outright.  Note of course that if you kill the rodef, then actually the
property that has been damaged ends up belonging to his heirs, who may
well be innocent (same is true of the talmid killed b'shogeg - if you
take away his property, and that doesn't work, and you then resort to
hitting, and then the talmid is killed, you are then sitting on the
property of innocent heirs).  One of the reasons I always thought that
there is a lot of discussion regarding which particular aveiros were
significantly henious that not only is the person chayav misa, but their
property is forfeit is because the latter hits subsequent existing
generations (while killing him only hits potential generations that he
might have produced had he not been killed).

> Kesivah VaChasimah Tovah,
> 
> Doron

Kesiva VaChasima Tovah and Shabbat Shalom

Chana

REReich
> We see that out of the 120 there are 76 cases (120-44), i.e a 
> 63%+ possibility that will be at least one Yibum and 30 cases 
> (1 + 10 +19), i.e. a 25% possibility that there be more than one.

RCL
>>
I have now had an opportunity to brush up on my probability theory
(which is a much simpler way of doing this kind of analysis) and which
gives the probability of getting five actual yibums at 1/5 x 1/5 x 1/5 x
1/5 x 1/5 = 0.00032 while of getting five chalitzas at 4/5 x 4/5 x 4/5 x
4/5 x 4/5 = 0.32768.  That means that the probability of getting one or
more cases of yibum (ie of equalling or bettering the situation where
you have one brother marry all the women) is 1 - 0.32768 = 0.67232.
>>
As far as the probability of getting 5 yibumim goes, RCL has gotten the math wrong. The possible combinations of the yevamim and yevamot is,  5 factorial (5*4*3*2*1) = 120, not five to the fifth power (=3125).Thus the chance that there will be 5 yebumim is, as REReich correctly points out, 1/120, an exponentially :) larger chance than RCL's  1/3125  This is because the five yibumim are not independent of one another. If , for example the first yibum is a "match", the chance that the second one is also a match is 1/4, not 1/5, since there are only 4 yevamot the second yavam may marry, one of whom is "his" yevama. In the probability examples we are probably familiar with, this illustrates the idea of "with replacement" and "without replacement". If five people blindly choose a ball from a box which contains one white ball and 4 black balls, there is a fundamental difference between if the ball chosen is replaced in the box after each choice or not. In the former case the number of possible choices is 5 to the fifth power, since each choice has no influence on any other; in the latter 5 factorial, since they do. In our case,obviously the yevamot are married "without replacement"
RCL wrote about my suggestion that we should take into account that in any event there are mitzvot chalitza being done.
>>
Thinking about this some more (and doing some research), I now wonder
can we indeed say this at all?  Is not the general principle that - even
though chalitza is a mitzva, b'mkom yibum aino mitzva.  >>
 I believe that this is not to be taken entirely literally. "Eino  mitzva" be "eino mitzva kol kach"; yibum is preferable to chalitza. The monei hamitzvot count chalitza as one of the taryag mitzvot, and I am unaware that there is a qualification "*only* if mitzvat yibum for some reason yibum cannot be done".
Clearly. sometimes mitzvat chalitza is *preferable* even if yibum could be done, even according to the opinion that mitzvat yibum kodemet. According to the Torah, the yavam is visited by beit din who talk to him about his obligation. The gemara says that they advise him as to the option he should exercise. If the yavam is very old, and the yevama is very young, yibum is considered unadvisable, and beit din may endeavor to persuade the yavam to do chalitza, rather than enter into an unhappy and problematic marriage.  If the yavam listens to this sage advice and does chalitza, he has definitely been makayem a mitzva from the Torah.  I am convinced that even in other than this extreme case, every yavam who does chalitza is mekayem a mitzva min haTorah.
>>Because if the yevama is forbidden to the yavam by way of a lav, yibum can still be
performed, on the basis that aseh docheh lo ta'ase, and we do *not* say
that since it is possible to do chalitza and it is not as though he will
not do a mitzvah at all, since he will perform chalitza, and it is
merely not a mitzva min hamuvchar, we should be mevatel the mitzvah of
yibum in favour of the mitzvah of chalitza  <<
I do not think that we can deduce from asei doche lo taaseh by yibum that chalitza is not considered a mitzva if yibum could possibly be done. Asei doche lo taaseh even if one could somehow both do a mitzva and avoid the lo taaseh. Tzitzit is doche k'laim, and wollen tzitzit can be put on a linen garment, even if linen tzitzit (without t'chelet) could possibly be used, both performing a mitzva (in perhaps a lesser way) and avoiding the lav. Despite the wording of the principle, I think it's fair to say that the lo taaseh is hutra, not merely d'chuya, by the asei.
Shabbat Shalom and KvCT
Saul Mashbaum
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