Avodah Mailing List

Volume 23: Number 165

Mon, 06 Aug 2007

• 1. Re: R' Ovadiah Yosef re candle-lighting (Ken Bloom)
• 2. Time and Emunah (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 3. Re: choson domeh le-melech (Daniel Eidensohn)
• 4. Re: Shmitta (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: Shmitta (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: Charedim in the army (Doron Beckerman)
• 7. What is sinat chinam (Cantor Wolberg)
• 8. "Be Sure to Cleave so He Won't Leave" (Cantor Wolberg)
• 9. Re: R' Ovadiah Yosef re candle-lighting (Zev Sero)
• 10. falsifying the Torah (David Riceman)
• 11. Re: Public school or non-Orthodox day school? (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 12. Re: Accompanying someone to the hospital (kennethgmiller@juno.com)

>> "Women should make hamin and not deal with matters of Torah," the
>> spiritual leader of Shas, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, said in a speech to
>> supporters on Saturday night.  
>> Yosef made the statement in the context of a major Halachic campaign
>> he is currently engaged in as to when women should recite the
>> blessing over the Shabbat candles.  

On Tue, 31 Jul 2007 23:59:20 EDT T613K@aol.com wrote:
> Women make a bracha /after/ lighting because by making the bracha,
> they  have brought in Shabbos, and now cannot kindle a candle.

A quick point of Sepharadi Halacha according to ROY:

* The act of lighting the candles doesn't bring in shabbat (based on
  many authorities).
* According to those who say the lighting does bring in shabbat, we
  make a condition once a year that we're not bringing in Shabbat when
  we light.
* According to those who say the lighting brings in shabbat, it doesn't
  bring in Shabbat until after we light the last candle. The beracha has
  nothing to do with it.
* The language of the Maran indicates that the beracha is said first,
  then the candles are lit.
* Saying the beracha after lighting is an issue of safek beracha
  lavetalla.

Regarding those who say that the beracha ushers in Shabbat, R' Ovadia
feels these authorities are less relevant to the Sephardi minhag than
the authorities who hold the above positions.

See Yalkut Yosef 263:33.

--Ken

-- 
Ken Bloom. PhD candidate. Linguistic Cognition Laboratory.
Department of Computer Science. Illinois Institute of Technology.
http://www.iit.edu/~kbloom1/
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From http://discovermagazine.com/2007/jun/in-no-time:

"Efforts to understand time below the Planck scale have led to an
exceedingly strange juncture in physics. The problem, in brief, is that time
may not exist at the most fundamental level of physical reality. If so, then
what is time? And why is it so obviously and tyrannically omnipresent in our
own experience? "The meaning of time has become terribly problematic in
contemporary physics," says Simon Saunders, a philosopher of physics at the
University of Oxford. "The situation is so uncomfortable that by far the
best thing to do is declare oneself an agnostic."

"The trouble with time started a century ago, when Einstein's special and
general theories of relativity demolished the idea of time as a universal
constant. One consequence is that the past, present, and future are not
absolutes."



I leave it to the philosophers on-list to discuss What this actually means
in terms of Yiddishkeit. Sent to Areivim and Avodah, please direct responses
where appropriate.

KT,
MYG

SBA wrote:
> From: "Eli Turkel" <>
> What is the origin of the concept that a choson is like a king?
>   
>
> I did a search and found that this is mentioned in Pirkei
> deReb Eliezer 16.
>
>   
SEE Igros Moshe OH I #34 page 91

Be'oso inyan, shemittah derabbanan and its relationship to yoveil,
the following was roughly Rafi's bar mitzvah derashah (Pesach 5761).

(If you notived that it would make an overly long derashah, so did we --
as the mesibah. Siggy still occasionally reminds me of it...)

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

In the first of yesterday's two pashios, Behar (25:18) perek khaf-hei,
pasuk yud-ches, it says:

    "Vesapharta lekha sheva` shabasos shanim
	"And you shall count for yourself seven sabbaths of years
    sheva` shanim sheva` pe`amim
	seven years seven times
    vehayu lekha yemei sheva` shabasos hashanim
	and it shall be for you the days of the seven sabbaths of years
    teisha vi'arbai`im yom."
	49 years."

The Torah here is discussing the mitzvah of Yovel, of the Jubilee year.
The word "yovel" refers to the blast of the shofar which is blown on Yom
Kippur of the Jubilee year. In that year, any land that was divided by
Joshua amongst the tribes is returned to the family that it was alotted
to. Also, in the yovel year, all slaves are freed.

Yovel only applies when "kol yosheveha aleha -- all of Israel's
inhabitants live on it". Only when the majority of all 12 tribes and Levi
are living within their ancestral borders -- again, as Yehoshu'a divided
them -- does Yovel apply. There has not been a Yovel since the fall of
the Kingdom of Israel, or perhaps even since the tribes in Transjordan
were exiled, in the first Temple period.

The Torah is being pretty wordy, and that isn't its normal style.
Usually, the Torah will use the fewest words possible to get the idea
across. Extra words imply extra, not obvious, ideas.

The Torah tells us that there is a mitzvah to count the number of years
between two yovelos, two jubilee years. But why does Hashem spell
out that we should count 7 cycles of seven years, and then again to
count 49 years? Do we need Hashem to tell us that seven times seven is
forty-nine? Can't we do the math ourselves?

When it comes to the mitzvah of counting omer, the Torah uses similar
terms. Omer is a special grain sacrifice brought during this time of year,
every day from the 2nd day of Pesach, of Passover, until Shavuos. During
this period there is also an obligation to count out 49 days. For example,
last night we said, in Hebrew, "Today is 42 days which is 6 weeks in
the omer." There are two parts, counting 42 days, and counting 6 weeks.

For counting omer, the Torah in Vayikra (23:15) chaf-gimel, pasuk
tes-vav says:

    "Vesafartem lachem mimocharas hashabas
	"And you shall count for yourselves from the day after the day
	of rest,
    miyom havi'achem es omer hatenufah
	from the day you bring the raised omer offering
    sheva` shabasos temimos tihyenah
	it shall be seven whole weeks
    Ad mimacharas hashabas hashevi`is, tisperu chamishim yom
	"until the day after the seventh week, you shall count fifty days".

The two are very similar, but we can also see some subtle differences.

The first is that by omer the Torah speaks in the plural -- "vesafartem"
is "and you shall count" when "you" means many people. By our pasuk, by
yovel, the word is "vesaphrta", "and you will count" speaking to only one
"you".

This is because the mitzvah of counting for yovel isn't on each and
every Jew, the way omer is. Each of us count omer. Each person needs to
prepare themselves for Shavuos, for reliving getting the Torah. Yovel
is one mitzvah for the entire Jewish people as a whole. The one "you"
counting the years toward yovel is the nation.

Since we can't all count together, Sanhedrin has the obligation to count
as the representatives of Benei Yisra'el.

The Hapanim Yafos says that the reason why the math is spelled out by
yovel is for the same reason as by omer. We learn from the pasuk by omer
that we need to count both 49 days and seven weeks. As we said there
are two parts to the count. Similarly when Sanhedrin would count the
years toward yovel, they would have to count that it was "the 39th year"
as well as being "the 5th cycle of 7 years, the 4th year of that cycle".

There is a mitzvah that comes in cycles of 7 years, one that we are also
in the midddle of, called shemittah. In the seventh year, the shemittah
year, farmers in Israel are not permitted to work the land. The land of
Israel rests. Also, in that year, all loans are forgiven.

The Torah is combining the mitzvos of shemittah and yovel, of the
sabbatical and jubilee years. In fact, it is the opinion of Rebbe (given
in the Yerushalmi, Shevi`is, perek yud, mishnah beis) that whenever one
does not apply, neither does the other. Since there is no yovel, shemittah
today can not be the real mitzvah. We observe it only as a comemoration,
to keep the mitzvah alive until we do once again live in Israel.

When Rebbe's opinion appears in the Talmud Bavli, though, it is cited as
part of a disagreement. Rebbe still says that shemittah today is not the
biblical mitzvah, but his peers, the other rabbis, say that it is. That
even without yovel, the Torah's idea of shemittah still stands.

The later sages, Abayei and Rava, are quoted in the Talmud in three
places trying to explain various rulings about shemittah in light of
this debate. As we will see, Abayei's position is quite clear -- he
assumes that the law is like Rebbe, that shemittah isn't the biblical
shemittah, and therefore one can take some leniencies. Rava's isn't
as straightforward.

The first of these discussions is in Mo'ed Katan beis amud beis. There
the mishnah says that one may water a fields that is on a slope, and
must be watered manually, during the shemittah year. The gemara asks how
this is permissable -- how is one permitted to tend a field by watering
it during shemittah? Abayei answers that the mishnah is like Rebbe.
This wouldn't be too surprising, since Rebbe is the one who compiled
the entire structure of Mishnah, including this one. But this means that
the mishnah permits watering a field on the side of a mountain because
it assumes that shemittah today isn't real shemittah.

Rava says that one can even say that the mishnah goes like the
Rabbanan, the rabbis other than Rebbe, who say that shemittah is from
the Torah even today. However, the Torah only prohibited the av, the
actual kind of tending one's field as framed for the laws of resting on
Shabbos. Shemittah does not include and not tolados, other derivatives of
the same basic idea that are close enough for Shabbos to prohibit. What is
being permitted in the mishnah is only one of these tolados, derivatives.

Note that Rava doesn't actually say that he holds like the other sages.
It is possible that he personally rules that shemittah is no longer the
biblical shemittah. However, in explaining the mishnah, he can understand
the mishnah even without assuming its author agreesl.

The second gemara is in Gitin (36b) lamed-vav amud beis. This gemara
should help us understand Rava's position.

In Gitin, the gemara asks about the justification for the law of
"pruzbul". As we said, normally all loans end at shemittah, and
can't be collected any more. Hillel enacted a kind of loophole, called
pruzbul. It's a contract, by which the loan is handed over to the court
and thereby there is no one person who is obligated to anull the loan.
In this way, people would still be willing to lend money to those who
need it -- even late in the sixth year. If they need to collect on the
loan, they can write up a pruzbul and still collect.

The gemara asks how Hillel could have enacted pruzbul -- doesn't is defy
a major point of shemittah?

And again Abayei appeals to Rebbe's idea to explain the leniency. Since
this isn't the biblical shemittah, Hillel is not overriding the Torah.
Maybe we can explain Abayei's idea further by suggesting that since
shemittah today is a commemoration, one remembers the Torah's mitzvah
when he does the pruzbul, and that's enough.

The gemara continues and asks: but still, you're overriding an earlier
Rabbinic enactment. Even with our suggested reasoning behind his ruling,
how does Hillel have the authority to do override an earlier and greater
court?

Rava provides an answer, but we're not sure which question he's answering:
the original one -- how can Hillel override shemittah? Or the later one --
how can he override even rabbinic shemittah?

According to Rashi, Rava answers the original question. In other words,
he is starting from ground zero, that shemittah isn't necessarily
from the rabbis. Instead Rava assumes that shemittah is from the Torah
even today, and uses a different principle. Hefker beis din hefker --
something a court declares ownerless is ownerless. One once they make
it ownerless, they can give it to someone else. So, they can make the
borrowed money ownerless and hand it back to the lender. And on those
grounds, he justifies pruzbul.

In other words, Rashi says that Rava does hold like the other Rabbis,
that the Torah's shemittah applies even today.

Tosafos disagree with Rashi. They say he is coming to answer the second
question and he is adding to Abayei's answer. They say that even according
to Rava, the law is like Rebbe, and we assume shemittah is NOT biblical.

Rava is answering how Hillel can overturn the earlier sages, those who
said we should continue to observe shemittah as a commemoration. He says
that Hillel doesn't override them. Instead, the court is using its power
to hand money from one person to another.

Tosafos therefore have no later sage who upholds the opinion that
shemittah today is from the Torah, so they clearly rule that it isn't.

But, Rashi makes this out to be a debate between Abayei and Rava as well.
Abayei, like Rebbe, says that shemittah is only a commemoration; while
Rava, like the other Rabbis of Rebbe's day, says that the original Torah
law still applies.

However, Rashi states his own position when explanaing a third
gemara. Sanhedrin (25a) khaf-vav amud alef again questions a leniency
about shemittah. The Romans levied a new tax, and R' Yanai allowed
sowing during shemittah so that people could pay it in the seventh year
too. Rashi there assumes that the law is Rabbinic, and R' Yannai rules
that they never imposed such a costly commemoration. Much like Abayei's
explanation of why one can water a field that is sloped.

In constast to Rashi and Tosafos, the Ramban comments on Gitin, the
gemara on pruzbul, that shemittah is from the Torah even today. After all,
this is the majority opinion against Rebbe, and we almost always rule
like the majority. This is also the opinion of the 19th century responsa
of the Beis Haleivi and the Netziv.

On the other hand, the Me'iri on that gemara in Gitin is MORE lenient
than anyone else we mentioned so far. He says that not only isn't the
mitzvah from the Torah, there isn't even a rabbinic mitzvah of shemittah
today! During the 2nd Temple period, a rabbinic yovel was observed. The
Me'iri understands Rebbe to say that when that rabbinic yovel existed,
there was also a rabbinic shemittah. However, today shemittah is only
a minhag chassidus, a nice custom, not a halachah.

All this helps us understand our opening pasuk from the Torah. We are
told to count "sheva` shabasos shanim" -- seven sabbaths, shemittos,
of years, because shemittah is inherently connected to yovel.

Perhaps we can go one step further. There is a debate in Eiruchin (24b)
khaf-dalet amud beis as to when the eighth shemittah ought to be. Should
it be seven years after the previous shemittah, like the weeks, going
by sevens forever? Or, do we not count the yovel year toward the seven
for shemittah?

In the first opinion, given by R' Yehudah, one yovel could be the year
after the seventh shemittah. But the next shemittah will be only SIX
years after that. So that by the time you get to the 50th year the next
time around, it will be the SECOND year after shemittah. Yovel's place
within the shemittah cycle will drift.

Going back to the two quotes from the Torah at the begining of this devar
Torah, this is actually closer to counting omer. Omer too we are told to
count 7 weeks, but we don't mean starting on Sunday and keeping the weeks
of omer in sync with the weeks of omer counting. Even though the word used
in the Torah for week was "shabbasos" -- Sabbaths. Instead, it is merely
7 period of 7 days. Whatever day of the week that period might end on.

So, when it says by yovel "shabbasos shanim -- Sabbaths of years" it
doesn't mean 7 Sabbaticals, but merely 7 cycles of 7.

The second opinion would not count yovel toward the shemittah cycle.
The first shemittah of every yovel would therefore be the 7th year of
the yovel. Instead shemittah being an independent cycle of 7 years, it
is set up as the 7th, 14th, 21st and so on in the yovel cycle. Shemittah
and Yovel are parts of the same cycle.

We could suggest a reason based on the opinion of Rebbe. He makes
shemittah dependent on yovel because they are parts of one bigger
picture. Which is why they're on the same cycle.

Looking at it the other way, if you say that yovel doesn't count
toward the shemittah cycle, what happens to shemittah when there is no
Yovel? Because yovel isn't skipped, shemittah is in a different pattern
than it used to be. Which fits Rebbe, who says it's only commemorative.

In which case, we can answer one last question. The Ramban rules that
shemittah is still a Torah law, following the principle of ruling like
the majority. How then can anyone else rule otherwise?

However, in the debate about whether to count yovel amongst the 7 years
toward shemittah, it was the majority who said that one should not. That
majority would therefore say that shemittah today, being every 7th year
with no exceptions, is not the same as the original mitzvah. It is not
Rebbe's opinion alone.

Whatever the status is today, may we observe the next shemittah because
of the Torah law; with the mitzvah of yovel restored because the people
of Israel will have returned to our homes.

On Sun, Jul 29, 2007 at 06:00:43PM -0600, Michael Kopinsky wrote:
: On 7/28/07, Dr. Josh Backon <backon@vms.huji.ac.il> wrote:
: > [According to
: > the Kesef Mishneh regarding living in Israel, today we *do* accept
: > ger toshav].

: That would require them accepting the issur of retzichah.  And if they were
: ready for that, a lot of our problems would be solved!

But they accept the issur of retzichah, sort of. The problem is that
they define permitted/mandatory killing overly broadly. Lehavdil, "lo
sirtzakh" poses similar problems: retzichah is prohibited, but the
definition of retzichah (as opposed to other slayings) is *prohibited*
killing. How do we understand this diberah as something other than an
empty tautology? But back to the subject...

This raises the question of what "accepting the 7 mitzvos" means. How
far can they stretch the theory and still be considered accepting?

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet
micha@aishdas.org        about things most people don't watch even on
http://www.aishdas.org   Yom Kippur.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                       - Rabbi Israel Salanter

I just remembered that R' Moshe Feinstein also has a short Teshuva (last
Cheilek, I don't have my Igros Moshe yet from my lift for the exact source)
to a pair of students in Netiv Meir High School regarding whether to go to
the army or learn, where he says that although serving in the army is a
Davar Chashuv, learning is more Chashuv and they should learn, relying
heavily on the Sugya in Bava Basra 8, IIRC.
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On reading the article on What is Sinat Chinam by Rafi Farber, I must respectfully disagree with the author's conclusion (apparently backed up by the Rambam) which is that "Sinas Chinam" is "really justified hatred, but justified hatred that won't lead anywhere." 
We've always understood it to be "Causeless" hatred, which makes much more sense. To condemn "justified" hatred as being what caused the churban is practically an oxymoron. If it is justified hatred, then it is justifiable! Perhaps it might be implying you should hate the sin but not the sinner. However, human nature being what it is, if someone abused or killed your child, could you in all honesty not feel hatred toward that individual? 
Or...if you use the argument that we are all created b'tzelem Elokim, then how would you apply it to Hitler, Eichman, or thousands of others, Y"Sh?
It's too much of an oversimplification to say that Sinas Chinam is "justifiable" hatred. It's one thing to "play with words," but it's another to "play with concepts."
ri
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Devarim 13:5  "The Lord your God you shall follow and Him you shall fear; and His commandments you shall observe and to His voice you shall listen; Him you shall serve and to Him you shall cleave."

What are the differences between "following", "fearing", "observing", "listening" to His voice, and "cleaving" to Him? To "follow" is to first accept God as the Authority. To "Fear" is to expect there are consequences for every action. To "observe" is to act upon the mitzvot according to one's teaching. To "listen to His voice" is to study the Oral Law as well as the written. (rw)

The question is asked, how does one cleave to God? The only way a human being can cleave to God is by emulating His ways. Just as He performs kind deeds, so should you; just as He buries the dead, so should you; and just as He visits the sick, so should you (Rashi).

"Man is wise only while in search of wisdom; when he imagines he has attained it, he is a fool."

Ibn Gabirol, Mibhar HaPeninim
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On 8/2/07, Chana Luntz <chana@kolsassoon.org.uk> wrote:

>> (Is he saying that our GRANDMOTHERS tried to learn Torah and
>> misunderstood what they learned?)
>
> Yup.  At least if you are related the the Falks of Prisha U'Drisha fame,
> I would guess (dates anyone?).

Just parachuting in to say that Falk was not the Drisha's family name, it was
his Yiddish name.  Yehoshua-Falk is a paired name, just like Yehuda-Leib or
Tzvi-Hirsh.  If his family had a name at all, I don't think we know what it was.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

> The Yam shel Shlomo in Bava Kama says even at the point of death one may not
> falsify Torah.  This is true even to goyim, kol she kayn Jews.

How does this harmonize with AZ 29b Rashi s.v. hishio l'davar aher, and Rambam PHM ad. loc.?

David Riceman

R' Daniel Eidensohn asked:
> Is it was preferable to encourage a person to stay in a
> non-Orthodox day school or let them go to public school.

There are *SO* many variables here that I cannot imagine how this is 
a suitable question for public discussion. (Unless, perhaps, what RDE 
meant to write was, "When considering these options, what factors 
should be investigated?")

There is such a wide variation of philosophies in what passes 
for "non-Orthodox". There's even a wide variation in what is 
called "Orthodox"! There's also a wide variation among the 
environments one would find at this public school or that public 
school. Not to mention the wide variation of the children themselves; 
some can cope with this better, and some can cope with that better. 
And the services offered by the schools; it's not inconceivable that 
the day school can deal with slow (or advanced) students better than 
the public school might.

First one needs to analyze these questions -- and the many others 
that I didn't think of -- and see how they relate to the schools and 
to the child. THEN you can start to evaluate the better and worse 
options.

On a more personal note, I'd say that if I were ever in such a 
situation, I would be willing to follow Rav Soloveitchik, and 
sacrifice my Mitzvas Tekias Shofar rather than support a mixed-
seating shul by standing outside it to hear the shofar. But the OP, 
as posted, seems to include a hava mina that RYBS's psak might go so 
far as to suggest that I'd consider sacrificing my child's -- or 
someone else's child's -- chinuch in order to avoid supporting a non-
Orthodox day school. And I, for one, am not willing to consider that 
option.

Akiva Miller

R' Micha Berger quoted R' Moshe Y. Gluck:
> A rav I know is of the opinion that anyone in a hospital
> unaccompanied by someone to watch them is in a Safek Sakana,
> and that one is may (and should) accompany them.

Was this thread originally on Areivim? I tried to find the original 
context of this quote, but I don't see it in any of the last 8 Avodah 
Digests. In any case, this psak sure sounds totally reasonable to me, 
and sounds so familiar that I don't see a need to look it up.

But this is Avodah, so I'll look it up anyway. ... Okay, here's from 
page 21 (which is about both Shabbos and Yom Tov) of "Guide to 
Halachos" by Nachman Schachter and Rav Moshe Heinemann: "A patient in 
a possibly life-threatening or life-threatening situation should be 
accompanied by a family member or close friend to a medical facility 
for support and/or advocacy unless the circumstances dictate 
otherwise."

(I can't imagine what sort of circumctances would dictate otherwise. 
Maybe it is a police or disaster situation, and the authorities need 
the patient isolated from interference?)

R' Micha Berge responded:
> I think it would depend on the hospital and its nursing staff.
> Perhaps as a default position, when you don't know the hospital,
> you should assume the worst. But I would not assume every
> hospital in every country requires the patient have an advocate
> in order for things to get done. Personally,I have had some
> positive experiences. If ch"v someone needed one of those
> hospitals, would he hold that it is assur to accompany them?

I think R' Micha and I have different ideas of what is meant here 
by "advocacy". I agree that there are some hospitals which are so 
good that for a friend or relative to noodge the staff with 
suggestions ("Did you do this test? Can you try that treatment?") 
would be superfluous and counterproductive.

But I don't know of any hospital that offers patients a one-on-one 
nurse 24 hours a day. The most one gets is a Call button, and the 
response is not immediate. Plus, we're talking about Shabbos, when 
the patient may be hesitant about pressing that button. It is very 
common for the patient to have a simple question or request, and it 
is of great relief for the patient to know that, at any moment, he 
can send his advocate to the nurses station to get an immediate, or 
very quick, response.

RMB continued:
> The gemara is so maqpid on making sure the patient is
> psychologically reassured, I am surprised that alone is
> insufficient reason to accompany them.

This seems to contradict the above. You seem to be saying that the 
patient's psychological reassurance alone ought to be sufficient 
reason to accompany them. Did I parse that correctly? If so, isn't it 
exactly the same as what RMYG quoted that rav as saying? What are you 
surprised about?

Akiva Miller



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