Avodah Mailing List

Volume 23: Number 35

Thu, 01 Mar 2007

• 1. Re: Tzinius and the ILG (T613K@aol.com)
• 2. Re: Tzinius and the ILG (Daniel Israel)
• 3. Re: ikkarim redux (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: Tzinius and the ILG (Chana Luntz)
• 5. Re: Torah and Slavery (Moshe Yehuda Gluck)
• 6. Re: Tzinius and the ILG (Marty Bluke)
• 7. When did Ta'anis Esther begin? (Micha Berger)
• 8. Rabbi Yonasan Sacks - The Character of Ta'anis Esther (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: Rabbi Yonasan Sacks - The Character of Ta'anis Esther (Micha Berger)
• 10. end of fast (Eli Turkel)
• 11. Re: When did Ta'anis Esther begin? (Zev Sero)
• 12. Re: Copyright and Dina deMalkhuta (Arie Folger)
• 13. Mechezei keRibbis (David E Cohen)

 
 


R' Michael Kopinsky writes:
>> I think that the fact  that the
> Torah permits slavery indicate that it is not  INHERENTLY
> problematic. <<
 
R' Akiva Miller writes:




>>According to this logic, rape is not inherently immoral, because if  
it was, then we would not find a case (yefas toar) where it is  mutar.>>

>>>>>
Well, a more limited inference would be that rape of an enemy woman in  
wartime is not inherently immoral.  (Speaking of a milchemes mitzva.)  
 
Rape is as "normal" an act of war as is killing enemy  combatants.  If  you 
assume a world in which soldiers routinely raped  women in war, the nation 
whose soldiers first took the woman home and gave  her a month to mourn, treated 
her humanely yada yada, would surely have been  seen as infinitely more 
self-restrained, humane and honorable than  the nation that just raped women in the 
"normal" way of  wartime.




--Toby  Katz
=============

<BR><BR><BR>**************************************<BR> AOL now offers free 
email to everyone.  Find out more about what's free from AOL at 
http://www.aol.com.
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On Wed, 28 Feb 2007 15:06:03 -0700 Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> 
wrote:
>The third category is problematic. Why would Hashem allow a TYQ 
>problem bad enough for Chazal to see the need to assur it?

Without comment on what category different things we have been 
discussing fall under, let me suggest the following (actually, this 
seems clear to me, but I can't think of an explicit source).

Given that HKB"H created the world in a manner that is for our 
good, it is necessary that the proper way for us to act has to be 
clear to anyone who honestly looks.  Furthermore, since the Torah 
is the blueprint of that creation, everything we need to know in 
order to act properly must be in the Torah.  _But_, this does not 
necessarily imply that everything we need to do in order to act 
properly is contained in b'feirush mitzvos d'orraissa.  In fact, 
what we see is that HKB"H left open the possibility that someone 
who follows the taryag mitzvos strictly, but without going any 
further, can do things that he shouldn't do.  It's part of our role 
in the world to look at the Torah and figure out what else we need 
to do.  (This is loosely what the Ramchal talks about in the 
definition of chasidus.)  That may be on the personal level, but 
sometimes it can be on the communal level.

IOW, HKB"H left open some of these potential problems precisely so 
that chazal could see (based on Torah sources, but not purely 
halachic sources) what and how to fix things.  I would suggest that 
He did this as a chesed so that not only could we be partners in 
the physical creation, but also partners in the "creation" of 
halacha.

--
Daniel M. Israel
dmi1@cornell.edu

On Wed, February 28, 2007 4:55 pm, Michael Kopinsky wrote:
: On 2/28/07, Meir Shinnar <chidekel@gmail.com> wrote:
:> ...remember that ma'aseh breshit is physics, and ma'aseh merkava
:> is metaphyics - and both are part of talmud tora;

: Not according to the Ran.  He says (in Drashos #1) that Maaseh Bereishis
: is understanding the connection between the seder hahishtalsh'lus and the
: world, and maaseh merkava is the connection between G-d and the seder
: hahishtalsh'lus.  Thus, according to him, both are metaphysics, just
: varying quantities of "meta".

True, but we're discussing the Rambam. We are using the Rambam as a source for
determining whether aggadita is TT, and so it is his definitions of MM and MB
that are relevent.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

RMK writes:

> On 2/27/07, Chana Luntz <chana@kolsassoon.org.uk> wrote:
> > ....  It has been argued, on this list and elsewhere, that this
shows that the Torah is morally in 
> >favour of  slavery, and that therefore any notions that we have that 
> >slavery is  not necessarly moral are contrary to the moral compass of
the 
> > Torah....

> If I may modify that slightly: "any notions we have that 
> slavery is INHERENTLY immoral are contrary to the moral 
> compass of the Torah."  I think that the fact that the Torah 

That is why I brought the example of kiddushei biah.  Because Chazal say
that acting in this way is a form of pritzus.  It is not similar to the
case of yibbum/chalitza, where there are discussions about whether
people are capable of doing yibbum with the right motivations, so your
"perhaps it is not inherently immoral" argument works.  But regarding
kiddushin, what Chazal appear to be saying is that to have biah with
eidim in the way required to effect kiddushin al pi halacha is
intrinsically a form of pritzus, regardless of motivation.  So by saying
that it is not inherently immoral to have kiddushin in this way appears
to be contradicting Chazal on a matter of morality (and surely whatever
view you have on Chazal and science, saying that their moral
understanding was flawed must certainly be a big no no).

I think part of the difficulty you are having is, if you take away the
moral compass aspect, then you are struggling to see any rationale for
permitting kiddushei biah (ie my question - what was the Torah thinking
of?, is too strong a kasha) - so let me give you a possible
understanding.  Let us say that we need to include kiddushei biah as one
of the halachically valid means of kiddushin, not because it is ever
moral to perform kiddushin in this way, but because you need this in
order to learn out all of the halachos that the gemora learns out in the
first few blatt of kiddushin from the existence of kiddushei biah on a
d'orisa level (such as the point at which the kinyan occurs and the
nature of biah) - such halachos themselves having practical applications
in other areas of halacha that are not immediately obvious (and may not
even have been invented at the time of the gemora, eg like the correct
halachic understanding of invitro fertilisation and other aspects of
modern reproductive technology). [This BTW could be seen as a derivative
of the ben soreh u'moreh argument, at least according to the opinion
that a ben soreh u'moreh never occurred).  If you were to accept this
argument, then there is no need to deny that kiddushin by way if biah is
inherently a form of pritzus - since its halachic existence is required
for other reasons.  But it does then mean that one cannot be sure that
because something is allowed for by the Torah within its halachic
framework, it is necessarily moral to act on that which is allowed.

Regards

Chana

R' Saul Mashbaum:
*Although it seems obvious to us that being a salaried employee is a
*straightforward and sensible way to make a living, it is regarded with some
*suspicion in classical Jewish sources. This is because of the shibud the
*worker has to his employer, which borders on slavery (no jokes please). The
*longer the worker contracted for, the more the practice was frowned upon.


Yaakov Avinu?

KT,
MYG

R ' Akiva Miller wrote:
<According to this logic, rape is not inherently immoral, because if

<it was, then we would not find a case (yefas toar) where it is mutar.

By yefas toar Chazal say explicitly that lo dibra torah ela k'neged
yetzer hara which implies that it is not a moral action.
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The person who gave me a lift into Manhattan this morning raised the following.

While Megillas Ta'anis was observed, one was not allowed to fast on those
days, nor the day before or after. This would mean that one couldn't fast on
most years' Ta'anis Esther.

Would this in turn mean that Ta'anis Esther post-dates Churban Bayis Sheini?

He wanted to argue yes, and that perhaps even Purim's preservation from the
rest of Megillas Ta'anis was why they muted it by requiring one go into Purim
and hear megillah fasting (most years).

I was unhappy with this suggestion because it would imply a need for a Ta'anis
Yehudis on erev Chanukah as well as making Ta'anis Esther pointless in ayaros
hamukafos chomah.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

I am posting this to the list as an intro to my next email, questions it
raised for me. With thanks to RJRich (not to be confused with RRJoel... ;-P)

-mi

------------------------------ Original Message ------------------------------
Subject: Rabbi Yonasan Sacks - The Character of Ta'anis Esther
From:    "TorahWeb.org" <torahweb@torahweb.org>
Date:    Thu, March 1, 2007 10:25 am
To:      weeklydt@torahweb2.org
------------------------------------------------------------------------------


http://www.torahweb.org/torah/2007/moadim/rsac_esther.html

Rabbi Yonasan Sacks
The Character of Ta'anis Esther

The opening Mishnah in Maseches Megillah relates the various days upon
which the Megillah may be read: "The Megillah is read on the 11th, 12th,
13th, 14th, and 15th (of Adar), no earlier and no later."

Noting that the Megillah itself explicitly specifies only the 14th and
15th of Adar as appropriate times for fulfillment of the mitzvah, the
Gemarah (2a) immediately seeks a scriptural source sanctioning the reading
on the 11th, 12th, and 13th of Adar.  The Gemarah identifies such a
source:  in describing the establishment of the days of Purim, the
Megillah uses the plural construction of the term "bi'zmaneihem" (Esther
9), denoting a plurality of days - "z'manim harbei tiknu la'hem."  This
term thus implies that the Megillah may be read on days other than the
14th and 15th of Adar.  The Gemarah notes, though, that the term
"bi'zmaneihem" would seem to denote only two additional days.  How, then,
do we derive that the three preceding days may serve for the mitzvah as
well?

In light of this challenge, the Gemarah reconsiders its analysis.  Indeed,
"bi'zmaneihem" teaches us that the 11th and 12th of Adar are fit for
Megillah reading.  What, then, allows for Megillah reading on the 13th ?
The Gemarah answers that the fitness of the 13th  is self evident and
needs no source, because "Yud Gimmel Z'man Kehillah LaKol Hi."  That is,
the 13th day's status as a "Z'man Kehillah LaKol," a time of assembly for
everyone, justifies reading the Megillah.  Rashi (2a, s.v. "Z'man Kehillah
LaKol Hi") explains that the 13th marks the day in history on which
"everyone assembled to exact revenge from their enemies."  This day thus
warrants Megillah reading because the "central part of the (Purim) miracle
took place" on that that day.

The Rosh (1:1), however, presents a very different possibility in the name
of Rabbeinu Tam.  Rather than commemorating the when the Jews of old
gathered to fight, the 13th of Adar marks the day upon which "everyone
gathers for the fast of Esther" - a time of assembly, not for the Jews of
antiquity, but rather for Jews of the present age.    This explanation
presents an obvious question:  why does the 13th of Adar's status as
Ta'anis Esther necessarily justify the reading of the Megillah?  The
Gemarah's inference certainly suggests a conceptual link between the
reading of the Megillah and the observance of Ta'anis Esther, but what is
the nature of this connection?

To answer this question, Rav Chaim Ahron Turtzin suggests that one must
understand the character of Ta'anis Esther.  While fast days generally
assume a tragic quality in commemorating despondent times of destruction,
ample evidence suggests that, perhaps, Ta'anis Esther is quite different
in this regard.  For example, the Ran (Ta'anis 7a in the Rif) cites the
Ra'avad who questions the permissibility of our practice of fasting on the
13th of Adar, given that Megillas Ta'anis expressly forbids the enactment
of such a fast, due to Yom Nikanor [1].  The Ra'avad adds that even though
the celebrations delineated in Megillas Ta'anis are not actively observed
after the destruction of the Temple, it is still forbidden to establish a
public fast day on any of the listed days.  The Ra'avad justifies our
practice by suggesting that only fasts of suffering are forbidden on days
of Megillas Ta'anis.  Ta'anis Esther, however, is not a fast of suffering,
and therefore does not violate the prohibition of Megillas Ta'anis.
Similarly, the She'iltos (Parshas Vayakhel, 67) explains that although
fast days that fall on Shabbos are generally deferred until after Shabbos
("akdumei pur'anusa lo mikadminan"), Ta'anis Esther is actually observed
early (on the preceding Thursday) because it is not a tragic fast.  These
sources suggest that Ta'anis Esther stands unique from other fast days in
being a fast day which is not colored by sadness.  Why is this so?

Perhaps one can understand the unique nature of Ta'anis Esther in light of
a brief comment of the Rambam at the very beginning of his Yad HaChazaka.
As the Rambam concludes his "Minyan HaMitzvos HaKatzuv" in which he lists
the 613 commandments, he notes that beyond the 613 biblically mandated
mitzvos, Chazal innovated a multitude of rabbinic enactments.  The Rambam
defends the legitimacy of these enactments, namely, that they do not
constitute a violation of the prohibition of "Bal Tosif," because Chazal
clearly publicized that their enactments are not written in the Torah
itself (see Hilchos Mamrim 2:9).  In the course of this discussion, the
Rambam cites an example of a legitimate rabbinic enactment:  reading the
Megillah on Purim.  The Rambam explains that Chazal enacted the mitzvah of
reading the Megillah in its time in order to proclaim the praise of Hashem
and the salvation which He orchestrated, and to attest to the fact that
HaKadosh Baruch Hu responds to the prayers of Klal Yisrael.  In the face
of adversity, we call out to HaKadosh Baruch Hu, and the salvation of
Hashem comes k'heref ayin, like the blink of an eye.  The Megillah is a
testament to the special relationship that connects Bnei Yisrael to
HaKadosh Baruch Hu.  The significance of the  Megillah is that HaKadosh
Baruch Hu responded to our cries.

The Rambam thus suggests that the purpose of reading the Megillah is to
accentuate the transition from fear and despondency to hope and joy; to
emphasize that K'nesses Yisrael can find itself on the brink of disaster,
and instantly find salvation.  On Purim, we do not merely celebrate the
miracles themselves, but rather, the metamorphosis from disaster to
tranquility.  The contrast is what is critical.

What emerges from the Rambam's interpretation is that the fast of Ta'anis
Esther constitutes an intrinsic part of the pirsumei nisa, the publicizing
and glorification of the mitzvah, itself.  Ta'anis Esther sets the stage,
allowing us to appreciate the direness of the situation that preceded the
miracle, so that we can fully appreciate the greatness of the salvation.
If so, the suggestion of the Ra'avad and the Sh'iltos that Ta'anis Esther
is not a tragic fast becomes clear.  The fast is not tragic, because it
merely serves to compound the eventual simcha and hoda'ah on Purim itself.
Moreover, Rabeinu Tam's understanding of "Z'man Kehilla La'Kol" becomes
lucid as well.  Our mandate to read the Megillah on the 13th is obvious,
even without a scriptural source, since Ta'anis Esther does not stand as a
day of sorrow independent of Purim.  Rather, Ta'anis Esther is part and
parcel of the pirsumei nisa which the Megillah strives to achieve.  When
the Jews of old gathered to fight their enemies, they gathered for
"puranus."  When we gather, however, we gather for pirsumei nisa.

___________________________________________
[1]  Megillas Ta'anis enumerates certain celebrated days that were
observed during the time of the Beis HaMikdash.  These days were seen
almost like minor Yamim Tovim, and prohibited fasting.  Yom Nikanor
specifically commemorates the victory of the Chashmonaim over a Greek
chieftain.

Copyright ? 2007 by The TorahWeb Foundation. All rights reserved.

So, here are my comments:
: Gemarah (2a) immediately seeks a scriptural source sanctioning the reading
: on the 11th, 12th, and 13th of Adar.  The Gemarah identifies such a
: source:  in describing the establishment of the days of Purim, the
: Megillah uses the plural construction of the term "bi'zmaneihem" (Esther
: 9), denoting a plurality of days - "z'manim harbei tiknu la'hem."

Grammatically, isn't "bizmaneihem" correct for two different groups of people
who have different days? So this would seem to me to be derashah, not peshat.
Except that derashah is only for chumash, not kesuvim. What exactly is this?
Asmachta? Outweighing peshat in the pasuq? How does this answer the question
of maqor?

:                                The Gemarah notes, though, that the term
: "bi'zmaneihem" would seem to denote only two additional days.  How, then,
: do we derive that the three preceding days may serve for the mitzvah as
: well?
...
: The Rosh (1:1), however, presents a very different possibility in the name
: of Rabbeinu Tam.  Rather than commemorating the when the Jews of old
: gathered to fight, the 13th of Adar marks the day upon which "everyone
: gathers for the fast of Esther" - a time of assembly, not for the Jews of
: antiquity, but rather for Jews of the present age....

Which would argue that Taanis Esther is as old as the megillah, otherwise the
"bizmaneihem" couldn't be taken to mean two days beyond TE, Purim and Shushan
Purim.

Which then necessitates the Ra'avad:
:                                            The Ra'avad justifies our
: practice by suggesting that only fasts of suffering are forbidden on days
: of Megillas Ta'anis.  Ta'anis Esther, however, is not a fast of suffering,
: and therefore does not violate the prohibition of Megillas Ta'anis.

...
: Perhaps one can understand the unique nature of Ta'anis Esther...
: The Rambam thus suggests that the purpose of reading the Megillah is to
: accentuate the transition from fear and despondency to hope and joy; to
: emphasize that K'nesses Yisrael can find itself on the brink of disaster,
: and instantly find salvation.  On Purim, we do not merely celebrate the
: miracles themselves, but rather, the metamorphosis from disaster to
: tranquility.  The contrast is what is critical.

Another idea suggested in the car this morning: Purim is not about ge'ulah as
much as the fact that HQBH answered out baqashos (which tangentially were for
ge'ulah). My problem with that is the same as this suggested diyuq in the
Rambam. Purim is on Adar II to bring ge'ulah close to ge'ulah.

To save this diyuq in the Rambam from the same objection, we would have to
define ge'ulah in terms of tranquility.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

In Israel the fast seems to end about 10 minutes before motzei shabbat time.
Whenever I am in the US the fast ends about the same time as motzei shabbat.
Any reason for the discrepancy?

-- 
Eli Turkel

Micha Berger wrote:
> The person who gave me a lift into Manhattan this morning raised the following.
> 
> While Megillas Ta'anis was observed, one was not allowed to fast on those
> days, nor the day before or after. This would mean that one couldn't fast on
> most years' Ta'anis Esther.

First we need to know what, if anything, Megilas Taanis actually says
about Taanis Esther.  If it's mentioned, then it would be a clear
exception to the general rule, and thus no problem.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

On Wednesday, 28. February 2007 22:08:42 avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org 
wrote:
> I thought the 7THI was specifically Jewish civil authority. What about
> copyright law in chu"l?

That is exactly one issue we ought to raise. DDD is, according to a number of 
opinions, fairly limited. Hence the Ran who states that in EY there is no 
DDD. However, that doesn't make the Ran into an anarchist. We need some model 
for government where we share the space with non Jews and with non O.

Perhaps we need to cover ourselves by finding support for laws both in DDD and 
in 7TH'I. A tzeruf of shitot.

Kol tuv,
-- 
Arie Folger
http://www.ariefolger.googlepages.com

R' Zev Sero wrote:
> AIUI, Mechzei Keribbis means that an outside observer who is
> fully aware of all the details of the transaction, but can't
> read the minds of the parties, can't distinguish this from a
> loan.  In the case of an iska, there is a contract setting
> out the terms, which are very different from that of a loan.

My experience banking in Israel (with presumably Jewish-owned banks), both
when taking out a mortgage and depositing money in an interest-bearing
account, has been that you sign all sorts of documents referring explicitly
to the "ribbit" that will be paid on the deposit or loan.  Somewhere hanging
on the wall, if you know where to look, you can find a document stating
simply that "all transactions in the bank are performed under the terms of a
hetter `iska."

I know that gedolim vetovim mimmeni use these banks, so I have not resorted
to keeping my money under my mattress or saving for 20 years before buying a
home, but I would appreciate a better understanding of how this is okay.

--D.C.



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