Avodah Mailing List

Volume 23: Number 32

Wed, 28 Feb 2007

• 1. Re: Ivrit and Leshon Hakodesh (Michael Kopinsky)
• 2. Re: Ivrit and Leshon Hakodesh (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Tzinius and the ILG (Michael Kopinsky)
• 4. Re: violating a lav to perform a mitzva (Chana Luntz)
• 5. Paper Towels (Yisrael Medad)
• 6. The Ikkarim and the Limits of O, rerere...dux (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: The Ikkarim and the Limits of O, rerere...dux (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: The Ikkarim and the Limits of O, rerere...dux (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: Torah and Slavery (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 10. Re: Paper Towels (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: Biblical text isn't precise record? (Micha Berger)
• 12. Re: Ki Avadim HaYitem (Micha Berger)
• 13. Re: Ki Avadim HaYitem (Moshe Yehuda Gluck)
• 14. Re: Tzinius and the ILG (Michael Elzufon)

On 2/27/07, Galsaba@aol.com <Galsaba@aol.com> wrote:
> I posted already re the terms Ashurit, Ivrit, and Leshon Hakodesh.
> Reading the Gemara, Ivrit is not Leshon Hakodesh, Ashurit is.
> Although in a few places in the Gemara (Senhadrin 21), Ashurit is the Ketav
> (wrting) and
> Leshon Hakodesh is the Dibbur, my impression reading in other places that
> Ashurit can be both
> Ketav and Dibbur.
Can you provide some examples of where Ashurit refers to the language and
not to the script?  Without any proofs, my natural association of the word
Ashurit
is specifically to a Ksav.

On Tue, February 27, 2007 1:36 pm, Michael Kopinsky wrote:
: Can you provide some examples of where Ashurit refers to the language and
: not to the script?  Without any proofs, my natural association of the word
: Ashurit is specifically to a Ksav.

In Ashur they spoke Aramaic, the Eastern dialect which evolved into Syriac and
Jewish Babylonian Aramaic.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

On 2/27/07, Chana Luntz <chana@kolsassoon.org.uk> wrote:
> ....  It has been argued, on this list
> and elsewhere, that this shows that the Torah is morally in favour of
> slavery, and that therefore any notions that we have that slavery is not
> necessarly moral are contrary to the moral compass of the Torah....
If I may modify that slightly: "any notions we have that slavery is
INHERENTLY immoral are contrary to the moral compass of the Torah."  I
think that the fact that the Torah permits slavery indicate that it is not
INHERENTLY problematic. Just like polygamy, there are times when slavery
is OK.  Both are unacceptable under certain circumstances, which is why
polygamy is assur, and slavery may as well be.  But there is not an
absolute moral value decrying either.  Murder, on the other hand, (if it
is actually murder, and not permitted killing) is absolutely immoral, and
no societal norms can EVER be machshir murder.

RJF writes:

> Rt. Chana Luntz wrote:
> > I find myself constantly finding examples where I end up 
> saying  - but  isn't this another case where there seems to be an 
> assumption that if we  are doche a Torah mizvah, a rabbinic mizvah
kama v'kama, 
> but anyway -  you are more than welcome to join me on my hunt.
> 
> The Qal Vahomer is not valid because Hakhamim Asu Hizuq Lidivreihem 
> Yoser Mishel Torah. It is therefore possible to apply dehiya for a 
> D'Oraisa, but not for a D'Rabbanan.
> 

Yes, this is what Rav Moshe said.  All I am saying is that I keep
falling over examples where it seems to me the rishonim did not take
this approach, and appear to be applying a kal v'chomer (I should
probably say a quasi kal v'chomer, it is not a kal v'chomer in the
strict sense).  The latest one is in the Taz on that Even HaEzer 4:20 to
which RSM referred me.  The Taz brings the problem that was bothering me
about how can you allow a mamzer to have relations with a shifcha,
aren't you over on a d'orisa in doing so? - and brings Rabbanu Tam that
in fact there is no violation of the d'orisa when davka a mamzer has
relations with a shifcha, because the problem in fact is "lo yiyeh
kadesh" and due to the nature of a mamzer he is anyway a kadesh, because
his whole being was created by way of averah, therefore there is no
violation if he is then boel a shifcha.  But he then goes on to say that
there is a still a d'rabbanan violation if a mamzer is boel a shifcha
according to Rabbanu Tam, just not a d'orisa - and hence only because of
being metaken the vlad is it  mutar - ie a l'chatchila.  

In other words, we are worried that there is a problem being over a lav
of the Torah - but once we work out that actually there is no violation
of the lav of the Torah, the fact that there is a rabbinic issur is not
a problem when we have a valid reason, such as being metaken the vlad.
No discussion about hachachim asu hizuk lidivreihem - and why it should
or should not apply in this case, just a straight plunge in to say it is
mutar where there is some sort of justifiable ztorech.

And I keep finding examples like this - where there is potentially a
violation of a Torah lav or mitzvah, and the posek or rishon or whoever
is discussing it works out how you can say that really there is no
problem on a d'orisa level, only on a d'rabbanan level - and then
appears to breathe a sigh of relief and says whatever it is is mutar
because of the tzorech in question.  Surely if Rav Moshe were right and
Hachamim asru hizuk lidivreihem was a general principle to be applied
wherever a rabbanan comes up (and not just to certain specific
derabbanans where this is specifically stated), then every time you have
one of these discussions, the next step after eliminating the d'orisa
problem, and before declaring it mutar, would be to say why this
principle did not apply in the case in question.

But that is why I called it a hunt.  It is not a kal v'chomer in the
technical sense (nor if you read my words carefully, did I discribe it
as such).  It is more a case that there seems to be an application of a
certain process that does not take into account the logic that you are
articulating, and therefore would seem by inference that such logic is
being disregarded.

> --Jacob Farkas

Regards

Chana

Michael Kopinsky" <mkopinsky@gmail.com>
writes about the taking of paper towels from someone who took them from the
schule's paper towel dispenser without first asking in a sitaution of
immediate hygienic need that "this Sha'ailah could be very relevant".

My point was that why does this need to be in the category of a
"she'ailah"?  It should be in the realm of common manners - if you have a
real need, and it is immediate, anyone would give you the handkerchief out
of his pocket (or in a similar situation, I have seen women lend other
mothers tissues for their babies, etc.).  So, if the paper towels were
common property, why get picayune and seek to apply Halacha?

-- 
Yisrael Medad
Shiloh
Mobile Post Efraim 44830
Israel
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On Tue, February 27, 2007 11:15 am, R Meir Shinnar wrote to Areivim:
: the radbaz (4:187) explicitly rejects labeling as kfira deviations
: from the ikkarim due to reason (presumably faulty reason..)

Agreed.

: I think that Micha's position reflects a dramatic change in the
: notion of what the ikkarim are.  After all, halachic psak typically
: does not presume to determine the truth - but a practical position -
: and therefore studying the other position, even if it is nidche
: lehalacha - remains torah study ( most people still study abaye...)
:
: However, ikkarim represent a statement of the core beliefs about what
: is true - and while psak may determine some practical actions...

Not at all. I'm staying the ikkarim are used in pesaq of what to do lemaaseh.
Who can handle my wine. Which converts should I accept. Who must I just lekaf
zechus.

I am saying that some loose form of them are de facto used in pesaq. Not that
that makes them true or false. But we can't say the ikkarim are open to debate
when we rely on them as "halachic truth".

I would also argue that this was the Rambam's intent, as he includes them in
Hilkhos Teshuvah in defining terms he then uses throughout Mishneh Torah in
these ways. But that's secondary, since I'm talking about pesaq today, not the
Rambam's intent.

While this has social impact, I'm not saying we should use that pesaq to
define the sociological grouping we call O. I'm convinced for Areivim-esque
reasons that we need to foster the existence of "non-observant O Jews", lest
they join communities where traditional halakhah is kept on their agenda.

I'm presenting the notion that we have defined for ourselves normative O
belief and used it lehalakhah. And not dismissing that of there being a home
in the O community for non-normative O Jews.

Nor am I saying that pesaq defines metzi'us, like pechusah mibas 3.

: The problem is the application of halachic methodology to the
: determination of the truth - which is a radical innovation - each
: area has its own rules of logic and thought.  halacha has become the
: predominant mode of jewish expression - but it too has bounds.. Its
: use in philosophy is a problem not only for philosophy - but for
: halacha.

Not at all. I would say that the same is true for pesaq here as whenever we
find a pesaq that contradicts the actual metzius. If we were to disprove one
of the Rambam's ikkarim somehow, we would each apply whatever our version of
that principle is.

: What RMB is representing is something else - many halachic scholars
: don't have philosophic training - and they may truly believe that
: some version of the ikkarim is true and is universally accepted
: (after all, what started the Marc Schapiro article on ikkarim was a
: claim by a noted rosh yeshiva that the ikkarim were true and
: universally accepted as true)...

OTOH, he also quotes this list's membership agreement, and while I'm neither
as bright as him nor as educated in the subject, I am well aware that the
ikkarim enjoy an acceptance today that they hadn't in the past.

Perhaps my whole attitude toward the subject is colored by the emotions caused
by his accusing me (admittedly not by name) of ignorance I do not possess.

: I would note that there are other major implications for this
: position, that few are really willing to make.  If there is a book
: that has opinions that would now be considered kfira - can we still
: study them as torah? ...

The book, or the opinions themselves? And wouldn't studying the opinions help
you understand the sevara of the issue as a whole?

Tangent: is philosophy talmud Torah altogether? The Rambam uses the beraisa
that talmud Torah has three parts: miqra, mishnah, gemara. The only aggadita
possibly included is that which is in miqra. It would seem that machashavah
and science are included in ahavas Hashem (Hil Yesodei haTorah 2), and mussar
is Hil Dei'os, not talmud Torah.

:                         After all, to take a recent example, if we
: believe that belief in the science of hazal is an ikkar - or in the
: age of the universe - what do we do about all other sources?  Do we
: cut out the tiferet yisrael, edit out everything in Hirsch, cut out
: the ma'amar on aggadot hazal??

But it isn't an ikkar. The flipside of accepting the ikkarim as defining which
of my peers I'm to treat one way or the other is that it sets a maximum as
well as a minimum.

Besides, we can learn from the fact that the gemara still quotes Rav Hillel
while telling us his statement requires kaparah that one is supposed to learn
these rejected opinions, just like any other. Perhaps this is a proof to the
Ra'avad.


ON THE OTHER HAND...


Take a look at the opening of the KSA's discussion of Shabbos.

Is he saying that anyone who keeps Shabbos has a chezqas kashrus, and you
don't need to do the impossible -- test another's belief? Or is the KSA saying
that shemiras Shabbos is inherently the dividing line.

This, being a halachic treatment, identifies with the angle of the question I
am speaking of.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

I just wrote:
: Take a look at the opening of the KSA's discussion of Shabbos.
: Is he saying that anyone who keeps Shabbos has a chezqas kashrus, and you
: don't need to do the impossible -- test another's belief? Or is the KSA saying
: that shemiras Shabbos is inherently the dividing line.

I just reread 72:2. It seems pretty incontrovertible that a mechalel Shabbos
is categorized in the manner I identified with the kofeir. He doesn't anywhere
say that he is limiting this category to the mechalel Shabbos. In 72:1 the KSA
has much positive to say about a shomeir Shabbos, but not that it is
sufficient.

So I retract the seifa of my post -- I don't see any way to draw conclusions
from KSA 72 about anything but chilul Shabbos.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

I just wrote:
: Take a look at the opening of the KSA's discussion of Shabbos.
: Is he saying that anyone who keeps Shabbos has a chezqas kashrus, and you
: don't need to do the impossible -- test another's belief? Or is the KSA saying
: that shemiras Shabbos is inherently the dividing line.

I just reread 72:2. It seems pretty incontrovertible that a mechalel Shabbos
is categorized in the manner I identified with the kofeir. He doesn't anywhere
say that he is limiting this category to the mechalel Shabbos. In 72:1 the KSA
has much positive to say about a shomeir Shabbos, but not that it is
sufficient.

So I retract the seifa of my post -- I don't see any way to draw conclusions
from KSA 72 about anything but chilul Shabbos.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

(Note: Much of what I write here is similar to R' Michael Kopinsky's 
recent post. I thank him for it, and especially for his cite from 
Choshen Mishpat. But I wrote this before I saw that post, so I'm 
sending this in anyway.)

R' Jacob Farkas pointed out:
> It can be argued that one variation of Qinyan haGuf extant in
> our society is that of sports teams and their pro athletes.
> While they are individuals who have legal autonomy, they usually
> sign contracts that prohibit them from engaging in otherwise
> standard activities, (e.g. playing basketball in a gym, a
> contract clause made famous a few years back concerning former
> NY Yankees 3B Aaron Boone) out of fear that they may injure
> themselves, a damage that affects the team's property.

My first reaction was to object that you are confusing kinyan haguf 
with a voluntary choice to certain restrictions in return for 
employment. After all, the Mishna Brurah which I quoted (304:1) 
explains the big difference between an eved and an employee as 
regards Hilchos Shabbos: Whereas my employee is like any other non-
Jew (who is not allowed to observe Shabbos totally), my eved is my 
personal property, my kinyan haguf, and I am responsible to make that 
he *does* observe Shabbos.

But maybe I was wrong. Maybe 'kinyan haguf' doesn't mean what it 
sounds like.

What does 'kinyan' really mean? Is 'ownership' a real concept in 
halacha? LaSHEM haaretz um'loah!!!

I am reminded of a very (some would overly) Politically Correct 
explanation of what is meant by 'Kiddushin' and 'Haishah niknis'. Do 
I really 'own' my wife? The same way as I 'own' my shirt? To 
answer 'yes' would be very unsettling, just as I'm uncomfortable 
about 'owning' an eved. But the parallels are too numerous: from the 
procedure of the kinyan, to my status as her 'baal', and more.

I cannot separate ownership of a wife or eved from ownership of a 
shirt, but maybe I have misunderstood what it means to 'own' a shirt. 
If I can clarify that point, it will in turn clarify what it means 
to 'own' a wife or eved.

Again: LaSHEM haaretz um'loah. I do NOT have total rights over my 
shirt. I can NOT do anything I want with my shirt simply because it 
is 'mine'. At the very least, Bal Tashchis limits me in what I may do 
with 'my' shirt (and resourceful listmembers will probably come up 
with other restrictions as well).

I may be the owner of this bread, in all the ways that a court might 
enforce. But I may not eat it until I bless its True Owner.

I may be the owner of this land, having purchased it from you in a 
plain sale, and not any kind of rental or lease arrangement. Yet when 
Yovel comes, I can't stop you from buying it back.

According to this mehalech, as it was explained to me, halacha does 
not recognize ownership as we usually understand that term. A kinyan 
does effect a change of status. For example, at first, I could not 
take this shirt without your permission, and now you cannot take it 
without my permission, but either way, there is no 'ownership'. There 
*is* a relationship between the shirt and someone, but 'ownership' is 
not the right word for this relationship. Perhaps 'stewardship' is 
better.

Similarly, I do not 'own' my wife, at least not as we usually use 
that word. But the kinyan of kiddushin creates a relationship between 
us, and that relationship puts certain issurim on her and certain 
chiyuvim on me.

In this manner, perhaps we can use the word "own" for these 
relationships, but ONLY if we are careful to understand it as 
something less than full ownership.

Akiva Miller

On Sun, Feb 25, 2007 at 01:03:29PM -0500, Rich, Joel wrote:
: Is Shimon a gazlan/borrower without reshut from Reuvain  or does the
: shul somehow maintain ownership and it's kol hakodeim zacha (or is there
: some other rule)?

What if a person takes a tissue on Shabbos, did he make a qinyan?

What if he ate at your Shabbos table?

It would seem that the only way this box of tissues could be used is if
the shul still owned it but gave reshus, not ownership, to Re'uvein.

On Tue, Feb 27, 2007 at 01:50:44PM +0000, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
: Short answer: YES, everything DOES need to be measured within the 
: Daled Amos of Halacha.
: 
: Longer answer:
: RYM makes an excellent case for why it should be allowed to take that 
: tissue. But just because we have an excellent case does not mean that 
: it is a guaranteed win...

However, if someone is living lifnim mishuras hadin, putting someone
out even when it is mutar to do so, then the question of heter is
only of abtract interest.

Kol hama'avir al midosav muvtach lo shehu ben olam haba. 

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The purely righteous do not complain about evil,
micha@aishdas.org        but add justice, don't complain about heresy,
http://www.aishdas.org   but add faith, don't complain about ignorance,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      but add wisdom.     - R AY Kook, Arpilei Tohar

On Fri, Feb 23, 2007 at 01:27:49PM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
: I have found a number of sources which indicate that prophets - 
: including Moshe - were sometimes not precise in their wording...

In saying what they were trying to day, or describing the history?
The example of the two versions of the diberos, or the IE on quotes
really being paraphrasing fit the idea that the text could paraphrase
history for the sake of making the fundamental point.


Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The purely righteous do not complain about evil,
micha@aishdas.org        but add justice, don't complain about heresy,
http://www.aishdas.org   but add faith, don't complain about ignorance,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      but add wisdom.     - R AY Kook, Arpilei Tohar

R Moshe Yehuda Gluck <mgluck@gmail.com>:
:                          Similarly, if a movement believes in
: egalitarianism or social justice it can still be called Orthodox -
: but if it doesn't believe in one of the 13 Ikkarim, it is not.

And then, Rn Shoshana Boublil, in the very next post to reach the chevrah:
: Many many halachot regarding how we are supposed to treat the OTHER, in the 
: Torah, include this sentence: "...b/c you were slaves in Egypt.. and I took 
: you out..."
...
: In our current situation, shouldn't we, the religious community in Israel, 
: take it upon itself to at least discuss the issue?  It looks like the 
: political leadership hasn't a clue what to do.  Isn't this the kind of thing 
: where religious Jews shouldn't keep quiet?

One assumes that embracing social justice is a goreia, the other,
a chiyuv.

The flaw in RMYG's lumping social justice with feminism is that
accomodating feminism means seeking what's mutar but never been done.
Pursuing social justice doesn't inherently raise such temptations for
envelope stretching.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy'
micha@aishdas.org         'Joy is nothing but Torah.'
http://www.aishdas.org    'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'"
Fax: (270) 514-1507                     - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l

R' MB:
*One assumes that embracing social justice is a goreia, the other,
*a chiyuv.
*
*The flaw in RMYG's lumping social justice with feminism is that
*accomodating feminism means seeking what's mutar but never been done.
*Pursuing social justice doesn't inherently raise such temptations for
*envelope stretching.

I was not saying that there is something wrong with embracing social
justice. No less than the Ramchal promotes it in the Hakdamah to Mesillas
Yesharim. But, if a movement makes it one of their guiding principles I
think that it is very telling, especially considering that R and C have,
under the label "Tikkun Olam," made it a centerpiece of their religious
expression. 

KT,
MYG

If in the cases of yibum and kiddushei biah, Hazal discouraged an action which was sanctioned by the Torah because people today will not do it lishmah, might not a similar argument apply to slavery?  Perhaps owning slaves demands a level of care with the various relevant halachoth or even a sensitivity that most people will not manage.  By not achieving the halachic or moral level demanded, the slaveholder may wind up doing things that he should not or even flat-out issurim.  If so, that might be a reason to do away with it altogether.  

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