Avodah Mailing List

Volume 23: Number 31

Tue, 27 Feb 2007

• 1. Ivrit and Leshon Hakodesh (Galsaba@aol.com)
• 2. Re: Tzinius and the ILG (Chana Luntz)
• 3. Neviim vs. Kesuvim - R' Chaim Brisker (Marty Bluke)
• 4. Tzinius and the ILG (Marty Bluke)
• 5. violating a lav to perform a mitzva (Chana Luntz)
• 6. Re: Paper Towels (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 7. Visiting the kevarim of parents/tzadikim (SBA)
• 8. AishDas and Mussar (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: [Areivim] owning an eved (Allen Baruch)
• 10. You Took My Tissue (Jonathan Baker)
• 11. Re: Preferred form of maror - spelling horseraddisch (Arie Folger)
• 12. Re: Copyright redux (Arie Folger)
• 13. Re: Tzinius and the ILG (Jacob Farkas)
• 14. Re: violating a lav to perform a mitzva (Jacob Farkas)
• 15. Re: Torah and Slavery (Michael Kopinsky)

I posted already re the terms Ashurit, Ivrit, and Leshon Hakodesh.
Reading the Gemara, Ivrit is not Leshon Hakodesh, Ashurit is.
Although in a few places in the Gemara (Senhadrin 21), Ashurit is the Ketav 
(wrting) and
Leshon Hakodesh is the Dibbur, my impression reading in other places that 
Ashurit can be both
Ketav and Dibbur.
My understanding is that only on later generation the word "Ivrit" was used 
for "Leshon Hakodesh".
Anybody can help know when?

Thanks,

Aaron
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RJF writes:

> The process of Qidushei Biah precedes Mattan Torah, see 
> Rambam Hilkhos  Ishus 1:1 . What changed after Mattan Torah was that
marriage 
> required  its own process, complete with witnesses, and Biah alone was

> not enough  to establish exclusivity. Kessef and Shtar were added, and
Biah was 
> modified to include witnesses and declaration of intent. (Mahloqes 
> Rishonim whether it needed Amirah or not, like Kessef).
> 
> Nevertheless, the original method was not entirely abolished. 
> However,  as there is a perfectly good option available, via Kessef,
or Shtar, 
> perhaps Hazal was uncomfortable with someone choosing a 
> method that is  Parutz, and while the Qidushin is still binding, the 
> punishment is Makas  Mardus.
> 
> The Torah did not permit Pritzus per se, rather it sought to 
> eliminate that process altogether, by suggesting a new method, Kessef.


But it could easily have done a direct substitution - ie no more biah,
now kessef.  It didn't do this, so I can't see how you get around the
idea that ultimately it permitted priztus.

The same thing would seem to be true by slavery.  There was slavery
before matan torah. The Torah took the concept and modified it and
required various elements that were not there before (eg obligation in
mitzvos), but did not ban it entirely.  It has been argued, on this list
and elsewhere, that this shows that the Torah is morally in favour of
slavery, and that therefore any notions that we have that slavery is not
necessarly moral are contrary to the moral compass of the Torah.  If
this argument were to be true, then the same thing would have to be said
for kiddushin by way of biah - it didn't ban it when it could have done,
therefore it must approve of it.  Otherwise you are left with the idea
that there may be concepts that the Torah is morally uncomfortable with,
but that doesn't mean it always bans it, sometimes it leaves it for
later generations, when the time is right, to procribe them out of
existance.

> --Jacob Farkas

Regards

Chana

I don't know if this is what you are looking for, RHS printed this in the
name of R' Chaim in his sefer Nefesh Harav
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R' Jacob Farkas wrote:
<The Torah was uncomfortable with the old method, and Hazal took note of
that, and

<ultimately banished the practice by prescribing a strong punishment.

Where do you see that the Torah was uncomfortable with kiddushei biah?
If that was the case why didn't the Torah change the din and disallow
kiddushei biah? There are many things that were permitted before matan
torah which are now assur to us. The fact that the Torah did not
disallow kiddushei biah seems to imply that the Torah had no problem
with it. If so why did Chazal ban it? Probably for the same type of
reason that we no longer do Yibum. Chazal felt that people would do it
shelo l'shem mitzva of have pritzusdik kavanos and therefore banned
it.
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Now sent with correct heading


RSP writes:

> on areivim it was stated
> 
> "admittedly, one is permitted to free a slave in order to
> perform a mitzvah, even a rabbinic mitzvah like constituting a minyan"
> 
> how does this fit w/ mitzva ha'baah b'aveirah.  Based on the
> gemara in sukkah (a stolen lulav can not be used for the 
> mitzva of lulav) this strikes me as strange....
> 
> what are the parameters of the above statement?

As RZS has stated, the freeing of a slave means one is over on an aseh -
the relevnt siman is Yoreh Deah siman 267 si'f 79 where that is made
very clear.  How far this extends, ie when you can be doche an aseh to
accomplish a mitzvah - well Rav Moshe has a tehuva regarding being docha
the rabbinical aseh of the shiva nekiim in order to fulfil pru u'rvu (ie
the Torah mitzvah, assuming the woman cannot conceive any other time)
and holds that while one can be doche a Torah mitzvah, that is not
necessarily true of a rabbinical mitzvah (he also brings examples which
seem to me to be discussing laviin, such as issurei shabbas ir order to
perform an aseh, but I may be misunderstanding the examples, as the
discussion purports to be about two mitzvos aseh, rabbinic and d'orisa).
I confess, since having read this teshuva, I find myself constantly
finding examples where I end up saying  - but isn't this another case
where there seems to be an assumption that if we are doche a Torah
mizvah, a rabbinic mizvah kama v'kama, but anyway - you are more than
welcome to join me on my hunt.  

Of course the aseh doche lo ta'ase  versus the mitzvah haba b'averah
discussion is also very interesting, but not actually what we are
discussing here.

Regards

Chana

Someone asked:
> Shimon reaches over and takes one to blow his nose without
> permission from reuvain. Is Shimon a gazlan/borrower
> without reshut?

R' Yisrael Medad protested the very question:
> Why not just leave it at that he is uncouth and lacking
> in basic manners and not get involved in Halacha? Or that
> in blowing his nose he is refraining from annoying the
> other congregants with a sniffling sound that could
> interfere with their davening and so he is contributing
> to the general welfare of the schule's decorum?   Does
> everything in the social field need to be parameted
> within the Daled Amot?

Short answer: YES, everything DOES need to be measured within the 
Daled Amos of Halacha.

Longer answer:

RYM makes an excellent case for why it should be allowed to take that 
tissue. But just because we have an excellent case does not mean that 
it is a guaranteed win. Someone needs to evaluate the importance of 
the positive points which RYM raised against the negative points 
which the prior poster raised.

For example, if the situation is such that the owner of the tissue 
would not mind someone taking it in this sort of situation, that tips 
the scales l'kula. If the owner *would* mind, but the value of a 
single tissue is less than a pruta, that too *might* tip it l'kula. 
OTOH, if the "owner" of the tissue is known to be makpid on this sort 
of thing (perhaps he has his own runny nose to worry about), a good 
argument can be made that the shul will have to put up with some 
noise rather than sanction theft.

Akiva Miller

From: "Aryeh Stein" <>
.. R' Reisman mentioned a related
issue - visiting one's parent's kever on their yahrtzeit.  R' Pam,
z'l, wasn't in favor of those people who would take several days off
from work to fly to Israel for the yahrtzeit to visit the kever of the
parent.  According to R' Pam, it would be much better if the person
would spend those days .. learning in a beis
medrash and giving all of the money that he would have spent on
airfare and hotel and giving it to tzedakah instead. ...


From: "A & C Walters" <>
...also many Chasidim, specifically Satmar do not to go kivrei tzadikim.
(See Kuntrus Al HaGeula veal HaTmura) Siman 108 (page 166),
 that the whole inyan of going to
kivrei tzadikim was never a minhag in klal yisroel
>>

I looked it up now and indeed the SR isn't a big fan of visiting kivrei
tzadikim (except by "bnei adam gedolim vetzadikim hayodim umevinim
sodon shel devorim" quoting the Zohar)

What caught my eye was his citing the Bach (YD end 217) who brings
a teshuva from R' Chaim Paltiel which may indeed be the source of
what Rav Pam said.   Very similar words, ayin shom.

There is also a lengthy teshuva in Minchas Elozor 1:68, which discusses this
matter and also the above words of RC Paltiel - some of which I too couldn't 
quite
understand.

Interestingly, the SR zt'l, has a teshuva in Sh'ut Divrei Yoel vol 1, 99, 
where
he seems to OK going to kivrei tzaddikim.

SBA 

On Tue, February 27, 2007 10:23 am, R Jonathan Baker wrote to Areivim:
: Further, I don't know if you remember that far back, but one of the
: purposes of AishDas and its old MMGH learning program was to try to
: counteract this Orthopraxy, to give people a chance to explore different
: hashkafic systems in hopes of finding one that would drive their halachic
: choices.  Eventually Micha settled on a form of mussar as the appropriate
: meaning to inform our mitzva performance.  But implicit in the endeavor,
: is realizing that most of us are Orthoprax, doing without thinking about
: WHY we do.

WADR, you misunderstood my choice of Mussar.

Mussar is the pursuit of meaning, not a particular answer to the question.
This is why Kelm could have secular studies in their high school, while the
Alter of Novhardok wrote about the collapse of the Jewish "city" and the need
to retreat to the citadel of the Yeshiva. Or the famous distinction between
N's "ich been gornisht" vs Slabodka's "gadlus ha'adam".

The only alternative to Mussar is chassidic ecstatic experience. IOW, either
one pursues meaning that is based on thought and experience, or one that is
based on experience for which thought is a second layer. I chose the former
for AishDas. Not the least because the experiential route is already covered
by others, but primarily because I'm too into philosophy to be engaged by the
alternative.

But both RYBS and R' Yaakov Kaminecki independently discuss the loss of the
"erev Shabbos Jew", using the same example (!) to describe the loss of
emotional backing to observance.

I highly recommend reading R' Elyakim Krumbein's Musar for Moderns. He relies
on sources that reflect the primarily "Anglo" MO community in Israel, ie his
typical student in Gush -- RYBS, R' Kook, some Tanya and Likutei Maharan
(think ChaBaKuK). The lifestyle he is giving a Mussar foundation to is MO.

Mussar is a broader concept than the one path taken by Tenu'as haMussar. One
can use their tools to deepen pretty much any hashkafah. Exceptions might be
Bretslov and Izbitch, which eschew any of the kind of thinking which could
complicate experience. Probably also Brisk, and the belief that "der bester
Mussar seifer iz a blatt gemara" -- no need to attacking Mussar's goals
directly.

Just look at the huge gap between my philosophy and RYGB's. I'm into RSRH,
REED, the Maharal, the Kuzari, the Aristotelian rishonim. RYGB is citing
Qabbalah and Rav Tzadoq. Both of us agree, though, on the need for a head-on
attack of the job of becoming the kind of person idealized

In short: I grabbed on Mussar as a tool to work on the heart. It doesn't
conflict with the range of philosophies to which one aims that heart.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

I emailed the Rov I heard speak on this a couple of weeks ago and he
replied with -
< I believe Minchas Yitzchok 5 65-69 based kidushin 68a (last daf 3rd
perek) and the rif>

kol tuv
Sender Baruch

>>> "Moshe Yehuda Gluck" <mgluck@gmail.com> 2/26/2007 11:56 PM >>>
I subsequently posted the correction you made, in response to R'n CL's
objections. I think someone posted Mareh mekomos from Gemara and SA on
Avodah today. If you have more recent Mareh Mekomos, I, for one, would
love
to see them...

Thanks,
KT,
MYG

*-----Original Message-----
*From: Allen Baruch [mailto:Abaruch@lifebridgehealth.org] 
*Sent: Monday, February 26, 2007 1:21 PM
*To: mgluck@gmail.com 
*Subject: Re: [Areivim] owning an eved
*
*R' Moshe,
*I don't know about R' Aharon, but L'maaseh, this aitzah was
*floated after WWII as a way to kasher mazeirim's kids. And
*BTW, you have it backwards - the children have to come
*while she is still a shifcha.
*I will try to get you maare mekomos
*
*kol tuv,
*Sender Baruch
**************
*Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2007 22:26:25 -0500
*From: "Moshe Yehuda Gluck" <mgluck@gmail.com>
*Subject: Re: [Areivim] YCT
*To: "'The General Discussion Area for Avodah'"
*	<areivim@lists.aishdas.org>
*Message-ID: <00b301c756fa$66f76310$2d01a8c0@acercc4ab20404>
*Content-Type: text/plain;	charset="us-ascii"
*
*R'n CL:
**In addition, no Jew, at least in Ashkenaz, has had an eved canani
for
*I
**would have thought at least 500 years, and from the comments of the
**Rema, it would seem for longer - so I would have thought that minhag
**would also conspire to ban it.
*
*There is a story said over in the Yeshivish world, that R' Aharon
*Kotler
*once advised a mamzer to go to one of the undeveloped countries where
*slavery was still extant, buy a slave, free her, and marry her. I
don't
*know
*if this story is true, but if it is, it directly impacts R'n CL's
*statement.
*Has anyone heard this story?
*
*KT,
*MYG



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From: "Michael Kopinsky" <mkopinsky@gmail.com>
 
> If I am in the middle of Shemoneh Esrei and my nose is dripping, and I
> have a choice between taking one of my neighbor's tissues or either
> sniffling and disturbing people's davening or wiping my nose on my sleeve
> (which is VERY lacking in basic manners), this Sha'ailah could be very
> relevant.
 
If your nose is dripping that badly, you have a bad cold, and probably
shouldn't have gone to shul in the first place, both for personal
discomfort and so as not to spread it to everyone else.  Or you have a
nosebleed, and again don't want to drip on everyone.  But there are ways
to control a nosebleed without a tissue.

--
        name: jon baker              web: http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker
     address: jjbaker@panix.com     blog: http://thanbook.blogspot.com

RMB wrote:
> horseradish (from mare redditch, sea radish, via mare -> mare)

actually, the name is Meerrettich.

-- 
Arie Folger
http://www.ariefolger.googlepages.com

RJF wrote:
> Can we ignore DDD for a widely recognized entity, is there precedent for
> ignoring newly created entities when they don't exist in Halakhah?

I clearly wrote that the issue is whether we should express a moral voice in 
the matter and clearly stated that it is a difficult issue centered around 
the question whether the transfer of wealth from the consumer to the 
copyright holder - who loses nothing material when someone "steals" his 
intellectual property - is within the powers of a goverment (which functions 
most closely according to the concept of shiv'ah tovei ha'ir).

I do not advocate violating laws, but I do advocate challenging them there 
were our heritage gives us the possibility to contribute a different 
viewpoint to society. At the very least, this kind of challenging takes place 
when we publicly debate the rightfullness of current intellectual property 
laws.
-- 
Arie Folger
http://www.ariefolger.googlepages.com

Rt. Chana Luntz wrote:
> But it could easily have done a direct substitution - ie no more biah,
> now kessef.  It didn't do this, so I can't see how you get around the
> idea that ultimately it permitted priztus.
> 

It didn't permit Pritzus outright. The world at large operated in that 
fashion, this was the de facto wedding ceremony. The Torah elevated 
marriage by introducing Qihah, a process that didn't discard the old 
method altogether, but refined it. Biah now requires declared intent 
rather than spontaneous coupling.

> The same thing would seem to be true by slavery.  There was slavery
> before matan torah. The Torah took the concept and modified it and
> required various elements that were not there before (eg obligation in
> mitzvos), but did not ban it entirely.  

Correct. That does not mean the Torah condoned it, though.

> It has been argued, on this list and elsewhere, that this shows that the Torah 
> is morally in favour of slavery, and that therefore any notions that we have that
> slavery is not  necessarly moral are contrary to the moral compass of the Torah.

I don't agree with that argument. That can be used to support 
/application/ of capital punishment as morally acceptable, because the 
Torah prescribes it. I prefer the view that the Torah was not in favor 
of *applying* CP, and challenged the judiciary to find ways to avoid it 
whenever possible.
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol17/v17n085.shtml#09>

> If this argument were to be true, then the same thing would have to be said
> for kiddushin by way of biah - it didn't ban it when it could have done,
> therefore it must approve of it.  Otherwise you are left with the idea
> that there may be concepts that the Torah is morally uncomfortable with,
> but that doesn't mean it always bans it, sometimes it leaves it for
> later generations, when the time is right, to procribe them out of
> existance.

The latter point/idea was precisely what I was looking to convey, that 
the Torah left certain things to later generations. Very important 
things, like Kesubah.

--Jacob Farkas

Rt. Chana Luntz wrote:
> I find myself constantly finding examples where I end up saying  - but 
> isn't this another case where there seems to be an assumption that if we 
> are doche a Torah mizvah, a rabbinic mizvah kama v'kama, but anyway - 
> you are more than welcome to join me on my hunt.

The Qal Vahomer is not valid because Hakhamim Asu Hizuq Lidivreihem 
Yoser Mishel Torah. It is therefore possible to apply dehiya for a 
D'Oraisa, but not for a D'Rabbanan.

--Jacob Farkas

> R' Akiva Miller wrote:
> > What I *don't* understand is RMB's comment that:
> >  > When the economy requires slavery to prevent failure, poverty, and
> >  > even worse ills, then Hashem says "this is how to do it".
> >
> > I don't get it. Could you describe to me which sort of economy
> > *requires* slavery? Which sort of economy *requires* kinyan haguf? In
> > which sort of economy is a sweatshop too expensive?
> >
> > Pay them however little you want. Deduct rent and meals and whatever
> > else from their salary, leaving only a few pennies left for their net
> > pay. Do whatever else you want, and whatever else the Torah requires
> > of a baal/eved. But stop short of actually owning them.

Why is kinyan haguf necessarily lacking in dignity?  The technical
halachic mechanisms behind slavery, if they don't reflect themselves in
actual treatment, are irrelevant to the average slave.  The fact that a
husband "owns" his wife does not make marriage inherently immoral.
(While feminists may be offended by halacha's considering marriage an
ownership, that is only because they misunderstand the significance and
meaning of "kinyan haguf".)

Interesting halacha I saw last night: (SA CM 267:33?)
If a person agrees to work for X number hours, and his employer rips him
off (ie by under/overpayment, not withholding wages), there is no din of
Ona'ah, because he has sold himself l'zman, and Ein Ona'ah l'avadim.  This
means that a Jew, by agreeing to work for a specified number of hours, has
assumed the din of an eved k'naani (as far as mamonus goes - he obviously
can't marry a shifcha just b/c of the job).  Is this immoral or lacking in
dignity?


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