Avodah Mailing List

Volume 23: Number 30

Tue, 27 Feb 2007

• 1. violating a lav to perform a mitzva (Shaya Potter)
• 2. Re: violating a lav to perform a mitzva (Zev Sero)
• 3. Re: [Areivim] dan lekaf zechus (Gershon Dubin)
• 4. Re: Visiting the kevarim of parents/tzadikim (SBA)
• 5. Paper Towels (Yisrael Medad)
• 6. Neviim vs. Kesuvim - R' Chaim Brisker (Daniel Eidensohn)
• 7. Re: dan lekaf zechus (Rich, Joel)
• 8. Re: [Areivim] dan lekaf zechus (Chana Luntz)
• 9. Re: Visiting the kevarim of parents/tzadikim (Jacob Farkas)
• 10. Re: Tzinius and the ILG (Michael Kopinsky)
• 11. Re: Torah and Slavery (Jacob Farkas)
• 12. Re: Paper towels ownership? (Michael Kopinsky)
• 13. Re: Preferred form of maror (Ari Zivotofsky)
• 14. Re: Paper Towels (Michael Kopinsky)
• 15. Re: Eilu v'eilu and mistakes (Micha Berger)
• 16. Re: Tzinius and the ILG (Jacob Farkas)

on areivim it was stated

"admittedly, one is permitted to free a slave in order to perform a
mitzvah, even a
rabbinic mitzvah like constituting a minyan"

how does this fit w/ mitzva ha'baah b'aveirah.  Based on the gemara in
sukkah (a stolen lulav can not be used for the mitzva of lulav) this
strikes me as strange....

what are the parameters of the above statement?

Shaya Potter wrote:
> on areivim it was stated
> 
> "admittedly, one is permitted to free a slave in order to perform a
> mitzvah, even a rabbinic mitzvah like constituting a minyan"
> 
> how does this fit w/ mitzva ha'baah b'aveirah.  Based on the gemara in
> sukkah (a stolen lulav can not be used for the mitzva of lulav) this
> strikes me as strange....
> 
> what are the parameters of the above statement?


It's not a lav, it's an asei.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

On Sun, 25 Feb 2007 23:46:25 -0000 "Chana Luntz"
<chana@kolsassoon.org.uk> writes:

I said "Aside from how any allegations against an institution reflect on
its sponsors"

There is apparently some feeling here that the institution per se is
entitled to DLZ treatment.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

From: "A & C Walters" <>
...also many Chasidim, specifically Satmar do not to go kivrei tzadikim. 
(See Kuntrus Al
HaGeula veal HaTmura) Siman 108 (page 166), that the whole inyan of going to
kivrei tzadikim was never a minhag in klal yisroel
>>

Despite what it says in AHVH, AFAIK, Satmar chassidim are very much
into visiting kivrei tzaddikim.
Just check out their newspapers - which advertise many such trips to Europe
almost every week.

SBA 

It was asked  "Shimon reaches over and takes one to blow his nose
without permission from reuvain. Is Shimon a gazlan/borrower without reshut
?"

Why not just leave it at  that he is uncouth and lacking in basic manners
and not get involved in Halacha? Or that in blowing his nose he is
refraining from annoying the other congregants with a sniffling sound that
could interfere with their davening and so he is contributing to the general
welfare of the schule's decorum?   Does everything in the social field need
to be parameted within the Daled Amot?

-- 
Yisrael Medad
Shiloh
Mobile Post Efraim 44830
Israel
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Found the following assertion on a website - does anyone have a written 
source for it?

*

*

*R? Chaim Brisker*([[In explaining the distinction between the Books of 
the Prophets, Neviim, and the Writings, Ksuvim, Rav Chaim Brisker 
maintains that the books of the Prophets are those books in which the 
revelations were first spoken by the prophet and only later committed to 
writing, whereas Kesuvim were those prophecies which were originally 
written down by  Divine command and only later read from their manuscripts.


Daniel Eidensohn

On Sun, 25 Feb 2007 23:46:25 -0000 "Chana Luntz"
<chana@kolsassoon.org.uk> writes:

I said "Aside from how any allegations against an institution reflect on
its sponsors"

There is apparently some feeling here that the institution per se is
entitled to DLZ treatment.

Gershon
==================================================================
Let's say Reuvain and Shimon establish a real estate sales partnership.
Would you say one owes each of them to be DLZ on their individual sales
actions?  If so, would one evade this responsibility by speaking/acting
about "the partnership" rather than the individual?
KT
Joel Rich
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> On Sun, 25 Feb 2007 23:46:25 -0000 "Chana Luntz" 
> <chana@kolsassoon.org.uk> writes:
> 
> I said "Aside from how any allegations against an institution 
> reflect on its sponsors"
> 
> There is apparently some feeling here that the institution 
> per se is entitled to DLZ treatment.

How does one divorce an institution from its facilty and those who
constitute it?  By judging the one you are perforce judging the other,
so in order to avoid judging individuals, surely you must extend the
same treatment to the institutions of which they are a part.  And even
more so where people are using the mere association with a particular
institution as a test of whether a person is considered kosher or not.
If you are going to use association with an "edah ra" as a reason to
judge people, it seems to me that you first have to establish that the
edah is, indeed, an edah ra.  If anything, a community of people should,
based on first principles, be entitled to a greater dan l'chaf zechus
than each individual, given the prima facie presumption that the
shechina rests on a community in Israel and that judgement is more
favorable when on a community than when on an individual (a theme that
comes up repeatedly on Yom Kippur).  Obviously that presumption can be
displaced - is that not precisely the point of deriving the concept of
community from the meraglim, but I can't see the basis on which a
community should be judged less favorably than an individual - can you?

> 
> Gershon
> gershon.dubin@juno.com

Regards

Chana 

> From: "A & C Walters" <>
> ...also many Chasidim, specifically Satmar do not to go kivrei tzadikim.
> (See Kuntrus Al
> HaGeula veal HaTmura) Siman 108 (page 166), that the whole inyan of 
> going to
> kivrei tzadikim was never a minhag in klal yisroel
>  >>

RSBA wrote:
> Despite what it says in AHVH, AFAIK, Satmar chassidim are very much
> into visiting kivrei tzaddikim.
> Just check out their newspapers - which advertise many such trips to Europe
> almost every week.

Absolutely true. Furthermore, on 26 Av, Satmarer (and other) Hassidim 
flock en masse to Reb Yoel Teitlebaum's Tzion in Kiryas Joel...

----------------
R' Michael Kopinsky wrote:

> The Ran in Drashos #8 discusses the idea of davening at Kevarim.
> 
> (While this doesn't provide any answers about minhagim today, it does
> provide us with at least one Rishon (and a highly rationalist one, at
> that) in favor of (or accepting of) the practice of davening at kevarim.)

Rashi in Parshas Shelah mentions the Gemara that Calev went to Qivrei 
Avos in Hevron to pray.

--Jacob Farkas

On 2/25/07, Chana Luntz <chana@kolsassoon.org.uk> wrote:
> Perhaps a more interesting example is encapsulated by the following
> (Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer, siman 26, si'if 4):
>
> "Haisha mekudeshes bshlosha drachim: b'kesef, u b'shtar, ou  b'biah, min
> hatorah aval hachachamim asru l'kadesh b'biah mishum pritzus"
>
> Now what does this say about what the torah allows versus prohibits?  As
> in, what was the Torah thinking of, allowing kidushin by way of biah?
> Does the Torah permit pritzus, and it takes chazal to assur it?  Why on
> earth did it not assur kiddushin by way of biah in the first place?
>
> It seems to me reasonably safe to say, based on this example, that the
> fact that something is permitted d'orisa does not necessarily mean that
> the HQBH approves of it (even begrudgingly) - or do you disagree?
>
> Regards
>
> Chana

Is this not a circular proof?  Perhaps there are circumstances when
kiddushei biah is not actually immoral, but the Chachamim decided that
based on societal norms it should be assur?  In other words, perhaps this
is another example (just like slavery, or polygamy) of something that in
an absolute (aka D'oraisa) sense is neutral, but when society began to
view as negative, the Chachamim saw fit to assur it.  The Torah doesn't
approve of Pritzus; just that in the time of Mattan Torah, kiddushei biah
was not parutz.

R' Akiva Miller wrote:
> What I *don't* understand is RMB's comment that:
>  > When the economy requires slavery to prevent failure, poverty, and
>  > even worse ills, then Hashem says "this is how to do it".
> 
> I don't get it. Could you describe to me which sort of economy
> *requires* slavery? Which sort of economy *requires* kinyan haguf? In
> which sort of economy is a sweatshop too expensive?
> 
> Pay them however little you want. Deduct rent and meals and whatever
> else from their salary, leaving only a few pennies left for their net
> pay. Do whatever else you want, and whatever else the Torah requires
> of a baal/eved. But stop short of actually owning them.

At least as an Eved, living wage is met. Paying someone a salary that 
makes it impossible to live except under extreme duress is possibly 
worse than the indignity of Qinyan haGuf. In any event, the Torah 
forbids taking advantage of your worker, whether you own him, or you pay 
him by the day/hour/year. The Torah expects humane treatment by employers.

> What advantage is there (in kinyan haguf) to the employer or to the
> economy? We read all the time of sports figures who are traded to a
> different team, even a team which the athlete might not like. But it
> is only the employee's services which got bought and sold, not his
> guf. Why does the Torah allow this?

It is funny that you mention professional athletes. It can be argued 
that one variation of Qinyan haGuf extant in our society is that of 
sports teams and their pro athletes. While they are individuals who have 
legal autonomy, they usually sign contracts that prohibit them from 
engaging in otherwise standard activities, (e.g. playing basketball in a 
gym, a contract clause made famous a few years back concerning former NY 
Yankees 3B Aaron Boone) out of fear that they may injure themselves, a 
damage that affects the team's property.

--Jacob Farkas

On 2/25/07, Rich, Joel <JRich@sibson.com> wrote:
> A shul has a paper towel dispenser by the washing sink for general use
> by the kahal.  Reuvain takes a few back to his seat in shul due to his
> having a cold. Shimon reaches over and takes one to blow his nose
> without permission from reuvain.
>
> Is Shimon a gazlan/borrower without reshut from Reuvain  or does the
> shul somehow maintain ownership and it's kol hakodeim zacha (or is there
> some other rule)?

I heard a psak (I think from RSZA, in his sefer on Purim) regarding
Mishloach Manos in Yeshiva, that once I have taken food and I would be
able to protest if you were to take it (based on societal norms of that
particular Yeshiva, I guess), I can be yotzei Mishloach Manos by giving
you that food.

In your example, I would think that once Reuvein has taken the tissues to
his seat, he intends to use them himself, and certainly *could* protest
Shimon's taking them, if he wished to.  Then this would be dependent on
the shailah of taking other people's stuff in a case where you know they
don't mind. But it seems that we would consider the tissues as belonging
to Reuvein.

thanks for pointing out my article. it was actually last year (2006, 
i.e. 5766) not 1996. but as someone already pointed out, much of my 
material is from Ari Schaffer's excellent article on the subject.


kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:

>Zev Sero asked <<< AIUI, those who've looked into such things (are 
>you here R Ari Z?) have concluded that that tradition is wrong, and 
>horseradish actually isn't one of the five kinds at all. >>>
>
>RAZ did that one eleven years ago.
>
>Jewish Action, Spring 1996: "What?s the Truth about ... Using 
>Horseradish for Maror?" By Ari Z. Zivotofsky
>
>http://www.ou.org/pdf/ja/5766/spring66/LegalEase.pdf
>
>Google is your friend. (This was the very first item when I searched 
>for: horseradish Zivotofsky)
>
>Akiva Miller
>
>  
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>_______________________________________________
>Avodah mailing list
>Avodah@lists.aishdas.org
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>  
>
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On 2/26/07, Yisrael Medad <yisrael.medad@gmail.com> wrote:
> It was asked  "Shimon reaches over and takes one to blow his nose
> without permission from reuvain. Is Shimon a gazlan/borrower without reshut
> ?"
>
> Why not just leave it at  that he is uncouth and lacking in basic manners
> and not get involved in Halacha? Or that in blowing his nose he is
> refraining from annoying the other congregants with a sniffling sound that
> could interfere with their davening and so he is contributing to the general
> welfare of the schule's decorum?   Does everything in the social field need
> to be parameted within the Daled Amot?

If I am in the middle of Shemoneh Esrei and my nose is dripping, and I
have a choice between taking one of my neighbor's tissues or either
sniffling and disturbing people's davening or wiping my nose on my sleeve
(which is VERY lacking in basic manners), this Sha'ailah could be very
relevant.

On Thu, February 22, 2007 6:00 pm, Daniel Israel wrote:
: This is _not_ an attempt to re-open any recurring debates....

I will therefore limit my comments to short references to ideas already batted
around.

...
: 1) We see ev"e explicitly applied to Tannaim.  While the term is
: used on this list often enough in the context of contemporary
: issues, do we have a clear source which indicates that it remains
: applicable in the same sense as in the Mishna?...

Well, there is a maqor that limits it to Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai. But the
rishonim, Maharal and R' Tzadoq who give explanations for eilu va'eilu in a
literal "both are right" sense, do not give explanations that are limited to a
single machloqes or era.

: 2) I've occasionally seen achronim suggesting certain other
: achronim were actually wrong.  The examples I can think of involve
: claims that a certain achron was missing a certain source, or
: relying on an incorrect girsa.  But perhaps there are example is
: which one achron argues that another has incorrect s'vara as well....

Well, the first two are differences of fact. The notion of an incorrect sevara
would not contradict eilu va'eilu. It would just mean that from this side's
"eilu", the other "eilu" doesn't work.

: 3) Finally, does anyone want to propose an intermediate position?
: That is, are there some arguements which are not ev"e, but neither
: side is "wrong."  My chavrusa proposed something along the lines of
: "they are doing different things," but it didn't sit well with me.

I am not sure what you're asking for, since if "neither side is wrong" isn't
it definitionally a literal interpretation of eilu va'eilu?

The Maharal suggests that Divrei E-lokim Chaim must perforce be reduced in
order to fit in this world. Thus, each side is giving different mappings from
Hashem's infinite truth to the finite reality. Like different shadows of the
same object being cause by lights shining on it from different angles.

Or if you take a constructionist view of halakhah, that chakhamim have the
power to define which conclusion is correct, than neither is wrong.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

> On 2/25/07, Chana Luntz <chana <at> kolsassoon.org.uk> wrote:
>  > Perhaps a more interesting example is encapsulated by the following
>  > (Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer, siman 26, si'if 4):
>  >
>  > "Haisha mekudeshes bshlosha drachim: b'kesef, u b'shtar, ou  b'biah, min
>  > hatorah aval hachachamim asru l'kadesh b'biah mishum pritzus"
>  >
>  > Now what does this say about what the torah allows versus prohibits?  As
>  > in, what was the Torah thinking of, allowing kidushin by way of biah?
>  > Does the Torah permit pritzus, and it takes chazal to assur it?  Why on
>  > earth did it not assur kiddushin by way of biah in the first place?
>  >
>  > It seems to me reasonably safe to say, based on this example, that the
>  > fact that something is permitted d'orisa does not necessarily mean that
>  > the HQBH approves of it (even begrudgingly) - or do you disagree?

R' Michael Kopinsky wrote:
> Is this not a circular proof?  Perhaps there are circumstances when
> kiddushei biah is not actually immoral, but the Chachamim decided that
> based on societal norms it should be assur?  In other words, perhaps this
> is another example (just like slavery, or polygamy) of something that in
> an absolute (aka D'oraisa) sense is neutral, but when society began to
> view as negative, the Chachamim saw fit to assur it.  The Torah doesn't
> approve of Pritzus; just that in the time of Mattan Torah, kiddushei biah
> was not parutz.

The process of Qidushei Biah precedes Mattan Torah, see Rambam Hilkhos 
Ishus 1:1 . What changed after Mattan Torah was that marriage required 
its own process, complete with witnesses, and Biah alone was not enough 
to establish exclusivity. Kessef and Shtar were added, and Biah was 
modified to include witnesses and declaration of intent. (Mahloqes 
Rishonim whether it needed Amirah or not, like Kessef).

Nevertheless, the original method was not entirely abolished. However, 
as there is a perfectly good option available, via Kessef, or Shtar, 
perhaps Hazal was uncomfortable with someone choosing a method that is 
Parutz, and while the Qidushin is still binding, the punishment is Makas 
Mardus.

The Torah did not permit Pritzus per se, rather it sought to eliminate 
that process altogether, by suggesting a new method, Kessef. The Torah 
was uncomfortable with the old method, and Hazal took note of that, and 
ultimately banished the practice by prescribing a strong punishment.

--Jacob Farkas


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