Avodah Mailing List

Volume 20: Number 21

Tue, 24 Oct 2006

• 1. Chazarat hashatz (Aryeh Stein)
• 2. Pas Lechem [shacharis] (Aryeh Stein)
• 3. Re: Havdalah (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 4. Re: Definition of a Mamzer (Elazar M. Teitz)
• 5. Re: Definition of a Mamzer (Zev Sero)
• 6. Re: Uman/Leaving the women behind (Chana Luntz)
• 7. height of Temple (Eli Turkel)
• 8. Re: "Knowledge of Good and Bad" (Cantor Wolberg)
• 9. Re: Knowledge of Good and Bad (David Riceman)
• 10. Re: Uman/Leaving the women behind (Chana Luntz)
• 11. Re: Definition of a Mamzer (Shoshana L. Boublil)
• 12. Ben Drusai (Gershon Dubin)
• 13. non-kosher and milk (Goldmeier)
• 14. Re: Chazarat hashatz (Micha Berger)
• 15. Re: Gra & importance of rishonim (Micha Berger)

RZS wrote:
>>>The requirement is for *nine* answerers, not ten.

RAM wrote:

>>>Yes, indeed, that is correct. But there are indeed some poskim who
wrote words to the effect that "if ten people are paying close
attention to the chazan then xyz, but if less than ten are
listening..."

Can we say that when they wrote "ten", they really meant "nine"? Or is
there something deeper here?
============================================
I assume that they meant "ten" - and,presumably, the chazan is
listening and paying close attention to the words that he himself is
saying in his chazaras hashatz, so he counts as one of the ten people
that are listening to chazaras hashatz.

KT,
Aryeh

See Bava Metzia 92b and
http://www.chabad.org.il/Magazines/Article.asp?ArticleID=1514&;CategoryID=537
=========================================
I remember reading in the Artscroll biography of R' Yehuda Zev Segal
that while he was accustomed to having pas shacharis, he would refrain
from doing so if he didn't think he could have proper kavanah for
benching.

KT,
Aryeh

Cantor Wolberg wrote:
> It is strictly a superstition and it's not if she makes havdalah,
> it's if she drinks the grape juice (or wine) she will grow a
> moustache. But it is utterly ridiculous.

No, not ridiculous at all. It sounds to me like someone mistook 
figurative language as being literal. (An all-too-common problem with 
midrashim, I think.) In the current case, *anyone* (man, woman, or 
child) will grow a moustache upon drinking the grape juice or wine of 
havdala. Or of kiddush, for that matter.

Or don't you watch milk commercials? :-)

Akiva Miller

     RYaakov Ellis, citing the case of an Israeli woman going to 
court in order to establish that her son's father is not the man to 
whom she was married at the time, but is the man with whom she had an 
affair, writes

<The mother is claiming that she had no actual contact with the man 
who was her halachic husband at the time of conception. There might
be a chazaka that "the majority of sexual acts take place with the 
legal husband", but in this case, we have the direct testimony of the 
woman that this is not so. Does the name printed on the birth 
certificate actually have significance in this case in determining 
whether or not the child is a mamzer?>

    The halacha is explicit (EH 4:29): "Eishes ish she'omeres al 
ha'ubar sheino miba'alah einah ne'emenes l'foslo."  Her unsupported 
statement is halachically meaningless.  (It is said that RMF was once 
m'sader kiddushin, when one of the mothers, under the chupah, said 
the child wasn't hers.  His immediate reaction was, "You're not 
ne'emenses," and he proceeded with birkas eirusin.)

     However, she is believed (because of shavya anafsha chaticha 
d'issura) that she is prohibited from marrying the man with whom she 
claims to have committed adultery.

EMT

Yaakov Ellis wrote:
> http://tinyurl.com/y49end
> Is this for real? The mother is claiming that she had no actual contact 
> with the man who was her halachic husband at the time of conception. 
> There might be a chazaka that "the majority of sexual acts take place 
> with the legal husband", but in this case, we have the direct testimony 
> of the woman that this is not so.

On its own, this is not significant.  Why should we believe her.
If her then-husband were making this claim we would believe him only
because of a gezerat hakatuv.  But if the case is allowed to proceed,
and she ends up proving her claim with forensic evidence, I don't
see how the son could avoid mamzerut.  Even if we were (counter-
factually) to give the DNA evidence less than 100% credence, it
must surely still be stronger than "rov be'ilot".


> Does the name printed on the birth 
> certificate actually have significance in this case in determining 
> whether or not the child is a mamzer?

Not the birth certificate itself, but in order to change the birth
certificate she will have to prove her case, and for her son's sake
she should be prevented from doing so.

What struck me is this:
>    It is absurd that in Israel of the 21st century people like
>    Moshe have to suffer because of Halacha," Rosenblum said.
>    "I'm not telling the Orthodox to abandon their faith, I just
>    don't want them to force me to adhere to it."

It seems to me that this woman needs to look in a mirror.  She's
the one who's hell-bent on making her son suffer because of her
"faith".  The principles which she claims motivate her to insist
on this move are no more rational than those of the rabbis for
whom she has such contempt.  And unlike them, she cares nothing
for the consequences of her fanaticism.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

RMP writes:
> 
> In Avodah Digest V3#17, RnCL wrote:
> > The Rema writes in Orech Chaim siman 739
> si'if 2 that it seems to him that the reason that these days 
> we are lenient regarding men sleeping in the sukkah is 
> because the mitzvah of sukkah is "ish v'beiso ish v'ishto 
> k'derech she hu dor kol hashana - and in a place where he is 
> not able to sleep with his wife because the sukkah isn't 
> private enough he is patur. Similarly therefore if a man 
> usually eats with his wife all year round, if she is asked to 
> leave the sukkah, and he cannot eat with her, is it not 
> arguable that the mitzvah of the husband has just 
> disappeared? <

 [OC 639, BTW, not 739.]

Sorry can't add.

> Under this argument, what should the husband do when his wife leaves
the sukkah of 
> her own accord because of personal discomfort? and would the 
> answer be different if she had never entered the sukkah 
> because of personal discomfort? 

A straightforward reading of the Rema would seem to suggest that it
wasn't any different, that is the extraordinary thing about this Rema
(although see my discussion of the Taz below).  That is, if a man was in
general accustomed to eating with his wife throughout the year (and that
is clearly the key question), then under this interpretation to eat
without his wife is not tshuvu k'ain tdiru.  Of course most men probably
don't eat every meal with their wives (eg my husband never eats
breakfast or lunch with me, except lunch on shabbas/yom tov) - but many
men may well eat all their festive meals with their wives.  Presumably
also the wife does not technically need to be in the sukkah (eg if there
are overhanging eaves, and she is under that portion and he is not, she
is still eating with him so it is just like it is the rest of the year
for him).

If his mitzva doesn't 
> disappear in either or both of these situations, why should 
> it disappear because she was "asked to leave"?! and wouldn't 
> it be more sensible to limit the RMA (as seems pashut IMHO 
> from his words) to situations where *he* can't be in the 
> sukkah, such that "baiso" goes where he goes (and see MA 
> 639:8)?

I guess I am not understanding your question here.  In the case of
sleeping, *he* can indeed be in the sukkah, he just cannot sleep in it
with her, because it is public, and on that basis the Rema says he is
patur.  I read the Magen Avraham as rejecting this Rema precisely on
this ground, ie because he can indeed sleep in the sukkah, just without
her, he still had an obligation, and hence the Magen Avraham prefers the
Rema's other reason, namely that the cold causes sufficient discomfort
for him to be patur.  On the other hand, the Taz deals with this
question head on, and argues a difference between eating and sleeping
because of the obligation to be sameach his wife on the regel making him
a shaliach mitzva -  and seems if anything to extend it to a situation
where the wife is in nida, so he wouldn't exactly be with her k'derech
ish v'ishto and be sameach her and even then he is patur.  But based on
this Taz, we might distinguish between a case where her simcha was
enhanced by eating with him (the asked to leave case) or where it was
not (in the sleeping case they cannot be together for objective tznius
reasons, in the personal discomfort case, she is choosing not to be with
him because that is what makes her happier than being together and
freezing) - although if eating together is the essence of v'samachta ata
u'vitecha (ie the shalmei simcha) at least for those meals might not the
argument that they need to be together be rather stronger?

 Thanks. 
> 
> All the best from
> --Michael Poppers via RIM pager
>

Regards

Chana

In daf yomi the mishna states that the lights from simcha bet hashoeva lit
the whole town. Rashi explains because the temple mount is high and it was
lit 50 amot high and the eastern was short.

However, anyone who visits Jerusalem sees that the Temple mount is
lower than the "upper city = Jewish quarter". According to the standard
models this was always true.

kol tuv

-- 
Eli Turkel

Regarding "Knowledge of Good and Bad" Kenneth Miller wrote:
"To someone who does not understand right and wrong, but does understand benefit and loss, I'd think this would sound like a great idea."     
"It is only we, who do understand the idea that disobeying G-d is wrong, who feel that the nachash's idea was stupid. But that was beyond Adam and Chava's comprehension. I think it would have sounded pretty reasonable to them."

From the statements above, how can there be culpability on the part of Adam and Chava?  If this was beyond their comprehension and they did not understand that disobeying G-d is wrong, then they are "anusim" at best and at worst they sinned "b'shogeg." Actually, "anoos" is not so far off because one could say that Chava was raped by the nachash, in a manner of speaking.  So why such harsh punishments?  And more perplexing, why does mankind have to pay such a high price for one lousy apple?   
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From: <kennethgmiller@juno.com>
<citing Rabbi Yossi Abrams>
> Then they ate from the tree, and gained a new knowledge. A new
> meaning was added to the word "tov". Not only did they understand the
> difference between good and bad, between tasty and putrid, between
> beautiful and ugly. But now they also understood the difference
> between right and wrong.

Let me explain why I think this is such a radical hiddush.  Breishis begins 
with God's creation of the world, which is obliged to obey God, and 
continues with God's creation of people, who have free will.  God gives the 
people one mitzva, and they disobey it.  As a result of this they are given 
what we normally think of as the highest human capacity, moral sensibility.
So the Torah begins by hinting to us that, when confronted by a command from 
God, we should not necessarily follow it, but should evaluate whether it is 
appropriate for us in our current situation.  This is especially surprising 
since Adam didn't even have the excuse that legislation, since it's made for 
the millions, is bound to cause a few unfortunates distress (the Rambam 
mentions this somewhere in part 3 of the MN, but I don't recall where off 
the top of my head).  That legislation was tailor made for Adam and Hava in 
their unique situation.
  So you see why I find this so surprising.  It suggests that when we read 
the Torah as divnely mandated legislation, we're reading it wrongly.

David Riceman 

I wrote:

  I read the Magen 
> Avraham 

On second thoughts I think the Magen Avraham is dealing with a different
question which is if he cannot sleep in the sukkah in the correct way
(ie with his wife), does that not by definition make the sukkah not
kosher even to be eaten in - and is concluding that a sukkah where he
could sleep alone is still considered a kosher sukkah since it is a form
of dira, even though he cannot sleep there with his wife (and may
himself therefore be patur).  I wasn't suggesting that the whole sukkah
was being rendered unkosher by the fact that a man could not eat with
his wife there (although it is an interesting thought) (not that the
Magen Avraham or the Rema mentions it, but a bocher could clearly dwell
in such a sukkah in the same way as he does throughout the year).  I do
also think that perhaps there may be a distinction between objective and
subjective - ie no man can sleep with his wife in a public sukkah might
be analogous to no man can eat with his wife in a sukkah to which women
are barred.  But that would not necessarily equate to a sukkah where a
man could eat with his wife, just his wife is not willing. 


>  Thanks. 
> > 
> > All the best from
> > --Michael Poppers via RIM pager
> >
> 

Regards

Chana

> Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2006 10:12:24 +0200
> From: "Yaakov Ellis" <yellis@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Avodah] Definition of a Mamzer

Does the name printed on the birth certificate actually have
> significance in this case in determining whether or not the child is a
> mamzer?

It's not the registration per se -- it's that she is going to court and demanding DNA testing to prove it.


Shoshana L. Boublil

Other than his predilection for partially cooked repasts, does anyone
have any sources on this person, or if in he fact was a real person or not?

Also, is there a shiur of kema'achal ben drusai for water?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

If a person would eat non-kosher meat (either pork, for example, or 
neveilah), let's say by accident, would it give him a status of fleishige? 
Would he be allowed to drink a glass of milk afterwards?

Rafi 

In v3n15, RAM <kennethgmiller@juno.com> writes about teshuvos that require "10
people playing close attention to the chazan" (to quote RZS) during chazaras
hashatz:
: Can we say that when they wrote "ten", they really meant "nine"? Or
: is there something deeper here?

Perhaps excluding the chazan who is on autopilot? In other words, he too must
be paying attention to what he's saying (and not what tune to use next) in
order to have a minyan?

I confess that I'm "fishing"...

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             One who kills his inclination is as though he
micha@aishdas.org        brought an offering. But to bring an offering,
http://www.aishdas.org   you must know where to slaughter and what
Fax: (270) 514-1507      parts to offer.        - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv

On Sun, October 22, 2006 4:16 am, R Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
: R' Moshe Meiselman - writing in Jewish Action 1997 - asserts that the
: primacy that we give to the Rishonim in understanding texts was from the
: Vilna Gaon.

I don't see it the way you phrased it. RDE seems to be saying that the Gra
gave primacy to rishonim in understanding texts. From his quote, I would have
concluded that RMM's thesis is that he gave primacy to understanding the
texcual mesorah as a whole.

The article claims that the Gaon promoted a shift from learning SA to
understand din to learning a wider variety of texts (critical editions, to the
best of his ability) to understand the mesorah. That only after one understood
the textual mesorah as a whole could one address the pragmatics.

: The relevant quote from the article is the following:...

Ellisions mine.

: Most Torah learning, even through the early 18th century, revolved
: around the Shulchan Aruch. This not only reflects the nature of Torah
: study, but also reflects the nature of halachic development....
: All of this was changed by the Vilna Gaon. In his view, the legal
: aspect of Torah practice and Torah learning was secondary to the issue
: of text analysis.
: * He exerted major efforts in first establishing proper texts....
: * He then established the method of using rishonim as the benchmark of
:   proper text analysis.
: * Finally, all halachic decision-making, in his view, was consequent to
:   proper text analysis from the perspective of the various rishonim.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             One who kills his inclination is as though he
micha@aishdas.org        brought an offering. But to bring an offering,
http://www.aishdas.org   you must know where to slaughter and what
Fax: (270) 514-1507      parts to offer.        - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv



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