Avodah Mailing List

Volume 17 : Number 102

Tuesday, August 1 2006

• Re: The Power of a Beis Din to Create a Halachic Metzius
• Re: Inyana d'Yoma: Without Comment
• Re: Noshim daatan kalos
• Re: Inyana d'Yoma: Without Comment
• Re: Noshim daatan kalos
• Minimizing civilian casualties at the expense of Jewish soldiers
• Re: Inyana d'Yoma: Without Comment
• Re: The Power of a Beis Din to Create a Halachic Metzius
• Different Types of Jews
• Re: How do Achronim become Rishonim?
• Geirus while still beliving in Jesus as a prophet
• RE: Noshim daatan kalos
• Re: Noshim daatan kalos
• Re: historical contingency and brachos
• Re: Eid echad

R' Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote:
> One of the very interesting responses was to the question of the
> status of a person condemned by a Beis Din to death who himself knows
> that he did not commit the crime in question. Is this person allowed to
> turn around and kill the Shaliach Beis Din who comes to execute him? R'
> Chaim responded that in Sanhedrin 82a we only see that in the case of
> Zimri (Bo'el Aramis) would he have been justified in killing Pinchas
> - the inference being that all other Chayavei Misos Beis Din are not
> allowed to kill their executioners. 

I do not understand R' Chaim's tzushtell. The question posed is
about a condemned man who knows he is really innocent, whereas the
case of Zimri is one who knows he is guilty. So the inference can
only extend to one who is guilty but not extended to one who knows
he is innocent.

Kol Tuv
Chaim Manaster

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer <rygb@aishdas.org> wrote:
> One additional
> note: The Rishon l'Tziyon on the mishnah notes that in Yehoshua 13:6 23
> find Eretz HaGavli, and he takes that as the Gavlan. The Da'as Mikrah
> identifies that as Jbail - modern day Byblos in Lebanon - but perhaps
> Bint Jbail...?

If Jbail is Byblos, could Bint-Jbail be "Bat-Bavel hashedudah"?

> Psalms 83:8 mentions
> Geval among the lands that border Eretz Yisrael to the south...

They're not all to the south - the list includes Moav to the eat,
Tzor up north, and Ashur far away in the northeast.  Nor is the
list in strict geographical order, so I see no reason why Geval
can't be in Lebanon.  (Though having it in the south would give the
gemara poetic symmetry as it pairs the Gavlan with the Galil.)

 -- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

On 7/26/06, Chana Luntz <chana@kolsassoon.org.uk> wrote:
> And what you seem to regard as so pashut does not seem to have been so
> pashut to the rishonim  - the discussion by the Ran springs to mind
> regarding whether the Torah form of justice is indeed the most just in
> the real world (IIRC the Ran answers in the negative, but understands
> the mechanism of the melech as acting as a corrective).

and R' Shmuel Weidberg wrote: The Chinuch also seems to take a
similar view...
Could you please provide mareh mekomos to the above Ran and Chinuch.

Kol Tuv
Chaim Manaster

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer <rygb@aishdas.org> wrote:
> One additional
> note: The Rishon l'Tziyon on the mishnah notes that in Yehoshua 13:6 23
> find Eretz HaGavli, and he takes that as the Gavlan. The Da'as Mikrah
> identifies that as Jbail - modern day Byblos in Lebanon - but perhaps
> Bint Jbail...?

If Jbail is Byblos, could Bint-Jbail be "Bat-Bavel hashedudah"?

> Psalms 83:8 mentions
> Geval among the lands that border Eretz Yisrael to the south...

They're not all to the south - the list includes Moav to the eat,
Tzor up north, and Ashur far away in the northeast.  Nor is the
list in strict geographical order, so I see no reason why Geval
can't be in Lebanon.  (Though having it in the south would give the
gemara poetic symmetry as it pairs the Gavlan with the Galil.)

 -- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

The psul eidus is a gzeiras hakasuv , but it appears that an attempt
is being made to offer a possible reason behind it. It could be
argued that there actually may be a connection between the underlying
reason for Daatan Kalos in its usual context as mentioned by CL,
and the psul eidus (which by the way, both apply to a woman with
the highest degree of chezkas Kashrus and neemonus), although this
connection is remote.

Eidus requires genuine independent thinking on the part of the
individual eid, such that the one witness formulates his own
understanding totally independently of the other witness. He cannot
rely on the other eid to supplement certain missing facts or points
or interpretations, and he has to have the whole story on his own.
Daatan Kalos is a result of a tendancy to collaborate with others
in deciding what to do and what is right to do, and possibly what
is the truth.  Chazal believe that one of a woman's attributes is
that she can never totally isolate herself from interaction with
others and influence by others (usually a good trait, but not
always). Accordingly, she possibly would reach decisions or conclusions
in a collaberative manner, and although those conclusions may be
the same at the end as those she would have reached had she been
able to emotionally isolate herself and analyze the event independently,
she did not follow the rigid cognitive steps needed in order to be
an eid. Stated differently, the perception was that a woman's
tendency to incorporate other's ideas into her own may lead her to
be unable to distinguish between what is actually her version and
what she has incorporated from others. Although the woman is totally
neemenes and we have no reason to believe that she would incorporate
anything untrue into her testimony, since the testimony may have
resulted from a process of synthesis that is not consistent with
the rigid requirements of eidus, the eidus becomes technically
invalid.

This explanation helps in answering why a woman is pasul according
to Rabbenu Tam who says that eidus can be sent biktav (and mipi
ksovom is only a problem where the eidim forgot the eidus) in which
situation there would seemingly be no breach of tznius.

Again, it is probably just simply a gzeiras hakasuv.

Avraham

This is what the Israeli army is doing and we see the tragic results.
The Torah view seems to be quite different.

Rabbi J. David Bleich writes (Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Volume
3, Preemptive War in Jewish Law, p. 277):
    Not only does one search in vain for a ruling prohibiting
    military activity likely to result in the death of civilians,
    but, to this writer's knowledge, there exists no discussion in
    classical rabbinic sources that takes cognizance of the likelihood
    of causing civilian casualties in the course of hostilities
    legitimately undertaken as posing a halakhic or moral problem.

The Maharal in Vayishlach discussing the action of Shimon and Levi regarding
Shechem writes:
    It seems to me that there is really no question. [A conflict
    between individuals or groups is] not comparable to strife
    between two national groups, like the Israelites and the
    Canaanites. For this reason, it was permitted for Yaakov's sons
    to wage war, comparable to that of any nation waging war on
    another. Although our Torah commands us (Deuteronomy 20:10)
    "When you approach a city to wage war against it, you shall
    call out to it for peace," this [obligation to first sue for
    peace] does not apply if the enemy has already acted against
    us. Where they have acted against us in some manner -- as in
    the incident at had where they opened a breach against them by
    their vile act -- we are permitted to avenge ourselves [through
    war] against the entire nation even when only a single individual
    was guilty of the infraction, since that individual is a member
    of the national group.

RYGB mentioned:
>In the period which will precede the coming of Moshiach... and the Galilee
>will be destroyed and the Gavlan* desolated, and the people who dwell
>on the borders will wander about from town to town,** but they will not
>be succored.

[Here's my recent post from soc.culture.jewish.moderated]

The gemara in Sanhedrin 97a  [and Sotah 49b] in discussing what
will happen in the "end of days" mentions that the Galil (Northern
Israel) will empty out ["yecharev" as per the meaning in Yeshayahu
19:5  "v'nahar yecharev v'yavesh"] and that the residents of the
Gailil will wander around from city to city and won't find rest
["v'anshei Galil y'sovvevu m'ir l'ir velo y'chonenu"]. [See: Tanna
D'vei Eliyahu Zuta 16; Shir haShirim Rabba].

Curiously the haftara we read this past Shabbat and the week before
(Yirmiyahu 1:14) "From the north shall disaster break loose" [and
this is NOT referring to the destruction of the First or Second
Temple but to a disaster in the far future] and 2:15 ..."they have
made his land a waste, his cities desolate without inhabitants".

The midrash then refers to the verse in Yirmiyahu "makel shaked"
{a branch] and mentions that this is either NASSR or NETZER (branch]
[See: Mishna in Sukkah 1:6 for translation of "makel" as NASER;
Daniel 11:7 and Yeshayahu 11:1 as "netzer"] as being the one who
threatens Israel.  To me it sounds like NASSRallah. BTW the translation
of the name of President Achmandnidzar of Iran is "NETZER of the
family of Achmad". What's a little scary is that Chazal mention
that the SHAKED takes 21 days to bloom [this whole situation started
on 17 b'Tammuz so this coming week may be fraught with danger]
==========================================================================

But the good news [tm] is that the midrash indicates that the Geulah
will occur when the PERSIANS are destroyed by the Romans [Edom =
Xtians]. See Rashi in Sanhedrin 98a. As to the type of punishment
(Zecharya 14:12], [for obvious reasons this won't be discussed on
Avodah; perhaps Aishdas chaver R. Dov Zackheim former US Undersecretary
of Defense might want to read it on Areivim where files aren't
indexed :-)].

KT
Josh

R' Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote:
> One of the very interesting responses was to the question of the
> status of a person condemned by a Beis Din to death who himself knows
> that he did not commit the crime in question. Is this person allowed to
> turn around and kill the Shaliach Beis Din who comes to execute him? R'
> Chaim responded that in Sanhedrin 82a we only see that in the case of
> Zimri (Bo'el Aramis) would he have been justified in killing Pinchas
> - the inference being that all other Chayavei Misos Beis Din are not
> allowed to kill their executioners. In response to a follow-up question,
> R' Chaim acknowledged two sevaros at work here: "Chiyuv mechudash," ...
> The first pshat is very much in line with my contention in the question
> of the permissibility of killing lice on Shabbos: Chazal are kovei'a
> the Halachic Metzius.

Curiously, the Mishna in Sanhedrin 43b "R. Yehuda omer, im haya
yode'a she'hu mezumam" talks about a guy who is condemned to death
and who insists he's innocent. The gemara there 44b mentions a case
of a person condemned to death who insisted he was innocent [he's
still killed].

So the question you raised (can the condemned man kill the Shaliach
Beit Din) would be irrelevant. The person would, in any case, still
be put to death. Whether he would be punished (in addition to the
gzar din mavet)?  Probably not. See the Yam Shel Shlomo Bava Kamma
III 26 and VIII 42 on "ein adam omeid (OR "nitpas") al tza'aro" in
the situation where a person spontaneously went "meshuggeh" and
lost control and beat someone up who attacked him. (that is, he
beat him up much more than he had to in order to defend himself).
The man doesn't get punished. It may also fall into the category
of "d'avid inish dina l'nafshei" [Bava Kamma 27b].

DIN RODEF: However, it would be absurd to place the Shaliach Beit
Din in the category of Rodef.

KT
Josh

RSBoublil quotes a drasha by Rav Shlomo Aviner:
> "If Yisrael would keep Shabbat twice, they would be redeemed immediately"
> [Shabbat 118b].
> The declaration about redemption does not refer to two random
> cases of Shabbat but rather to two specific dates in the year,

Rav Asher Weiss mentions this concept, but applies it to Shabbat
Hagadol and Shabbat Shuva (he mentions it in the course of his
drashot on these Shabbatot). He relates this to the different nature
of these drashot, the first related to halachic scrupulousness, the
second to tikkun hamidot, areas which clearly complement one another.

Saul Mashabum

RRWolpoe wrote:
> Rambam took the Bavli as numero Uno but also included Tosefta, Sifra
> Sifrei and TY in the mix.
> For many Ashkenazim the mix was MUCH broader. Ashkenazim included
> Midrashim {e.g. Midrash Rabba} Pesikta etc. as well, albeit these
> texts rarely had the same authority as the Bavli.

Rabbi Amir Mashiach recently gave a lecture in a local shul in which
he also pointed out that the Ashkenazi tradition was far more
inclined to give weight to midrashic sources that the Sephardic.
OTHO, he noted that the Sephardic tradition was far more inclined
to give halachic weight to kabbalic and philosophical concepts than
the Ashkenazic.

Saul Mashbaum

An interesting case just came up in a conversion-issue list I'm on:

A person converted a few years ago via a respected Orthodox Beis
Din. He accepted the obligation of Mitzvah Observance.

However, at no time was he asked about his beliefs regarding Jesus
(whom he considers to be a Prophet sent to the non-Jewish community).

He (foolishly) was open about his beliefs -- and has running into
major opposition in his community, with people claiming his geirus
was invalid.  (with obvious consequences on his family).

On the one hand, Geirus requires Kabbalat Mitzvot. He did so.

OTOH, the people attacking him say it requires more than that --
it requires *rejection* of the idea of other, later prophets.

He's asked me for help in clarifying the situation -- anyone have
any leads?

TIA

R' Allswang [mailto:aswang@netvision.net.il] writes:
>The psul eidus is a gzeiras hakasuv , 

Agreed.

>but it appears that an attempt is being made to offer a possible reason
>behind it. 

Agreed - that is what various posters appear to be doing.

> It could be argued that there actually may be a connection between
> the underlying reason for Daatan Kalos in its usual context as
> mentioned by CL, and the psul eidus (which by the way, both apply
> to a woman with the highest degree of chezkas Kashrus and neemonus),
> although this connection is remote.

>Eidus requires genuine independent thinking on the part of the
>individual eid, such that the one witness formulates his own
>understanding totally independently of the other witness...

I don't think this explanation will fly.  While we do not have a
lot of information on noshim daatan kalos, the one other data point
we have, as brought by R'SBA is ma'ase Bruria.  And that was a case
of the woman (Bruria) acting independently and not collaborating
(unless you are talking about collaborating with the male seducer,
but I am assuming here that you are talking about collaborating
with the other woman who makes up the two who would otherwise guard
against yichud, otherwise there is no distinction between the male
and female in this).

>This explanation helps in answering why a woman is pasul according
> to Rabbenu Tam who says that eidus can be sent biktav (and mipi
> ksovom is only a problem where the eidim forgot the eidus) in which
> situation there would seemingly be no breach of tznius.

But does there still not need to be drisha v'chakira in some form?
And I always understood that the whole point about shvuas haeidus
is that somebody can require someone else to give eidus or swear?
Does this shita of Rabbanu Tam really get us a full patur from
attendance on Beis Din (can the shevua also be given biktav)?

Shabbat Shalom
Chana

From: "Chana Luntz" <chana@kolsassoon.org.uk>
> I don't think this explanation will fly.  While we do not have a lot of
> information on noshim daatan kalos, the one other data point we have, as
> brought by R'SBA is ma'ase Bruria...
> But does there still not need to be drisha v'chakira in some form? And I
> always understood that the whole point about shvuas haeidus is that
> somebody can require someone else to give eidus or swear?  Does this
> shita of Rabbanu Tam really get us a full patur from attendance on Beis
> Din (can the shevua also be given biktav)?

Of course there are situations where the witness will have to come to Beis
Din, just that when giving a Taama DiKra, it should be noted that the reason
of kol kvuda does not cover many situations where public appearance is not
needed, and the explanation that I gave applies to any situation where an
eid must formulate a view, which is basically every eidus (I thought that
someone would object on the basis of eidei kiyum such as at a get or
kiddushin, which does not work so well with my sevoro).

As to the use of the term NDK, I agree that the original poster misapplied
the term as it is intended in the context used by Chazal, but I just wanted
to move the focus of the Taama Dikra from being part of some overall
limitations with respect to the woman due to norms of society such as Kol
Kvuda, to an underlying understanding of the mahus of how she thinks and is
influenced (by potentially anyone, to address your first question), which,
albeit very remotely as stated, connects the two areas. The main point is to
try to understand why someone who is totally neeman is not a kosher eid, and
that is answered by the collaberation theory, which stresses the importance
of total autonomous thought as a pre-requisite for eidus.

Avraham

It occurred to me this morning that perhaps I've been putting too
much emphasis on the sugya of Pashtida, which is admittedly subject
to machlokes. Perhaps I can demonstrate my point more simply by
focusing on an older point, one which is more widely agreed upon.
Namely, matzah.

(For this post, and subsequent posts in this thread, please understand
the word "matza" to refer only to the flat, thin, hard kind of
matzah.)

The first two definitions of pas habaa bkisnin (OC 168:7) are that
it is an ordinary bread dough stuffed with other goodies, or that
the dough itself has so many other flavorings in it that it is not
even a bread dough. I would categorize these definitions as "ingredient
oriented". But the third definition is not ingredient oriented. It
is an ordinary bread dough, but baked to be dry and crunchy.

What is it about these three definitions that sets them apart from
ordinary bread? We cannot says that the ingredients differ, because
in the 3rd case they *don't* differ.

What distinguishes PHBK from regular bread is the manner in which
it is used in that community and at that time. That's it. That's
the only definition. And matza proves it. If you are in a situation
where matza is used as a meal-food, then even a tiny pice of it is
Hamotzi.  But if you are in a situation where matza is *not* a
meal-food, then it is Mezonos.

Does anyone argue on this? Perhaps you'll say that "Matza is always
hamotzi because it is always a meal-food." Okay, fine, it is always
a meal-food for *you* -- but surely you'll agree that someone who
is accustomed to eating soft pita-style matza on Pesach, he can say
mezonos on the cracker-type matza, right? So I hope we can all agree
that matzah is an example of a bread which is Hamotzi in some
situations and PHBK in other situations.

All I've been trying to suggest is that perhaps other breads are
also in this category.

I will concede that a large challah is unlikely to ever be a snack
food. But sliced white bread is another story. I *propose* that
perhaps such bread is similar to pizza: If a person takes a single
slice, shmears a topping on it, and plops down with it in front of
his tv or pc, it is mezonos. Two slices (together as a sandwich or
not) with no side-dish, safek. Three slices is a meal.

Akiva Miller

I can't find the exact reference at the moment, but IIRC the Aruch
HaShulchan, after discussing the kashrut of a certain food on Pesach
concludes matter-of-factly "nowadays we appoint a mashgiach in the
factory to ensure that the product is kosher for Pesach."

It is clear to me that the modern phenomenon of mashgichei kashrut
is a response to the industrial revolution and the removal of the
production of food staples from the home. It does not reflect any
change in the priciple of eid echad neeman b'issurim.

Regarding REMT's expalnation of the function of eidei kiddushin, I
recall that I once recalled to a family friend and a respected
talmid chacham the he was one of the eidim at my wedding. To my
surprise, he said he had absolutely no recollection of having so
served. Although I felt bad about this, I realize that the moment
the kiddushin is effected, the eidei kiddushin have fulfilled their
purpose; subsequently forgetting the eidut has absolutely to effect
whatsover on the validity of the kiddushin (as does not the fact
that this eid is now in olam ha-emet).

[Email #2. -mi]

I wrote
> I can't find the exact reference at the moment, but IIRC the Aruch
> HaShulchan, after discussing the kashrut of a certain food on Pesach
> concludes matter-of-factly "nowadays we appoint a mashgiach in the
> factory to ensure that the product is kosher for Pesach.

I was referring to Aruch HaShulchan OH 467:15. The product in
question is sugar.

Saul Mashbaum

**********************


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