Avodah Mailing List

Volume 17 : Number 051

Thursday, May 25 2006

• RE: Nasi
• RE: Ambivalence, Dialectics, Eilu va'Eilu and Nevu'ah
• Re: Looking for mekor
• RE: Nasi
• Re: Kedushah
• Re: Looking for mekor
• A Thought on Yom Yerushalayim
• Re: A Thought on Yom Yerushalayim
• Re: Avos keeping Torah
• taking midrashim literally
• Re: Lubavitch acosmism
• Re: Looking for mekor
• Re: Shevuos - Matan Torah
• Re: Divine Inaction
• Re: Ambivalence, Dialectics, Eilu va'Eilu and Nevu'ah

On May 24, 2006, Rich, Joel wrote:
> On a certain blog there's been a discussion of government powers. IIRC
> Zerubabbel was the first Nasi - Does anyone know how this position was
> established or who endowed it with authority? Was there "religious
> authority" , community authority or both?

Zerubavel was not the first Nasi. The first appointed Nasi was Yosi ben
Yoezer the talmid of Antignos. He was a Cohen and he was a member of the
Beis Din haGadol. The reason the Beis Din instituted the office of Nasi
was due to the political upheaval of the times. Just twenty years earlier,
the Cohen Gadol relinquished his power to his unscrupulous nephew Yoseph
ben Tovia. Along with a contingent from Ptolmey's army, Yoseph exacted
exorbitant sums from the people and created a terrible disorder amongst
the populace. His activities caused a unique class of individuals called
the Muchasim (tax collectors) to arise and they molested the nation no
end. To address this issue, the Beis Din decided that the leader of the
nation could no longer be the Cohen Gadol; he must be a member of the
Beis Din haGadol.

Simcha Coffer

On May 24, 2006, Micha Berger wrote:
> And since REED and Maharal seems (to me, pace RSC) to be clearly
> phenomenological in bias, then by nevu'ah as well the result depends
> on the observer, just as it does for nissim. 

I'm sorry but I just can't let that slide. Phenomenology is the study
of how things are 'perceived' as opposed to their ontological status. I
agree that Rav Dessler and the Maharal frequently use phenomenological
imagery in their explications but this has nothing to do with ontology.

> RSC asks:
>>                              You just finished quoting Rav Dessler in
>> chelek aleph that the difference in olamos is a result of the perspective
>> of the individual. Are you saying that if a person does not possess
>> the perspective of a tailor, the suit someone else is wearing actually
>> doesn't exist? Can a lack of awareness actually affect the ontological
>> integrity of an object and if so, what mechanism is employed to accomplish
>> this? What is forcing you to postulate such a radical innovation?

> Look at the ma'amar on cheileq 1 again. He has a section that addresses
> this question. It's the equivalent of saying the extra shoes don't
> exist in the tailor's olam. Yes. How else does he both assert
> the reality of multiple olamos and then explain them in terms of
> perception. Phenomenolism. Or, as RSC put it, REED's thought is "more
> subtle than Kant".

Iruv parshiyos kasuv kan. Of course bi"ya (beriah yetzirah assiah) have
ontologically unique qualities but this doesn't mean that if in Beriah,
for instance, time is perceived (or even exists) one way, that it has
to detract from an alternate reality in a 'lower' world. In Beriah,
your 'shoresh' does not enjoy physical sensations. Does that mean that
physicality is not real? If you believe that your physical existence is
just a mirror of some higher reality without possessing any intrinsic
ontological qualities onto itself, I have an experiment for you to
perform. Take a needle and jab it into your arm. If you say ouch, you
(and any of the physical imperatives which govern your existence) are
real! (I think therefore I am). You simply cannot say 'ouch' and try
and convince me that you understand, or even relate to, the idea that
essentially you, or time, or any other physical property is not real
(i.e. does not exist) To me it just sounds like an empty abstraction,
nothing more.

> RSC writes:
>>> Ambivalence is
>>> the norm, not the rarity.

>> I don't think you are right. People are not ambivalent; ...

> The existence of ambivalence is generally considered far more clear
> than dialectic in general. In addition to the above we have ideas like
> "Gilu bir'adah". The requirement for the new yoreish to make berakhos al
> hatov and Dayan emes. The LR's writings. And in the psych world, Freud,
> Adler, Frankel and Ellis all discuss the phenomenon.

Nothing to do with what we are talking about. If I win the lottery
and as I go across the street to collect my winnings I stub my toe,
I can feel ecstasy over my winnings and at the same time pain over my
toe but they are not contradictory feelings. Feeling happy and sad at
the mitzryim's death is. The truth is, I might even be able to envision
such a dynamic but the point is, it is not mandated by Hashem. He wants
us to be happy with the missa of rishaim (gemurim) and not feel one iota
of sympathy for them. If we do, we flirt with the danger of becoming like
them chs'v. As humans, we are inexorably united with the impressions of
our emotions. Feeling sympathy for a rasha connects one emotionally to
the rasha and transforms one on a subconscious, and many times conscious,
level. For an exposition on this topic, see Maharal (Chiddushei Aggados
Sotah 38:) and MME 4 pg 4-7.

> Ever see a child encounter a strange doggie and pet it -- but only in
> the back, near its hip? Excitement and fear, simultaneously.

Excitement over a new impression, fear over the possibility of being
bitten. But could he experience excitement and fear simultaneously over
being bitten?

> Or the
> person anxiously anticipating a date -- also two conflicting emotions.

Anticipation over the union, anxiousness over being rejected. Can one
feel anticipation and anxiousness simultaneously over being rejected? And
even if he could, is that what Hashem is looking for from us at the time
of missas rishaim? I propose not.

...
>> This has nothing to do with our topic. Subconscious (or even
>> semi-conscious) animating factors are beyond the ability of man to
>> inhibit; his is the job of reigning in his feelings, of controlling
>> his thoughts so ultimately they don't contradict the ratzon haBoreh...

> The irbuviah that RYSalanter speaks of as the collections of motivators by
> which we make decisions can not exist without accepting ambivalence. Say
> someone starts a shul in a neighborhood that already has at least one.
> Hopefully his primary motivation is one of building a mosad more suited
> for his avodas Hashem than what exists. But also, for normal people,
> there is an element of personal interest, of a desire to be a "macher"
> somehwere. These two motivations are themselves two very different
> emotions. One, a spiritual longing, the other, unfulfilled ga'avah (which
> in turn usually comes from a weak self-image that needs bolstering).

You are no doubt correct but perhaps we are defining 'ambivalence'
differently. I understand ambivalence as a conscious tension between
two opposing ideas. Almost like cognitive dissonance. OTOH, if a person
is building a shul, he is animated by his conscious desire to be marbeh
kvod shamayim. R' Yisrael is warning against the *subconscious* element
of redifas hakavod which must be excised to the best of ones ability
(to accomplish in its entirety is very difficult after the chet of Adam
haRishon as Razal say, "or va'choshech mishtamshim bi'irbuvya". Very
few people manage what, for instance, Dovid managed by that which is
represented in the pasuk "libi chalal b'kirbi). To this effect we pray
"v'taher lebeinu l'avdicha b'emes". However, once again, this has nothing
to do with conscious, free will decisions to feel a certain way about
a certain thing in two diametrically opposed ways.

> In fact, RSC seems to be unique in my experience to question the frequency
> of ambivalence. Since it is in contradiction with many baalei mesorah
> as well as many schools of psychology, I am guessing that he simply is
> unaware of how often it comes up. It would be interesting if he kept
> a formal cheshbon hanefesh, and see if the issue really is that it is
> rare in his life or if the frequency of ambivalence is simply overloooked.

I'd like to clarify something here. It is obvious that RMB and I have
propped up some scarecrows and have summarily commenced to debate
them to death. Now that I understand what he means by ambivalence,
I unhesitatingly concur. I require no education in mussar, behavioural
therapy (although I might need it) or psychology. My point simply was that
people cannot cop out from their responsibilities by appealing to their
feelings of ambivalence (the way I understand the idea i.e. *conscious*
tension between two ideas which, in Avodas Hashem, translates into
the tension between the YT and the YH.) Deep in one's heart, a person
generally understands his responsibilities (ha'Elokim assah es haAdam
yashar) and thus he is considered responsible for his actions despite
the fact that he may ta'anah 'confusion' which has led him to sin. Look
at my original remark and you will see that this is precisely what I
meant to say.

Simcha Coffer

On May 24, 2006, at 21:35:00 -0400 GMT, R' Itamar wrote:
> Can anyone here 'source' for me the following:
> 'kayin was born with one female twin, hevel was born with 2 female 
> twins..

see Bereishit Raba 22:2-3

[This reference was also given by R' Nachman Levine
<nachmanl@juno.com>. -mi]

> The fight between kayin and hevel was partially ovee who gets hevels
> second twin.
> Kayin felt that as he was older, the 'extra female' belonged rightfully
> to him as the older brother...

see Bereishit Raba 22:7

 -Stephen 'Steg' Belsky
   "jealousy, selfishness, and being a self-hating human
    can cause early death."
       ~ ribbi yehoshua` (colloquial translation)

[R Simcha Coffer:]
> Zerubavel was not the first Nasi. The first appointed Nasi was Yosi ben
> Yoezer the talmid of Antignos. He was a Cohen and he was a member of the
> Beis Din haGadol. The reason the Beis Din instituted the office of Nasi
> was due to the political upheaval of the times....

Please provide a source.

KT
Joel Rich

R' Micha Berger wrote:
> LAD, "qedushah" is separated for a purpose, which is
> why we usually have a "le-" if there is a prepositional
> phrase. "Qadosh Lashem". "Mequdeshes li". ...
> This is in distinction to "tahara", which is separation
> from. Thus explaining the use in "zahav tahor" for pure gold.

It might be interesting to see how Tevel and Terumah work into this.

I've often thought of Tevel has having kedusha, but kedusha of a useless
sort. This is not to be confused with mere *potential* kedusha; no,
the kedusha of tevel is very real -- hence the issur on eating it --
but there's nothing that can be done with it. But when that kedusha is
concentrated into a small portion of the whole, that portion gets the
useful kedusha of Terumah, and the rest loses all of its kedusha and
becomes mere chullin.

This is a very different sort of separation than "Qadosh Lashem" and
"Mequdeshes li", where an individual is singled out and raised up,
without changing the status of the others.

I'm not sure where to take this from here. Anyone else?

Akiva Miller

On Wed, 24 May 2006 21:35:00 -0400, <mageq@fastmail.fm> wrote:
> Can anyone here 'source' for me the following:
> 'kayin was born with one female twin, hevel was born with 2 female 
> twins..
...

http://www.kabbalaonline.org/WeeklyTorah/Ari/Ego_versus_Self-abnegation.asp

The citation there is from "Translated and adapted by Moshe Wisnefsky
from the Writings of the Ari, Likutei Torah". It's darshaned from the
number of times "et" is used. One "et" = One twin sister. So it says
"et Kayin", and it says "et achiv et Hevel".

Lisa

On Thu, 25 May 2006 15:29:16 -0400 (EDT), "Micha Berger"
<micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> The call to remind Edom ... is also a call for them to remember 
> Yom Yerushalaim, a day in which they join the union to serve G-d 
> wholeheartedly.

I don't see that.  You left out the fact that King David made it very
clear what it means to remind Bnei Edom of Yom Yerushalayim.  It
means "Ashrei she'yocheiz v'nipetz et olalayich al ha-sala".  And to
take your drash further, destroying those who refuse to allow us to
live in peace is precisely how we attain the peace of Yerushalayim.

Lisa

On Thu, May 25, 2006 at 05:24:26PM -0400, Lisa Liel wrote:
: I don't see that.  You left out the fact that King David made it very
: clear what it means to remind Bnei Edom of Yom Yerushalayim...

I simply didn't focus on it. To remove the ellipses in my earlier post:
> The call to remind Edom doesn't end with a cry for Divine
> Justice. Although it is that. But it is also a call for them to
> remember Yom Yerushalaim, a day in which they join the union to serve
> G-d wholeheartedly.

The first two sentences were to acknowledge the portion of the call
which was not included in my chiddush.

-mi

RZL:
> Well, I /think/ it's from Rav Miller. I've used this  mehalach for a long
> time. But I do distinctly remember him saying that  if Avraham Avinu was
> not metsuvah to wear tsitsis, how could he wear  them on Shabbos without
> transgressing hots'ah? So he either did wear  tstsis, not keeping Shabbos,
> or didn't, not keeping the mitzvah of  tsitsis.

[RJB and someone else also proposed that solution yesterday:]
> If he wasn't a Yid, he wasn't metzuveh.
> If he wasn't a Yid, it  was ossur for him to keep Shabbos fully. So to
> keep that part of his  non-Jewishness, he went outside in his tzitzis on
> Shabbos, keeping Shabbos as  a non-Jew, and keeping tzitzis.

My brother-in-law R' Osher Katz made two comments about this question
when we discussed it. One, Avraham lived in the desert or at any rate
away from population centers -- there would not have been anywhere near
enough people around to make his neighborhood a reshus harabim de'oraysa,
so he could have worn tzitzis outside. Two, even if he wouldn't carry
outside in the desert, surely he wouldn't have wanted to spend the
whole Shabbos in his tent and surely he would have made an eruv.
He didn't just have one tent, either, he had several, for family,
employees, maybe for guests, so he must have made an eruv around the
whole compound and then would have no problem wearing tzitizis as there
would be no question of carrying.

 -Toby  Katz
=============

Re a subject that is a perennial here on Avodah -- It's possible, even
likely, that the medrashim about the Avos keeping the Torah are literally
true (or meant to be taken as literally true).

However there are other, more outlandish medrashim around that are
probably not meant to be taken literally. I am reading a book by R'
Aharon Feldman, called *The Juggler and the King.* It is based on the
Vilna Gaon's interpretation of the Rabba bar Bar-Chanah stories.

 From the introduction:

    These stories recount the experiences of a Talmudic sage, Rabba
    bar Bar-Chanah, while travelling at sea. They are bizarre tales
    of being swamped by gigantic waves, meeting fantastic animals,
    and other incredible and incomprehensible incidents.

    The commentaries differ as to whether or not these accounts are
    to be taken literally. Some maintain that they are accounts of
    incidents which actually happened to Rabba....

    However, several major commentators, such as Rashba, Ritva, Maharal,
    Maharsha, and the Vilna Gaon, are apparently of the opinion that
    the stories are not to be taken literally. Some understand them
    to have been visions seen by Rabba, probably in a dream; the Vilna
    Gaon refers to them simply as as "stories" (ma'asim).....the stories
    are parables offering various truths about the evil drives in man....

In the title story, Rabba saw a man (the "juggler") pouring wine from
one cup to another while jumping from one donkey to another -- while
the donkeys were on opposite banks of a river. The king heard what
the juggler was doing and had him put to death.

To summarize very much (which does not do the book justice at all),
the juggler is a man who goes back and forth between seeking physical
gratification or seeking ego gratification and prestige. Either way he
isn't doing what G-d intended him to do here in this world, with the
talents and abilities He gave him, and therefore Hashem (the "King")
puts him to death.

It's a terrific book, BTW, inspiring and thought-provoking.

 -Toby  Katz
=============

"Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> See the igeres of the LR translated at <http://tinyurl.com/maw4z>.

The "acquaintance" mentioned in the letter is probably REED.

-- 
Zev Sero <zev@sero.name>

In a message dated 5/25/2006 5:53:46pm EDT,  lisa@starways.net writes:
> It's  darshaned from the
> number of times "et" is used. One "et" = One twin  sister. So it says
> "et Kayin", and it says "et achiv et  Hevel".

This is brought in Rashi Al Asar.

On Wed, May 17, 2006 at 05:11:36PM -0400, Jacob Farkas wrote:
:> Why? "Zeman" could mean period, which includes the very day, when it comes
:> to Pesach and Sukkos, but not Shavu'os.
:> Personally, I do not believe that's the difference between zeman and yom,
:> but I do not see how you have proven your point.

: My point was, that the tefilloh is about VaTitein lanu... es yom...,
: thanking God for giving us "This Day" with "Z'man" describing what
: "this day" is about. Zman in this context is describing the purpose of
: this day. This could be an issue if the Torah were not given on this day.

Alternatively, it is a day within the zeman of matan Torah. It needn't
be that zeman and yom refer to the same thing, just that zeman refer
to something that sheds light on the nature of the yom -- most
logically, because it's included within the zeman.

I still think zeman = day set by progression works better.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 42nd day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        6 weeks in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Malchus sheb'Yesod: Why is self-control and
Fax: (270) 514-1507       reliability crucial for universal brotherhood?

On Tue, May 23, 2006 at 10:37:12AM -0400, Steg Belsky wrote:
: The difference is in the applicability of _gezeira hi' milefanai_; if
: God *decided* (whatever that means) that a certain horrible event (let's
: generalize the philosophy here) would happen, that would indicate that
: there are specific causes and/or specific effects -- justifications,
: that is -- for the horrible event. However, if a human being decided
: on their own to effect the horrible event, and God *let it happen* by
: 'stepping back' for the sole or primary purpose of preserving free will,
: then there isn't necessarily any deeper message aside from "yo, human
: beings, use your free will responsibly".

When dealing with the Omnipotent, action represents no effort, and
inaction is definitionally no effort. So how do they differ in moral
import?

Your formulation differs from mine only in that I'm identifying the
motivation of preserving free will in the Divine Inaction case with the
(potentially unknowable) primary component of the motivation of the
Divine Action case.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 42nd day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        6 weeks in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Malchus sheb'Yesod: Why is self-control and
Fax: (270) 514-1507       reliability crucial for universal brotherhood?

On Thu, May 25, 2006 at 04:04:14PM -0400, S & R Coffer wrote:
: I'm sorry but I just can't let that slide. Phenomenology is the study
: of how things are 'perceived' as opposed to their ontological status. I
: agree that Rav Dessler and the Maharal frequently use phenomenological
: imagery in their explications but this has nothing to do with ontology.

Phenomenology is a feature of schools of philosophy which teach that one
can't know the ontological, only our perceptions of it. Such as Berkley,
Kant, the existentialists, Mach, REED...

Such schools simply ignore the thing-in-itself, beyond proving its
unknowability.

:> Look at the ma'amar on cheileq 1 again. He has a section that addresses
:> this question. It's the equivalent of saying the extra shoes don't
:> exist in the tailor's olam. Yes. How else does he both assert
:> the reality of multiple olamos and then explain them in terms of
:> perception....

: Iruv parshiyos kasuv kan. Of course bi"ya (beriah yetzirah assiah) have
: ontologically unique qualities but this doesn't mean that if in Beriah,
: for instance, time is perceived (or even exists) one way, that it has
: to detract from an alternate reality in a 'lower' world. In Beriah,
: your 'shoresh' does not enjoy physical sensations. Does that mean that
: physicality is not real? ...

Strawman. Who said anything about unreality? Maybe L does, but not REED!
Again, see MmE vol I pp 304-306, "Olamos" ch 1. In it he addresses the
question that if it depends on the madreigah of the person in question,
"im kein, lamah qeruyyim olamos velo madreigos"?

We're in yet another example where I feel you're imposing a false
understanding of REED on the text. He speaks of bechinos, of phenomena,
whereas you cast his philosophy as being about pneumena, what is
ontologically there. And so, every time you cite one of these texts, you
come up with an interpretation that differs from those of us (including
RACarmell) who see REED in more Kantian terms than Scholastic ones.

...

:>>> Ambivalence is
:>>> the norm, not the rarity.

:>> I don't think you are right. People are not ambivalent; ...

:> Ever see a child encounter a strange doggie and pet it -- but only in
:> the back, near its hip? Excitement and fear, simultaneously.

: Excitement over a new impression, fear over the possibility of being
: bitten. But could he experience excitement and fear simultaneously over
: being bitten?
...

You mean like joy over Divine Justice and sorrow over human death?
Our original case too it's two aspects of the same event.

(BTW, it could anticipation about meeting a potential mate vs anxiety
over possibly having a rotten evening instead. Two emotions based
on the same uncertainty -- what if yes, what if no.)

...
: You are no doubt correct but perhaps we are defining 'ambivalence'
: differently. I understand ambivalence as a conscious tension between
: two opposing ideas. Almost like cognitive dissonance...

Ambivalence is emotional, not conceptual. It's having two emotional
reactions of emotions we normally think of as "conflicting". Nothing
about ideas...

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 42nd day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        6 weeks in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Malchus sheb'Yesod: Why is self-control and
Fax: (270) 514-1507       reliability crucial for universal brotherhood?

*********************


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