Avodah Mailing List

Volume 17 : Number 049

Wednesday, May 24 2006

• Re: Malachim (was Spilling drops of wine at the Seder)
• RE: Al Naharos Bavel: Authorship and Ibn Ezra's shitta
• Holocaust/daat torah
• RE: Al Naharos Bavel: Authorship and Ibn Ezra's shitta
• Re: Malachim (was Spilling drops of wine at the Seder)
• Doctor's fees
• Re: Doctor's fees
• Re: Al Naharos Bavel: Authorship and Ibn Ezra's shitta
• Quantum Mechanics and Yahadut (was: Al Naharos Bavel: Authorship and Ibn Ezra's shitta)
• Re: Divine Inaction
• RE: Al Naharos Bavel: Authorship and Ibn Ezra's shitta
• Re: Al Naharos Bavel: Authorship and Ibn Ezra's shitta
• Nasi
• Mutav Sheyihiyu Shogegin
• Re: Mutav Sheyihiyu Shogegin
• RE: Rambam on variation in length of month of Elul
• Ambivalence, Dialectics, Eilu va'Eilu and Nevu'ah

On Sun, May 21, 2006 at 06:06:10PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote:
: Question: Is it established that they were down on earth? ...

Other than the three anashim who visited Avraham, or the one who battled
Ya'aqov, or the one who stopped Bil'am's donkey, the one who approached
Yehoshua, or Shimshon's parents, etc...

It would seem that mal'achim regularly visit olam hazeh.

-mi

I wrote:
> Rav Avigdor Miller zt""l explained that the avos did literally keep the
> mitzvos; but since, unlike us, they were not metsuvah, they had the option
> of weighing matters: in a conflict between marrying the right person to
> raise a holy nation or even a holy family (or the kindness of feeding
> others dairy with meat) vs. keeping [o]the[r] mitzvos d'oraissa and d'rabanan
> and chumros, they in their great wisdom could (and were expected to)
> choose the former.

Well, I /think/ it's from Rav Miller. I've used this mehalach for a long
time. But I do distinctly remember him saying that if Avraham Avinu was
not metsuvah to wear tsitsis, how could he wear them on Shabbos without
transgressing hots'ah? So he either did wear tstsis, not keeping Shabbos,
or didn't, not keeping the mitzvah of tsitsis.

Zvi Lampel

Our recent areivim thread on this topic included discussion of the pasuk
(Yeshayahu 44:25) Mayshiv Chachamim Achor , as to why Rabbinic leadership
in pre-holocaust Europe advised their kehilot to stay.

Just a few technical points that don't speak to the holocaust. I assume
those that quote this pasuk are drawing from the gemara in gittin 56b
(the famous kamtza bar kamtza story). It's worthwhile to note that this
pasuk appears twice. The first explains why R'YBZ did not answer the
analogy of the barrel and the snake. The second time was by not asking
for Yerushalayim to be spared. The Maharsha inteprets the statement
as the sins of the people of the city causing HKB"H to cause a lack
of daat to respond.From the content and the placement in order, it's
clear that the Maharsha was referring to the 1st usage. While one could
apply a somewhat similar approach to the 2nd usage, imho there is a big
difference between the 2 cases (i.e. I could see saying HKB"H didn't
give clarity as to the right choice, not that he forced the wrong choice)

Also of interest is the pasuk in its original context. The quote in the
gemara is from the end of a pasuk whose context makes it clear why the
parshanim on Yeshayahu do not interpret it in the way the gemara uses it.

In any event, the real reason for this post is to point out the flow of
the storyline in Yeshayahu and tie this issue to our Yom Haatzmaut thread.
The VERY NEXT WORDS following the snip of the pasuk above are: Meikim
dvar avdo vatzat malachav yashlim haomer lyerushalayim tushav ularey
yehuda tibanena vcharvoteha akomem. Haomer ltzulah charvi vnaharotayich
ovish. Haomer lkoresh roi vkol chaftzi yashlim vlamor lyerushalayim
tibaneh vhaichal tivased.

I hope to see you all on Thursday in Yerushalayim(BE"H by that haichal)
KT
Joel Rich

I wrote:
>...if Avraham Avinu was not metsuvah to wear tsitsis, how could he
>wear them on Shabbos without transgressing hots'ah? So he either did
>wear tstsis, not keeping Shabbos, or didn't, not keeping the mitzvah
>of tsitsis.

 --unless, of course, he wore the tsitsis and stayed indoors all Shabbos,
or built an eruv.

Zvi Lampel

Mon, 15 May 2006 from: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>:
> ...The Rambam and Or Samei'ach prove that malachim have no bechirah[:]
> the Rambam because they lack it bekoach, the OS because they have no
> opportunity to use it bepo'al. But there are plenty of aggados that
> presume they do.

> RYGB once suggested that leshitas haOS, they lack bechirah because in 
> Shamayim, good vs evil is obvious, not a choice. Which would mean that 
> when sent down here, where tov is occluded, perhaps they do. This would 
> answer the timing of mal'achim when down on earth, eg saying shirah at 
> qeri'as Yam Suf. Since they obtain bechirah, time follows suit.

Question: Is it established that they were down on earth? (If so,
mekor, please.) Or are you saying that witnessing events down on earth
(even "from shamayim") necessitates (for melachim) being involved with
earthly time? Or are you just raising the possibility that they were
down on earth, or that witnessing events down on earth necessitates being
involved with earthly time, in order to go on to answer the question?

Zvi Lampel

Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deiah 336:2 states that while a physician may
accept payment for his exertion and his batalah (""s'char ha-toreiach
v-ha'batalah""), it is prohibited for him to take payment for his
knowledge and [to compensate for the expenses of] his studies (""s'char
ha-chochmah u-s'char ha-limud"").

How does this square with today's doctors' fees?

[Email #2. -mi]

CORRECTION:
(Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deiah 336:2): the "s'char ha-limud" a physician
is prohibited from taking is not, as I stated, payment to compensate
for the expenses of his studies. The nosei kaykim explain that it is
payment for the advice and instructions he gives to the patient and/or
his caretakers. This siman in Shulchan Orech is based on the Ramban's TH,
and the prohibition is based upon the fact that by giving this advice,
the physician is performing the mitzvah of hashavas aveidah--returning the
patient's loss (of health)-- and one must not take payment for performing
mitzvos. The question, how this squares with today's doctor's fees,
still stands.

Zvi Lampel  

[Sent in reply to the first of the two emails combined above. -mi]

[R' Zvi Lampel:]
> Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deiah 336:2 states that while a physician may accept
> payment for his exertion and his batalah (""s'char ha-toreiach
> v-ha'batalah""), it is prohibited for him to take payment for his knowledge
> and [to compensate for the expenses of] his studies (""s'char ha-chochmah
> u-s'char ha-limud"").
> How does this square with today's doctors' fees?

R. Zilberstein one of the world's experts on the area has said that the
doctors fees are legitimate since you need their prescriptions and for
that they need state/country permission which requires all the training.
In general he says that the definition of rofeh mumcheh is anyone with
a license to practice medicine.

BTW what is the reason that he cannot charge for his expenses in medical
school?

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel

> ...if Avraham Avinu was not metsuvah to wear tsitsis, how could he
> wear them on Shabbos without transgressing hots'ah? So he either did
> wear tstsis, not keeping Shabbos, or didn't, not keeping the mitzvah
> of tsitsis.

I remember hearing the tzizit davka as an answer to the question was
Avraham Avinu Jewish and mechuyav to keep Shabbat or not Jewish and
asur to keep Shabbat. The answer was that he wore tzitzit, if Jewish
not hotzaa, and if not Jewish hotzaa and breaking Shabbat menucha

On May 19, 2006, at 2:57 -0400GMT, R' Chaim Manaster wrote:
> This idea of the bechira being kovea the nevua is somewhat reminiscent
> of the observer causing the collapse of the wave function in quantum
> mechanics. I have no idea if this similarity has any significance or not,
> but I could hear the possibility that there is more depth to this analogy.

You can hear a recording of a shiur about Quantum Physics and Halakha 
at this website:

<http://www.springbird.net/>

 -Stephen (Steg) Belsky

On May 19, 2006, at 06:48:51 -0400GMT, R' Micha Berger wrote:
> I don't see the difference between action and the Omnipotent's decision
> not to act. By humans, action takes more effort, and therefore implies
> more culpability. But WRT the RSO? Effort?
> Clearly Hashem decided it would happen. Invoking bechirah would mean
> that Hashem values bechirah sufficiently to justify allowing terrible
> things to happen to preserve it. Not an impossible position -- without
> bechirah, what value does life have altogether?

The difference is in the applicability of _gezeira hi' milefanai_; if
God *decided* (whatever that means) that a certain horrible event (let's
generalize the philosophy here) would happen, that would indicate that
there are specific causes and/or specific effects -- justifications,
that is -- for the horrible event. However, if a human being decided
on their own to effect the horrible event, and God *let it happen* by
'stepping back' for the sole or primary purpose of preserving free will,
then there isn't necessarily any deeper message aside from "yo, human
beings, use your free will responsibly".

 -Stephen 'Steg' Belsky
  "i am against big cities; they bring out the worst in men."
      ~ david ben-gurion

On May 21, 2006, Zvi Lampel wrote:
> I wrote:
>>...if Avraham Avinu was not metsuvah to wear tsitsis, how could he
>>wear them on Shabbos without transgressing hots'ah? So he either did
>>wear tstsis, not keeping Shabbos, or didn't, not keeping the mitzvah
>>of tsitsis.

>  --unless, of course, he wore the tsitsis and stayed indoors all Shabbos,
> or built an eruv.

I'm not following the logic here. Just because Avraham Avinu was not
metsuvah in Tzitzis does not mean he didn't receive a 'mitzvah' for
wearing them bi'geder eino metsuva v'oseh. As long as he had a tallis
metzuyetzes ki'hilchasa, why would it be hotsa'a on Shabbos?

To clarify further, Avraham's kiyum Shabbos itself was bigeder eino
metsuvah v'osseh. I don't see how a Shabbos such as this would necessitate
the type of Tzitzis that is bi'geder metsuvah v'oseh in order to eliminate
the problem of ho'tza'a. All of Avraham's mitzvos (other than mila) were
bi'geder eino mitsuvah v'oseh. As long as he kept them all uniformly
*as if* he was a metsuva, that's all that can be expected.

Simcha Coffer

On Wed, May 17, 2006 at 05:35:41PM -0400, S & R Coffer wrote:
:> That's medrash, though. And not to be taken as literally true.

: What gives you licence to say such a thing? ...

First, the LR does not take it as literally true. Rather that they were
mequyamim the same tafqidim, perhaps in the way halakhah now requires
for people who can't figure out their neshamos's needs on their own,
but not necessarily.

Second, the list of rishonim who tell you not to assume any particular
medrash is literal is long, and has appeared here with M"M and quotes
more than once. The Rambam holds that any medrash that consists of
fantastic claims MAY NOT be accepted as historical, and this one likely
qualifies. (Not that the Rambam's hashkafos are too popular bizman
hazeh... But that just eliminates the requirement, not the license.)

...
: The Ramban (Bereishis 26:5) deals with your question - ayin sham. In
: addition, he claims (Bereishis 48:7) that Yaakov did not bring Rachel
: to the Mi'aras haMachpela because he was embarrassed...
:                                  Furthermore, the Ramban (Vayikra 18:25)
: says that the reason Rachel died when she did was so that Yaakov would
: not have to be over the prohibition of shtey achyos in Eretz Yisrael
: which fits with the Ramban's shita in Bereishis 26:5....
...
: As far as why Yaakov was not machmir on himself to keep the prohibition
: of shtey achyos in chutza la'aretz...
: As far as how Yaakov was able to avoid the spiritually damaging effects
: of such a union...
: MME 5 entitled Shochad LaSatan (end of the second part)

All of which doesn't change the fact that be'emes Yaaqov did marry
them. And thus, did not keep all the mitzvos in all places at all times.

On Wed, May 24, 2006 at 07:48:43AM -0400, S & R Coffer wrote:
: I'm not following the logic here. Just because Avraham Avinu was not
: metsuvah in Tzitzis does not mean he didn't receive a 'mitzvah' for
: wearing them bi'geder eino metsuva v'oseh. As long as he had a tallis
: metzuyetzes ki'hilchasa, why would it be hotsa'a on Shabbos?

Because unless AA was required to wear tzitzis in order to wear the
beged, the tzitzis aren't beteilim to the beged and there is a problem
of hotz'ah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 41st day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        5 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Yesod sheb'Yesod: What is the ultimate measure
Fax: (270) 514-1507                     of self-control and reliability?

[Copied over from Areivim, by my request. -mi]

On a certain blog there's been a discussion of government powers. IIRC
Zerubabbel was the first Nasi - Does anyone know how this position was
established or who endowed it with authority? Was there "religious
authority" , community authority or both?

R'SBA on areivim maintains this does not apply to duraita's. I
recall learning that it does not apply to mfurash bkra. See
<http://tinyurl.com/j5vp6> for more detail.

KT
Joel Rich

On Wed, May 24, 2006 at 06:10:23AM -0400, Rich, Joel wrote:
: R'SBA on areivim maintains this does not apply to duraita's. I recall
: learning that it does not apply to mfurash bkra.
: See <http://tinyurl.com/j5vp6>  for more detail.

The gemara says that it doesn't apply to that which is mefurash biqra
BECAUSE we can assume everyone knows the qera. There is no reason to
believe anyone would be shogegim in such things. See Rashi, who discusses
this in terms of those things both we and Tzeduqim agree upon.

Which would seem to me to mean that bizman hazeh, the sevara doesn't
hold and one can not give tokhachah to undereducated Jews who won't
accept it anyway even on things that are mefurashim biqera.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 41st day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        5 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Yesod sheb'Yesod: What is the ultimate measure
Fax: (270) 514-1507                     of self-control and reliability?

R Chaim Manaster replied to me:
>> Given the rush to get the word out for Rosh Chodesh Tishrei, Elul was
>> made chaseir.

> I am not clear on why the "rush to get the word out" would make BD make
> Elul chaseir rather than malei and how that would help anyone. Consistency
> by BD either way would avoid any doubts, but the "rush ..." and starting
> Tishrei a day sooner, would not eliminate any doubts which was the
> central problem. could you clarify what you meant.

Making it predictable -- as you note it needn't be predictable by being
chaseir -- eliminates the need for sheluchim.

> RMB also wrote:
>> This eliminates the need for sheluchim for Tishrei, who lema'aaseh
>> couldn't succeed anyway.

> But as the mishna clearly states, the sheluchim went out in Tishrei
> nonetheless for Yom Kippur and Succos etc.

Because we are dealing with ruba deruba, not always. Enough to rely upon
lehalakhah if the sheluchim don't get there, but only because they are i
efshar levareir. You still must try.

...
> PS: Does anyone know if the actual time from new moon to new moon
> (as opposed to the constant mean length of the synodic month) caused
> by the 3-body problem and other minor perturbations varies in a gradual
> (if not readily predictable) manner from month to month or is it erratic
> and all over the place from one month to the next (within the limits of
> 29.53 days + or - 7 hours).

The 3 Body Problem is a chaotic system, and the mean is a "strange attractor".
IOW, in order to know the length of any given month, you need to know the
orbit of the moon to a great precision. More precision to project forward to a
second month, etc... IOW, "erratic all over the place".

And worse, the average length is growing by a rate that can only be
approximated polynomially. It's almost linear with time, growing about
3sec/century but there is a slight upward drift from the line from a component
that grows by time^2, etc...

See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/N-body_problem#Three-body_problem>, which
begins:
> The three-body problem is much more complicated; its solution can be
> chaotic. In general, the three-body problem (and the n-body problem for
> n>3) cannot be solved by the method of first integrals.
...
> The restricted three-body problem assumes that the mass of one of the
> bodies is negligible; the circular restricted three-body problem is the
> special case in which two of the bodies are in circular orbits
> (approximated by the Sun - Earth - Moon system).

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 41st day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        5 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Yesod sheb'Yesod: What is the ultimate measure
Fax: (270) 514-1507                     of self-control and reliability?

R' Chaim Manaster wrote:
> This idea of the bechira being kovea the nevua is somewhat reminiscent
> of the observer causing the collapse of the wave function in quantum
> mechanics. I have no idea if this similarity has any significance or not,
> but I could hear the possibility that there is more depth to this analogy.

And R "Steg" Belsky added:
> You can hear a recording of a shiur about Quantum Physics and Halakha
> at this website:
> <http://www.springbird.net/>

I used to think the same thing about safeiq. And theories of this
sort are normal fodder for the journal Higayon, published by R' Moshe
Koppel. However, I since shifted to a more phenomenological view. After
all, quantum uncertainty is generally immeasurable in the realm of human
activity, and halakhah seems to ignore anything smaller than that realm.

Also quantum uncertainty doesn't take probability as a primitive, but
rather a variable that takes on complex values whose magnitude^2 is the
probability. This yeilds to probabilities adding oddly, in more ways than
those given by rules like sefeiq sefeiqa, mi'ut bemaqom safeiq, etc...

Which lead me to suggest that we're modeling human uncertainty. IOW,
what affects halakhah is not the world as it is, but the world as it
is perceived. If someone must pasqen about an uncertain metzi'us, it
is the uncertainty that has impact on the gavra, not whatever happens
to be the state. Thus the din is on a peice of 40% cheilev.

The phenomenological stance also explains chazaqah demei'karah. When you
enter a room and see someone sitting exactly where they were when you
left, you assume they didn't move in the interum. It is possible they
left and came back, but our default response is to assume that things
don't change in our absence.

And since REED and Maharal seems (to me, pace RSC) to be clearly
phenomenological in bias, then by nevu'ah as well the result depends
on the observer, just as it does for nissim. It's a totally different
level of relationship between observer and observed. (One may be proven
to underly the other, but that's off-topic.)

RSC asks:
>                              You just finished quoting Rav Dessler in
> chelek aleph that the difference in olamos is a result of the perspective
> of the individual. Are you saying that if a person does not possess
> the perspective of a tailor, the suit someone else is wearing actually
> doesn't exist? Can a lack of awareness actually affect the ontological
> integrity of an object and if so, what mechanism is employed to accomplish
> this? What is forcing you to postulate such a radical innovation?

Look at the ma'amar on cheileq 1 again. He has a section that addresses
this question. It's the equivalent of saying the extra shoes don't
exist in the tailor's olam. Yes. How else does he both assert
the reality of multiple olamos and then explain them in terms of
perception. Phenomenolism. Or, as RSC put it, REED's thought is "more
subtle than Kant".

The notion that eilu va'eilu depends on the ability for humans to embrace
conflicting thoughts is stated by R' Tzadoq (Resisei Laylah sec. 17):
    Whenever a new thing found about the Torah by any wise person,
    simultaneously arises its opposite.... When it comes to the realm of
    action (po'al) it can not be that two things true simultaneously. In
    the realm of the mind (machshavah), on the other hand, it is
    impossible for a man to think about one thing without considering
    the opposite.

Similarly, RYBS bases eilu va'eilu on unresolved and unresolvable
existential dialectic ("Majesty and Humility", Tradition 17:2 -- reference
provided by R' Binyamin Hecht, Instrospection 5766, no 2, pg 2). The
chaqira as well as EvE emerge from the fact that every halakhah comes
from at least two themes, not one. This is, in turn, because it better
describes the human being for which the Torah is the meens to redeem.

(We discussed EvE as a plurality of truths too many times for me to want
to jump into it again, but since we have new people, I HAVE to ask one
question: In the intro to IM, RMF appears to support the notion of a
right answer and a wrong one. The wrong one, if reached through honest
derishah vechaqirah is part of talmud Torah, but not emes. And yet,
in O"Ch 4:25, he joins the voice of the pluralists, and that machloqes
isn't merely a reality, but an ideal. We noted this in the past, but I do
not recall a resolution. This too came to mind because of RBH's article.)

RSC writes:
>> Ambivalence is
>> the norm, not the rarity.

> I don't think you are right. People are not ambivalent; ...

The existence of ambivalence is generally considered far more clear
than dialectic in general. In addition to the above we have ideas like
"Gilu bir'adah". The requirement for the new yoreish to make berakhos al
hatov and Dayan emes. The LR's writings. And in the psych world, Freud,
Adler, Frankel and Ellis all discuss the phenomenon.

Ever see a child encounter a strange doggie and pet it -- but only in
the back, near its hip? Excitement and fear, simultaneously. Or the
person anxiously anticipating a date -- also two conflicting emotions.

Earlier, the same post, he writes:
> I don't think this is true, you just haven't noticed. Ever since the eitz
>> hada'as, every decision is the product of an irbuvyah of motivations,
>> and every situation met with an irbuvyah of reactions.

> This has nothing to do with our topic. Subconscious (or even
> semi-conscious) animating factors are beyond the ability of man to
> inhibit; his is the job of reigning in his feelings, of controlling
> his thoughts so ultimately they don't contradict the ratzon haBoreh...

The irbuviah that RYSalanter speaks of as the collections of motivators by
which we make decisions can not exist without accepting ambivalence. Say
someone starts a shul in a neighborhood that already has at least one.
Hopefully his primary motivation is one of building a mosad more suited
for his avodas Hashem than what exists. But also, for normal people,
there is an element of personal interest, of a desire to be a "macher"
somehwere. These two motivations are themselves two very different
emotions. One, a spiritual longing, the other, unfulfilled ga'avah (which
in turn usually comes from a weak self-image that needs bolstering).

>                                         However, we are discussing a
> specific command by the Torah to feel a certain way. This *is* within
> our control and nowhere in the pasuk of 'ba'avod' does it imply that we
> should embrace two separate and contradictory emotions.

Actually, our control of emotions is limited. As the old question
goes, "'Ve'ahavta es H' E-lokekha' -- but how can we be commanded
to love?" Also, the rishonim who struggle with "lo sachmod". Yes, we
have control today over our future emotional makeup; tiqun hamiddos is
possible. And we have some control over more slowly rising emotions. But
total control? No.

I agree with RSC, though, the mixture isn't in the pasuq "ba'avod".
It's in the existence of two pesuqim (not in the Torah, BTW) which each
recommend a different emotional response. Now one either has a setirah
to resolve, or simply assume the two do not contradict.

In fact, RSC seems to be unique in my experience to question the frequency
of ambivalence. Since it is in contradiction with many baalei mesorah
as well as many schools of psychology, I am guessing that he simply is
unaware of how often it comes up. It would be interesting if he kept
a formal cheshbon hanefesh, and see if the issue really is that it is
rare in his life or if the frequency of ambivalence is simply overloooked.

If one accepts, as do both Torah and secular studies (as well as my
personal experince), that people can and frequently do feel conflicting
emotions, than the two pesuqim in Mishlei do not contradict, there is no
she'eilah and no need to assume non-naive peirushim as a teirutz. "Binfol"
and "ba'avod resha'im" simply coexist. No problem.

That doesn't require accepting a role of dialectic in the deep
existential level, but I used the word in my original post, and that
spawned a tangent.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 41st day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        5 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Yesod sheb'Yesod: What is the ultimate measure
Fax: (270) 514-1507                     of self-control and reliability?

*********************


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