Avodah Mailing List

Volume 17 : Number 032

Sunday, May 7 2006

• When the B"Din requires help
• Akdamus, Yetziv Pisgam, and the 4 Questions
• ethics question (commerce)
• Linguistic Shifts was Peanuts
• Re: Spilling out drops of wine at the Seder
• RE: Spilling out drops of wine at the Seder
• Re: Spilling out drops of wine at the Seder
• Re: kitniyos and minhagim
• Re: spilling of wine
• Re: ethics question (commerce)
• Re: Anshei Kneses Hagedola

What is the meaning of the T"Cohanim quoted by Rashi, Kedoshim 20:2,
that if B"Din is unable to execute then the people must assist the B"Din?

Why is B"D unable to act?

What assistance is provided by the people?

This is a short introudction to the mis-understandings and mis-perceptions
that prevail upon those who look at a given text as is and fail to take
into consideration of how that text evolved!

Let's strart with the up and coming Shavuos and then freflect back to
common mis-undersatandins re: the Seder's so-called 4 questions.

Given both Akdamus and Yetziv Pisgam are in Aramaic

AND

The Roedlehim mahczor has Akdamus AFTER the first passuk is lained
on Shavuos
The Taz - and others -rasie strong objections...

Yetziv Pisgam - which FWIW is NOT in most German Machazomim - also is
recited after the first {or 2nd} passuk of the hatora of the 2nd day.

Why?

Answer: {Artscroll kind of gets this right in some of their book}
is that they are NOT introductions ot the reading but to the TARGUM!

And as part of the Targum they are NOT a hefseik at all,any more than
the Targum itself is a hefseik to the kr'ia!

Now look back at the criticisim by the Ta et. al. they are reading the
machazor AS IS without regard to its history! Watch this trend carefull
because if you read things as they are now, they sometimes do not make
sense stripped of their original scenarios.

Now to give the Taz credit, he migth very well be entitled to criticize
what IS, but without understanding how it came about, the lakc of
undersanding tends to lead to flase conclusions.

Now let's look at hte 4 questions. AS they are now, they elicit all
kinds of beautiful divrei Torah and Midrashim etc. But if you look
at the oriingal texts - such as the Yerushalmi - you will find THREE
questions all directly related to matz a and marror.

In FACT, if you look at an early edition of the Mishna and set aside
both the Gmara and the haggadh you will see the obvious, theat the 3
so-cllaed questions are really a DIRECT into to Rabbna Gamliel's Pesach
Matzah and Marror

Furthermore you will see that they are really not quesns for the kids,
but what the father teaches the kids IF the kid fails to ask his own
questions. This implies that the curiosity arousers are ALL BEFORE the
mah nishtana! And THEY include in no particualr order:

yachatz
Karpas
chotfin matzos
Egozim
mezigas kos sheini
removing the k'ara

I saw in the Ais Das haggadh an attempt to show that the question
regarding tevilla goes on the tevillah of Marror. this is completely
outside THE ORIGNAL STUCTURE - in which attempts are made to arouse
curiosity on the part of the son! The 4 questns As WE have them and
the original THREE quesins all ooccur AFTER this point in the Seder!
There is no reason to expect a son to ask upon what he has NOT YET SEEN.
So why the does AVIV MELAMDO?

MY answer:
if the kid has missed every opportunity to ask about the arousals so far,
it is unlikely that he will be sensitive or curious enough to ask about
the up and coming Pesach matza and marror! So if the son fails to ask,
the father TEACHES HIM TO ASK by making him aware of what he should
take notice!

NB: According to AhS ma nishtana si NOT a set of queestions so much as an
exclamation - interrobang!? - re: the uniqueness of the Seder procedure.

Sorry for being long winded.

KT
RRW

Regarding the following, what are the customer's HALACHIC and ETHICAL
obligations. Are they one and the same?

Big box chain store sells folding chair for $40.00/piece. (Price is on
website and on shelf in store where chairs are on display.) These chairs
come two to a box, but may also be purchased individually off the floor.
Customer brings three unopened boxes to checkout. Cashier scans box
and final bill is $120 (plus tax). After making payment customer reads
receipt and notifies cashier that customer was UNDERcharged, having been
charged the price for only three chairs. Cashier says, "No, that's the
price per box. Do you want both boxes?" Customer says yes, and then,
realizing that this is quite a bargain, requests to buy an additional box.
While waiting for additional box to arrive from stockroom, manager on duty
comes to this cash register to help with a return by another customer.
After return is completed, cashier rings up the sale for another box of
two chairs, scans one of the two boxes already at the checkout (third box
had not yet arrived) and charges $40. Manager on duty, who is still at
cash register notes to cashier that there are two chairs in the box and
cashier replies that THAT box was already paid for, but that customer
had decided to buy another box. After customer arrives home with the
three boxes, each containing two chairs, customer observes that in bold
letters on each box, cashier is instructed in three languages that there
are two chairs per box and each chair must be scanned separately in
order to ring up sale for both chairs inside of box. Same, in English,
appears on bright yellow sticker attached to one panel of each box.
This was clearly not done. There are two receipts for each of the two
transactions. The first receipt shows two scans and the second shows one
scan. The designation for each scan is "folding br" and does not indicate
how many chairs are included per scan. However, given that known price
for chair is $40 per chair, and that customer received six chairs for
the price of three, does customer have halachic duty to notify store
manager that six chairs were purchased for the price of three chairs?

Does it make a difference if two of the six chairs are defective and
must be returned or exchanged?

 From a legal standpoint, I believe it is clear that the purchase is legal
and that the customer has no further duty. However, was the halachic duty
fulfilled? I believe it was not. Is this a case of michshol livnei iver?
(This michshol in this case being the customer allowing both the cashier
and the manager on duty to have a mistaken belief-the cashier mistakenly
believing that the price per BOX was $40, and the manager not realizing
that the customer was charged a total of $120 for six chairs.)

Finally, one person suggested that the customer has no halachic obligation
to return the chairs, but that it would be unethical to keep the chairs
at the wrong price. But, doesn't halacha define for us what is ethical?
If there is an ETHICAL obligation to inform the store that 6 chairs
were purchased for the price of 3 chairs, isn't there also a HALACHIC
obligation to bring that matter to the store's attention in a meaningful
way?

//Avi
Avram Sacks

From: Zev Sero <zev@sero.name>
>       The Taz 453:1 says that the reason mustard is included in the
> issur, even though none of the reasons seem to apply, is because it
> grows in a pod, and therefore is forbidden as a member of that class.
> It seems clear to me that the same applies to peanuts....
> As for the original reason for the issur on kitniyot, the SA Harav says
> it's because these things are cooked in a porridge ("daisa" / "kashe")
> just like barley or wheat...
> BTW, I've noticed a linguistic shift - "kashe" means a porridge, any
> cooked grain, e.g. rice, barley, etc. Cooked buckwheat is just one
> kind of kashe, called "shvartze kashe". But in relatively recent times
> (one or two generations), we have come to use "kashe" only for 
> buckwheat,
> and this leads to some confusion when reading earlier sources.

Indeed we have had threads in the past re: the shifting meaning of
various terms.

Da'as Torah is a term that also has evolved.

Matzah Shmura has also evolved to mean different things. According to
original Ashkenazic practice all matah ithat is kosher for Passover is by
definition Shmura, only Rif et. al. require misha's ketzira. However the
term matzos mitzva could still apply to even that level of Minhag Ashkenaz
- iow you COULD have 100% matza shmura according to Ashk. Rishjnim and
not be baked leshim mitzva. But we have conflated the terms.

Even the term Kitniyos itself is a bit fuzzy. How is it that rice
and millet - IOW Orez and Dochan - ever included in legumes? And if
Sperber is correct that legumes were prohbited on All yomimTovim as
detracting from Simhas Yom Tov how come then Ashkenezim don t eat rice
and millet?! another conflation of terms over time perhaps?

We saw this shift with the term corn and and North American Corn -
i.e Maize.

IIRC the term apple in the King James edition meant fruit in general, like
apple of the eye, or apple of the ground {potato} etc. So in the KJ era,
when Chava picked an apple it was understand clsoer to the Hebrew as the
furit of the tree, but apple evolved to mean strictly what WE call apple.

Kol Tuv
Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com

On Thu, May 04, 2006 at 11:18:39PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote:
: Perhaps those who can handle or the mekoros will comment on the
: possibility that this is all it amounts to: That the sadness is that
: it came to this; that a person or people maliciously so perverted
: their tsellem Elokim as to make themselves into monsters deserving
: destruction. But once they did so, we revel in Hashem's Justice and
: in His saving us (as in Shiras HaYam), and in their destruction (the
: feeling of exultation when the bad guys get theirs at the end).
: Do the mekoros indicate this?

Commentaries on Mishlei address the issue of 11:10 (ba'avod resha'im
rinah -- with the loss of evil people, there is outcry of happiness)
vs 24:17 (binfol).

So, checking that, I found that ithe idea I took as obvious from the
fact that the Pisqa deRK is on Chatzi Hallel, a middle point between
not saying it ans daying it, is Rabbeinu Yonah's, in his commentary to
Avos 4:19, where Shemu'el haQatan is cited as turning "binfol" into
a motto. Hashem silenced the mal'achim because they had no personal
redemption to celebrate. We had a reason for mixed emotions -- the
combination of verses, they lack that mixture. (Given that I learned
Avos with Rabbeinu Yonah, I was probably working with a memory of that,
without realizing where I got the idea from.)

When Googling for people who quote the Rabbeinu Yonah, I
also found R' Moshe Taragin's shiur from Yeshivat Har Etzion at
<http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/avot/10avot.htm>. I guess we can drag
him into the discussion too.

Even with RZL's suggestion, we're supposed to feel bad. And the line
between feeling bad that their death happened and feeling bad that they so
identified with evil that they made their own deaths necessary is blutty.

My problem with it, though, is that he's asking me to focus on yenem's
ruchniyus, whereas I believe (as per the famous maamar of R' Yisrael
Salanter's) that when it comes to others, our focus should be on their
gashmiyus. They're both tragic, though.


On Fri, May 05, 2006 at 05:46:18PM -0400, S & R Coffer wrote:
: I feel the mekoros reveal that having compassion for the death of evil
: people is a decidedly un-Jewish attitude...
: The pasuk in Tehilim (58) states: 'Yismach tzadik ki chazah nakam,
: pi'amav yirchatz bi'dam rasha' (a tzadik shall rejoice when he witnesses
: the recompense [against the wicked], and bathe his feet in the blood of
: the rasha).

: IMO, the Jewish view is that we love whoever Hashem loves and hate whoever
: he hates...

The whole argument Avraham raises in defense of Sodom vaAmorah complicates
that picture. And the Meshekh Chokhmah already cited does so further.

I would say, though, that you bring a list of ra'ayos that binfol doesn't
stand alone without ba'avod resha'im rinah, not that compassion is wrong.
IOW, you proved the existence of the other emotion, but did not disprove
the idea that we're supposed to feel both.

 -mi

 -- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 23rd day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        3 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Gevurah sheb'Netzach: How does my domination
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            stifle others?

On May 6, 2006 Micha Berger wrote:
>: IMO, the Jewish view is that we love whoever Hashem loves and hate whoever
>: he hates...

> The whole argument Avraham raises in defense of Sodom vaAmorah complicates
> that picture. 

Not really. Rav Dessler explains that AA, much like Berurya's
remonstrations with her husband, believed that Sodom was able to be saved,
to be able to be transformed to good. Notice that when he got to ten
he stopped because even he realized that it would be a chilul Hashem to
pray for the welfare of reshaim that there was no hope of saving. And if
they were omed brish'asam when they died, then we apply to them b'avod
rishaim rinah.

> I would say, though, that you bring a list of ra'ayos that binfol doesn't
> stand alone without ba'avod resha'im rinah, not that compassion is wrong.
> IOW, you proved the existence of the other emotion, but did not disprove
> the idea that we're supposed to feel both.

I am incapable of experiencing these contradictory emotions simultaneously
and thus I teitch binfol differently than you.

1) It does not apply to the umos haOlam, like the mitzryim, for instance.
This is actually an openly stated Gemara in Megilla 16.
2) It doesn't even apply to Jews who have the din of goyim such as
atheists etc.

Simcha Coffer

[RSC:]
> I feel the mekoros reveal that having compassion for the death of evil
> people is a decidedly un-Jewish attitude. I haven't been following Avodah
> for a couple of weeks so some of this might have been written already.

Compassion for the wicked and rejoicing in their demise are quite
different. The former suggests ignoring justice, the latter is precisely
what Binfol Oyivkha warns against.

> The pasuk in Tehilim (58) states: 'Yismach tzadik ki chazah nakam,
> pi'amav yirchatz bi'dam rasha' (a tzadik shall rejoice when he witnesses
> the recompense [against the wicked], and bathe his feet in the blood of
> the rasha).

Next Pasuq, V'yomar adam, akh p'ri latzaddiq akh yeish elokim shof'tim
ba'aretz. (loosely translated: And man will say, there is a reward for
the tzaddiq, there is a God who administers justice). This verse is
explaining why the Tzaddiq would rejoice, and the explanation is because
this is an execution of justice, and that is worthy of rejoicing. Not
that Tzaddiqim are gleeful bathing in the blood of the wicked, for its
own sake, rather they are gleeful that there is justice in the world,
justice that is visible, justice that can inspire man.

> IMO, the Jewish view is that we love whoever Hashem loves and hate whoever
> he hates. And Hashem loves (frum) Jews and hates rishaim as the pasuk in
> Malachi states "va'ohav es Yaakov vi'ess Eisaav sa'ney'see". 

I'm not clear how the pasuq in Malakhi indicates that Yaaqov are only
those who are frum, and I am also unclear how it indicates that Eisav
means R'sha'im alone.

> Consequently, we rejoice at the mapala of rishaim. In fact, the Medrash states that
> Dovid composed 120 mizmorim but was not chosem with haliluya until
> he foresaw the downfall of the evil as it states 'yitamu chataim min
> ha'aretz' etc." MR Vayikra 4:7 (Don't ask from Berurya - She was enjoining
> R' Meir to change rishaim into tzadikim and if this is at all possible,
> why not? But we are talking about the downfall of people who were wicked
> to the end and what our attitude should be regarding this downfall)

I will not ask from b'rur'ya per se, but from her p'shat in the pasuq.
Hata'im v'lo Hot'im is a very serious hiluq. It doesn't absolve a rasha,
but it does give perspective to others on how to view niqmas hashem.
Should we be happy that the rasha died, or should we be happy that Ra
is no longer amongst us? The latter is indicated by Hata'im v'lo Hot'im.

> As the subject line implies, someone probably mentioned the pshat that
> we spill wine out of the cup to symbolize our distress at the mapala of
> rishaim but this simply doesn't make sense...
> Revenge is a tremendous mida when used by Hashem. The Gemara in Berachos
> states "how great is nikama, for it is flanked by two shemos of Hashem
> (El nikamos Hashem). Rav Dessler notes that the two shemos El and Havaya
> are both shemos of rachamim. From here we see that nikama is essentially
> an expression of rachamim....

Absolutely. And that is precisely why it is important in tehilim 58 to
follow the pasuq of yismakh tzaddiq with V'yomar adam, to show that the
happiness is for kavod shamayim, and that yeish elokim shof'tim ba'aretz.

> This is why when the malachim wanted to say shira, Hashem stopped
> them and said "Ma'aseh yadai tov'im bayam vi'atem omrim shira"? OTOH,
> the greatest expression of ecstasy ever invented was sung by the Jews
> upon seeing "sus v'rochbo ramah va'yam". The reason for this contrast
> is that malachim are not affected by the actions of rishaim. Their
> estimation of Hashem's greatness is never compromised by the activity
> of the evil just as we, lihavdil, would not be insulted by the barking
> of a dog. Thus, they cannot relate to the kiddush Hashem inherent in
> the mida of nikama. All they see is "ma'aseh yadai tov'im bayam". All
> they see is a potential tzelem Elokim going li'ibud and thus shira,
> for them, is inappropriate. OTOH, for us, not only is it appropriate,
> it is a mitzvah to rejoice at the mapalasam shel rishaim.

Rather than running the risk of repeating in great length what was already
discussed in the past few weeks, I will summarize by pointing out that
the Yalqut Shimoni quotes a P'siqta that states that we don't say Hallel
on 7th day Pessah because of Binfol Oyivkha, see Meshekh Hakhmah [Shemos
12:16 sv. U'vayom Harishon Miqra Kodesh vGo'], as well as Manos Haleivi
[Esther 9:20 sv. Vayikhtov Mordakhai].

I don't know how you determined that it is a Mitzvah to rejoice
b'mapalasam.

...
> This is why Hashem will not reveal His final plans to the malachim
> because they too are not nifgam by the chataim of the wicked and thus
> they cannot be masig the Kiddush Hashem which manifests itself through
> nikama. And when the malachim will want to say shira (in other words,
> fulfill their mission of teaching the world about the inyan of shira)
> they will attempt to say shira through the old bechinos of Yam, Sinai,
> and Zion etc. But this will not be the ultimate praise of Hashem because
> after He revealed Himself in these bechinos, he consequently was mastir
> Himself through the churban and through galus and thus, at the end of
> days, nikama will be the vehicle by which Hashem will re-appear once
> again. And this is why the malachim ask about the "place" of Hashem,
> in other words, they want to know mikom chalos giluy kivodo so they can
> praise Him. And they finally ask Yeshaya and he answers them that from
> the bechina of olam haAsiya, there is a musag referred to down here as
> nikama which is the source of the Kiddush Hashem at the end of days and
> this is where the chalos of his giluy haKavod lies.

While we can appreciate niqmas hashem in the context of its bringing 
about kavod shamayim, the fact that it has to be done in a way that it 
leads to mapalah, even while necessary, is not in itself a reason to 
rejoice.

Jacob Farkas

R' Jacob Farkas wrote:
> IIRC, the Maharil says that you ... would violate Lo
> Sasur, as Qitniyos is a Gezeirah D'rabbanan and not
> merely a Minhag.

Is it possible for a Gezera D'rabanan to be binding on only one portion
of our people? (and I don't mean women or kohanim)

My understanding is that the legal process which created halachos
d'rabanan ceased at the dissolution of the Sanhedrin, which was long
before the Ashkenaz/Sfard split. Could the Maharil be saying that Kitniyos
is older than people think it to be? Or what is his reasoning? Would
the Maharil say that sefardim are all violating Lo Sasur?

Akiva Miller

 "D&E-H Bannett" <dbnet@zahav.net.il> wrote:
> Just before drinking the second kos, he went out to the next door neighbor
> and invited him in to have a drink with us in honor of our holiday. The
> neighbor was happy to join us for a drink....
> I do not know whether this custom was from London or from a generation
> or two before that in Lita. I have never seen it again and wonder if
> others have any info.

I recall hearing that many safardim (perhaps from India) would pour the
wine into a separate dish, and remove that dish to the street and leave
it there!

Perhaps your host when he was younger was a guest...

But I would be very surprised to hear that such a minhag was
prevalent in Lita. Firstly, it involves inviting a goy to your house
on Yom Tov which is ossur (SA OC 512, though perhaps only drinking is
different). Furthermore, can you imagine Yidden from Lita inviting all
the Lithuanians to their houses on Seder night, the night they kill a
christian.. sorry, I mean drink wine and eat matza, you know what I mean.

I suspect that your host didn't want to waste a good glass of wine.

Akiva

"Sacks, Avram" <Avram.Sacks@wolterskluwer.com> wrote:
> Finally, one person suggested that the customer has no halachic obligation
> to return the chairs, but that it would be unethical to keep the chairs
> at the wrong price. But, doesn't halacha define for us what is ethical?
> If there is an ETHICAL obligation to inform the store that 6 chairs
> were purchased for the price of 3 chairs, isn't there also a HALACHIC
> obligation to bring that matter to the store's attention in a meaningful
> way?

Strict letter of the law... you are not obligated to recompense an Akum
if it is his error and he does not realize he made one. But it would
be a big Kiddush HaShem if the customer went back and straightened
it out. See Rabbi Aaron Soloveichik's book "Logic of the Heart, Logic
of the Mind". It has an entire chapter on what our attitude should be
towards non-Jews and addresses almost the indentical situation.

HM
Want Emes and Emunah in your life? 
Try this: http://haemtza.blogspot.com/

[RGD:]
> How long did this institution last? Were its members replaced when
> they died? How did it end--bang or whimper?

It will be interesting to see what replies you get -- and I really hope
the knowledgeable historians on list weigh in -- but AFAIK the answer to
your questions is -- no one knows for sure. At the beginning of the
Bayis Sheni period there seems to be a 120-member body called the Anshei
Knesses Hagedolah, at the end of that period there is a 70-member body
called the Sanhedrin, and what happened in between -- a mystery.

 -Toby  Katz
=============

*********************


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