Avodah Mailing List

Volume 16 : Number 126

Thursday, February 9 2006

• Re: Segulah For Parnassah - Parshas Hamon
• Re: Creation & allegory & nevuchim
• Re: Creation & allegory
• Re:Creation & allegory
• Re: Creation & allegory
• Re: the Mabul
• Re: Killing kinim on shabbat
• Re: Sabbath mode wall ovens
• Re: Kashrus
• Re: Kashrus
• Re: Kashrus
• Re: Kashrus
• Re: Kashrus

>>> Reb Mendel M'Riminov said that saying Parshas Ha'monn (Shneyim Mikroh
>>> V'Echod Targum) on Tuesday Parshas B'Shalach, is a Segulah for Parnasah....

>>I have a question about this. How does doing this fit with the
>>statement that our Parnassa is decided on Rosh Hashanah? If what we will
>>get is already decided, then how can saying this change anything? ...

I figure what's set on Rosh Hashana is somewhat subject to modification.
I also think that what's determined on RH is somewhat influenced by
what is GOING to happen, by the tefillos you are GOING to make (based,
perhaps, on your past record as a reliable davener). I know last time
this came up people said no, it's "ba'asher hu sham" and you are not
judged by what you will do in the future or what will happen in the
future, but I think maybe for good things that's not so. For example,
a person may be kept alive even if he deserves death, for the sake of
mitzvos he will -- or may -- do in the future, or teshuva he will do,
or descendants who will be tzaddikim.

Also it /can/ help for next year, as you suggested. When Rosh Hashana
rolls around you'll be judged for everything you did this year, right? And
maybe already some of what you're doing -- e.g., making plans to start
a new business -- is already seeing results, such that NEXT year you'll
have good parnassah from it.

 -Toby Katz
=============

"Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> Lisa Liel wrote:
>> The Rambam wrote the Moreh for Nevuchim. He says things in the 
>> Moreh that contradict things in the Yad. It's important to 
>> consider the audience.  I wouldn't have any problem telling 
>> someone who was having a hard time accepting the Torah that the 
>> sequence of the days of creation aren't necessarily reflective 
>> of the historical order of events. You teach people on a level 
>> they can handle....

> But you don't do so by telling them things that are assur, or 
> that you feel are demonstrably wrong.

I'm not sure I agree with the second part of that. You don't do so by
telling them things that are assur, certainly. But "demonstrably" can
be subjective. It may be demonstratively wrong that mass is a constant,
but that's certainly not what you teach in a high school physics class.

Chotamo Shel Hakadosh Baruch Hu Emet, right? So if our backs are to
the wall, then of course we have to come up with some sort of way around
things. In theory. My point is that our backs are not to the wall.

> So at the very least, even if I bought this argument, it would 
> identify an "efshar lomar" that the Rambam gave a hechsher to. Even 
> if not his position, it's one he felt was within the boundries of 
> kosher.

Or "not assur".

> The Rambam, in his introduction, says he's framing Yahadus for 
> nevuchim, but better one not be an Aristotilian trying to force 
> Yahadus into those categories.

Exactly. And that, I think, is what a number of frum Jews are finding
themselves doing now. Rather than question "givens" of the current
paradigms in this or that scientific field and open themselves up to
accusations of being "primitive" or "fundamentalist" or "irrational", the
first reaction of some frum Jews today is to try and bend over backwards
to find ways to squish the Torah into those paradigms. It seems to
be their first choice, perhaps out of a kind of "making a virtue of a
necessity" feeling, even though the necessity isn't truly there.

> Nothing about the following positions being a mere "efshar lomar", 
> but an inferior presentation of his beliefs to accomodate people
> who got themselves stuck in an inferior perspective.

I'm not sure that it isn't a mere "efshar lomar".

Lisa

Zvi Lampel wrote:
> Fri, 03 Feb 2006 R' Daniel Eidensohn <yadmoshe@012.net.il> posted:
>> Can someone explain the apparent neglect of the Moreh Nevuchim 2:30 
>> where the Rambam seems to assert that the sequence of the days of 
>> creation are not necessarily relective of the historical order of 
>> events.

> Please quote the passage you are referring to. The only thing I can
> find close to what you're saying is Rambam's position (along with many
> other rishonim) based upon Chazal and pesukim. Namely, despite first
> impressions, the various things were not actually each created on
> the designated days, but were brought out into the open or placed in
> their final positions on each day named, after having been all created
> simultaneously at the first moment of the first day:

> "You must know that the particle "ess" in the phrase "ess ha-shamayim
> ve-ess ha-arez ("the heavens and the earth") signifies "together
> with." Our Sages have explained the word in the same sense in many
> instances....

As we all known the issue of understanding the Rambam is very complex.We
recently debated whether the Rambam was presenting inferior views
(apologetics) in order to deal with the theologically challenged
and/or religious opponents However what I am interested in is the polar
opposite understanding of the Rambam. - that his writings are esoteric.
In other words his literal meaning conceals his true position. His message
can only be ascertained by careful reading and attention to changes in
terminology, understanding of his metaphors and careful collation of his
discussions through out his writings. It also is critical to understand
that he was fully immersed in an Aristotelian framework - though he does
maintain his independence. The difficulty of understanding the Rambam is
reflected in the fact that he is claimed as an Aristotelian rationalist
where philosophy and science are the Truth to which Torah must justify
itself (R' S. R. Hirsch) while others understood that he was a kabbalist
(Komarno).

Not being an expert in the Rambam, or philosophy nor can I claim
competence in the Torah discussion of Maaseh Bereishis - I just am probing
the text. In this case Moreh Nevuchim 2:30 which seems to be concealing
some awesome ideas about creation. Some of this is discussed in head
spinning detail by Prof Sara Klein-Breslavy in her work "Maimonides'
Interpretation of the Story of Creation".

 My concern here is simply understanding the Rambam - not whether I
agree with it.

Let me just point out some of the salient facts.

1) 2:30 starts out with the Rambam differentiating between first in
a temporal sequence and first indicating a foundation principle which
doesn't necessarily temporally precede that for which it is fundamental.

2) The Rambam clearly asserts that he agrees with Aristotle that there
is no time without physical motion.(2:13)

3) Consequently -contrary to various statements found in Chazal - Rambam
asserts that time can not exist prior to creation ex nihilo.. That means
that it is impossible to understand Bereishis to mean "At the beginning
of time - the cosmos were created." Time was created only when the solar
system was created and thus the motion of the system produces and measures
time. In fact the Rambam asserts that if time did precede creation of our
universe then of necessity the universe is eternal. He asserts Chazal
also wrestled with this problem and concluded that either there were
previous worlds that have been destroyed or that time preceded creation.

4) He asserts - as per R' Lampel's citation above - that in fact Creation
started with Heavens & Earth and everything they contain on the First
Day. Regarding the obvious problem - what were the 6 days needed for? -
he answers that the physical entities were not put into place until
after the first day.Somehow the entities from Day One were stored in
some type of existential limbo and were not part of physical creation
and did not exist in time..

5) All of this leads to the problem - if the solar system or the celestial
spheres in which the stars and planets exist were not put into place
until the fourth day - what does "day" mean for the first 3 days since
time did not exist.

The Rambam seems to be implying that in fact the first three days were
not historical - temporal days. They were allegorical descriptions of
some profound process. In contrast for the subsequent days, the term
day is in fact referring to a temporal quality.

Once you are not required to fit Creation into 6 days of 24 hours
[contrary to the Ramban] then the age of the universe is indeterminate
from the literal meaning of the Bereishis story.[In another explanation
which adds an indeterminate element to Bereishis - Rav Belsky told me
that the first day was different in length than the other days since
the attribute of day in night and night in day did not occur till the
end of the first day] If the first three days are not temporal days
- it follows that one is no longer required by the Torah to explain
scientific data to comply with Bereishis as to the sequence of events.

In sum, the Rambam's acceptance that everything was created the first
day but not put into place - means that time did not exist until the
Fourth Day of Creation. Thus the first three days are allegorical and
not historical. This means that he Rambam preserves the literal meaning
of Bereishis bara only at the expense of the literal meaning of the six
days of creation. Because time can not exist without physical motion
it follows that the term day for the first 3 days can not refer to a
temporal quality.

Daniel Eidensohn

RMB
>The Rambam, in his introduction, says he's framing Yahadus for nevuchim,
>but better one not be an Aristotilian trying to force Yahadus into those
>categories.

Where in the introduction does he say that it is better"not be an
aristotelian trying to force Yahadus into those categories"?? The nevuchim
that the rambam is addressing are those who know more than the ignorant
who reject philosophy, but who don't realize that yahadus actually fits
into aristotelian categories.....

Meir Shinnar

On Thu, Feb 09, 2006 at 09:37:54AM -0500, Shinnar, Meir wrote:
: Where in the introduction does he say that it is better"not be an
: aristotelian trying to force Yahadus into those categories"?? The nevuchim
: that the rambam is addressing are those who know more than the ignorant
: who reject philosophy, but who don't realize that yahadus actually fits
: into aristotelian categories.....

 From the letter to R' Yosef ibn Aknin [tr. Friedlander]:
    ... Afterwards, when I took you through a course of logic, I found
    that my great expectations of you were confirmed, and I considered
    you fit to receive from me an exposition of the esoteric ideas
    contained in the prophetic books, that you might understand them as
    they are understood by men of culture. When I commenced by way of
    hints, I noticed that you desired additional explanation, urging me
    to expound some metaphysical problems; to teach you the system of
    the Mutakallemim; to tell you whether their arguments were based
    on logical proof; and if not, what their method was. I perceived
    that you had acquired some knowledge in those matters from others,
    and that you were perplexed and bewildered; yet you sought to find
    out a solution to your difficulty. I urged you to desist from this
    pursuit, and enjoined you to continue your studies systematically;
    for my object was that the truth should present itself in connected
    order, and that you should not hit upon it by mere chance. Whilst
    you studied with me I never refused to explain difficult verses in
    the Bible or passages in rabbinical literature which we happened to
    meet. When, by the will of God, we parted, and you went your way,
    our discussions aroused in me a resolution which had long been
    dormant. Your absence has prompted me to compose this treatise for
    you and for those who are like you, however few they may be.....

The Rambam urged him to desist from the pursuit of logical proof and
methodology, from trying to study Judaism like the Mutakallemim study
Islam (or the Scholastics, Xianity). That he was studying things in the
wrong organization -- which is why I thought of categories. And that
motivated the Rambam to write the book for other people in this situation.

In the preface, he gives a different description of the perplexity:
    The object of this treatise is to enlighten a religious man who
    has been trained to believe in the truth of our holy Law, who
    conscientiously fulfils his moral and religious duties, and at the
    same time has been successful in his philosophical studies. Human
    reason has attracted him to abide within its sphere; and he finds
    it difficult to accept as correct the teaching based on the literal
    interpretation of the Law, and especially that which he himself
    or others derived from those homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid
    expressions. Hence he is lost in perplexity and anxiety. If he be
    guided solely by reason, and renounce his previous views which are
    based on those expressions, he would consider that he had rejected
    the fundamental principles of the Law; and even if he retains
    the opinions which were derived from those expressions, and if,
    instead of following his reason, he abandon its guidance altogether,
    it would still appear that his religious convictions had suffered
    loss and injury. For he would then be left with those errors which
    give rise to fear and anxiety, constant grief and great perplexity.
...
    ... I feel assured that those of my readers who have not studied
    philosophy, will still derive profit from many a chapter. But the
    thinker whose studies have brought him into collision with religion,
    will, as I have already mentioned, derive much benefit from every
    chapter..,..

So, I do believe the Moreh really is the Rambam's opinion, but phrased
in more Greek terms then he would have otherwise, aiming at someone
whose faith in Aristotle had created conflict with his faith in Torah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             One doesn't learn mussar to be a tzaddik,
micha@aishdas.org        but to become a tzaddik.
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

[Micha:]
> Although it is strange that similar legends exist among the frozen

Cultures around the world share MANY different legends -- that's what
prompted Jung to develop the idea of Archetypes.

Akiva
--
Most people act on their own account; they pursue personal ambitions
without seeking God's guidance and grace. By asserting the self they
will achieve nothing.

From: <T613K@aol.com>
> I agree with
> him, of course, in subscribing to the halachic infallibility of Chazal.

Then what's the point of Massecheth Horayoth?

David Riceman

R' Micah Berger wrote:
> Wouldn't changing the display involve turning lights on and off, not
> just adjusting ones that are already lit? Havarah, rather than
> bishul?

The control panels on ovens use LED's and not incandescent lights and
therefore there is no havara when they go on. The only problem is using
electricity which according to most modern poskim (except the Chazon Ish)
is an issur d'rabbanan (and according to RSZA is not really assur at all).

On 2/9/06, Yitzchok Levine <llevine@stevens.edu> wrote on Areivim:
> At 12:31 PM 02/08/2006, you wrote:
>>This is far from correct. Assuming Kashrus base on the clothing style
>>of the clientle is foolish. There is much ignorance in the world and
>>one never knows. Behavior of others doesn't prove anything.

> A number of years ago there was a Chosid in Williamsburg who sold raw
> fish. He had no supervision. When asked about this, he would unroll
> his very long peyos and say, "These are my hashgocha!"

> He was caught selling raw fish that had been scaled that was not
> kosher. So much for appearances and Kashrus!

There is a substantial difference between those cases. In the case of
the fish seller, one cannot rely on his looks as he is a nogea b'davar.
In the case of the sheitelled ladies, they are not nogea b'davar.
Therefore, you can assume that they really are frum. As I wrote earlier,
if a number of frum people tell you that they know a person has a chezkas
kashrus, then that should constitute "makirin bo she'hu muchzak b'kashrus"
of S.A. YD 119:1.

The difference may be analogized to the difference in the Ramo S.A. YD
119:1 between the case of buying from a seller (in which case they must
be "makirin bo she'hu muchzak b'kashrus") and eating at the seller's
house--in which case you need not know anything about him other than
the fact that he is a religious Jew, so long as he is not known to be
chashud on kashrus (but you need not investigate whether he is chashud).
Aruch HaShulchan 119:6 explains the difference between the two cases:
in the case of the seller, he has a monetary interest and therefore may
succumb to his yetzer hara.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

At 04:45 AM 02/09/2006, Moshe Feldman wrote:
>The difference may be analogized to the difference in the Ramo S.A. YD
>119:1 between the case of buying from a seller (in which case they
>must be "makirin bo she'hu muchzak b'kashrus") and eating at the
>seller's house--in which case you need not know anything about him
>other than the fact that he is a religious Jew, so long as he is not
>known to be chashud on kashrus (but you need not investigate whether
>he is chashud).  Aruch HaShulchan 119:6 explains the difference
>between the two cases: in the case of the seller, he has a monetary
>interest and therefore may succumb to his yetzer hara.

Given today's world and the complexity of kashrus, would you agree 
that in our times "makirin bo she'hu muchzak b'kashrus" means that 
every caterer, restaurant, meat supplier, seller of fish, etc. needs 
some sort of supervision?

Yitzchok Levine 

I wrote:
> The difference may be analogized to the difference in the Ramo S.A. YD
> 119:1 between the case of buying from a seller (in which case they
> must be "makirin bo she'hu muchzak b'kashrus") and eating at the
> seller's house--in which case you need not know anything about him
> other than the fact that he is a religious Jew, so long as he is not
> known to be chashud on kashrus (but you need not investigate whether
> he is chashud).

On 2/9/06, L. E. Levine <llevine@stevens.edu> wrote:
> Given today's world and the complexity of kashrus, would you agree that in
> our times "makirin bo she'hu muchzak b'kashrus" means that every caterer,
> restaurant, meat supplier, seller of fish, etc. needs some sort of
> supervision?

I don't think that that se'if in S.A. would be the basis for such a
requirement. The concept of "muchzak b'kashrus" deals with your belief
that the person will make the effort to be careful with regard to kashrus.
It is really stamp of reliability with respect to the gavra, rather than
with regard to his food.

Even in today's complex world, we expect the average housewife to be
able to buy and cook kosher food. There is no reason why a restaurant
owner should be any different.

As a practical matter, it is possible that the OU decided that given
the wide range of places that it services, it cannot rely on a frum
person's good reputation and therefore wants a mashgiach temidi even on
the premises of a restaurant run by frum people and frequented by frum
people. However, AIUI this is a new phenomenon and is not based on the
requirements of the S.A. Therefore, we should not condemn hashgachos which
have not accepted the OU's chumra (which, incidentally, is a money-maker
for OU), or people who continue to eat in heimeishe restaurants run by
people they know and trust.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

At 11:25 AM 02/09/2006, Moshe Feldman wrote:
>Even in today's complex world, we expect the average housewife to be
>able to buy and cook kosher food.  There is no reason why a restaurant
>owner should be any different.

But you yourself have pointed out in other posts a striking difference,
the financial issue. There is big money to be made selling non-kosher
food as kosher. Just look at the difference in the price of treif chicken
and meat when compared to kosher chicken and meat.

There is also the attitude in some circles, "It is good enough for
them!" This means that a person may be willing to let others eat something
that he would not eat himself. There are stories about mashgichim who
gave supervision on caterers who would not eat from the caterer they
supervised!

WADR, I do not think that your reasoning from a housewife to a restaurant
holds.

Yitzchok Levine

I wrote:
> Even in today's complex world, we expect the average housewife to be
> able to buy and cook kosher food.  There is no reason why a restaurant
> owner should be any different.

On 2/9/06, Yitzchok Levine <llevine@stevens.edu> wrote:
> But you yourself have pointed out in other posts a striking difference, the
> financial issue. There is big money to be made selling non-kosher food as
> kosher. Just look at the difference in the price of treif chicken and meat
> when compared to kosher chicken and meat.

The financial issue existed at the time of the S.A. as well, and is the
basis for the Ramo's psak requiring a seller to be "muchzak b'kashrus."
The Ramo's psak does not require an outside hashgacha, just that the
seller have a good reputation. You want to go one step further and
require a hashgacha. What has changed from the Ramo's time to our own?

> There is also the attitude in some circles, "It is good enough for them!"
> This means that a person may be willing to let others eat something that he
> would not eat himself. There are stories about mashgichim who gave
> supervision on caterers who would not eat from the caterer they supervised!

I would not necessarily be motzee la'az on those mashgichim.
The mashgichim may be giving a hashgacha based on ikkar ha'din but may
insist on certain chumros for themselves.

> WADR, I do not think that your reasoning from a housewife to a restaurant
> holds.

You made two points with respect to restaurants: (1) they have a financial
incentive to cut corners and (2) nowadays kashrus is more complex than
before. My response was that (1) the financial issue always existed and
despite that, the Ramo required just a good reputation of kashrus but
not a hashgacha, and (2) we trust housewives to run a kosher kitchen
nowadays, so obviously the complexity of modern kashrus itself is not
a reason to require a hashgacha.

I will agree that if a restaurant is large and employs non-Jewish workers,
a hashgacha would be advisable as it will create policies to ensure that
mistakes are less likely to occur.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

**********************


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