Avodah Mailing List

Volume 16 : Number 039

Saturday, November 26 2005

• Going to shul during Shiva
• Re: "Es" lerabos
• Re: "Es" lerabos
• Rishonim and Chazal (was One Opinion)
• Re: Going to shul during Shiva
• Re: Eliyahu not a kohein?
• RE: Rabbi Broyde on Thanksgiving
• Re: Lashon Hara about Eretz Yisrael
• Lashon Hara about Eretz Yisrael
• Re: Eliyahu not a kohein?
• RE: Greeting Women
• RE: Rabbi Broyde on Thanksgiving

Danny -
 
Questions:

1. Can anybody find a mekor for aveilim going to shul (besides for 9
B'Av) in the SA?

The Mechaber's shita is for an Ovel to go to shul when there is Krias
Hatorah. This is based on the original minhog of Bovel. The Ramoh
disagrees with him supports the ancient minhog of Eretz Yisroel .

3. What happened to the age-old practise of davening Shabbes Mincha in
the Ovel house to have 3 times Krias HaTorah?

I understand that a Sefer Torah specifically set aside for Shiva houses
can be read less than three times. I guess that is a tenai that is made.

Rallis

RMB wrote:
> The point of this? From the way I see it, "es" need not be redundant
> in order to be a marbeh. To my mind, "es" is a necessary article
> used to separate object from subject in a language which doesn't
> use limited word order schemes to do so.

I had always much difficulty with the notion of superfluous words, as many
of those upon which derashot are built are not really superfluous. I
believe, in a way similar to what you presented, that counting the
extra words isn't an issue of finding superfluous words, but is rather
an alternate plane on which to read words, where each word represents
an entity of Divine Speech. As such, rather than talk about counting
superfluous words, I would term that accounting for words, period. Is
that similar to what you think?

Arie Folger

On Fri, Nov 25, 2005 at 11:35:52AM +0000, Arie Folger wrote:
: I had always much difficulty with the notion of superfluous words, as many of 
: those upon which derashot are built are not really superfluous. I believe, in 
: a way similar to what you presented, that counting the extra words isn't an 
: issue of finding superfluous words, but is rather an alternate plane on which 
: to read words, where each word represents an entity of Divine Speech. As 
: such, rather than talk about counting superfluous words, I would term that 
: accounting for words, period. Is that similar to what you think?

It's a nice thought, but not the one I'm trying to make. So let me
elaborate, even if I'm repeating myself somewhat.

REMT, RMP, and others on Mesorah count the derashos based on "es" amongst
those built by "accounting for words" (or conjugations or spelling).

I, OTOH, assumed they were derashos, implementation of R' Aqiva's middos
of ribui umi'ut. And just as kelal uperat or gezeirah shavah do not
require that the words have are not accounted for al derekh hapeshat,
neither does "es".

This grew from a claim of mine that "es" isn't normally superfluous. It's
a necessary feature of a grammar that allows a wide variety of word orders
that objects be distinguished from subjects through the use of an article
("es/eis"), or conjugation. In Latin, where "Brutus" is the subject,
"Brute'" is the accusative case used for direct objects. Thus, Julius
Caesar is alleged to have said, "Et tu Brute'?" not "... Brutus." In
addition is has a dative case used for indirect objects. Hebrew has
prepositional prefixes, "le-", "me-", etc... for indirect objects. In
both cases, the need to marry the role of the noun with the noun itself
is due to looser rules of word order than in English.

One example RMP and I debated was Bereishis 1:1. I said that without the
occurances "es", the verse would be ambiguous. Is it saying that E-lokim
created the heaven and the earth, or ch"v that Elohim, the heaven and
the earth created? RMP pointed to the trop, which would disambiguate. I
countered that the text determines trop, it's not the role of trop to
define the choice of text.

And since I believe "es" (or "eis") is usually a necessary word, part
of saying things gramatically, I could not see how the derashos could
be of the "extra is merabeh, omission is mema'eit" sort.

Then I had a problem because "es" as a ribui is lumped together with "akh"
and "raq" as mema'atim (as well as "gam" as another ribui). However, if
"es" has power as a word that isn't accounted for otherwise, than why
would it be together with words whose inclusion is mema'eit?

And last, as I said above, the R' Aqiva connection. R' Aqiva saved the
program of darshening every "es", and is the one who formulated the
middos in terms of ribui umi'ut instead of kelal uperat.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The waste of time is the most extravagant
micha@aishdas.org        of all expense.
http://www.aishdas.org   			-Theophrastus
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

[RSC wrote]
> On Thu, Nov 03, 2005 at 02:04:12AM -0500, S & R Coffer wrote:
>: Can you name me any Rishonim who eschew maamarey Chazal whenever they are
>: contrary to the simple pshat? Examples please. Perhaps if you illustrate
>: your point we can flush out the issue.

[RMB replied]
> Rashbam, who even questions "vayhi erev vayhi voqer" as meaning that 
> night precedes day. ...

[RDE replied]
> I am surprised that this is a matter for discussion. There are 
> countless examples. Those below I cited in Daas Torah page 222. ...
> p 232

> *Rashbam[i] (Shemos 4:10):* It is inconceivable that a prophet who 
> spoke with G-d face to face and received the Torah from Him should 
> have a speech impediment....

In addition to the above quotes (from RMB and RDE), RGS writes that the
GR'A and others "disputed the interpretation of the Sages" (Avodah Nov 9,
see link to his blog). I believe they are not correct on this issue (on
the assumption that they intend #1 below), and in this post I will focus
on the Rashbam and the GR"A, but I believe this can be suitably extended
to the other sources quoted by RDE as well (but I leave that for a later
post perhaps, time permitting). Two positions are possible. They are:

[1] The (in my view mistaken) notion that most Rishonim, when giving a
Peshat different from Chazal, do so because they believe that Chazal made
and error, and these Rishonim are therefore (c"v) disputing Chazal, or

[2] The Rishonim believe that Peshat is a legitimate derech fully
authorized by Chazal, even where the Peshat is not only different from
the Derush, but even asserts what appears to be the opposite. In this
case, the Rishon merely reveals one of the Shivim Panim of Torah given
to Moshe Rabbenu at Har Sinai.

First a brief overview: The Menoras HaMeor was an early expert on
Midrash. He writes in his hakdama that with respect to halacha "Ve-eyn
reshus la-shum adam leharher acherecha" -- no person has the right to
criticize Chazal. This is clearly stated in TB Sanhedrin even with
respect to a single "diyuk" or "gezeira shava" of Torah She-Beal Peh and
is clearly stated by the Rishonim under discussion (e.g. Radak, Ibn Ezra,
Rashbam and even the Ralbag). I imagine that our issue is thus limited to
Agadata or Midrash not involving halacha and not involving agadata that
is from Sinai (how to tell ?), as the Talmud itself has many statements
indicating that Agadata was from Moses at Sinai or divinely inspired. The
Menoras HaMeor indicates that the limitations stated by the Gaonim only
apply to a minority of Agadata as "the majority of midrashim and agada
are profound secrets" and ethical instruction. But as the Rashba and
Maharal write, whereas absolute consistency is required in halacha,
the same is not required in Agadata due to the nature of this wisdom
(and herein lies the source of those who err as in #1). This is why
the Menoras HaMeor ultimately states that we are obligated to believe
in midrashim and agadata in the same way that we believe in the Torah
of Moshe Rabbeinu. This is why the Derashos Haran has harsh words to
say against those who reject the agadata of Chazal and we will likewise
quote the Rambam in full on this issue at the end of this post.

Thus I believe that RMB, RDE, and RGS would only be able to make
a compelling case for #1 if they can find a substantial number of
Rishonim who clearly and openly state that Chazal were (c"v) in error
and that we therefore have the right to dispute Chazal. One should not
look at a few isolated statements of a Rishon, but should try to infer
their position from the context and the other statements that they make.

I can show this best by studying the first Rashbam quoted by RMB.

RMB writes that the Rashbam even questions "vayhi erev vayhi voqer"
in Beraishis as meaning that night precedes day. Now it is true that
according to the Rashbam, since creation starts with the creation of
light, the Peshat in the verse is that night follows day (see Rashbam
for the details). I asked RMB to clarify which Chazal the Rashbam was
disputing. Since RMB did not respond, I will assume for the sake of
concreteness that the Rashbam is putatively "disputing" Chulin 5.5,
which asserts that for halachic purposes the day follows the night. This
would appear to support #1.

However, that would be an error, as the Rashbam clearly states (Ber. 1.14
"Uleyamim" -- "and for days') -- "from one appearance of the stars until
the next appearance constitutes one day". The Rashbam is fully bound by
Chazal as in #2.

What exegetical problem was the Rashbam trying to resolve and how can
a Peshat be the opposite of a Derush Chazal and yet still be within the
constraint of "shivim panim latorah"? This is an interesting question and
there are a variety of possibilities, e.g. Rabbi Yaakov Kamentsky zt"l
(Ber. 1.4, p17) explains that until Matan Torah the night followed the
day (see Emes LeYaakov for the full development).

Whatever the explanation, the Rashbam is a faithul follower of Chazal
as in #2. In Ber. 1.1 he asserts that "... ALL of our Rabbis' words and
Midrashic explanations are HONEST and TRUE".

This is a remarkable statement that should force us to look at apparent
instances of #1 differently.

In his description of his discussion with his famous ancestor Rashi,
the Rashbam writes (Ber. 32.7) that the Midrashic methods of the Sages
which are derived from hints hiddden in the plain meaning and the use
of Midrashic exegesis such as the 32 principles of R. Eliezer or the 13
principles of R. Yishmael is the ESSENCE of the TORAH.

Midrash is the essence and Peshat is thus of secondary importance, as
the Sages say "keep your children away from too much higgayan" (Berachos
28b and see also BM33a). However, since the Peshat is also of (secondary)
importance (Shabbos 63a), the Rashbam undertakes its development not as
a disrepectful hetorodox activity, nor in conflict with the Midrashic
essence of the Torah as developed by the Sages, but in order to develop
one of the legitimitimate "panim" fully authorized by the Sages.

We see here the tremendous awe and subservience that the Rashbam (and
all Rishonim) felt towards Chazal.

Second Rashbam as per RDE.

> *Rashbam[i] (Shemos 4:10):* It is inconceivable that a prophet who 
> spoke with G-d face to face and received the Torah from Him should 
> have a speech impediment. Such an assertion is not found in the words 
> of the Tanayim and Amoraim. We don't concern ourselves with what is 
> written in books outside the canon [The assertion found in Shemos Rabbah
> 1:26 that Moshe stuttered] ...

The statement in brackets about Shemos Rabbah was inserted by RDE. In
RDE's hakdama to his own book he states that one authority advised him not
to present his own views or interpretations and to let the sources speak
for themselves. So while it is possible that "Chitzonim" could mean Shemos
Rabbah, RDE presents no evidence that this in fact what it does mean.

Whatever the case, the Rashbam clearly states that he is not contradicting
either Tannaim or Amoraim. Thus once again we have #2.

Meforshim do say a Peshat in a verse the very opposite of the Midrash,
yet this is still intended within the rubric of #2. This remarkable fact
is explained by Rabbi Chaim Friedlander zt"l in the name of the GR"A as
the concept of "tishapech ke-chomer chosam" (Iyov 38.14) -- as a seal
stamps its opposite on clay. The writing of a seal is the opposite and
the reverse of what must finally be written, and the correct text appears
only by virtue of these two opposites being there simultaneously. (Sifsei
Chayim - Pirkei Emunah u-Vechirah, vol. 2 pp. 257-272).

RGS writes that the GR'A and others "DISPUTED the interpretation of the
Sages" (Avodah Nov 9, see link to blog, original not in bold). But, Rabbi
Friedlander nowhere says that Rishonim or the GR'A do dispute Chazal and
find them in error (see p. 257-6, -- all the "panim" are true and they
do not contradict each other, and everything is included in the Torah).

For example, the Mechilta (cited by Rashi, Shemos. 21:6) which states
that a slave's ear may be pierced only on a door and not on a doorpost
("mezuzah"). However, the The Vilna Gaon (Aderes Eliyahu) writes that the
simple meaning of the verse indicates that the mezuzah is also kosher"
(the verse does say mezuzah). But this is an instance, says the GR"A,
where the verse is "ke-chomer chosam", i.e. both the halachic/midrashic
meaning (which the GR'A says uproots the Peshat) and the Peshat are
needed to arrive at a full understanding of the verse. Possibly, the
mezuzah must be in the verse to teach us another lesson viz, that why
of all vessels are door and mezuah chosen for the slave's ear -- HKBH
says that the door and the mezuzah were both witnesses in Egypt to the
redemption that the Children of Israel are servants to Him, and they are
not to be servants of servants (Kiddushin 22b). "We see the importance
of trying to understand the Peshat, even when it contradicts practical
halakhah or does not match the historical reality as relayed to us by
the Sages. Every Peshat in the Torah teaches us something in hanhagah
(practice) or hashkafah (philosophy), even if we do not always understand
the lesson." (translation by RGS).

It is worthwhile to read about the awe with which the Rambam spoke about
the Midrashim of Chazal:

    (Pirush HaMishnayos, translation by RZL). Therefore, it is proper
    for us to give those Drashos the benefit of the doubt, and it would
    benefit us to carefully analyze them in depth, and not be so hasty
    as to even brush aside one word of them. When any of their words seem
    far-fetched to us, we must immerse ourselves in the various branches
    of knowledge until we understand the concepts in the matter at hand,
    if our hearts are capable of grasping them. For even the Sages, though
    they were of excellent minds, though they yearned to study, worked
    hard at their researches, were in the company of profound scholars,
    and though they kept away from all worldly matters, they would still
    assign a deficiency to themselves when comparing themselves to those
    Sages who preceded them: "The greatness of the ancients is as great as
    the doorway of a vestibule, and that of the moderns is not even as big
    as the eye of a needle" (Eruvin, 53A). This, then, certainly applies
    to us, from whom wisdom had ceased and disappeared. When the Holy One
    Blessed be He informed us that "the wisdom of wise men shall perish
    and the understanding of men of understanding shall be obliterated"
    (Isiah, 29: 14); we, each one of us whom Scriptures characterized
    as possessing four adverse qualities: (1) weakened intellect and
    (2) strengthened superficial desires, (3) laziness in the search
    for wisdom and (4) zealousness for superficial gratifications -
    the "four deformities" - how can we not assign the deficiency to
    ourselves, when we compare ourselves to our predecessors?!

    And because the later sages realized this fact (may they rest in
    peace), that all of their predecessors' words were clear and pure,
    with nothing superfluous stated, they commanded and exhorted us
    that no man may ridicule them: "Anyone who ridicules the words of
    the Sages is sentenced to boiling excrement [in the Hereafter]"
    (Gittin, 57 A). And you have no greater boiling excrement than the
    stupidity which made him degenerate into ridiculing the words of
    the Sages! Thus, you will never find anyone who brushes aside their
    words, except for a man who seeks superficial gratifications and
    overindulges in physical pleasures, one who did not enlighten his
    heart with any of the shining brilliance of Torah. And because they
    saw the truth of their words, they devoted their entire lives to
    that task of mastering the Torah, and commanded us to be diligent
    in studying it at night and for part of the day, and they deemed
    this task the height of wisdom, as it indeed is.

Kol Tuv
JSO

On Friday, 25. November 2005 04.30, Avodah wrote:
> 2. Would it be OK to bring a private ST to their home - or do they have
> the same restrictions on mobility as public ones?

There are opinions that it is always OK to bring a ST anywhere to read,
as we also take the ST out on the street on certain occasions (greeting
the king).

I can fax something on this, if you want.

Arie Folger

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> matter, is there any reason to rule out the possibility that the boy
> was revived by his prophetic knowledge of CPR?

In Eliyahu's case, with the Ben Hatzarfatit, I suppose it's just possible.
It seems that he was in the house at the time, and if all this happened
quickly there might have had time for the mother to explain the situation
to him, for Hashem to tell him what to do, for him to carry the boy
up to his room, and to perform the revival, all before the boy's brain
stopped functioning. Perhaps one could even justify still counting it
among his five miracles. But the parallel case with Elisha and the Ben
Hashunamit cannot be explained that way, because the delay was far too
long. And once we're attributing Elisha's case to an outright miracle,
it makes more sense to do the same to Eliyahu's case as well.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

On November 22, 2005 Moshe Feldman wrote:
> Here, in Israel, many Americans make a Thanksgiving dinner as a way
> of celebrating their American origins. I wonder whether, given the
> lack of need for patriotism by olim toward the American gov't, a posek
> might be more likely to advise against such celebrations (and, perhaps,
> encourage a July 4th picnic instead).

Rav Avigdor Miller, when queried by a questioner during the question
and answer period about eating turkey on Thanksgiving, replied as follows:

Quote (from memory)
    The Torah says (Dvarim 12:30) "ufen tidrosh lay'loheyhem laymor eicha
    ya'avdu hagoyim ha'ayleh ess elohayhem, v'e'eseh kain gam ani"... Now,
    although technically this refers to Avodah Zara, the pasuk can be
    understood to warn against saying "and lest you should inquire as
    to the method by which they serve their gods and say that you will
    do the same to Me" IOW, "v'e'eseh kain" doesn't have to mean to a
    foreign god but even if one wishes to imitate the service of goyim
    and direct it towards Hashem, he is enjoined against doing so.

    A certain gadol writes in his tshuvos that celebrating Thanksgiving
    is mutar. How did the gadol find out about Thanksgiving...he asks
    his grandson "vos iz dus...thanksgiving" and his grandson replies
    "it's nothing zaidy...it's like... Presidents day..."so the gadol
    writes in his tshuvos "Thanksgiving....no problem!" This gadol knows
    as much about Thanksgiving as I know about Chinese holidays...I
    don't go to gedolim to find out about secular holidays, I go to
    goyim. I consulted three different encyclopaedias, and three perfectly
    kosher goyim state that Thanksgiving is a church holiday. Therefore,
    (based on the interpretation of the pasuk in Dvarim) celebrating
    thanksgiving is abuzrayhu d'avodah zara.
End quote

Simcha Coffer

Re: Moshe Feldman's posting
>Is it an aveira to speak lashon hara (i.e., the truth) about Eretz
>Yisrael, or just to speak falsehood about EY? The gemara Arachin
>15a states:
and
>Nevertheless, a computer search on midrashim shows that most of them
> talk about lashon hara on EY, without saying motzi shem ra;

>Does anyone have any sources directly discussing this issue?

Tehilim 106:24, prior to Midrashim and Gemara, reads: "Vayim'asu b'eretz
chemdah" in describing the attitude of Bnei Yisrael in the desert.

-- 
Yisrael Medad
Shiloh
Israel

From: Moshe Feldman <>
> Is it an aveira to speak lashon hara (i.e., the truth) about Eretz
>Yisrael, or just to speak falsehood about EY? 
>Also, assuming that there is an issur of lashon hara about EY, to what
>extent does it apply to speaking negatively about Israeli society (as
>opposed to just the land)?

Would saying that summer in EY is unbearably humid or the buses
send up too much pollution be LH?

According to the CC there is no issur of LH when talking
about porkei ol. Talking LH about frum Jews is ossur worldwide.

SBA

RMB wrote:
> Isn't this far closer to our case than Eliyahu's own ascent? For that
> matter, is there any reason to rule out the possibility that the boy
> was revived by his prophetic knowledge of CPR?

This, of course, is the central question: what exactly happened, in what
state was the boy?

However, while traditionally it has been assumed (or so I thought)
that this was a foll fledged te'hiyat hametim, Melakhim I 17:17 supports
your reading, as it is the only objective voice in the story (the other
pessukim either are Eliyahu's speech or the widow's), and there is no
statement there that the boy died, but rather "veyehi 'holyo 'hazaq meod,
'ad asher lo notra bo neshamah". Neshamah doesn't only designate the
soul, but also life breath. IOW, it seems that the boy hadn't died yet,
but was very close to it and wasn't breathing anymore.

A'hare omri et kol zeh matsati khen beRadaq. However, Ralbag (yes, the
philosopher) and Metsudat Tsiyon state the boy died. Rashi implies he
died, as Rashi explains that the whole episode happened so that Eliyahu
would need the "key" of te'hiyat hametim.

Gut Shabbos,
Arie Folger

[R' Gil Student:]
> I don't understand. The Gemara (Kiddushin 70b) is explicit "Ein sho'alin
> bi-shlom ishah KELAL" and that's how the Shulchan Aruch paskens (EH
> 21:6). Are there leniencies? According to some, yes. But I don't think
> you can bring a proof from anywhere in Shas.

Yes you can. The Gemara in hasocher ess hapoalim (BM 87) says that al
yidei shliach it is mutar to be shoel b'shlom eesha. The Rishonim point
out the apparent contradiction to the Gemara in asara yuchsin and make
a distinction between greeting and inquiry. Thus, a simple good morning
is permissible.

Simcha Coffer 

[R Simcha Coffer:]
> Rav Avigdor Miller, when queried by a questioner during the question and
> answer period about eating turkey on Thanksgiving, replied as follows:
>     ...
>     A certain gadol writes in his tshuvos that celebrating Thanksgiving
>     is mutar. How did the gadol find out about Thanksgiving...he asks
>     his grandson "vos iz dus...thanksgiving" and his grandson replies
>     "it's nothing zaidy...it's like... Presidents day..."so the gadol
>     writes in his tshuvos "Thanksgiving....no problem!" This gadol knows
>     as much about Thanksgiving as I know about Chinese holidays...I
>     don't go to gedolim to find out about secular holidays, I go to
>     goyim. ...

I am not mkabel this quote which would have one believe that R'AM
felt that "A certain gadol" would write a tshuva on this basis. I
don't know where the error lies but I prefer to think it's in my lack
of understanding.

KT
Joel Rich

*********************


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