Avodah Mailing List

Volume 16 : Number 023

Monday, November 7 2005

• Re: Kabbalah today
• Re: pas yisrael
• Re: only one opinion
• TIDE
• Re: Kabbalah Today
• Re: Kabbalah today
• RE: Kabbalah today
• RE: TIDE
• RE: isolation (vs. TIDE)
• RE: only one opinion
• one opinion
• RE: only one opinion
• Re: only one opinion

On 11/6/05, YFel912928@aol.com <YFel912928@aol.com> wrote:
>> 8) Christianity is based on a distorted understanding of genuine
>> kabbalistic ideas (Rabbi Akiva Tatz)

> That's absurd, as Christianity only came upon kabbalistic ideas in the
> Middle Ages (though some Christian *justified* their faith based on what
> they then learned.)

Not necessarily. Many Christian ideas derive from, or are a reaction to
Gnosticism, which (at least according to some scholars, e.g. Gedaliahu
Stroumsa at the Hebrew University) derives from early Jewish mysticism.

Reb Newman,Saul Z wrote:
> i wondered why the commercial systems to make bishul yisrael possible
> arent used for pas.

> here is the Ou webbe rebbe's response--

>> JS-1465 -Electronic System for Pas Yisroel
<SNIP>
>> to start it up again. Bakeries shut off their boilers when not in use
>> and it would not be feasible to have a rabbi available to start it on
>> a daily basis

??? The bakery I supervise has two sets of ovens (bread and cakes, both
enormous things with several levels) and the oven stays on 24 hours a day,
because it is too expensive to heat them up, allowing us to switch them on
once a week, except when public holidays interrupt work for two or three
days, at which point the ovens will be turned off. I also inquired from
other rabbis, and having ovens on for 24h a day is quite common, it seems.

Arie Folger

On Thu, Nov 03, 2005 at 02:04:12AM -0500, S & R Coffer wrote:
: Certainly. Firstly, the Ramchal doesn't say what you claim he does. He
: breaks up maamarei Chazal into two categories, halachic and aggadic,
: and then goes on to break up the aggadic into two categories, ethical and
: spiritual. Only in the spiritual ones does the Ramchal mention that they
: are not all necessarily kipshuto. The remainder certainly are and there
: is no question that we have to follow them. Chazal are full of history,
...

How is that possible? History is neither ethics or spirituality.

Which is why, when RBK wrote:
: It is made clear by the Ramchal and others that Medrash Aggadata are
: allegories to teach deeper ideas and not historical facts....

... I made a point of rephrasing it as
> One is as obligated to accept medrashei aggada (and aggadita in Shas)
> as one is medrashei halakhah (and the pesaqim of Shas). However,
> accepting medrash aggada means accepting the truth of the nimshal,
> not the historicity of the mashal.

On Thu, Nov 03, 2005 at 03:39:36PM -0600, Gershon Seif wrote:
:  - Someone out there, isn't there a very explicit statement in Moreh
: Nevuchim about this?

How about peirush hamishnayos, introduction to Cheileq (before the 13
ikkarim)? He has pretty harsh things to say about the first and second
katim, who assume every aggadic story is literal history. One group
belittles the Torah by reducing it to foolishness, the second reject the
Torah because they think it contains foolishness. Only the third kat,
who realize that Chazal speak in riddle and metaphor truly embrace Torah.

See also RNS at v13n70.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "Man wants to achieve greatness overnight,
micha@aishdas.org        and he wants to sleep well that night too."
http://www.aishdas.org         - Rav Yosef Yozel Horwitz, Alter of Novarodok
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

> Can the second camp point to RSRH's writings for support? Or, as I
> personally believe, they are just trying to claim RSRH without any
> evidence. I'll reserve final judgment when I see the marei makomos in
> RSRH's writings that you'll bring.

Im confused. Do you expect RSRH to write that I really believe in what
I am writing and it is not a horaat shaah? Logic dictates that if you
dont take his words as face value then the onus is on you. Strange to
accuse the others of believing what he wrote! Besides his family and
community all certify that this is what he really believed. But many
their testimony is not good enough against ones preconceived notions

--
Eli Turkel

> Regarding R' Soloveitchik - I am simply looking for a citation in his
> name openly citing a Zohar or Arizal. Did he ever cite the Leshem
> or Maharal? Regarding Chabad did he explicityly mention that an
> idea was from Chabad or was it just an inference made by others?

He quotes Tanya and Chabad ideas explicitly in Halachic Man.

Raffy

David Riceman wrote:
> 4) Rav Y. B. Soloveitchik made no reference to Kabbalah  <snip>
> See "Uvikashtem Misham" 8:2 (pp. 168-169, esp. note 12 - which
> extends to p. 172 - in the WZO edition entitled "Ish Hahalacha -
> Galui v'Nistar").

Thanks for the references

My brief perusal of Halakhic Man seems to indicate a view very comparable
to the Hirschian position. Namely he seems to be rejecting Kabbalah in
favor of halacha as Hirsch did in favor of ethics.

p49 "THIS mystery of tzimtzum, of "contraction," in the Halakhah does not
touch upon questions of cosmogony. Unlike the kabbalists and (mutatis
mutandis) Philo, Plotinus, the Neoplatonists, and the Renaissance
philosophers, the Halakhah does not concern itself with metaphysical
mysteries. Nor does It Inquire into that which is too remote for it
regarding the creation of the universe. The law of Halakhah is a practical
utilitarian one. Therefore, one should not compare the concept of tzimtzum
in the Halakhah with the concept as it appears in mystical doctrine. There
(in mystical doctrine) this idea expresses a metaphysical system that
penetrates into the hidden recesses of creation, that contemplates the
foundation stones of the cosmos, being and nothingness, the beginning
and the end; here (in the Halakhah) the concept of tzimtzum does not
pertain to the secrets of creation and the chariot but rather to law
and judgment. Therefore, halakhic man's ontological outlook differs
radically from that of the mystic. Their different interpretations of the
concept of tzimtzum give rise to major divergences in their respective
ontological stances.54 The mystic sees the existence of the world as
a type of "affront," heaven forbid, to God's glory; the cosmos, as it
were, impinges upon the infinity of the Creator. The Kabbalah senses and
empathizes with the anguish of Shekhinta be-galuta, the Divine Presence
in exile-the glory of God that emerged from the hiddenness of infinity,
that became embodied in the creabon of the cosmos, and that became
contracted in it and by it. The creatIon of the world constitutes a
type of "waiver" on the part of God of His own glory, "for He is holy
and separate from aU the worlds, and no thought can grasp Him. "55 The
cosmos is a revelation of God's grace, "for His Shekhinah, His Divine
Presence, clothes herself with worlds in order to give them life ... f

>> 5) R' Yisroel Salanter asserted that he was not familiar with Kabbalah
>> and thus it is not relevant for the Mussar Movement

> See Immanuel Etkes "Rabbi Israel Salanter and the Mussar Movement"
> pp. 93-95 esp. note 10

Study of Salanter's writings reveals that, not only is his underlying
theological position completely lacking in innovation, but it even entails
a certain degree of retreat. His approach is essentially a return to the
classical Rabbinic thought of the Mishnah and the Talmud. The image
of God in his writings is a strictly transcendent and personal one:
He is the God Who reveals Himself to humankind in His Torah and His
commandments; who is providential; who rewards and punishes. Just as
He is not the God of the philosophers, the object of speculation and
of intellectual apprehension, so is Salanter 's image of God remote
from that of the Kabbalah. The attempt to influence the upper worlds
or the desire to cling to God in the mystical sense play no role in
his religious thought. Religious activity and meaning are defined by
the concepts of commandment and transgression, reward and punishment,
this world and the World to Come. The essence of Divine service thus
consists in response and obedience to the mitzvot per see ... What is
surprising is his attitude of distance toward the Kabbalah, not only
because of the central role that it played in Jewish thought from the
sixteenth century onward, but because one might have expected him to
follow in the foptsteps of his forebears in this matter. It will be
remembered that Kabbalah played a central role in the spiritual world
of both the Vilna Gaon and of Rabbi Hayyim of Volozhin; there is also
some evidence that Rabbi Zundel of Salant was attracted to it. For this
reason, Rabbi Israel's position concerning the Kabbalah may properly
be described as a conscious retreat. This is even more striking in
light of the fact that he specifically studied Rabbi Hayyim's book,
Nefesh ha-hayyim, even citing it in his sermons. Interestingly enough,
whenever he paraphrases Rabbi Hayyim's words in one of his sermons, they
lose their kabbalistic coloration and are, so to speak, assimilated to
the conceptual world of the rabbis. 6

note 10: ... Hillel Goldberg, in his book, Israel Salanter: Text,
Structure, Idea (New York, 1982), devotes an excursus to the question:
"Did Israel Salanter Study Philosophy and Kabbalah?" (pp. 209-19). He
engages there in a detailed polemic with my position, marshaling
evidence of his own to support the conclusion that Salanter did in
fact study Kabbalah. After a careful study of his arguments, I remain
convinced of the validity of the position presented here. Even if we
assume that Goldberg is correct-namely, that Salanter did study and know
Kabbalah-and we admit, for the sake of argument, that he was expert in
all the various branches of Kabbalah, what is the significance of it?
The crucial question for anyone who wishes to characterize and to analyze
the thought of Salanter is whether, and to what extent, his thought was
influenced by the Kabbalah. Goldberg has not brought any proof likely
to upset my conclusions on this matter.

Daniel Eidensohn

On November 6, 2005 Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> If you accept Rav Tzadok's assertion that Yashka [ and Shabtzai Tzvi]
> reached very high spiritual levels before being destroyed by their belief
> that they were divine - it is reasonable that Yashka was aware of the
> kabbalistic ideas in the period of Chazal.

Where does R' Tzadok say this?

Simcha Coffer

On November 6, 2005 Eli Turkel wrote:
>> Not everyone agrees with this interpretation of TIDE. There are two
>> camps. One holds that RSRH felt that TIDE was the preferable approach
>> whereas the second camp maintains that TIDE as a movement was created
>> to address a situation....

> Basically the two camps consists of those RSRH and those that didn't.
> Rabbis from Eastern Europe justified TIDE as a temporary expedient for
> German Jewry. Everyone in the family and community who knew RSRH verify
> the first alternative.
> Obviously the Rambam himself spent much time leraning Grrek and
> Arab philosophy.

Also to address a need. That's why he called it Moreh Nevuchim.

Simcha Coffer

On November 6, 2005 Gershon Seif wrote:
> R' S. Coffer wrote:
>> There are twocamps. One holds that RSRH felt that TIDE was the preferable
>> approach whereas the second camp maintains that TIDE as a movement was
>> created to address a situation, but intrinsically, RSRH would say that
>> ideally, and if possible, one should devote his life entirely to Torah
>> without wasting time on participation in foreign societies. Personally,
>> I believe the latter is self evident and is supported by the Rambam
>> himself in several places.

> If you find a Rambam to the contrary of his approach, so be it. That
> doesn't make it RSRH's approach.

Actually, IIRC, it was you who was troubled with the apparent
contradiction between TIDE and the Rambam. As far as I'm concerned,
RSRH has a right to argue on the Rambam if he wants. I was merely
addressing RMB's response and attempting to show that there need not be
a stira between the two approaches. If you posit that RSRH was merely
addressing a need, the Rambam you originally quoted would no longer be
at odds with RSRH.

Simcha Coffer

On November 6, 2005, Shaya Potter wrote:
> I already said, look at what different rishonim (radak, rashbam, Ibn
> Ezra....) say, many eschew the common medrash we all know.

I didn't mean examples of names of Rishonim. I meant examples of instances
where the above-named Rishonim diverged from Chazal. So far, only R'
Micha has responded with an example from the Rashbam and JSO has jumped
in with a response so I'm going to sit this one out.

[Email #2. -mi]

On November 6, 2005 Micha Berger wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 03, 2005 at 02:04:12AM -0500, S & R Coffer wrote:
>: Certainly. Firstly, the Ramchal doesn't say what you claim he does. He
>: breaks up maamarei Chazal into two categories, halachic and aggadic,
>: and then goes on to break up the aggadic into two categories, ethical and
>: spiritual. Only in the spiritual ones does the Ramchal mention that they
>: are not all necessarily kipshuto. The remainder certainly are and there
>: is no question that we have to follow them. Chazal are full of history,

> How is that possible? History is neither ethics or spirituality.

It's both. In fact, history is one of the three fundamental ways that
one can learn about the yad Hashem, the other two being Torah and the
study of nature. Are you disputing the fact that the Gemara is full of
historical events? Surely not. Therefore, the history brought down in
Chazal is the history of the yad Hashem, of how he expects us to conduct
ourselves (ethics) of is intervention into our affairs (spirituality) etc.

> Which is why, when RBK wrote:
>: It is made clear by the Ramchal and others that Medrash Aggadata are
>: allegories to teach deeper ideas and not historical facts....

> ... I made a point of rephrasing it as
>> One is as obligated to accept medrashei aggada (and aggadita in Shas)
>> as one is medrashei halakhah (and the pesaqim of Shas). However,
>> accepting medrash aggada means accepting the truth of the nimshal,
>> not the historicity of the mashal.

In some instances you are correct and in others you are not. If the
Medrash describes far-fetched phenomena that are rachok min hasechel,
then one should suspect that perhaps they are concealing lofty concepts
in superficial raiment. However, if the maamar Chazal goes something
like this: "Anyone who takes the words of the Torah literally regarding
Reuven's indiscretion is erring" and goes on to describe in detail
precisely what happened, is a literal depiction of real events and is
meant to put the historical episode of Reuven into the appropriate Torah
perspective as Chazal understood it. It is not some superficial mashal
that has no truth to it and only represents some deep esoteric nimshal.

Simcha Coffer

On Thu, 2005-11-03 at 02:04 -0500, S & R Coffer wrote:
> Can you name me any Rishonim who eschew maamarey Chazal whenever they are
> contrary to the simple pshat? Examples please. Perhaps if you illustrate
> your point we can flush out the issue.

I again refer to my previous post where the Radak in Divrei Hayamim
explicitly rejects Chazal as to the identity of Caleb ben Chetzron
because it is against the pshat. The gemara in fact uses this identity
to prove that a boy can have a child at a very young age. In this case
the Vilna Gaon brings further proofs for the Radak that this does not
fit into pshat of the pasuk besides being unlikely in terms of ages.
I dont have the exact quote but rishonim also do not accept as pshat the
various agadot about the extreme age of various individuals in Tanach
by identifying different people. Even the famous medrash identfying
Pinchas and Eliyahu has many problems. There are many questions about
Eliyahu being a Cohen and bringing to life a dead person and tumah
of a cohen. Another problem is how did Pinchas resign from being high
priest.The obvious answer is that Eliyahu was not a cohen As some explain
Eliyahu was a gilgul of Pinchas. In any case the answer is not to take
this medrashim literally. The Griz asks a question on Rambam based on
the gemara that Ezra=3DMalachi. (again problematic because Ezra was
a Cohen and maybe (?) cohen gadol). However Rambam himself does no=
t accept this identification.

--
Eli Turkel

On Sun, 2005-11-06 at 19:01 -0500, S & R Coffer wrote:
> On November 6, 2005, Shaya Potter wrote:
>> I already said, look at what different rishonim (radak, rashbam, Ibn
>> Ezra....) say, many eschew the common medrash we all know.

> I didn't mean examples of names of Rishonim. I meant examples of instances
> where the above-named Rishonim diverged from Chazal. So far, only R'
> Micha has responded with an example from the Rashbam and JSO has jumped
> in with a response so I'm going to sit this one out.

I meant in regards to Migdal Bavel. They give very different deraching
in pshat from the famous medrash we all learn as kids.

S & R Coffer wrote:
>On November 6, 2005, Shaya Potter wrote:
>>I already said, look at what different rishonim (radak, rashbam, Ibn
>>Ezra....) say, many eschew the common medrash we all know.

>I didn't mean examples of names of Rishonim. I meant examples of instances
>where the above-named Rishonim diverged from Chazal. So far, only R'
>Micha has responded with an example from the Rashbam and JSO has jumped
>in with a response so I'm going to sit this one out.

I am surprised that this is a matter for discussion. There are countless
examples. Those below I cited in Daas Torah page 222.

*Ohr HaChaim**[i]* (Bereishis 1:1): *You should know that we have
permission to explain the implication of the verses after careful
study--even though our conclusions differ from the explanation of our
Sages. That is because there are 70 faces to Torah (Bamidbar Rabbah
13:16). There is no prohibition against differing from the words of our
Sages except if it changes the Halacha. Similarly, we find that even
though the Amoraim did not have the right to disagree with Tannaim in
halachic matters--but we find that they offered alternative explanations
to verses.

*Ohr HaChaim**[ii]* (Bereishis 46:8): *Don't be bothered by the fact that
our explanation is the opposite of what our Sages stated. We have already
asserted that concerning the understanding of the non-halachic verses
of the Torah--permission is given to the diligent student to innovate.

*Ohr HaChaim**[iii]* (Devarim 32:1): *Even though I am explaining this
differently than our Sages but we know that there are 70 faces to Torah
(Bamidbar Rabbah 13:16). Concerning Agada it is permitted to offer
explanations even if they contradict those of our Sages as long as they
don't contradict the Halacha....

*Ohr HaChaim**[iv]* (Vayikra 26:3): *Vayikra Rabbah (22:1) states that
Scripture, Mishna, Halacha, Talmud, Tosefta, Agada and even what a
faithful student would say in the future--were all taught to Moshe on
Sinai. It is clear from this medrash that permission has been granted
for Torah scholars to explain and interpret in various ways and for the
diligent students to provide new insights in expounding verses--to the
degree that it can be justified with the verse.

*Vayikra Rabbah**[i]* (22:1).* Torah, Mishna, Halacha, Talmud, Tosefta,
Agada, and even what a faithful disciple would say in the future were
taught to Moses on Sinai...

*Yaavetz*[ii] (1:108): *I am upset with Rishonim such as the Radak
and other pursuers of the simple meaning of the text (rodfei hapshat)
whose lust for the surface understanding causes them to swallow it
without proper preparation and without proper cooking. Many times, we
see that they have arrogantly rejected the views of our Sages for their
own understanding based on the simple meaning of the text. Here also in
this case they don't accept the traditions of our Sages in understanding
the nature of the altar of the Temple...

*Ramban**[v]* (Bereishis 8:4): The Ark came to rest in the 7th month
on the 17th day of the month*...--Rashi writes that we learn from this
verse that the Ark was submerged in the water to a depth of 11 amos
according the calculations that he wrote in his commentary. This is also
stated in Bereishis Rabbah (33:7). However, since Rashi in various places
minutely analyzes medrashim and toils to explain the plain meaning of the
verses--he grants us the right to also do it. That is because there are 70
faces to the Torah and also many medrashim contain disagreements between
the Sages. Therefore, I claim that this calculation is incompatible with
the language of the verse.

p 232

*Rashbam[i] (Shemos 4:10):* It is inconceivable that a prophet who
spoke with G-d face to face and received the Torah from Him should have
a speech impediment. Such an assertion is not found in the words of the
Tanayim and Amoraim. We don't concern ourselves with what is written in
books outside the canon [The assertion found in Shemos Rabbah 1:26 that
Moshe stuttered].

*Ramban**[i]* (Dispute): *We have three types of books. The first is
the Bible and everyone believes in it with perfect faith. The second is
called Talmud and it is a commentary on the mitzvos of the Torah. The
Bible has 613 commandments and there is not one which is not explained
in the Talmud. We believe in it concerning the explanations of the
mitzvos. There is a third type of book which is called medrash i.e.,
sermons. It is comparable to a preacher getting up and giving a sermon
and some listening liked it and recorded it. Concerning medrash--it
is fine if one wishes to believe them. However there is no loss if one
doesn't want to believe them.

*Chasam Sofer**[ii]* (O. H. 1:16): *The Ramban has stated in his debate
with the apostate that the obligation to believe agada and medrashim
only applies to those found in the Babylonian and Yerushalmi Talmud. The
validity of other medrashim can be accepted or rejected.

page 108 Ramban rejects the views of Chazal concerning the rainbow which
contract Greek science

*Ramban[i] (Bereishis 9:12): *We are forced to believe the words of the
Greeks that the rainbow is a natural result of the sun shining on moist
air--because we see a rainbow when a container of water is placed before
the sun.... In other words, the Torah is stating that the preexisting
physical phenomenon--the rainbow--will from now on serve as a sign of
the covenant.

In fact it is such a common phenomenon that Rav Dessler felt it necessary
to rationalize it. Not everyone agrees however with his assertion that
the Rishonim didn't believe what they wrote- as is obvious from the
comments above..

page 224

*Michtav M'Eliyahu**[i]* (4:355): *R' Shmuel HaNagid in his Introduction
to the Talmud is to be understood in the following manner. The words
of Agada which we don't understand--we are not obligated to learn them
and to base our service of G-d upon--even though we know that all agada
are foundation principles of the Torah. In contrast, Halacha which is
involved with deed, is obligatory even if we don't understand it. The
purpose of Agada is inspiration and therefore when it doesn't inspire us
because of our limited ability to understand we have no obligation to
study that which doesn't inspire. When we reach the level that that we
can understand it then it becomes obligatory. Furthermore, Agada has deep
secrets of the Torah. As long as we are not on the spiritual level that
these secrets should be revealed in a particular Agada, there is no reason
to study it since we would be misunderstanding its true meaning. This
is actually what R' Shmuel HaNagid meant when he said if the Agada
doesn't make sense to use we shouldn't learn it or rely on it. You will
notice that he didn't say that those Agada that we understand are true
and the rest are fantasies--G-d forbid! However, it is as we explained
that there is no benefit in learning profound material that we don't
comprehend. This is also the correct way of understanding commentaries
such as Rashi and the Radak when they say a medrash is far from the
simple meaning of the verse or doesn't fit the verse. They are saying
the medrash can't be used until it is comprehended and clarified...5)
It is important however to distinguish between those explanations which
are basically interpretation of the verses and those of our Sages which
are the actual meaning of the verses. _*Given this clear distinction it
is puzzling why many Rishonim strive to follow a different understanding
than the true explanation given by our Sages? We find such tendencies
in the commentary of the Rashbam, Ibn Ezra and other Rishonim. What is
the purpose of offering explanations which differ from the definitive
true ones? I think that they offer these alternative explanations for
the sake of confused people. In other words, these Rishonim want to show
that there are many different aspects even in the simple understanding
of the verses and that it is permissible for a person to create new
interpretations according to what makes sense to him. (Of course,
any alternative explanations which contradict foundation principles of
faith are prohibited.) This is consistent with our understanding of R'
Shmuel HaNagid. This advice is very critical in order to save the souls
of the confused people. Such an approach is similar to that of the Rambam
who wrote so much for the confused. We see this from the fact that many
difficulties that exist in what he wrote could have been explained in a
much clearer fashion. However, since he was addressing confused people he
provided alternative explanations which they could accept--as long as it
didn't contradict the Halacha. Using this approach, I have been able to
understand the difficult comments of the Radak who was a very holy person
and one of the great members of the period of the Rishonim. In particular,
it justifies his comments concerning the disparity of the text of the
Torah and how it is to be read in a number of places (kri v'kesiv)....

Daniel Eidensohn

*********************


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