Avodah Mailing List

Volume 16 : Number 022

Sunday, November 6 2005

• RE: Ikkare Hashkafa
• RE: only one opinion
• RE: only one opinion
• Re: The Power of Speech
• Re: rabbinic misconduct
• Re: Kabbalah Today
• A Mathemetical Basis for Noachide Morality?
• Re: Kabbalah today
• Re: Kabbalah Today
• Kabbala today
• Re: Kabbalah today
• Re: Kabbalah today

On November 4, 2005, Micha Berger wrote:
> The Rambam is addressing the question of who is "Yisrael" WRT "kol
> Yisrael yeish lahem cheileq". The Ikkarim isn't. He instead is seeking
> the minimal list of primary principles that from which you can reason
> your way to a complete emunah. They both use the same word "ikkarim",
> but to mean different things: necessary belief vs postulate.

I don't believe you are correct on either count. The Rambam states that
this Mishana is the most appropriate place to mention the 13 Ikkarim
however this doesn't mean that the primary significance of the Ikkarim is
to act as a definition of eligibility for olam habba. And your definition
of the Ikkrim's term of Ikkar is, IMO, definitely incorrect.

The term Ikkar, according to the Rambam, the Ikkrim, and whoever else
talks about it can be expressed in a single statement with two qualifying
principles.

Statement: An Ikkar is a fundamental principle upon which a religion is
based upon.
Qualification #1 - This principle must set the religion apart from all
other religions.
Qualification #2 - The absence of the principle causes the entire religion
to collapse.

The reason the Rambam chooses this Mishna to state his thirteen ikkarim
is because the salient feature of an Ikkar is that its denial (or its
ignorance) leads to a loss of olam habba. It is quite possible that
someone can be ignorant of, or even deny (inadvertently) the existence of
one of the taryag mitzvos and still be a candidate for olam habba. But
denial or ignorance of an Ikkar leads to an unequivocal loss of olam
habba.

> As for disagreement, we've discussed this before WRT more extreme cases,
> like corporeality. Lehalakhah we hold like the Rambam. Ask any beis
> din legiyur.

Betey denim l'giyur go lichumra because there's no reason to go likula
when it comes to giyur. This doesn't mean that we pasken like the Rambam
in all contingencies. I am frightened to think of the ramifications of
paskening like the Rambam regardless of circumstance.

Good Shabbos
Simcha Coffer

On Thu, Nov 03, 2005 at 02:04:12AM -0500, S & R Coffer wrote:
>: Can you name me any Rishonim who eschew maamarey Chazal whenever they are
>: contrary to the simple pshat? Examples please. Perhaps if you illustrate
>: your point we can flush out the issue.

[Micha:]
> Rashbam, who even questions "vayhi erev vayhi voqer" as 
> meaning that night precedes day. Ralbag too, I'd bet.

Which maamar Chazal is the Rashbam disagreeing with? 

I am sure you don't mean that the Rashbam disagrees with the *halacha*
that night precedes day [e.g. Berachos 2a which uses "vayhi erev vayhi
voker" as the prooftext]?

A gutte voch

JSO

On Thu, 2005-11-03 at 02:04 -0500, S & R Coffer wrote:
> Can you name me any Rishonim who eschew maamarey Chazal whenever they are
> contrary to the simple pshat? Examples please. Perhaps if you illustrate
> your point we can flush out the issue.

I already said, look at what different rishonim (radak, rashbam, Ibn
Ezra....) say, many eschew the common medrash we all know. 

> I realized something during leining last week (Bereishis): It's lehefech!
> The point isn't that speech is a real thing, the point is that every
> real thing is in truth just speech! "Vayomer E-lokim...."

I wonder if that thought is related to the Haggodo's 'Chochom/Rosho ma
hu, omer" - [you can tell] who is a chochom/rosho by what he says.

I'm also wondering if one could reinterpret Koheles along those lines:
If we say that speech is "hot air" then you get "The speech of speeches,
everything is merely speech."

- Danny

In message <002e01c5e008$6bb85590$017ba8c0@livingroom>, Russell Levy 
<russell@rentmagic.ca> writes
>> 4. Importation of concepts into an important Tanachi term where itis
>> not clear they exist. Because you are determined that Eli cannot but
>> have doubted what had to be the exaggerated reports, you are forcedto
>> interpret the term hashamuah as meaning a rumour, something that is
>> not known to be true. But, as I mentioned, the root here is shema.

>Shmuel II 13:30, melachim 1 10:7, twp pesukim I encountered in the pasr
>couple days...

I don't think that Melachim 1: 10:7 is a good source for this. The
Queen of Sheba says (in the pasuk above) "emes haya hadavar" (ie true
was the report) [dvar being the way I would expect it to be expressed if
there was some doubt about the truth). She then goes on to say but they
didn't tell me the half of it in the report [Hashamua] which they gave.
So in fact she is explicitly saying that the telling was true, but the
true telling didn't go far enough.

Shmuel II 13:30 however is indeed a good one, because the report
(hashamua) was in fact false - well you might be able to dray that it was
in true - by using the word maka loosely to mean attack, but certainly
the plain meaning (ie that Avshalom had killed all the king's sons and
not one of them was left) and the way that Dovid Hamelech took it was
false - since in fact as Yonadav tells him a few psukim later it was
only Amnon who is dead and the rest had just fled -( note the use of
"dvar" by Yonadav when he knows he is talking about something false).
Of course the whole point was that Dovid Hamelech did not treat it as
rumour or as something of unknown province - - he tore kria for all his
sons, so he treated this report as being absolutely true [Somewhere or the
other I have a recollection that there is a midrash to the effect that
in fact this report was supposed to have been told to him by Batsheva,
and that this was part of the mida kneged mida of it all - but I can't
find it in my quick look tonight - any assistance out there?.]

Part of the reason I am so doubtful about a usage of hashamua to mean
other than the absolute truth is the usage one seems to encounter
of baal hashamua (eg in the way that Rashi uses it eg in Mishlei 1:5)
in which the linkage is clearly to a "hearing" which is from Hashem.

So I don't know that even the case of Dovid Melech gets you to the
point of being able to say that hashamua can ever mean rumour - because
according to RSC not only is the report regarding the Bnei Eli not true,
but Eli himself does not believe it to be true and it is that that he is
conveying by the use of the term hashamua (ie something not known to be
true) - whereas the in the case of Dovid, the report was in fact not true
(it was actually a dvar sheker), but Dovid Hamelech believed it to be
true (ie I would say, he believed it to be a shamua, to the extent that
he sat shiva). And if my memory is correct about the Batsheva midrash,
then it is even more poignant, because it really was "hashamua" in that
it came from Hashem (because believing his sons to be all dead for a
little while was like them actually being dead to him, fulfilling his
punishment and hence in a deeper sense being absolute emes).

Shavuah tov
Chana
-- 
Chana Luntz

Fascinating list of Gdolim and their insights. WADR to R M Shurkin,
RYBS certainly refers to the impact of Chabad Chasidus and especially
many drashos re Yamim Noraim that are steeped in Chabad thinking.

Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

I found the following interesting. But then, I do math for a living,
so I'm only hoping someone else would. I assume RRA's Nobel Prize for
his work in game theory played a role in RJS thinking of this one.

 -mi

Covenant and Conversation
Rabbi Jonathan Sacks
Office of the Chief Rabbi

Is there such a thing as an objective basis of morality? For some time,
in secular circles, the idea has seemed absurd. Morality is what we
choose it to be. We are free to do what we like so long as we don't
harm others. Moral judgments are not truths but choices. There is no
way of getting from "is" to "ought", from description to prescription,
from facts to values, from science to ethics. This was the received
wisdom in philosophy for a century after Nietzsche had argued for the
abandonment of morality -- which he saw as the product of Judaism --
in favour of the "will to power".

Recently, however, an entirely new scientific basis has been given to
morality from two surprising directions: neo-Darwinism and the branch
of mathematics known as Games Theory. As we will see, the discovery is
intimately related to the story of Noah and the covenant made between
G-d and humanity after the Flood.

Games theory was invented by one of the most brilliant minds of the 20th
century, John von Neumann (1903-1957). He realised that the mathematical
models used in economics were unrealistic and did not mirror the way
decisions are made in the real world. Rational choice is not simply a
matter of weighing alternatives and deciding between them. The reason
is that the outcome of our decision often depends on how other people
react to it, and usually we cannot know this in advance. Games theory,
von Neumann's invention in 1944, was an attempt to produce a mathematical
representation of choice under conditions of uncertainty. Six years later,
it yielded its most famous paradox, known as the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Imagine two people, arrested by the police under suspicion of committing a
crime. There is insufficient evidence to convict them on a serious charge;
there is only enough to convict them of a lesser offence. The police
decide to encourage each to inform against the other. They separate them
and make each the following proposal: if you testify against the other
suspect, you will go free, and he will be imprisoned for ten years. If
he testifies against you, and you stay silent, you will be sentenced to
ten years in prison, and he will go free. If you both testify against
one another, you will each receive a five-year sentence. If both of you
stay silent, you will each be convicted of the lesser charge and face
a one-year sentence.

It doesn't take long to work out that the optimal strategy for each is
to inform against the other. The result is that each will be imprisoned
for five years. The paradox is that the best outcome would be for both
to remain silent. They would then only face one year in prison. The
reason that neither will opt for this strategy is that it depends on
collaboration. However, since each is unable to know what the other is
doing -- there is no communication between them -- they cannot take the
risk of staying silent. The Prisoner's Dilemma is remarkable because
it shows that two people, both acting rationally, will produce a result
that is bad for both of them.

Eventually, a solution was discovered. The reason for the paradox is
that the two prisoners find themselves in this situation only once. If
it happened repeatedly, they would eventually discover that the best
thing to do is to trust one another and co-operate.

In the meantime, biologists were wrestling with a phenomenon that
puzzled Darwin. The theory of natural selection -- popularly known as the
survival of the fittest -- suggests that the most ruthless individuals
in any population will survive and hand their genes on to the next
generation. Yet almost every society ever observed values individuals who
are altruistic: who sacrifice their own advantage to help others. There
seems to be a direct contradiction between these two facts.

The Prisoner's Dilemma suggested an answer. Individual self-interest often
produces bad results. Any group which learns to cooperate, instead of
compete, will be at an advantage relative to others. But, as the Prisoner'
Dilemma showed, this needs repeated encounters -- the so-called "Iterated
( repeated) Prisoner's dilemma". In the late 1970s, a competition was
announced to find the computer program that did best at playing the
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma against itself and other opponents.

The winning programme was devised by a Canadian, Anatole Rapoport, and was
called Tit-for-Tat. It was dazzlingly simple: it began by co-operating,
and then repeated the last move of its opponent. It worked on the rule of
"What you did to me, I will do to you", or "measure for measure". This was
the first time scientific proof had been given for any moral principle.

What is fascinating about this chain of discoveries is that it precisely
mirrors the central principle of the covenant G-d made with Noah:

"Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in
the image of G-d has G-d made man."

This is measure for measure [in Hebrew, middah keneged middah],
or retributive justice: As you do, so shall you be done to. In fact,
at this point the Torah does something very subtle. The six words in
which the principle is stated are a mirror image of one another: [1]
Who sheds [2] the blood [3] of man, [3a] by man [2a] shall his blood
[1a] be shed. This is a perfect example of style reflecting substance:
what is done to us is a mirror image of what we do. The extraordinary fact
is that the first moral principle set out in the Torah is also the first
moral principle ever to be scientifically demonstrated. Tit-for-Tat is
the computer equivalent of (retributive) justice: Whoever sheds the
blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed.

The story has a sequel. In 1989, the Polish mathematician Martin Nowak
produced a programme that beats Tit-for-Tat. He called it Generous. It
overcame one weakness of Tit-for-Tat, namely that when you meet a
particularly nasty opponent, you get drawn into a potentially endless and
destructive cycle of retaliation, which is bad for both sides. Generous
avoided this by randomly but periodically forgetting the last move of
its opponent, thus allowing the relationship to begin again. What Nowak
had produced, in fact, was a computer simulation of forgiveness.

Once again, the connection with the story of Noah and the Flood is
direct. After the Flood, G-d vowed: "I will never again curse the ground
for man's sake, although the imagination of man's heart is evil from his
youth; nor will I again destroy every living thing as I have done." This
is the principle of Divine forgiveness.

Thus the two great principles of the Noahide covenant are also the first
two principles to have been established by computer simulation. There is
an objective basis for morality after all. It rests on two key ideas:
justice and forgiveness, or what the sages called middat ha-din and
middat rachamim. Without these, no group can survive in the long run.

In one of the first great works of Jewish philosophy -- Sefer Emunot
ve-Deot (The Book of Beliefs and Opinions) -- R. Saadia Gaon (882-942)
explained that the truths of the Torah could be established by reason. Why
then was revelation necessary? Because it takes humanity time to arrive at
truth, and there are many slips and pitfalls along the way. It took more
than a thousand years after R. Saadia Gaon for humanity to demonstrate
the fundamental moral truths that lie at the basis of G-d's covenant
with humankind: that co-operation is as necessary as competition, that
co-operation depends on trust, that trust requires justice, and that
justice itself is incomplete without forgiveness. Morality is not simply
what we choose it to be. It is part of the basic fabric of the universe,
revealed to us by the universe's Creator, long ago.

> 1) R' S. R. Hirsch did not accept the validity of post geonic Kabbalah
> (Jewish Action Fall 1996 R' Danziger) - and that he viewed Kabbalah as
> a type of aggada."

See R' Breuer's Intro. to Horeb about R' Hirsch and Kabbalah.


> 5) R' Yisroel Salanter asserted that he was not familiar with Kabbalah
> and thus it is not relevant for the Mussar Movement

See R' Hillel Godlberg's "Israel Salanter: Text, Structure, Idea" where he
discusses the (very cogent) idea of R' Salanter and of his talmidim having
studied Kabbalah from the Leshem himself (and from others' seforim).

> 6) Chassidim view the Rambam & Moreh Nevuchim as Kabbala while
> Kabbalists believe that he accepted Kabbalah only after completing all
> his writing - and mostly everyone else rejects the idea that Rambam ever
> knew Kabbalah

Chassidim derived their perspective from early Mekuballim, most especially
from R' Abulafia (who greatly admired the Moreh and wrote a peirush to
it al pi Kabbalah) and his talmidim. I forgot who or where, but one of
the nosei keillim to the Yad wrote that Rambam came upon Kabbalah late
in life and had charatta for a lot of what he'd said as a result of not
having seen it beforehand.

> 8) Christianity is based on a distorted understanding of genuine
> kabbalistic ideas (Rabbi Akiva Tatz)

That's absurd, as Christianity only came upon kabbalistic ideas in the
Middle Ages (though some Christian *justified* their faith based on what
they then learned.)

> 10) Kabbala was given on Sinai but it eventually basically disappeared -
> to be revived by the Rabad through human intellect and then with ruach
> hakodesh and finally with the aid of Eliyahu (Shomer Emunim).

Ibn Gabbai said that Adam Harishon had the Kabbalah (In Avodas Hakodesh),
and Sefer Yetzirah (which Rabad wrote a peirush to) as well as Sefer
Bahir predated Rabad.

 - Yaakov Feldman

Zeliglaw@aol.com wrote:
>Fascinating list of Gdolim and their insights. WADR to R M Shurkin,
>RYBS certainly refers to the impact of Chabad Chasidus and especially
>many drashos re Yamim Noraim that are steeped in Chabad thinking.

You misread my list. Rav Shurkin was cited regarding the validity of
the Gra's attack on the Rambam & Rema and not regarding Rav Soloveitchik.

Regarding R' Soloveitchik - I am simply looking for a citation in his
name openly citing a Zohar or Arizal. Did he ever cite the Leshem or
Maharal? Regarding Chabad did he explicityly mention that an idea was
from Chabad or was it just an inference made by others?

Daniel Eidensohn

R. Eidenson's new volume sounds great & I have couple small points about
the propositions in his post (though others on the list certainly know
more about these than I do): Re: The Rambam & Kabbala, Avraham Abulafia
(13C) of course also wrote a commentary on the Moreh that interpreted
it in the light of his prophetic/meditative system.

Re: RYBS & Kabbala: (I assume you are talking about the 20C figure & not
the Beis HaLevy): Some sections of Halakhic Man are certainly influenced
by Kabbalistic ideas as interprreted by Tanya, and especially teh Habad
interpretation of Zimzum, as a perusal of the footnotes makes obvious:
see notes, 31, 55, 58, 59, 60,61, 65, 66, 70, 71 & accompanying text.
(How much this is connected to Classical Kabbala as distinguished from
Hassidus I'm not really qualified to say, but the Rav himself does say
that when he talks about zimzum he means the Habad idea of zimzum and
not the Classical Kabbalistic version). Also see his use of R. Haim
of Volozhin's ideas on Man as creator and destroyer (c"v) of worlds (a
constant theme in the first part of HM) which were also deeply influenced
by Kabbala.

Re: the GRA's statement, although it has been disputed in the past, I
think current scholarship considers it genuine, but I don't have any
sources to cite on it, maybe others here do.

From: "Daniel Eidensohn" <yadmoshe@012.net.il>
> I am working on volume 2 of Daas Torah - dealing with the role the human
> intellect, philosophy and Kabbalah play in halacha and hashkofa.

Are we to deduce that volume 1 is available? Where can we find copies?

[http://www.eichlers.com/details.cfm?Group_ID=288&;Product_ID=14904 -mi]

> 4) Rav Y. B. Soloveitchik made no reference to Kabbalah  <snip>

See "Uvikashtem Misham" 8:2 (pp. 168-169, esp. note 12 - which
extends to p. 172 - in the WZO edition entitled "Ish Hahalacha -
Galui v'Nistar").

> 5) R' Yisroel Salanter asserted that he was not familiar with Kabbalah
> and thus it is not relevant for the Mussar Movement

See Immanuel Etkes "Rabbi Israel Salanter and the Mussar Movement"
pp. 93-95 esp. note 10 (I have access only to the English translation,
I can't tell you the relevant pages in the original).

David Riceman 

YFel912928@aol.com wrote:
>>1) R' S. R. Hirsch did not accept the validity of post geonic Kabbalah
>>(Jewish Action Fall 1996 R' Danziger) - and that he viewed Kabbalah as
>>a type of aggada."

>See R' Breuer's Intro. to Horeb about R' Hirsch and Kabbalah.

Thank you for your responses.

I assume you are referring to Dayan Grunfeld's introduction. I found his
explanation unsatisfactory that Hirsch focused on the ethical dimension
and not the mystical dimension and that he did not reject the mystical.
Hirsch wrote in the 19 Letters 18th Letter page 267-268 '"Presently, a
form of learning!3 came into existence about which, not being initiated
in it, I dare not venture to express any opinion. However, if I properly
understand that which I . believe I do comprehend, then it is, indeed, an
invaluable repository of the spirit of the Tanach and the Talmud, but it
was also unfortunately misunderstood; the eternal progressive development
which it taught came to be considered a static mechanism, and what was to
be understood as inner perception was seen as external dreamworlds. As
this branch of learning came into being, the mind could turn either to
external sharpwitted dialectics in the study of Talmud, mentioned before,
or to this new field of study, which appealed to the emotions as well. Had
it been correctly comprehended, it might perhaps have imbued practical
Judaism with spirituality; but, as it was misconstrued, the practice of
Judaism was interpreted to be a form of magical mechanistic manipulation,
a means of influencing or resisting theosophic worlds and anti-worlds. " .

Rabbi Danziger wrote (page 63), "To Rav Hirsch (emphasis added), Kabbalah
is "an invaluable repository of the spirit of Tanach and Talmud' in the
same sense as the aggadah contains that spirit. Both in his view (i.e.,
in Rav Hirsch's view) are rhetorical and metaphorical works.".

>>6) Chassidim view the Rambam & Moreh Nevuchim as Kabbala while
>>Kabbalists believe that he accepted Kabbalah only after completing all
>>his writing - and mostly everyone else rejects the idea that Rambam ever
>>knew Kabbalah

>Chassidim derived their perspective from early Mekuballim, most especially
>from R' Abulafia (who greatly admired the Moreh and wrote a peirush to
>it al pi Kabbalah) and his talmidim. I forgot who or where, but one of
>the nosei keillim to the Yad wrote that Rambam came upon Kabbalah late
>in life and had charatta for a lot of what he'd said as a result of not
>having seen it beforehand.

Do you have an source for this assertion regarding R' Abulafia &
Chassidim? The story about the Rambam is cited by the Abarbanel and
has been researched thoroughly. Gershom Scholem wrote an article in
Tarbiz #6 page 90-98. Rav Shilat lists it as a forgery in his two volume
collection of the Rambam's letters. The Shomer Emunim accepts the story.
Migdal Oz accepts it also. The Chassidim such as the Kamarno obviously
reject the story since they assert that the Rambam's writings - especially
the Moreh Nevuchim are actually Kabbalistic works.

>>8) Christianity is based on a distorted understanding of genuine
>>kabbalistic ideas (Rabbi Akiva Tatz)

>That's absurd, as Christianity only came upon kabbalistic ideas in the
>Middle Ages (though some Christian *justified* their faith based on what
>they then learned.)

If you accept Rav Tzadok's assertion that Yashka [ and Shabtzai Tzvi]
reached very high spiritual levels before being destroyed by their belief
that they were divine - it is reasonable that Yashka was aware of the
kabbalistic ideas in the period of Chazal.

>>10) Kabbala was given on Sinai but it eventually basically disappeared -
>>to be revived by the Rabad through human intellect and then with ruach
>>hakodesh and finally with the aid of Eliyahu (Shomer Emunim).

>Ibn Gabbai said that Adam Harishon had the Kabbalah (In Avodas Hakodesh),
>and Sefer Yetzirah (which Rabad wrote a peirush to) as well as Sefer
>Bahir predated Rabad.

The fact that Kabbalah existed prior to Sinai is not relevant the issue
of whether it was revived by the Rabad after being nearly forgotten.

*********************


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