Avodah Mailing List

Volume 16 : Number 012

Friday, October 28 2005

• abuse
• Torah and communal sheleimus
• Re: Ikarei Hashkafah
• RE: Ikarei Hashkafah
• Re: Ikarei Hashkafah
• Re: Ikarei Hashkafah
• RE: Kohain gadol
• RE: Kohain gadol
• Kohain gadol
• Re: Kohain gadol
• RE: Kohain gadol
• Re: Direction for na'anuim
• Gezerot Tovot?

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> Alternatively (kindly reply to this point on Avodah) should we argue that
> Torah is a tool for sheleimus but does not guarantee it?

I don't see how you can say otherwise. The facts speak for themselves. But
to say that Torah Hashkafa is not at tool for Sheleimus would be to say
that Torah adherence will not influence behavior in a positive way which
to me seems ridiculous.

The exemplars of Torah behavior are the Gedolei HaDor. They are the one's
who observe and understand Torah better than all of us. Even they can be
flawed but I thinbk it is safe to assume that if all of us emulated thre
behavior of the truly great figures in Jewish history we would have no
abuse of any kind. Can anyone imagine any kind of abuse in the home of
a R. Yaakov, a R. Moshe, or a RYBS? These people were Shelaimim because
of Torah.

HM

In discussing abuse in the frum community, I asked how people deal with
the problem that Torah is supposed to ennoble, and yet the rates of such
aveiros is either only somewhat lower to not measurably lower than the
background populations'.

I <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
>> Alternatively (kindly reply to this point on Avodah) should we argue that
>> Torah is a tool for sheleimus but does not guarantee it?

R Harry Maryles replied (on Areivim):
> I don't see how you can say otherwise. The facts speak for
> themselves. But to say that Torah Hashkafa is not at tool for
> Sheleimus would be to say that Torah adherence will not influence
> behavior in a positive way which to me seems ridiculous.

In the last line you seem to say that it /does/ guarantee progress toward
sheleimus. Which position are you trying to espouse?

> The exemplars of Torah behavior are the Gedolei HaDor. They are the
> one's who observe and understand Torah better than all of us. Even
> they can be flawed but I thinbk it is safe to assume that if all of
> us emulated thre behavior of the truly great figures in Jewish
> history we would have no abuse of any kind. Can anyone imagine any
> kind of abuse in the home of a R. Yaakov, a R. Moshe, or a RYBS?
> These people were Shelaimim because of Torah.

To spell out, the choices I gave (which is why I didn't include them
when I moved the thread):

1 (not quoted)- What the hamon am observe isn't really Torah, and its
resemblence to Torah is distant enough that the effect on sheleimus on
a statistical level across the community is small.

2- Torah does not guarantee sheleimus; it's a tool that people can use
to seek sheleimus. However, they still have to actively seek it. This is
along the same lines as the Gra's version of mitokh shelo lishmah. A
mitzvah will only "bah lishmah" if it is at least lesheim getting
there. But total lack of kavanah will not approach lishmah.

So it could well be that the people RHM lists have that extra element.

(Leaving questioning the statistics on the margin because we left
Areivim.)

BTW, this may be akin to the question of whether Mussar is part of
halakhah (e.g. Rambam's Hil' Dei'os), underlies and is Hashem's Motivation
for halakhah (to the extent we can understand His Motivations), and/or
is a pragmatic tool for becoming the kind of person more likely to
observe halakhah.

A major nafqa mina lema'aseh -- curriculum changes. How do we raise
children who are less blighted than our generation?

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org               The Torah is complex.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                                - R' Binyamin Hecht

S & R Coffer wrote:
>>Here is one of the major points of contention between the rambam and
>>more kabbalistically inclined. That is the contention that the purpose
>>of creation was man - something that the rambam writes specifically
>>and strongly against (and others wrote strongly against the rambam on
>>this point)

>Huh? Where does the Rambam write specifically and strongly against the
>idea that man is the purpose of creation!?

*Rambam[1] (Moreh Nevuchim 3:13):* There is much confusion regarding
the question of the purpose of Creation. However, I will explain to you
how to why this question is really not a question -- according to the
different views about Creation. An agent who acts purposively must of
necessity must have a goal or reason for his actions. This is obvious and
it does not require any philosophical proof. Furthermore it is obvious
that something which has been produced purposively has changed from
non-existence to existence. Finally it is obvious and generally agreed
that that which of necessity must exist and has never been in a state of
non-existence and never will be non-existent -- does not need an agent
for its existence. Consequently one can not ask about the purpose or
cause of action concerning a being which does not need an agent. Thus we
can not ask a question as to the purpose of the existence of G-d since He
was never created. Therefore it is obvious according to these axioms that
purpose can be sought concerning anything which is produced intentionally
by an intelligent being. In other words, that which comes into existent
through an intelligent being of necessity must have gained existence for
a reason or purpose. However something which has not come into existence
from non-existence, one does not seek out the purpose for his existence.
After this introduction one can conclude that there is no basis to
seek a purpose for the universe either according to our view that the
world was created or according to the view of Aristotle that the world
is eternal... In conclusion it is necessary to accept that one should
not search for the purpose that G-d created the world but rather it is
because of G-d's Will or Divine Wisdom that He brought it into existence.

I appreciate RDE's citation of the Rambam. He cites the beginning
of 3:13, where the rambam discusses the general problem of ascribing
a tachlit. However, as some of our colleagues wish extremely explicit
proof, let me cite a little bit further in that chapter (MN 3:13),
which deals specifically with the issue at hand.

He first goes through the shitta that the world was created according
for the sake of man, and admitting that there are ma'amre hazal that
seem to support such a view, he then goes on through some logical
difficulties with this position - essentially that hashem did not need
all those other items if the sole object was man - he then concludes
from http://taupress.tau.ac.il/perplexed/chapters/chap_3_13.htm

lachen be'eynay hada'at hanechona behet'em le'emunot hatora, vehamatima
lade'ot haiyuniyot, sheeyn lehaamin shekol hanimzaim hem bishvil metziut
ha'adam ela af she'ar hanimzatim mechuvanim le'atzmam velo bishvil
davar acher.

Therefore, in my view, the correct position in accordance with the beliefs
of the torah and which fits with philosophical positions, is that one
should not believe that all that exists is for the existence of man,
but the other beings exist for themselves, and not for another reason.

Now, in terms of some aristotelian thought, it was thought that as man is
the noblest sublunar creation, the sublunar world was created for him -
a position rejected by the rambam. With regard to the stars, he views
the position that they were created for man as even more problematic

al titeh belivcha vetachshov shehagalgalim vehamalachim huvu lide
metziut bishvilenu, shehare hivhir lanu et erchenu: hen goyim kemar midli
(yeshayahu 40:15)

do not err in your heart and think that the heavenly spheres and angels
were brought into existence for our sake, because he (hashem) explained
to us our worth:

After this, all of Moreh Nevuchim 3;14 is devoted to astronomical
calculations to show how large the universe is in relation to man, to
emphasize how trivial man is in the cosmos, and therefore how ludicrous
it is to think that the world is created for man.

This is, therefore, very explicit in the rambam. Many have been bothered
by it, as it goes against a major trend in hashkafa,and speak harshly
about it - but he is quite explicit (and the rambam on many controversial
issues is not explicit), and I don't know of any who will deny this is
the rambam's position. Of course, some are willing to write the rambam
out of the realm of "hashkafa" - but that is a separate issue.

Meir Shinnar

From: "Moshe Y. Gluck" <mslatfatf@access4less.net>
> The following is an article I've been meaning to write for a long time. I
> think that something like this should be taught in every Yeshiva and Bais
> Ya'akov.

I have a friend whose comparison of his sons' and daughters' education
goes something like this: "My daughters know halacha l'maaseh much
better, but my sons are aware that there's more than one opinion about
practically everything."

The basic problem with your article is that ikkarei emunah are necessarily
incomplete; that is, every complete Jewish system is talui b'machloketh.
You have not selected ikkarim acceptable to all, instead you have tried
to summarize the Ramchal's opinion. If you teach this as a creed your
children will conclude that anyone who disagreees is an apikores, and
that's simply not true.

Now for some nitpicks within your version of Ramchal's opinion:

> Before this world existed, G-d,

You may not predicate time of God!

> a being we have no comprehension of,

If we have no comprehension of God how can you write this about Him?

> was unable to bestow anything to anyone,

Is this a limitation on God? Isn't He omnipotent?

> as there was no one to receive
> anything from Him. G-d, by His nature is a giving being,

I thought we couldn't know anything about God? I thought God was simple?
What is God's "nature"? Is it something different from God (polytheism)
or is that clause ("by His nature") meaningless? Is it appropriate to
use the same term, "being", of God and Adam (I'd keep "being" for God
and use "creature" for Adam).

> and therefore
> He decided to create a being able to accept His beneficence. Therefore,
> He created Man (Adam), to be the recipient of this goodness.

> However, in His wisdom

What is God's "wisdom"? See the questions above about His "nature".

> he felt

I hate that word. I think you mean "thought", in which case you need to
analyze it as above, but I have no idea what it means for God to "feel".

> that it was inappropriate for anyone

Including Himself? I think you mean any human being. The Ramchal presents
this as a facet of human nature, but does not (as far as I could tell
last time I thought about this question) explain why God decided to
create people this way.

> to receive something that he did not toil for. Therefore, he decided
> that man must have free will to make the choice to do G-d's desire -
> or not.

Above you said "He created Man (Adam), to be the recipient of this
goodness". Now you're qualifying that. I think you need to elaborate
(IIUC according to Ramchal its inevitable that the tikkun will occur,
and free will is just an illusion on our part).

> If Man would make the choice to do G-d's wish, then the entire
> universe would reach its ultimate goal, and Man would be able to accept
> G-d's beneficence forevermore, with no limitations.

> G-d created the universe as a temporary stopping point for Man, as the
> place where this choice would be made. This was necessary,

If God has free will how can this - or anything - be necessary?

> because G-d's
> beneficence is incompatible with free choice - for one who can experience
> the goodness of G-d cannot choose to do other than his will. Therefore,
> our universe - where G-d's beneficence can't be recognized - was the
> place for Man's choice, while G-d created a second world (a World-to-Come)
> to be the place of Man's ultimate reward.

> Adam made the wrong choice.

You need to be much more polite here.

> G-d, in his mercy,

What is God's "mercy"? See the usual list of questions above.

> decided to extend the scope
> of the world

I think this part is just plain wrong. What is the "scope" of the world
and how did God extend it? Was something previously left uncreated?

> and to give Adam's (and Eve's) descendents the opportunity
> to rectify Adam's misdeed. However, his error was so great

Politeness again.

> that it was
> not possible that it be rectified in one generation - and indeed, we are
> still working to rectify it today. The choices we make decide our own
> fate in the World-to-Come,

What is "the World-to-Come"? The truth or falsity of the above (for
Ramchal) depends on how you answer that question. You are hinting
inadequately at the problem of individuality after death and in Olam
haTiqqun.

> and influence the cosmic fate

Can the universe have some kind of fate other than "cosmic"? What's a
"cosmic fate"?

> of the universe.

> We are faced with a dilemma: How do we know if the choices we make are
> the choices we should be making?

"Dilemma" means two options.  You mean "problem".

> G-d provided for this by giving us
> a document providing a master plan for our choices, and by giving us
> a tradition as to how to interpret this document. The document is the
> Torah, and the tradition is the oral learning of the greatest Torah
> Scholars of each generation.

You are conflating two things: Torah Sheb'al Peh, which stems not from
each generation but from Sinai, and the continuing mesorah. I suspect
Ramchal would be at the anti-hiddush end of the spectrum, and would view
"the oral learning of the greatest Torah Scholars of each generation"
purely as transmission rather than innovation.

> The conclusions we can draw from this are that Man's complete purpose
> in this world is to be a recipient of G-d's goodness.

How can you draw any conclusion about (a) man's purpose or (b) this world?
What you've told us is that God's purpose is that man "be a recipient
of G-d's goodness" in the world-to-come.

> That is, to enjoy
> the pleasures of the World-to-Come. A condition to enable this is that
> Man make the proper choices in our world, so that it be appropriate for
> him to receive reward. The Torah and accompanying oral tradition teach
> us the proper choice.

David Riceman 

"S & R Coffer" <rivkyc@sympatico.ca> wrote:
> This is why when berias haolamos is discussed
> in kisvei Arizal it is represented in terms of ratzon. "And as it arose
> in His *will* to create the worlds..." because ultimately there is no
> further place to go back, in a causal sense, than the will. One does
> something because he wants to. Why does he want? Because he does. Thus,
> when discussing the purpose of the existence of our world the Medrash
> (popularized by the Tanya and brought down at the end of Nefesh haChaim)
> states, "nisaveh HKBH lihiyos lo dira bitachtonim" HKBH "desired" to have
> a resting place in the lower worlds and thus created them. The ultimate
> shoresh of this beria is Hashem's Ratzon and nothing more. Thus, the
> ultimate shoresh of the beria is unknowable and thus indefinable thereby
> resolving your question vis-a-vis Hashem's apparent lack "before" the
> beriah was created.

Ta'avah is further back than ratzon. Ratzon is a deliberate will, that
can be analysed and explained; ta'avah is a simple desire, a lust, that
originates in the non-rational parts of the brain, and therefore cannot
be explained. So while the creation "alah *birtzono*", the reason why
it did so is that "*nit'aveh* HKBH".

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

"Rich, Joel" <JRich@Segalco.com> wrote:

>> AIUI, they pretty much did die every year. Except for the rare occasions
>> when an appropriate person either bought the job, or someone bought it for
>> him (the gemara mentions one KG whose wife bought it for him, and who held
>> it for 8 years).

> If so, given the long stretch that the bayit stood, why would they keep
> trying for the job?

The taavah for power and kavod was so strong that they thought the risk
worth it.  And each one may have deluded himself that he was different,
and wouldn't die.  AIUI there were more than 300 Kohanim Gedolim during
the 2nd Bayit's 420 years, and that includes Shimon Hatzadik who was KG
for decades.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas

<<I've always assumed that in bayit sheini the kohain gadol no longer died
if he entered the kodesh kadoshim while being imperfect or they would've
died each year.  Anyone have any mesora on this? >>

Check out Yoma 9a: There were more than 300 kohanim in the bayis sheini (420
years). 4 kohanim gedolim served 141 years, so you have the other (at least)
296 kohanim in 279 years -- the average was less than a year. I understood
the gemara to mean that they died (since they are called reshaim in a
passuk), but I guess it could be they all got tamei...

>>>AIUI, they pretty much did die every year. Except for the rare occasions
>>>when an appropriate person either bought the job, or someone bought it for
>>>him (the gemara mentions one KG whose wife bought it for him, and who held
>>>it for 8 years).

> If so, given the long stretch that the bayit stood, why would they keep
> trying for the job?

Each one thought he was better than the previous ones, and that he
wouldn't die. (Which is probably a sure sign that he would die.)

 -Ken Bloom

R Ken Bloom wrote:
> Each one thought he was better than the previous ones, and that he
> wouldn't die. (Which is probably a sure sign that he would die.)

It sounds like you are confusing anavah and modesty. Moshe was anav
mikol adam, but knew his stature and unique relationship with the Borei.

:-)BBii!
-mi

> Check out Yoma 9a: There were more than 300 kohanim in the bayis sheini
> (420 years). 4 kohanim gedolim served 141 years, so you have the other
> (at least) 296 kohanim in 279 years -- the average was less than a
> year. I understood the gemara to mean that they died (since they are
> called reshaim in a passuk), but I guess it could be they all got tamei...

Or they could have been outbid.  What about those of Hasmonaic descent-
didn't they fill King and Kohain Gadol roles?

KT
Joel Rich

I wrote:
> Which makes sense, since it seems obvious that the order (whichever order
> one follows) is based on kabalah to do with the relation of the compass
> direction to the sefirot

Confession time: when I wrote that, I was aware that there existed (at
least one set of) non-Ari na'anuim, that the Nusach Ashkenaz Artscroll
described, but I had never bothered to actually read it in detail and
learn exactly what they were. I just assumed they were based on a
different shita about the symbolism of the directions.

Over yomtov, I looked at the Artscroll, and then at the Shulchan Aruch
and commentaries from which this order derives, and it turns out that
my assumption was wrong. This order (Forward, Right, Back, Left, Up,
Down) seems to have nothing to do with the characteristics of specific
compass directions, and is entirely to do with the positions relative
to the person himself. Therefore it would see that those who follow
this shita should remain facing whatever direction their shul faces,
and disregard the compass.

Whereas the AriZal's na'anuim (Really Lively Friends Understand Davenning
Backwards), are related to the compass directions, and therefore should
be performed facing east. As I pointed out earlier, the AriZal himself
would have davenned facing south (from Tzefat), so he would have had to
turn to his left in order to orient himself correctly for the na'anuim.
And so I have seen in Australia, where the shuls face north or west,
and people turn to the east for the na'anuim.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

In the addition to "Sim Shalom", nusach Sefard (following Siddur R
Amram Gaon) asks for "gezerot tovot", while nusach Ashkenaz (following
Machzor Vitri) does not. Nusach Bnei Roma also omits "gezerot tovot",
but substitutes "chen vachesed".

On Hoshana Rabba I heard someone suggest that R Amram Gaon's version
was a mistake, because there are no such things as good gezerot - that
the word "gezera" by definition means something bad. Can anyone think
of a counter example? Does the word "gezera" ever appear in Tanach or
Chazal with a good meaning?

("Bigezerat irin pitgama" is used in gemara Pesachim in a neutral way,
but it's a quote from Daniyel, and in the original pasuk the gezera is
definitely bad. The gemara is borrowing the words of the passuk to use
bederech melitza, so I don't think it can be used as a proof that the
word itself can mean something good. And in any case I think one can
argue that the gemara actually intended a slight undertone of harshness.
The same can be said for the Tanya, which borrows the expression from
the gemara, and also uses it in a context where a harsh connotation
would make sense.)

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]