Avodah Mailing List

Volume 16 : Number 011

Friday, October 28 2005

• chumrot and kulot
• Re: an unnamed rav counseling an unnamed, unmarried lady [Areivim V16 #34: "Re: Re: child abuse"]
• Re: Ikarei Hashkafah
• RE: Ikarei Hashkafah
• Re: statistics
• Re: colors in the gemara
• Re: Ikkare hashkafa
• Re: Kohain gadol
• Kohain gadol
• Kohain gadol
• RE: Kohain gadol
• RE: rabbinic misconduct
• Re: Ikarei Hashkafah

In recent daf yomi the gemara discusses that one who goes outside the
eruv on shabbat has only 4 amot. An exception is when needs a bathroom
because of kavod ha-briot.
There is a discussion of the exact parameters of this halacha. The Mishna
Berura then paskens that one should go le-chumra.

Why is this true? First of all it is only a rabbinic prohibition. Secondly
why not be machmir in kavod habriot. Reminds me of the old saying of
R. Chaim Brisk that he wasn't mekil in shabbat but machmir in pikuach
nefesh.

--
Eli Turkel

R'Avi Burstein recently noted the case of a friend who was shocked at
the method of counseling employed by a particular person whose advice
she sought yet didn't want to publicize his name. Strictly under the
banners of "Torah hi, ul'lamdah..." and of being m'lamaid z'chus, here
are some Qs/thoughts which popped into my unlearned head while reading
his Areivim post on Hosha'na Rabbah:

 - Is there any scenario under which a male advisor can (perhaps even
should) use endearing words and physical gestures with a female advisee
strictly in order to build up her self-image and confidence?

 - When a person gains first-hand knowledge of an
apparently-unquestionable halachic violation which has caused him or her
(or someone else) harm and doesn't wish to approach the presumed violator
to receive an explanation and/or apology, is that person nevertheless
required to publicize the presumed violation so as to possibly protect
others from harm by the violator? or, on the contrary, must that person
seek further information in private?

At the request of the Areivim moderator[s], this post (originally sent
a few days ago to Areivim) has been resent to Avodah. To amplify what
I wrote then, halachic sources, not opinions, are much preferred &
earnestly requested. Thanks.

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ, USA

Moshe Y. Gluck wrote:
> I have a very busy few months coming up, what with Yeshiva, work and my
> wife's illness (Sheva bas Tamar, l'refuah sheleima b'soch sha'ar cholei
> Yisroel)...

Im berakhos lirefu'ah sheleimah...

> Before this world existed, G-d, a being we have no comprehension of,
> was unable to bestow anything to anyone, as there was no one to receive
> anything from Him. G-d, by His nature is a giving being, and therefore
> He decided to create a being able to accept His beneficence. Therefore,
> He created Man (Adam), to be the recipient of this goodness.
...
> The conclusions we can draw from this are that Man's complete purpose
> in this world is to be a recipient of G-d's goodness. That is, to enjoy
> the pleasures of the World-to-Come. A condition to enable this is that
> Man make the proper choices in our world, so that it be appropriate for
> him to receive reward. The Torah and accompanying oral tradition teach
> us the proper choice.

This is pretty much Derekh Hashem 1:2. The first paragraph is an idea
also found in Emunos veDei'os by R' Saadia Gaon, and a number of baalei
machashavah in between. WADR to stories told about R' Chaim Brisker,
this is very far from a chassidishe innovation. My guess is his objection
was to this apply this to explain "ein melekh belo am", not the idea
in general. Using the idea to explain melukhah also is rejected by the
author of "Adon Olam", "asher malakh beterm kol yetzir nivra".

I would offer, though, a little embelishment:
> However, in His wisdom he felt that it was inappropriate for anyone
> to receive something that he did not toil for. Therefore, he decided
> that man must have free will to make the choice to do G-d's desire -
> or not....

It would be logically meaningless. Here's my argument:

Hashem Himself is the greatest good. And, we just concluded that He has a
"need" (kevayachol) to give. Therefore, if He wanted to give us the greatest
gift, it would be giving us the ability to be active givers, not passive
recipients. The greatest good therefore logically must be one that a person
made, rather than passively received. Passivity is unlike His Good.

This paradox, that the ultimate gift is not giving us everything, underlies
the dialectics that make up the human condition. E.g. Adam I is a creative,
active being. Adam II relies on being able to receive from G-d. Cognivitve man
-- creates. Religious man - receives. Man's most noble gift is to the
community; the community exists to provide for its members. Etc...

And of course, much can be said from REED's Qunterus haChessed based on this
giving-receiving dialectic.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org        And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (270) 514-1507

> Ikarei Hshkafah:
> Before this world existed, G-d, a being we have no comprehension of,
> was unable to bestow anything to anyone, as there was no one to receive
> anything from Him. G-d, by His nature is a giving being, and therefore
> He decided to create a being able to accept His beneficence. Therefore,
> He created Man (Adam), to be the recipient of this goodness.

IIRC R'HS in Mpninei Harav quotes R' Chaim Soloveitchik as totally
rejecting this approach because it implies something lacking in HKB"H
and that HKB"H created the world because he did (IIRC the story was he
was at someone's home and while waiting opened a sefer on the shelf of
chassidic philosophy which posited this and that HKB"H needed an am to
be melech over as "reasons")

KT
Joel Rich 

R Leonid Portnoy wrote:
> But does the picture where the benoni is left to the whims of nature
> work?

Do you really think that the Rambam's position (and that of nearly all
rishonim) would have /logical/ flaws?

But your question is misplaced. I was clear that I was not criticising
total HP as being unsound. The Besh"t is as unlikely to make that kind
of error as any of the baalei mesorah who held otherwise. Rather, my
complaint is with the popularized version. Which not only speaks of
universal and total hashgachah, but also both embraces and ignores the
question of tzadiq vera lo, both remembers in some contexts and forgets
in others the differences between sechar va'onesh and HP in general. (Not
all of hashgachah is about rewarding or punishing.)

The hamon am embrace truisms that sound good without trying to build
a consistent picture. And often it's not possible to build one --
truths pulled from opposing sides of a machloqes. Or a denial of basic
commenplace occurances -- such as the number of chozerei beteshuvah who
don't suddenly have more perfect lives. A basic lack of critical thought
when it goes beyond the domain of lomdus.

>       From a theological perspective, what is this 'whim of nature' or
> 'chance' anyway? We had this discussion before (re: hashgacha protis I
> believe), but at the end it must come out that every event in nature is
> decided/decreed by G-d (with the notable exception of bechira). To say
> that G-d throws dice to decide the benoni's fate, would be attributing
> an independent [of G-d] reality to the dice! If anything, such a picture
> would be much more theologically troubling and inconsistent with the
> rest of Judaism than the 'popular' picture, at least in my mind.

And yet, both the Kuzari and the Rambam write of "miqra". Both also speak
of "teva" as a deterministic entity that Hashem delegeates many events to.

But neither is necessary in order to say that the beinoni is subject
to teva. It could well be that the beinoni gets something done directly
by Hashem (although this runs counter to the rishonim named above), but
not what's best for him or others (even in the long run) but what fits
the rules we call "teva". His life's events are determined causally,
not teleologically.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org        And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (270) 514-1507

kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
> R' Micha Berger quoted RSRH: <<< We find only three terms to encompass
> the colors of the spectrum: adom for red, yaroq for yellow and green,
> and techeiles for blue and violet.... >>> So RSRH says No, techeiles is
> not the name of the wool, but is in fact the color of that wool.

> But if so, then where does "argaman" fit into this? If it's not the name
> of the fabric, then wouldn't it perforce be the name of the color?

Clearly RSRH is saying that techeiles is blue, argaman is purple wool.

That said, I have no idea how he holds this, as the definition of
techeiles as blue wool is assumed by chazal in defining mitzvas tzitzis.

Personally, I can take RSRH's point as being about the primary colors,
and therefore find the linguistics as being secondary. Of course, this
thread is about the linguistic issue, even if the Hirsch I cited was not
(primarily).

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org        And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (270) 514-1507

WRT to RMYG's article on ikkare hashkafa, while this reflects a common
hashkafa, it is hard for me to view it as ikkar. Two points quickly
come to mind.

RMYG writes as first sentence
> Before this world existed

Whether this even has meaning is problematic - as what is the meaning
of time in the absence of the world.

Far more problematic is the following
> 2. and therefore
> He decided to create a being able to accept His beneficence. Therefore,
> He created Man (Adam), to be the recipient of this goodness.....
> G-d created the universe as a temporary stopping point for Man, as the
> place where this choice would be made.

Here is one of the major points of contention between the rambam and
more kabbalistically inclined. That is the contention that the purpose
of creation was man - something that the rambam writes specifically
and strongly against (and others wrote strongly against the rambam on
this point)

(there are multiple other difficulties with this position, as it implies
that hashem had a lack "prior" to creation, and that we have some insight
into the divine will, and....)

This illustrates the difficulty of deciding on ikkare hashkafa beyond
the 13 ikkarim (and we already had more than our share of discussions
as to now normative they truly are).

Meir Shinnar

"Rich, Joel" <JRich@Segalco.com> wrote:
> I've always assumed that in bayit sheini the kohain gadol no longer died if
> he entered the kodesh kadoshim while being imperfect or they would've died
> each year.  Anyone have any mesora on this?

AIUI, they pretty much did die every year. Except for the rare occasions
when an appropriate person either bought the job, or someone bought
it for him (the gemara mentions one KG whose wife bought it for him,
and who held it for 8 years).

<<<I've always assumed that in bayit sheini the kohain gadol no longer
died if he entered the kodesh kadoshim while being imperfect or they
would've died each year. Anyone have any mesora on this? KT Joel Rich>>>

The term used for the chamber of the Kohanim (gedolim?)was Lishkas
Palhedrin (I think it means switching over) because there were constantly
new Kohanim. But it wasn't because they would die each year. I recall
reading in a few accounts of history (all probably based on Josephus) that
there were lots of Kohanim Gedolim walking around at the same time. Each
one would buy his way in and the next one would take over. The previous
ones still had political power and were very visible publicly.

From: "Rich, Joel" <>
> I've always assumed that in bayit sheini the kohain gadol no longer died if
> he entered the kodesh kadoshim while being imperfect or they would've died
> each year.  Anyone have any mesora on this?

I recall exactly the opposite, that they indeed died each year.

SBA

>AIUI, they pretty much did die every year. Except for the rare occasions
>when an appropriate person either bought the job, or someone bought it for
>him (the gemara mentions one KG whose wife bought it for him, and who held
>it for 8 years).

If so, given the long stretch that the bayit stood, why would they keep
trying for the job?

KT
Joel Rich

On October 27, 2005 Moshe & Ilana Sober wrote:
> This reminds me of I Shumel 2:2-27. Rashi and Radak say that "yishkavun"
> is k'mashma'o, although they also cite the midrash that bnei Eli did
> not actually have relations with the women who came to bring korbanos,
> but only delayed their return to their husbands.

> If b'nei Eli did actually take advantage of these women and had relations
> with them, some interesting questions arise. Eli had heard of this - from
> whom? If he had reliable information that his sons were... married women... 
> producing mamzerim - why did he consider some rather gentle words of mussar
> "lo tovah hashmuah asher anochi shomea maavirim am H'" sufficient? "Lo
> tovah" is a bit of an understatement here, no? 

Well, you answered your own question. The Gemara (Shabbos 51) says
"anyone who says the sons of Eli sinned is in error" and thus, whatever
their infraction, it didn't involve the production of mamzeirim chs'v. In
fact the Ralbag (in addition to several proofs recorded in the Gemara)
proves, from the lack of criticism, that their aveira could not have
been eishes ish. What Rashi possibly means to say is that some elements
in klal Yisrael (disgruntled husbands?) may have been circulating some
inappropriate rumours about the bnei Eli and thus the pasuk says that
Eli heard these things. Hence Rashi's pirush (kimashmao: v'Rabboseinu
pirshu...) as if to say that this is what Eli heard but the truth is that
they didn't sin. As far as the Radak is concerned, I don't understand
how he deals with the Gemara in Shabbos.

> Relevant to our case because it shows that (1) big rabbis can commit
> very serious aveiros and (2) the system doesn't always work to prevent
> this - their own father was basically a tzadik, and the kohen gadol,
> and yet he did not do anything effective to prevent this abuse.

You obviously were never exposed to Slobodka mussar or you wouldn't be
talking like this. Firstly, "big rabbis" today can in no way be compared
to "big rabbis" of yesteryear. This is precisely why the Gemara goes out
of its way to say that anyone who thinks that Reuven, bnei Eli, Dovid,
Shlomo etc. sinned is in error. True the pesukim seem to indicate
that they sinned but this is only lefi madreigasam, according to their
incredibly lofty spiritual level hence the terminology "error" in the
Gemara. The error is that we are comparing our level to theirs and thus
assuming that the sin outlined in the pesukim is literal when in fact
this is the furthest thing from the truth (based on Michtav MeEliyahu
Vol. 1 pg. 161 and Rejoice O Youth pg.174 and countless maamarim in
Chochma U'mussar (the Alter of Kelm) Daas Chochma U'mussar (R' Yerucham
Levovitz) and Mishnas R' Aharon (R' Aharon Kotler).

Second of all, Eli was exceedingly old (v'Eyli zaken meod) and lacked the
strength to chastise his sons and ensure their proper behaviour. Besides,
the pasuk states that Hashem hardened his son's hearts so they wouldn't
listen to their father so what do you want from Eli? The truth is that
as far as we're concerned Eli was beyond reproach. If it wouldn't be
that the pasuk assigned some blame to Eli, we would have no right to
say anything against him. Now that these great men are taken to task,
our job is to understand that we are to take a lesson *on our level* and
yet understand that the blame assigned is not literal and only applies on
a dakusdic level according to their elevated status. (see Malbim pasuk
23). Thus, although you may be right about some of the shortcomings of
our generation, comparing them to previous generations, especially those
of antiquity, with comments such as "their own father was basically a
tzadik, and the kohen gadol, and yet he did not do anything effective
to prevent this abuse." reveals what I believe to be a misunderstanding
in the appropriate interpretation of the sins of Klal Yisrael's great
people of antiquity.

Simcha Coffer

On October 27, 2005 Meir Shinnar wrote:
> WRT to RMYG's article on ikkare hashkafa, while this reflects a common
> hashkafa, it is hard for me to view it as ikkar. Two points quickly
> come to mind.

> RMYG writes as first sentence
>> Before this world existed

> Whether this even has meaning is problematic - as what is the meaning
> of time in the absence of the world.

None, and despite that it is a commonly used phrase amongst all baalei
machshava and mikubalim. In fact, it is used by Chazal themselves. Thus
we find statements such as "Torah kadma labriah", 'tishuva kadma labria"
gan eden, gehinom etc.

There a two explanations for this. The first is that we are using
anthropomorphic terminology to describe an essentially spiritual reality
due to our lack of ability to describe it in more accurate terms.

The second, more profound reason is that the concept of kadimus does
not necessarily have to denote precedence in the dimension of time
alone. It can also relate to precedence in terms of significance, of
importance. When viewed in this context, the kadimus of the Torah, for
instance, would relate to its significance as the blueprint upon which
the world was established. Since the world is only an outgrowth of the
reality of the Torah, it is considered to come "after" the Torah in terms
of importance. Causal items are also viewed as preceding consequential
things and thus Yisrael is portrayed as preceding the Beria because they
were its raison detre, its cause for existence.

> Far more problematic is the following
>> 2. and therefore
>> He decided to create a being able to accept His beneficence. Therefore,
>> He created Man (Adam), to be the recipient of this goodness.....
>> G-d created the universe as a temporary stopping point for Man, as the
>> place where this choice would be made.

> Here is one of the major points of contention between the rambam and
> more kabbalistically inclined. That is the contention that the purpose
> of creation was man - something that the rambam writes specifically
> and strongly against (and others wrote strongly against the rambam on
> this point)

Huh? Where does the Rambam write specifically and strongly against the
idea that man is the purpose of creation!?

> (there are multiple other difficulties with this position, as it implies
> that hashem had a lack "prior" to creation,

This piece in the Ramchal (Derech Hashem Chelek Aleph chapter 1 and 2)
must be taken with a grain of salt. He is here referring to the tachlis
haberia as is able to be conceived by us. This is referred to later in DH
and in Daas Tevunos as hanhagas schar vaonesh. However, there is a deeper,
unknowable shoresh for the existence of the beriah referred to as hanhagas
haTikkun or hanhagas haAchdus. This, the Ramchal states, is unknowable
even to the greatest neveim. This is why when berias haolamos is discussed
in kisvei Arizal it is represented in terms of ratzon. "And as it arose
in His *will* to create the worlds..." because ultimately there is no
further place to go back, in a causal sense, than the will. One does
something because he wants to. Why does he want? Because he does. Thus,
when discussing the purpose of the existence of our world the Medrash
(popularized by the Tanya and brought down at the end of Nefesh haChaim)
states, "nisaveh HKBH lihiyos lo dira bitachtonim" HKBH "desired" to have
a resting place in the lower worlds and thus created them. The ultimate
shoresh of this beria is Hashem's Ratzon and nothing more. Thus, the
ultimate shoresh of the beria is unknowable and thus indefinable thereby
resolving your question vis-a-vis Hashem's apparent lack "before" the
beriah was created.

Parenthetically, the Ramchal states that hanhagas hatikkun and hanhagas
schar vaonesh do not contradict each other. In fact, they compliment
each other.
>
> and that we have some insight
> into the divine will, 

What's the problem with that? The Torah is a revelation of the Divine
Will as it can be understood by man. Obviously the ultimate essence of
Hashem's Will is unknowable. But like I heard Rav Avigdor Miller once say,
"the Torah is what Hashem wants us to think that he is thinking"

> This illustrates the difficulty of deciding on ikkare hashkafa beyond
> the 13 ikkarim (and we already had more than our share of discussions
> as to now normative they truly are).

At the risk of being blasted by the righteously indignant, I propose
that the first four perakim of the first chelek in Derech Hashem are
indispensable to the proper understanding of hashkafas haYahadus whereas
the 13 ikkarim are not necessarily indispensable (although one must
be aware of these ikkarim in order to possess the halachic title of a
Jew). BTY, IIRC six of the Rambam's ikkarim are represented in the first
perek alone.

[Email #2. -mi]

On October 27, 2005, Micha Berger wrote:
> This is pretty much Derekh Hashem 1:2. The first paragraph is an idea
> also found in Emunos veDei'os by R' Saadia Gaon, and a number of baalei
> machashavah in between. WADR to stories told about R' Chaim Brisker,
> this is very far from a chassidishe innovation. My guess is his objection
> was to this apply this to explain "ein melekh belo am", not the idea
> in general. Using the idea to explain melukhah also is rejected by the
> author of "Adon Olam", "asher malakh beterm kol yetzir nivra".

I doubt R' Chaim objected but if he did it might have been because the
book he was perusing misrepresented the idea of nahama d'kisufa etc. as
the sole reason for creation when in fact it is merely the most profound
reason *we* can relate to. As far as your comment re ein melech bilo am,
once you assume the reason of hatavas Hashem lizulaso, you have already
incorporated within your reasoning the idea that there seems to be some
kind of lack kaviyachol in the Shechina which necessitates the existence
a beriah. Consequently, however one chooses to resolve this dichotomy
is ultimately able to be applied to ein melech bilo am also.

I choose to understand ein melech etc. and "asher malach biterem kol etc."
using a combo of the Shelah hakadosh and the Maharal. Melech in this
context means absolute control and thus, Hashem was, is and will always
be in absolute control (Shelah). Maharal adds that after the beriah was
created, the concept of "am" was necessary in order to maintain this
control in the new circumstances as the Shechina, inasmuch as it is one,
is only nisaleh (i.e. elevated via our increasingly qualitative perception
of the Shaechina as the Master Controller) when we are biachdus.

Simcha Coffer   

*********************


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