Avodah Mailing List

Volume 15 : Number 063

Wednesday, August 3 2005

• Re: Maximum time for Tosfos Shabbos
• Fw: holy body
• eruv in brooklyn avodah/vol14
• Is the World Good?
• [hirhurim] [Hirhurim - Musings] Addictive Behavior
• RSRH on 17 Tammuz
• spiders
• Chassidim-Misnagdim
• Davening at Kevorim and Catholics
• Re: harry potter and kishuf
• Re: harry potter and kishuf
• [hirhurim] [Hirhurim - Musings] Women Learning Gemara
• Shu"t Besamim Rosh
• Re: Rabbinic law and spirituality
• Re: Rabbinic law and spirituality
• Re: Maximum time for Tosfos Shabbos
• Re: Chassidim-Misnagdim
• Re: harry potter and kishuf
• Re: harry potter and kishuf
• Re: Pri Megodim on Lag B'Omer
• Re: harry potter and kishuf
• Re: Chassidim-Misnagdim
• Re: Chassidim-Misnagdim

In Avodah V15 #42, I had asked: <<< We all know that one can extend
Shabbos for many hours past tzeis if one so wishes, and accomplishes the
mitzvah of lengthening Shabbos thereby. But I once heard that there is a
limit. Just like it's not possible to begin Shabbos any earlier than Plag
on Friday, so too it is not possible to extend it further than chatzos
on Motzaei Shabbos. Further, IIRC, if one does extend his Shabbos that
long, once chatzos passes he can do melacha without saying any kind of
havdala (not even Baruch HaMavdil) because that time is inherently chol,
just like prior to Plag on Friday. >>>

R"n Toby Katz asked <<< If anyone answered RAM's question I missed it,
but is it not the case that one can make havdala until Tuesday? (And that
if for some reason you didn't make havdala before then, you have to?) >>>

RTK is correct about havdala - and in fact we'll all be using that halacha
in two weeks, when we make havdala on Sunday night Motzaei Tisha B'Av.

But my question is on a totally different point (which did *not* get
answered, BTW). I'll restate it now, in the hopes it might attract
more attention.

RTK's point is specifically about Havdala Al Hakos, which is still an
obligation even if a person said Baruch Hamavdil. My question concerns
how far the obligation of Barcuh Hamavdil lasts.

Note these examples: (A) If it is Saturday night, and the stars are
already out, but one has not said Baruch Hamavdil, he is not allowed to do
melacha. (B) If it is Thursday, then even if one has not said any sort of
Havdala at all, neither Al Hakos nor Baruch Hamavdil or any other thing,
he *IS* allowed to do melacha, because the connection to last Shabbos
is already severed.

My question is: At what point do we switch from A to B? At what point does
melacha become allowed without Havdala? What is the maximum legth that
one can stretch Shabbos until? Is it midnight Saturday? Is it Sunday
morning? Is it Tuesday evening? There HAS to be a point somewhere,
and I wonder what it is.

Akiva Miller

From: Minden <>
> Is there a (Jewish) tradition for the concept of holiness in the mortal
> relics of exceptional personalities?

{from the top of my head..)

"Likedoshim asher ba'aretz heimoh..."?

SBA

From: shayh.director@att.net
> Concerning Reb Moshe Feinstein's novel ruling about eruvin in
> Brooklyn...                            His ruling is against the Shulchan
> Aurach... "Sefer Eruv Vhotzah" was reprinted 25 years ago.
> They ruled, oceans and rivers, surronding Manhatten, are like walls
> around it. This ruling applys to Brooklyn as well....

So what's the shiur for rivers and oceans??
Like Australia is completely surrounded by oceans does that mean one
can carry everywhere?

And then of course EVERY island and continent is.
Eppes shtimt nisht..

SBA

> One possibility is
> that we consider the good of the world to outweigh the bad because
> our survey of the world has demonstrated this to be the case.
> According to the Rambam, the preponderance of the good is
> questioned only by the ignorant populace...

Where is there is source at all in Torah that considers this world good?
It is called, "Emek HaBachah" (Valley of Tears), "Olam HaChoshech"
(World of Darkness) and other such terms. Stating that the world is
""good" or "bad" as a fact is completely subjective. Some people are
naturally optimistic and some are naturally pessimistic and each see
the world accordingly.

brent kaufman 

Is it permissible to become addicted to something?

Regarding smoking marijuana, R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggeros Moshe</i>,
Yoreh De'ah 3:35) wrote:....

[See http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2005/08/addictive-behavior.html for
the rest of the post. -mi]

I just started reading The Collected Writings of RSRH last week, and
I'm just blown away by his ideas and presentation. I wish I had read
it sooner!

Here's one thing that struck me though, page 285 of Vol. 1 (first
essay on Tammuz):

    From time to time in the course of the centuries God allowed His
    people ever and anon to touch the earth again. He put it to the
    test to see whether it had become ripe for the external Torah-state
    on earth, whether the miracle of its existence through centuries
    of Galuth had at length taught it to despise utterly the gods of
    the earth, whether at last the experience of these wonders had
    eradicated from its obstinacy which was ingrained in it as in all
    men and which prevented it from acknowledging completely the power
    of the Divine word -- ?�?�?� ?�?�?�?� -- whether it had at length
    learnt to devote itself unreservedly and exclusively to the Torah,
    and whether it could preserve this devotion, which had never become
    alien to it in the Galuth, also in freedom and in abundance and in
    independence and power.

    But Israel had up to now always given signs that it has not yet
    reached this point. True, it has shown that it no longer fears the
    journey through the desert, and that, while having no footing on
    the earth, it can commit itself with cheerful confidence to the
    celestial wings of its Divine Law. But it has also shown that it
    still has reason to fear the ground, that as soon as it touches the
    soil and thinks that it has firm ground under its feet it runs the
    danger of abandoning the Divine Law and revering as gods, alongside of
    the Torah of its God, the political independence, the social freedom
    and the civil rights which this soil provides. It runs the danger of
    devoting its life to them and finding room for the Torah only in its
    synagogues, committing afresh all the old sins which brought on it
    the ?�?�?�?�?�, the destruction of its state and temple. And again
    and again God has straightway allowed this soil to vanish from under
    its feet. And He has again in such cases committed it to the celestial
    wings of His Torah. And He will sustain it and teach it until it has
    finally reached its full and lasting maturity, and until all the old
    errors shall have been abandoned and all the old mistakes atoned for,
    and the word will be fulfilled by which after the restoration of the
    tables of the testimony the eternal covenant of God was concluded with
    Israel -- ?�?�?� ?�?� ?�' ?�?�?�?�?�?� ?�?� ?�?� ?�?�?� ?�?�?� ?�?�?�
    ?�???�?�?� ?�?�?�?�?�?� ?�?�?�?�?�?�?�?� ?�?�?�?�?�?�?� (Exodus 34,
    9) -- that God will walk with us in the midst of our wrongdoing and
    though we are a hard people to train up, yet He will grant forgiveness
    to our sins and backsliding, until we at length fall into His arms
    wholly and unreservedly, as His own everlasting inheritance.

--Russell

> One of my father's favorite bed time stories was about how Dovid (yet
> to become King) was saved from capture by hiding in a cave and a spider
> weaving a web to made it look uninhabited.
> As a result, we try not to kill spiders - a lesson in hakoras hatov.
...
> Any know of a "mekor" for the story and its lesson?

I looked it up many years for an article I wrote. Unfortunately I am
on travel. What I do remember is that this is from a medrash that was
authored in medieval times.

Eli Turkel

 I was asked by a talmid at Ohr Somayach to compile a list of 
distinctions between Chassidim and Misnagdim. I put it in table form, so 
I cannot reproduce it for Avodah. The list is too short and sharp to be 
accurate, but take it as a springboard. The middos used for comparison 
purposes are taken from the Table of Contents of Otzaros HaMussar by R' 
Moshe Tzuriel shlita. Please take a look and comment, either here or in 
in the blog comments section.

http://rygb.blogspot.com/2005/08/chassidim-and-misnagdim_01.html

KT,
YGB

|From: "brent" <fallingstar613@hotmail.com>
> I've always wondered about this. At kevarim, and especially Kever Rachel,
| people daven to the tzaddik who is there and ask for them to intervene.
| Who hasn't heard people yelling, "Mama Ruchel, Mama Ruchel!!!.... "
| This is very disconcerting for many baalei teshuva that are familiar
| with Catholicism....

I guess I just don't know enough about Catholicism to pinpoint what could
be bothering these people. As you described what the yidden davening
said it doesn't seem to be a problem. "Ask for them to intervene",
"ask her to beg for rachamim for them", it seems that they're asking
Rochel Imanu to daven for them. As far as I know no one holds that's
a problem. And if this is similar to something that the Catholics do,
well maybe they are imitating us. After all, we are around longer, no?

KT,
MSS 

From: "brent" 
> I've always wondered about this. At kevarim, and especially Kever Rachel,
> people daven to the tzaddik who is there and ask for them to intervene.
> Who hasn't heard people yelling, "Mama Ruchel, Mama Ruchel!!!.... "
> This is very disconcerting for many baalei teshuva that are familiar
> with Catholicism....
> The Kohain Gadol also does something similar to this. He acts as an
> intermediary between us and Hashem on Yom Kippur and davens for kapara
> and rachamim for Klal Yisrael.

I'm not sure that this is really analogous. I know that someone pointed
out the difference between a living tzadik praying on your behalf vs. a
deceased one. Even if you say they are similar, the Torah has given the
c.g. a unique status to represent us. Is there any obligation to believe
that supplicating Rachel emainu is appropriate? My intuition would
be that it's actually better to distance geirim from such activities.
I know a ger who was raised Catholic (?) and switched from Chabad to
Sephardi because of the messianism. He told me of a midrash (?) that
geirim used to move to the side of Israel which was farthest from their
country of origin, so as to minimize backsliding. I believe that he
felt a similar need to avoid messianists.

RBK wrote:
>> it would seem from the Rambam's ikkarim that asking somehting that can
>> be confused with being a middleman between oneself and HQBH is prohibited
>> for more fundamental reasons than kishuf. Or is kishuf a toladah?

> I've always wondered about this. At kevarim, and especially Kever Rachel,
> people daven to the tzaddik who is there and ask for them to intervene.

Well, the Gra -- whose shitah I was exploring -- specifically prohibits
this. He limits davening at a qeiver to using the environment and niftar
there are inspiration for one's tefillos, and is quite firm that one
may NOT say "pray for me".

...
> The Kohain Gadol also does something similar to this. He acts as an
> intermediary between us and Hashem on Yom Kippur and davens for kapara
> and rachamim for Klal Yisrael.

The kohein is a sheli'ach, not a conduit. Moreso, he's a part, not an
external. Your question can be compared to asking how one's leg can gain
from the zechus of tying a tefillin onto your arm. Kelal Yisrael gains
kaparah through the action of that part of it called "the kohein gadol".

MPoppers@kayescholer.com wrote:
>> According to NhC ch. 2, making a berakhah is connecting the mevorakh to
>> the Shoresh of all shefa. It's very much a metaphysical "something".

> But that's also true when one says, "Boruch Atah H'...," not just when
> one says, "Bor'chuni l'shalom" (or asks any other non-Divine entity
> l'voraich on one's behalf), and surely the former activity doesn't
> qualify as kishuf by anyone's definition.

I'll try to clarify by reiterating the shaqla vetarya so far:

The problem we were discussing was RZSero's idea that "asking or
commanding sheidim (and other non-Hashem entities) to do something"
would be kishuf. I asked about "borekhuni leshalom" would qualify, mostly
because I was intrigued with the possibility of linking kishuf to the
5th ikkar (about not worshipping intermediaries). Borkhuni leshalom is
not to be said according to those who stick more closely to the Rambam.

RZSero's reply that a berakah isn't "doing anything". As you reinforce
my statement, yes it is. Therefore, when one is asking mal'achim (which
are non-Hashem entities) to make a berakhah it would qualify by his
definition, but when one does it oneself, it wouldn't fit the definition.

RAMiller's answer to my initial question was that they aren't coerced to
give the berakahah, and in fact can choose not to. Therefore, I'm simply
making a request, much like requesting from a person. A reduced version
of RZS's definition of kishuf, limiting it to only in cases of compulsion.

His comparison to human beings highlights my suggested connection to the
5th ikkar. In most hashkafos (Breslov and L may be exceptions) people are
not percieved as intermediaries. Mal'achim and other non-physical denizens
do pose that risk. Deceased souls end up in a gray area, therefore.

I'd like to add another nequdah to the dialogue now. Mal'achim have
no bechirah chafshi. Is anything they do not compelled? Is there a
difference between a request and compulsion since they can't, in truth,
decide otherwise than they did?

Moving on to RSBA's contribution, he asked about the "ish" that Yaaqov
blackmailed into giving him a berakhah. I replied that this is not
actually a question on RSZA's definition of kishuf, or my suggesting
that this definition derives from the 5th ikkar, but on the Gra's broad
understanding of what the ikkar prohibits. How can the Gra prohibit
asking angels to pray for you if Yaaqov avinu a"h did so? I didn't have
a teirutz, though.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (270) 514-1507

I. The Prohibition

The Mishnah (Sotah 20a) quotes R. Eliezer who states that one who
teaches his daughter Torah is as if he had taught her tiflus (I'll
leave that untranslated and we can just assume that it is a bad
thing). The Shulhan Arukh (Yoreh De'ah 246:6) quotes this law and
...
The conclusion is that there are four areas within this law:
...

[ Much more can be found at
<http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2005/08/women-learning-gemara.html> -mi]

As far as I know, everyone agrees that Shu"t Besamim Rosh was a forgery by
R. Shaul Berlin (who printed the sefer and claimed that he was printing
an ancient ksav yad of the Rosh). So why is it that many modern sefarim
(e.g., Piskei Tshuvos, siman 168 n. 58) continue to cite the Besamim
Rosh? I note that Rav Ovadia Yosef in Yabia Omer chelek 8 Eh"E siman 12
paragraph 10 (and in other places) states (citing previous achronim)
that although Besamim Rosh is a forgery, this means just that his
statements as to what various rishonim held are to be ignored, but his
views are to be taken seriously. Is it that they consider him to be
a posek who influenced psak halacha even though he was dissembling?
Or that he was a talmid chacham who had a weakness for lying, but we
"throw away the peel and eat the fruit inside?"

Kol tuv,
Moshe

[R' Saul Mashbaum:]
> Rabbinically non-kosher food consumed b'heter would not induce timtum
> halev according to either side of the chakira.

I wanted to say that I truly enjoyed this chakirah. It strikes me, though,
that there might also be the possibility that when G-d decreed pork to
be not kosher, that this affected its ontological state regardless of
whether or not eating it is necessary, and hence permissible.

R Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> The Leshem in fact claims that the basis for the BHG citing rabbinic
> laws was because there is no difference between doreissa and derabbonon
> laws. Both are the direct word of G-d without any mediation of human
> intellect.

Obviously even according to the Leshem they must be different. Otherwise,
why did we coin the two names (three, if divrei soferim qualify as a
middle state)? Why do the oneshim differ?

So the question becomes how do they differ. It would seem that the only
difference is the time of giving. Why is that of such great impact?

> *Leshem(2:4:19): *"The critical point is that every Jew is obligated to
> belief with perfect faith that all which is found in the words of our
> Sages -- both in halacha, Talmudic agada and medrashim -- are in their
> entirety the words of the living G-d....

Does this include the science upon which they pasqened? Not that which one
can say (following the Ramchal) was meant as mashal, but actual din. Does
the :ashem hold that the abiogenesis of kinim is "divrei E-lokim Chaim"?

If so, score one for the literalists!

...
> However such an assertion is incompatible with both the Rambam and the
> Ramban.

So the non-literalists would still have al mi lismoch, if you can handle
being on the Rambam's and Ramban's shoulds.



R Saul Mashbaum wrote:
> R. Asher Weiss in Michat Asher - Vayikra - Parshat Shmini has an
> interesting chakira on kashrut and timtum halev: What is the cause, and
> what is the result? Is food non-kosher because it induces timtum halev,
> or does timtum halev derive from the non-kosher nature of the food?...

This looks like the flipside of my old (posted repeatedly) conundrum
about the protection of mezuzos? Are we chayavim to hang mezuzos (at
least in part) because the ezem davar causes protection, or does the
protection derive (as sechar) from the tzivui?

...
> The nakfa mina is clear: what if one ate non-kosher food permissibly,
> because of pikuach nefesh? If it is the food itself because of its
> essential nature which causes timtum halev, this would presumably be
> true even b'oness.

To continue the parallel: a flawed mezuzah wouldn't provide protection.

>                     If it is the aveira which causes the timtum, then if
> the food is consumed b'heter, no timtum would result....

And if the mezuzah were checked as required and happened to be kosher,
no loss of protection would result.

The question of eating tarfus for piqu'ach nefesh might also involve
hutrah vs dechuyah. One might be oveir be'oneis, or perhaps not oveir
anything.

...
> I believe that there is an additional nafka mina. It seems to me that the
> question of timtum halev and rabbinically non-kosher food can turn on
> this chakira. If the timtum is based on the intrinsic qualities of the
> food, which caused the Torah to forbid it, then rabbinically forbidden
> food, lacking these qualities, would not have this effect....

Unless the rabbinic prohibition changes the essence of the food. WRT
HQBH, it's impossible to say which came first, which is cause and which
effect. But for a derabbanan, one could say that the takanah caused
a change in the etzem davar. Thus the timtum haleiv is not "only" the
onesh for being oveir a lav, but because the lav changed the nature of
such food.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (270) 514-1507

[Rn Toby Katz:]
> If anyone answered RAM's question I missed it, but is it not the case
> that one can make havdala until Tuesday? (And that if for some reason
> you didn't make havdala before then, you have to?)

Unfortunately, I have no access to my sforim b/c we're in the middle of a
move. However, I learned the S.A. on this just this week. I believe that
he says that it's till Tues. but there's an opinion that you only have
Sunday. The M.B. explains (I believe) that this is b/c you either hold
that the first three days work due their affiliation with the previous
Shabbos, or you stick to Sunday b/c a halakhich day begins with the night.
Interestingly, though, I believe you omit the spices and ner. If you
look at the Channukah sugyah in Shabbos, there's a story related to this,
but I don't recall if it's only regarding lighting early before Shabbos.

From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org>
> I was asked by a talmid at Ohr Somayach to compile a list of
> distinctions between Chassidim and Misnagdim.

Several comments:

1. Is this sociology or theory? I think some fit into each category.

2. You don't distinguish between mussar influenced misnagdim, misnagdim
who are mekubbalim, and other misnagdim.

3. You don't distinguish between different types of hassidim (wholesale
vs. retail, Kotzk vs. non-Kotzk).

4. Certainly there's a lot of overlap between Maharalniks (e.g. Rabbis
Kook, Dessler, and Hutner) and Hassidim.

5. Nothing about the role of the rebbe?

David Riceman

Mendel Breitstein <mendelbreitstein@yahoo.com> wrote:
> I'm not sure that this is really analogous. I know that someone pointed
> out the difference between a living tzadik praying on your behalf vs. a
> deceased one. Even if you say they are similar, the Torah has given the
> c.g. a unique status to represent us. Is there any obligation to believe
> that supplicating Rachel emainu is appropriate?

Yirmiyahu hanavi's description of Rochel Imenu crying for her children,
and many midrashim about the Avos at the time of the churban, seem to
indicate that this is an idea which is quite old and well established.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

On Tue, Aug 02, 2005 at 07:43:18PM +0000, Gershon Dubin wrote:
: Yirmiyahu hanavi's description of Rochel Imenu crying for her children,
: and many midrashim about the Avos at the time of the churban, seem to
: indicate that this is an idea which is quite old and well established.

But the extrapolation from the fact that they are crying to the notion
of asking them to do so for us, using a prayer-like format no less,
could well be "new" (as Jewish tradition measures time).

-mi

RSBA wrote back on May 26th:
> Whilst perusing the MB re haircuts on Lag B'Omer it was interesting to
> see the Biur Halocho [493:3] cite the Pri Megodim:
> "...yom echad meihem [ie - yemei hasefireh] yesh lehokel
> ...ubochru beyom Lag B'Omer, ve'ulay me'eizeh taam..."

> No mention at all about Rashbi !

Maybe we can build a leshitaso. The PM explains WRT Chanukah that the
military victory was too close to teva to celebrate, as koferim can deny
the Yad Hashem in it. Perhaps he bichlal won't change the calendar for
teva and near-teva events. Availus, OTOH...

It would be interesting to see if the PM says something about public
yahrzeits in general.

-mi

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 02, 2005 at 07:43:18PM +0000, Gershon Dubin wrote:
>: Yirmiyahu hanavi's description of Rochel Imenu crying for her children,
>: and many midrashim about the Avos at the time of the churban, seem to
>: indicate that this is an idea which is quite old and well established.

> But the extrapolation from the fact that they are crying to the notion
> of asking them to do so for us, using a prayer-like format no less,
> could well be "new" (as Jewish tradition measures time).

The former, maybe. The latter, no. The formulations include appeals to
the Avos and Imahos to plead on our behalf.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

"Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org> wrote:
>  I was asked by a talmid at Ohr Somayach to compile a list of 
> distinctions between Chassidim and Misnagdim. I put it in table form, so 
> I cannot reproduce it for Avodah. The list is too short and sharp to be 
> accurate, but take it as a springboard. 

Here are some of my thoughts. 

Although you alluded to it somewhat, I think you missed an essential
point of difference, the concept of the Rebbe as the closest connection
to God... the very conduit to Deveikus, without whom it would be nearly
impossible to acheive. The concept of a Rebbe is indispensible to
Chasidus. The reliance on the Rebbe in all matters of life... and the
extreme honor paid to him as a near God-like figure is a common element
to Chasidim of all stripes. And importantly, one becomes a Rebbe primarily
(if not exclusively) through Yichus, usually a son.

Eventhough Breslov has been without one for many generations, I believe
they are the exception that proves the rule. The only other group
without a Rebbe is Chabad and only recently became "Chasidim withiout a
Rebbe". Many Lubavitcher Chasidim feel he is either still alive or that
his reappearnce as Moshiach is so imminent that his relatively recent
Petirah (or disappearance from the scene) is either irrelevent or some
sort of signal of his imminent arrival.

Misnagdim have no such comparble figure as a Rebbe. The honor and respect
and loyalty for a Rosh Yeshiva is on the level one would have of any great
religious knowledgeable figure and is usually based more on intellectual
rather than emotional considerations. In the world of Misnagdim, the
concept of a Gadol is what is valued. And a Gadol is generally accepted as
such by consensus of many disparate yeshiva groups and it is almost always
based on merit, not on Yichus. For example R. Aharon Kotler became a Gadol
precisely through his own merit and did not inherit the position. When
He was Niftar, R. Moshe Feinstein became the Gadol Hador.. also, through
merit. He did not inherit his postion either. And a Gadol is usually is
universally honored by virtually all Misngdim. But to a Chasid, such
honr goes to their own Rebbe, each Chadidc group with a different one
(although they usually repsect other great Rebbes as well).

I suppose this has something to do with the emphasis of Deveikus by
Chasidim versus the emphasis on learning by Misnagdim. Deveikus implies
more of an emotional component. Ideas like Kedusha get more play by
Chasidim than they do by Misnagdim. Misnagdim, who rely more on the
intellectual component tend to therefore look to the learnedness of the
individual rather then the "holiness".

Then there is the idea of seperateness. In this, Chasidim also tend to
be far more oreitned to appearances. They value looking a certain way far
more than do Misnagdim (Although Misngdim value this as a concept too, it
isn't anywhere near the degree to which Chasidim do). I base this on my
own observations but it should be obvious to anyone. Chasidim wear very
distinctive clothing designed to look distinct and very different than
anyone else, specifically people in general culture. The purpose is to
separate oneself as much as possible from the surrounding culture. This
is done not only with clothing but with speech as well. Most Chasidem
learn english as a second leanguage and are discouraged to learn it too
well. They consider it too assimilationist.

These are a few of the things which come to mind off the cuff.

HM

David Riceman wrote:
>> I was asked by a talmid at Ohr Somayach to compile a list of
>> distinctions between Chassidim and Misnagdim.

> Several comments:

> 1. Is this sociology or theory? I think some fit into each category.

True.

> 2. You don't distinguish between mussar influenced misnagdim, misnagdim
> who are mekubbalim, and other misnagdim.

True.

> 3. You don't distinguish between different types of hassidim (wholesale
> vs. retail, Kotzk vs. non-Kotzk).

True.

> 4. Certainly there's a lot of overlap between Maharalniks (e.g. Rabbis
> Kook, Dessler, and Hutner) and Hassidim.

True.

> 5. Nothing about the role of the rebbe?

It's below the table in the additional points.

KT,
YGB

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