Avodah Mailing List

Volume 15 : Number 041

Thursday, June 30 2005

• Re: SheLo Asani Isha
• Metaphysical causality other than sechar va'nesh
• re: TIDE
• re: TIDE
• learning in bathroom
• Re: Manna
• [Hirhuim] The Spies and the News
• ksv vs. kvs
• Territorial compromise
• Re: hechsharim
• Re: [Hirhurim] Downloading Music
• [Hirhurim] Abortion IV
• Re: learning in bathroom
• Misdemeanors and dina demalkhusa
• Re: SheLo Asani Isha
• [Hirhurim] Spectator Sports
• re: TIDE
• [Aspaqlaria] Tzitzis, Advance and Retreat

On Sun, Jun 26, 2005 at 10:03:07AM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
:> Already answered. We are enjoined to understand what we can of why He
:> created, and there is a commonly given answer from across the hashkafic
:> spectrum.

: I'm not sure how this answers my questions. To understand what we can
: just means that we can't really answer to our satisfaction which then
: leaves the question unanswered.

It means that we acknowledge the notion of "it is the nature of Good
to have whom to be good" as a partial answer to why we exist, but also
a solid enough peice of the answer that numberous ballei mesurah were
willing to use it to reason further.

:> In order for that answer to make sense, we must understand how Hashem
:> is meitiv us. Even WRT sechar va'onesh, and therefore of the mitzvos
:> that earn us that sechar.

: How... does not explain... why.

And why do we need it to?

:> First, parents love their children before their children love them back.
:> The relationship does not start with receiving, but with giving. 

: Of course. That does not contradict what I said, however. All I am saying
: is that it is in the nature of humanity to feel loved before one can
: give love...

I fully disagree with that. People do love their infant before it is born,
never mind before they feel loved by it.

To repeat RSShkop's position, people love themselves, and love others
when they realize that "no man is an island", that there are bridges
across the barrier between "me" and "you".

In mussar, this is classically done by giving. So that most often, we
love that to which we give -- far more than that which gives to us.

Again, I refer you to the introduction to Shaarei Yosher
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/shaareiyosher.pdf> and my blog
entry on Ahavah <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2004/12/love-part-i.shtml>.

:> Second, you seem to be saying that only conditional love exists.

: I wouldn't call it conditional. I would call it a necessary component
: of the human condition that in order to give love properly one must
: have been properly (or at least minimally) nurtured in childhood.

But isn't that a different beloved? How does this link loving G-d
to His nurturing us, rather than our experiencing nurturing in
general?

Second, the love of an abused child is a diseased thing, but it still
exist.

Third, you do make our love of G-d about His nurturing, which is a
conditional love.

...
:> Meaning, as in "Man's Search for Meaning" and Victor Frankl's Logotherapy.
:> Man has an innate need for meaningful existence. As primary and
:> first-principle as his desire for reward. In Frankl's thought, it's
:> actual more primary and more central for happiness.

: Judaism is all about meaning. The meaning of life is in the service of
: God. That's all we CAN know of meaning, IMHO. There is no search...

You just answered your own question! The meaning of life is the service
of G-d, or perhaps to follow in His Footsteps (deveiqus vs sheleimus,
respectively). Therefore, if we seek to live meaningful lives, we should
be motivated

:                       Meaning is not motivation and that is my primary
: point.

And yet Logotherapy is based on the exact opposite premise!

To put it in Jewish terms, man is not only a joy-seeking yeitzer, but
also a meaning-seeking neshamah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (270) 514-1507        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Fri, 24 Jun, 2005 at 3:18pm +0300 Moshe Feldman
<moshe.feldman@gmail.com> wrote:
: In any case, as I was addressing the issue of timtum ha'lev, we do find
: cases where poskim said that something is muttar to eat but nevertheless
: is metamtem es ha'lev...
: In fact, in my Bar Ilan CD search I found that Mishne Halachos 16:137
: specifically states that even where something is muttar to eat because
: of bittul b'rov, nevertheless, one may be machmir not to eat it because
: of timtum ha'lev. ...
: Also, I think that this ties into the machlokes of whether rov causes
: issur to change into heter, or just is a hanhaga allowing us to eat
: the food.

: When we learned Yoreh De'ah, my chavrusa and I theorized that Minhag
: Ashkenaz was to be much more machmir than dina d'gemara because of the
: fear of timtum ha'lev.

Along similar lines, on Sat, Jun 25, 2005 at 11:38pm -0400, T613K@aol.com
wrote:
: In Avodah V15 #38 dated 6/25/2005 Saul Lieberman quotes a letter by R'  
: Jehiel Jacob Weinberg (?):
:> his  sexual intercourse does not render a woman forbidden to her
:> husband according to R. Tam because their issue is like that of
:> horses.

: News to me. Do we posken that way?

(A tangent on that last line:
We don't even know if /he/ did. That's the problem with citing personal
email that wasn't intended for distribution. It could be a hava amina,
or something he feels is emes but lacks authority to rule, etc...)

We've discussed the subject of metaphysical causality that isn't sechar
va'onesh in the past, usually WRT broken mezuzos that have a chezqas
kashrus. These, like segulos and qemei'os, defy my understanding. I
don't see how they serve tachlis haberi'ah -- it's neither corrective,
like sechar va'onesh, nor adds the predictability necessary for bechirah.

There is also the issue of there being two different kinds of birur,
according to ShuT R' Aqiva Eiger. Birur of the metzi'us for the purpose
of making a pesaq, and birur of what to do when the pesaq was made,
but is unknown. Rov is a means of defining the metzi'us. Once there
was a known metzi'us, the subject is kavu'ah, and kemechtza al mechtza,
not rov, applies.

Chazaqah demei'ikara, like relying on the last time the mezuzah was
checked (when checked as per chiyuv), is a case where there was a known
metzi'us, and the chazaqah is telling us not to revisit the doubt. A
birur of the how to act for an unknown din, not the metzi'us. In that
case, there is /more/ of an argument for metaphysical causality.

Similarly the unproven mamzeir we are told we can marry. This could
be understood as a rule for behavior, not for defining the chalos of
mamzeirus.

Personally, I'd be happier saying that a kosher mezuzah is one with
a chezqas kashrus, not one that is physically kosher. Similarly, a
mamzer is one that is provable, not the happenstance of his origins. But
without resolving the basic issue of how they can cause anything without
being about sechar va'onesh for doing what you're supposed to (or ch"v
lehefech), it's just wishful thinking.

I don't know how Litvaks would explain why timtum haleiv would affect
pesaq. IIUC, the classic Litvisher thought is that such causality exists,
but it's a violation of "tamim tihyeh im H' E-lokekha to worry about them.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "As long as the candle is still burning,
micha@aishdas.org        it is still possible to accomplish and to
http://www.aishdas.org   mend."
Fax: (270) 514-1507          - Unknown shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter

At 12:56 PM 6/28/2005, Harry Maryles wrote:
>I guess my point was that TuM seems to have a componenet that TIDE does 
>not: the idea that the study of Mada is beneficial to understanding Torah 
>better. This fits better with the GRA than TIDE, no?

"All knowledge that broadens our understanding of the social and physical
realities of the world gives us no little help in understanding the
Torah's view of man and creation."

Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch p. 205

HM writes, "I guess my point was that TuM seems to have a componenet
that TIDE does not: the idea that the study of Mada is beneficial to
understanding Torah better. This fits better with the GRA than TIDE, no?"

But I am puzzled by this-- because Rav Hirsch writes in "The Relevance
of Secular Studies to a Jewish Education" (p. 90 in the English) that
one who is
"acquainted with, say, Rabbinic literature knows about the significance
of mathematics and astronomy, botany and zoology, anatomy and medicine,
jurisprudence and ethics in the deliberations of our Sages. He will
therefore not underestimate the extent to which disciples of Talmudic
learning can benefit from familiarity with these fields of general
knowledge."

Unless I misunderstand that article, it seems to me to be stating
explicitly the idea you raise: that the study of the sciences &c. can
in fact contribute to a more nuanced understanding of Torah.

Respectfully,
Sara

p.s. I am not familiar with the manner in which an "e-mail digest" works,
so please forgive me if I have responded to a matter already concluded.

<Those who claim that the GRA studied secular subjects in the "bathroom"
seem to think that he had a beautiful tiled chamber in which to do
this. They have no idea of how primitive a facility an outhouse was in
the past.>

OTOH the Rama states explicitly that he studied philosophy in the
bathroom while the Maharshal chides the Ramah that he should have
studied grammar. So It was not unusual to study non-Torah subjects in
the bathroom.

However, with regard to the Gra, as pointed out, the Peat HaShulchan
quotes the Gra as demanding the study of secular studies in order to
better understand Judaism. Hence, it is unlikely that he only did this
in the bathroom.

Coming closer to our times, CI learned some secular subjects, in
particular advanced geometry/trogonometry in order to understand kiddush
halevana. I have never heard it claimed that he only studied this in
the bathroom.

-- 
Eli Turkel

In v15n38, RYGB wrote:
: At 04:45 PM 6/23/2005, [Micha] wrote:
:> Lemaaseh, kashrus -- in particular basar vechalav -- does something
:> similar. Elevates the act of eating from simply doing what animal do
:> and places it into the uniquely human realm of thought.

: I do not think so. To put it "Kabbalistically" there is a vast difference
: between food from kelipas nogah and food from the oros elyonim.

And later, RYGB forwarded from Anonymous at
<http://rygb.blogspot.com/2005/06/manna.html#c111952275333409681>:
: Might I suggest that 'Intellectual' is perhaps the wrong word; it
: might be better to say that the Mon related to Nefesh Hasichlis
: rather than bahamis/tivi'is...

I must agree. My error was in taking your word "intellectual" at face
value. Kashrus does turn eating into an intellectual exercise, and
therefore ennobles an animal act by giving it a human element.

I will refrain from proving my ignorance of qabbalah by commenting
on the intended notion.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A life of reaction is a life of slavery,
micha@aishdas.org        intellectually and spiritually. One must
http://www.aishdas.org   fight for a life of action, not reaction.
Fax: (270) 514-1507      		      -Rita Mae Brown

I saw that R. Yehuda Henkin (Hibah Yeseirah on Numbers 13:31, in the
back of Bnei Banim vol. 2 p. 67) has a very interesting insight into the
story of the Spies. The Spies returned from touring the land of Israel
and reported to Moses and the nation (Numbers 13):

    27 Then they told him, and said: "We went to the land where you sent
    us. It truly flows with milk and honey, and this is its fruit. 28
    Nevertheless the people who dwell in the land are strong; the cities
    are fortified and very large; moreover we saw the descendants of
    Anak there. 29 The Amalekites dwell in the land of the South; the
    Hittites, the Jebusites, and the Amorites dwell in the mountains; and
    the Canaanites dwell by the sea and along the banks of the Jordan."

    30 Then Caleb quieted the people before Moses, and said, "Let us go
    up at once and take possession, for we are well able to overcome it."

    31 But the men (anashim) who had gone up with him said, "We are not
    able to go up against the people, for they are stronger than we." 32
    And they gave the children of Israel a bad report of the land which
    they had spied out, saying, "The land through which we have gone as
    spies is a land that devours its inhabitants, and all the people whom
    we saw in it are men of great stature. 33 There we saw the giants
    (the descendants of Anak came from the giants); and we were like
    grasshoppers in our own sight, and so we were in their sight."

R. Henkin points out that even after reporting both good and bad about
the land, and after Caleb's opposing interjection, the Torah (v. 31)
still refers to the Spies as "anashim" (men). Rashi, on 13:2, explains
that the word "anashim" (men) implies importance: "Anashim in Scripture
always refers to distinction. At that time they were righteous." Since,
even after giving their report, the Spies are again called "anashim,"
by implication they were still righteous at that time! It was only
afterwards, when they gave their opinion that the nation could not conquer
the land and then *exaggerated* (or lied) to support their viewpoint,
that they sinned by giving a "bad report."

Their offering of a balanced report and even their honest evaluation
of the possibility of conquering the land was not sinful. It was
their subsequent exaggeration to support their point that was their
sin. Gathering intelligence is allowed. Honest reporting of the
information is permitted. However, analyzing the facts in anything other
than an entirely honest fashion is a great sin. (6/28/2005 5:41:17 AM)

From: "Herbert Basser" <basserh@post.queensu.ca>
> its quite common--- its official name is metathesis-- letter reversal
> salma/ simla, perush/pesher -- its not dyslexia -- it is a lingusitic
> thing that happens.

RBE z'l uses this repeatedly in Tosefes Brocho and brings many interesting 
[and unknown] examples.

SBA 

Arnold Lustiger writes:
> Here is a translation of a five minute segment of the Rav's 1967 Teshuva
> drasha...
> For an almost diametrically opposed POV, listen to the Rav's talmid
> muvhak, RHS' lecture on the Gaza disengagement (I don't have the website,
> but there are at least two pro-settlement links to the lecture out there,
> in addition to the YU site.)

The Rav's position was that territorial compromise is permissible on
grounds of Pikkuah Nefesh and that just as one listens to the physician
in case of illness, one listens to the authorities on military matters.

I don't what R. Schachter said recently on the sites referred to. I
do recall what he wrote years ago. The position taken there is NOT
diametrically opposed to the Rav's. R. Schachter held then that since
the military people are divided on the subject, the analogy to Pikkuah
Nefesh would be to a case where the physicians disagree and then you have
to consult the sick person (by analogy, the Jewish population of Israel).

Again, I don't know what he has said recently.

R' Brent asked <<< ... it has gotten to the point that people are
accustomed to the phrase: "We don't eat that hechshar." "Our rav says
not to eat it." Does anyone ask why? >>>

R' Harry Maryles tried to answer, by writing <<< We are not talking about
Chumros or politics WRT to the Rabbanut MeHadrin Yerushalyim Hechsher. We
are talking about a serious problem there according to those who have
issued this warning. >>>

It seems to me that R' Harry missed R' Brent's point, which was that
if we simply "follow the leader" without asking "Why?", then we have
no way to know whether we are talking about chumros or politics or a
serious problem.

In order for the individual to be able to make an informed decision about
these things, he needs some sort of factual info about the nature of the
problem, and far too often we are unable to get anything more detailed
than "The rav hamachshir isn't as careful as we think he ought to be."

Akiva Miller

In v15n38, RGStudent writes:
: I have been asked a number of time to write about the downloading of music
: from the internet...
: I think the issue boils down to two points, the latter for which there
: are three positions.

In <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol07/v07n058.shtml#13> I mentioned other
issues, which we then batted around for a few days. I wonder why you feel
they didn't even warrant discussion.

: II. Halakhic Copyright Violations
...
: 1. The tape is mine and I can copy it if I want. Conditions that some
: companies put on the sale, that if I copy it the sale is void, are just
: plain silly...

You don't offer the possibility that those conditions are not dismissable.
After all, qoneh al menas lachazor is real, why are these any worse?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "The worst thing that can happen to a
micha@aishdas.org        person is to remain asleep and untamed."
http://www.aishdas.org          - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

Haaretz has an article about the new issue of Tehumin.

    An article that appears in the latest volume of the halakhic journal,
    Tehumin, argues to the contrary: "Most poskim [halakhic arbiters]
    in our generation have permitted the aborting of a fetus, even
    when there is no danger to the mother." The author of the article,
    Rabbi Moshe Tzuriel, a former mashgiah ruhani (spiritual mentor)
    at the Sha'alabim hesder yeshiva, argues, "It is incorrect to state
    unequivocally and authoritatively that the ban [on abortion] is
    absolute," and that in a case of a disagreement among poskim, it is
    appropriate in this case to follow those with a permissive approach.

    Among the prominent poskim who in certain cases permitted aborting
    a fetus that will develop a severe illness is the late head of the
    Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli - who permitted abortion
    due to the great anguish that may lie ahead for the parents "who
    will see the fruit of their womb suffering and living a life that
    is not a life"; a former member of the Supreme Rabbinical Court,
    Rabbi Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg and the head of the Institute of
    Halacha and Technology, Rabbi Levy Yitzhak Halperin.

    The article, which will certainly prompt quite a bit more controversy,
    appeared in the 25th volume of Tehumin.

This is not new or controversial. (6/28/2005 6:48:07 AM)

At 06:03 AM 6/29/2005, you wrote:
>OTOH the Rama states explicitly that he studied philosophy in the
>bathroom while the Maharshal chides the Ramah that he should have
>studied grammar. So It was not unusual to study non-Torah subjects in
>the bathroom.

Are you quite sure? IIRC he says he studied philosophy on Shabbos when 
everyone else was out on their shpatzir.

YGB 

I know there are a number of opinions about the scope of dina demalkhusa
dina: some are broader, others limit it to mamanus or even just taxation.

Does anyone know of a maqor that distinguishes between crimes and
misdemeanors?

-mi

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
>:> In order for that answer to make sense, we must understand how Hashem
>:> is meitiv us. Even WRT sechar va'onesh, and therefore of the mitzvos
>:> that earn us that sechar.

>: How... does not explain... why.

> And why do we need it to?

The "why" of my statement is precisely what my original quetion was.
"Why" simply means: to what purpose... to what end? To ask why we need
ask why is to push aisde my entire question.

> I fully disagree with that. People do love their infant before it is born,
> never mind before they feel loved by it.

There is an insinct to love a child pre-birth or an infant to love a
parent. there is no instinct to love God. In the case of a child, the
feelings are based in physical reality. Our emotions are generated by
perceptions, anticipations and interactions with the newborn. They are
based on experiential data imprinted in the mind. OTOH it is extremely
difficult to work up a love of a Being that is completely super-natural
without any aid. There are none of the above stimuli. As for God, there
is no natural tendancy to love a Being that has no physical presence and
therefore no physical interaction. It requires pro-activity for man to
come to love a supernatural Being. It is of course possible to work up
a love of God since we are mandated as such. But it is work... and not
something that can be achieved in the same way as the love of a parent
for a child. Even if it is still in the womb the child is a tangible
reality. Not so, God. There is nothing tangible about Him. God's existence
is based on belief. His true nature is beyond our comprehension and
relating to Him has to be learned. It is not innate. To love God without
the benfit of the knowledge of Schar VeOnesh is an imposibilty, IMHO.

> To repeat RSShkop's position, people love themselves, and love others
> when they realize that "no man is an island", that there are bridges
> across the barrier between "me" and "you"...

I think R. Shimon Shkop has then just argued my case for me. It is
the realization that "no man is an island", etc. that generates love.
Until that realization is reached love is impossible. If a parent
does not communicate at least his or her own existence to a child in
some... at least rudimentary way, a child will not love his parent at
all. To understand that we need God to exist is not any more motivation
to love Him than the realization we need air to exist to motivate us to
love air. IOW if God is the cause of our existence but doesn't indicate he
cares about us in some at least rudimetary way, no love will be generated
in us.

>:> Second, you seem to be saying that only conditional love exists.

>: I wouldn't call it conditional. I would call it a necessary component
>: of the human condition that in order to give love properly one must
>: have been properly (or at least minimally) nurtured in childhood.

> But isn't that a different beloved? How does this link loving G-d
> to His nurturing us, rather than our experiencing nurturing in
> general?

There is the difference between what we can perceive with one or more of
the five physical senses which I personally believe creates the "instinct"
to love. I don't know that one would experience the emotion of love if
one did not have any of the physical senses. IOW even though love is an
emotion, I beleive that emotion would be impossible to achieve without
some physical interaction with humanity. On the other hand one cannot
have any physical interaction with God.

> Second, the love of an abused child is a diseased thing, but it still
> exist. 

But it wouldn't exist at all if there was no physical interaction at
all. Or to put it another way there has to be some physical interaction in
order for love to exist even for an abused child. If the abusive parent
could not even be perceived there could be nothing to love (or hate for
that matter). For one to realize God's existence without realizing His
bounty is tantemount to realizing that a parent exists but is irrelavant
to his well being. One must be actively made aware of God ...AND... His
bounty in some rational way. Bounty can de defined as Schar.

> Third, you do make our love of G-d about His nurturing, which is a
> conditional love.

Conditional love has a harsh connoation. That phrase makes it sound like
one is giving God an ultimatum. That is absurd. I see it as the natural
order of things... the nature of humanity.

HM

Avodah Zarah 18b (Soncino translation):
    Our Rabbis taught: One should not go to theaters or circuses because
    entertainments are arranged there in honor of the idols. This is
    the opinion of R. Meir. But the Sages say: Where such entertainments
    are given there is the prohibition of being suspected of idolatrous
    worship, and where such entertainment is not given the prohibition is
    because of being in 'the seat of the scornful.'According to the Sages,
    there are two reasons to prohibit attending theaters and circuses: 1)
    the idolatrous practices that were attendant at ancient celebrations,
    2) Moshav letzim, "the seat of the scornful," which is a phrase
    taken from the first verse of Psalms. This latter reason seems to
    apply even when there is no idolatrous aspect to the proceedings (see
    the Rashash's gloss to Rashi, sv. nasa ve-nasan). This point is made
    further by the Magen Avraham (224:3) who prohibits attending theaters
    and circuses run by Jews, that entirely lack idolatry (cf. MA 338:8).

What does it mean to be in "the seat of the scornful"? One might be
tempted to say that it refers to wasting time rather than studying
Torah. However, the Maharsham (glosses to Shulhan Arukh 224:1) states that
this prohibition applies to women, who are not obligated in consistent
Torah study. Clearly, it refers to being in an inappropriate environment,
as the Seder Ya'akov (Avodah Zarah, ad loc.) elaborates.

With all this in mind, is it permissible for any of us to go to the
theater, circus or even a sporting event (as a spectator)? Every rabbi
with whom I have discussed this seriously told me not to pursue the issue
further. In other words, they have no good answer but don't want to say
not to go. Last year, word came out of Lakewood that kollel families
should not go to circuses. This was roundly mocked (or, perhaps,
"scorned"), but sounded to me quite reasonable. That is, after all,
the standard halakhah.

R. Asher Meir, the Jewish Ethicist, tackles this issue and also doesn't
really have a good answer. (6/29/2005 6:44:41 AM)

At 12:56 PM 6/28/2005, Harry Maryles wrote:
>>I guess my point was that TuM seems to have a component that TIDE does 
>>not: the idea that the study of Mada is beneficial to understanding Torah 
>>better. This fits better with the GRA than TIDE, no?

Sara Jones <eschuli613@mail.md> wrote:
> But I am puzzled by this-- because Rav Hirsch writes in "The Relevance
> of Secular Studies to a Jewish Education" (p. 90 in the English)...
> Unless I misunderstand that article, it seems to me to be stating
> explicitly the idea you raise: that the study of the sciences &c. can
> in fact contribute to a more nuanced understanding of Torah.

Similarly: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org> answers:
> "All knowledge that broadens our understanding of the social and physical
> realities of the world gives us no little help in understanding the
> Torah's view of man and creation."
> Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch p. 205

I stand corrected.

I am not as familiar with TIDE as described by its creator, RSRH, as
I would like to be and though I probably knew the above at one time,
I had forgotten this aspect of TIDE. It does appear (as others have
indicated) that both Hashkafos are a lot closer philosophically than I
realized during the course of this thread.

Please recall that TuM is not necessarily defined by Dr. Lamm?’s
preference for the Chasidic model, as he readily admits. He in
fact cites many models for TuM and concedes that his list is not
comprehensive. Dr. Lamm in fact includes the Hircshian model in his
book on the subject. credits RSRH as a visionary in this respect. After
re-reading parts of his chapter on RSRH, I now see the differences between
TIDE and TuM to be almost insignificant. For example: ?“By Derech Eretz,
Hirsch means ?“culture?” in its broadest sense and most especially
Western culture?” (p113). Sounds a lot like TuM to me.

In my view TuM can be more broadly defined but should always include a
positive attitude towards secular studies. The differences between TIDE
and TuM are of lesser importance than the similarities. We can quibble
whether Mada has inherent value or whether it has value only WRT to Torah.

RSRH was quite critical of the prevailing educational institutions of his
day. RSRH (quoted by Dr. Lamm) says: ?“Removed from life, estranged and
strange to the world and life, the old type of East European yeshiva
student yielded his views on the world and life and no longer used
them... in order to understand Torah?” (19 Letters p.98). Dr. Lamm then
continues: ?“Hirsch negated the religious legitimacy of a great deal of
traditional life...?” and ?“The model he built in Frankfurt reflected
this dissatisfaction . (p.115).

Unfortunately the Yeshiva world has a revisionist interpretation of
what RSRH's TIDE is. In this sense, too, TuM and TIDE are more united
than divided. The attack from the right is against both camps. It would
behoove us to realize this and work in concert and present a unified
front to counteract the onslaught of revisionist criticism of secular
studies as at best B?’Dieved and at worst, totally worthless which is
how it is thought of in Israeli Yeshivos (based on the virtual Cherem
of institutions like Maarava).

HM

There are two descriptions of the mitzvah of tzitzis. First, from parashas
Shelach (and Qeri'as Shema):
  ... [T]hey should make for themselves tzitzis on the corners of their
  garments (bigdeihem) throughout their generations, and that they put
  on the tzitzis of each corner a thread of blue wool (techeiles). And
  it shall for you tzitzis, and you will see it and remember all the
  mitzvos of Hashem... (Bamidbar 15:38-39).

There are a few points I want to stress about this quote:

1- The term for garment used is beged. Hebrew has a number of terms for
clothing. That it's called a beged rather than a kesus or a levush is
significant. The uniform of the kohanim is called the bigdei kehunah. By
saying the mitzvah is on our begadim is to cast the mitzvah in terms
of the uniform for a role. (For an analysis of these terms with respect
to bigdei kehunah and all the mentions of clothing in Megillas Esther,
see "[1]The Natures of Clothing", and with respect to the clothing of
Adam and Chava see "[2]Ki Arumim Heim".) 2- The term for the tassel is
tzitzis. Tzitzis is actually an agricultural term, it means "sprout" or
"small growths". Tzitzis implies human growth. It is associated with the
idea in Menachos 39a that "the beauty of techeiles (meaning tzitzis in
general -Rashi) is 1/3 gedilim (knotted cords), and 2/3 free."

3- Hashem describes techeiles as a thread of blue wool on the tzitzis.
From this phrase, the Rambam and Raavad (as opposed to Rashi and Tosafos,
see below) conclude that only one of the strings should be blue. The
Rambam defines that as one of 8 string-ends coming out of the knotted
portion. The Raavad, that it's one of 4 strings, i.e. two ends are
blue. (The Vilna Gaon writes that he is convinced that one of these two
positions should be followed, but couldn't determine which.)

From the Rambam's position, R' SR Hirsch explains techeiles as the
Jew's higher calling. It is the eighth string, going beyond the six
days of physical creation and even the seventh day of the sanctity
imbued within this world. It is sky-blue, the primary color most
associated with spirituality -- beyond the physical red (adom, redadamah, earththen, imposes spirituality on the growth of the tzitzis. As Rav Hirsch
describes it, human growth must be expressed freely -- represented by
the 2/3 of free-string tassel, but only after it was channeled by that
blue thread. )I discuss this idea in more detail in [3]Toras Aish for
parashas Shelach.)

4- Hashem gives a motivation and purpose to the mitzvah. It's a mnemonic
device to remember not to chase aveiros, and to do mitzvos. But there
is a second presentation in the Torah of the mitzvah. The mitzvah is
repeated in Devarim 22:2, to appear next to the laws of shaatnez. This
teaches that techeiles, which is definitionally blue wool, is put on a
linen garment despite the laws of shaatnez. There the Torah reads:
    You shall make for yourself gedilim (cords) on the four corners of
    your covering (kesusekha), with which you cover yourself.

In this presentation, all three points that I stressed above are
different.

1- The term for clothing is kesus, a cover. And in case we missed it,
the pasuq continues by saying "which you cover (mekhaseh) yourself
in it." As opposed to the uniform of the beged, this is clothing that
one wears to hide. The beged is an appointment to a duty, the kesus,
a retreat from shame.

2- There is no mention of the free strings of the tassel, only of the
gedil, the knotted part. This is in concert with the notion of it being
a kesus. There is no emphasis of human creativity and individuality.

3- It's from this pasuq that we learn there are eight ends of strings
in each tassel. A gedil, a term for a cord or rope from the root /gdl/ -
large, must be more than one string. Gedilim, in the plural, is therefore
at least 2 pairs of strings, four in all, or eight ends. In fact, Rashi
and Tosafos conclude from this pasuq that there is one gedil of white
strings, and one of techeiles, i.e. two full strings (four ends) are blue.

The image of the mitzvah of techeiles, then, is that it's one of man's
forces -- with no description to its role in binding and guiding the
others.

4- Hashem doesn't say why we should wear it. Gedilim are worn simply
because Hashem said so.

In R' JB Soloveitchik's terms, a beged is worn when one is in a state
of advance, a kesus, when one seeks retreat. We're not looking at man
advancing, but his withdrawing in order to re-aim himself at the higher
goal. Thus, we only speak of the gedil, the channeling of forces.

To use another of R' Soloveitchik's models, we can say that Adam I,
majestic man, is given begadim with which to accept the responsibility
that comes with his ability, and to aim his mastery of the world in
positive directions. Adam II, covenental man, is given a kesus with which
to hide his needfulness, to help him retreat long enough to find G-d.

Therefore, in Bamidbar, the beged is associated with human creativity,
with instructions how to sanctify it, and with a personal motivation
for keeping the mitzvah. Whereas in Devarim, the focus is not on our
sanctifying ourselves, but in our accepting G-d's role in sanctifying us.

Both relationships are true. As Rabbi Aqiva asked "Before whom do you
make yourselves tahor, and Who makes you tahor?" There are times when
we should take the initiative, and times when we are unable, and allow
Hashem to do it for us.

In general, I'm trying to explore the concept of clothing, of uniform,
and the proper use of chitzoniyus(externals). Like it or not, others do
form their first impressions of us from our clothes. While we all know
it's silly to judge people by their clothing, it happens preconsciously
and we can't stop ourselves from forming that first impression. Nor can
we change the entire human race from forming such impressions of us.

And there is no neutral clothing. Wearing a black fedora means that
people's first impression of you is "he's yeshivish". Not wearing one,
though, equally creates an impression, the person will conclude you're
not all that yeshivish (assuming you're a man, of course). You're judged
in comparison to the stereotype of people with similar clothing. To avoid
wearing clothing of any particular subculture marks you as an outsider,
an oddball. Etc... But the point is, you're always marked. There is
no non-uniform.

The other contrast to a beged is a levush. (I'm using the terms as
I see them in Tanakh. When Chassidim call their clothing "levush",
it's obviously based on a different understanding of the differences
in connotation between the words.) Achashveirosh's royal robes are
"levush malkhus". Not begadim, because he wasn't inherently a royal
person. Achashveirosh is portrayed in the megillah as a real follower,
being lead around by his advisors, a drunkard, and not the swiftest
thinker. Begadim help one assume a role. Levush helps look like they
are in a role they really aren't.

We often end up viewing ourselves and trying to remake ourselves to live
up to our clothing. That's the role of beged, raising our self-image to
motivate us to improve. However, without knowing the proper time for
begadim, one could try to don a beged only to have it devolve into a
levush, a means of fooling ourselves into thinking we are holier than
we are.

The key is knowing when is a time for advance, and when for retreat.
Knowing that is knowing when we're using chitzoniyus constructively,
and when not. But most of us are not in the habit of even noticing the
choices we make, never mind working toward improving them. At risk of
getting overly repetitive, I see no way of knowing when to don the beged
and when the kesus without keeping a daily cheshbon hanefesh.

Posted by micha to [4]Aspaqlaria at 6/28/2005 09:29:00 PM

References

1. http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/tetzaveh.pdf
2. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2005/06/ki-arumim-heim.shtml
3. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/shlach.shtml
4. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2005/06/tzitzis-advance-and-retreat.shtml

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]