Avodah Mailing List

Volume 15 : Number 030

Tuesday, June 7 2005

• Re: hashkafa and psak
• Swimming pool is a kosher mikveh
• parshas Naso BEFORE Shavuos
• Dealing with an apostate Jew
• Subject:RE:innocents dying
• [none]
• Re: Dealing with an apostate Jew
• Dealing with an apostate Jew
• Re: kofrim who say tehillim
• Re: kofrim who say tehillim
• Re: kofrim who say tehillim
• Re: Gezel Shemi'ah
• Re: Gezel Shemi'ah
• The robber and the thief
• Re: parshas Naso BEFORE Shavuos
• Innocents Dying

On Sun, May 29, 2005 at 10:35:04AM -0400, S & R Coffer wrote:
>: RE is one of the gedoley hador. If he signed on the ban,
>: it means that he felt that RNS's book has questionable material and
>: thus should not be read. Period. Who cares if his opinion is pesak,
>: aggadita or whatever? You're getting caught up in technicalities that
>: misdirect the focus from where it needs to be.

On 2 Jun 2005 Micha Berger wrote:
> The CI's sevarah about Hillel's lack of belief in a personal mashiach
> only works because of the laws of pesaq. If it's aggadita, then RYSE's
> opinion is no more binding than RSRH's, and yeish al mi lismokh even
> for someone who consistently follows him in inyanei halakhah.

The type of Aggadita you are referring to have no ramifications in halachah
because they have no practical application. Much like the Rambam says in
pirush haMishnayos in perek Chelek (and other places) regarding the
machlokes R' Akiva and R' Eliezer if the dor hamidbar have a chelek loalam
habba. However, in this case, the "aggadita" you are referring to has very
practical applications; according to RYSE and the gedolim who signed on the
ban, it is assur to read RNS's book. Thus, the Rambam's caveat regarding not
having to take sides in an aggadic dispute would not apply here. And
therefore, RYSE is more binding than RSRH whose article did not outline any
"limassadic" conclusions. As far as your CI re R' Hillel, I am not aware of
this source (mareh makom please?) but I have my own sevara regarding R'
Hillel which I will outline shortly.

> Without
> pesaq, there is no azlinan basar rubah, no need to follow one's poseiq
> as opposed to a seifer, etc... If it's pesaq, and it doesn't have
> implications about my wine or (U) shechitah, then in what din is RYSE
> pasqening?

Until now, I have been addressing your issues from the standpoint of
aggadita which I feel (in some cases incl. our present topic) is binding.
However, in addition, I feel that RYSE's injunction is a full blown
pesak and yet I don't feel that a necessary consequence of that pesak
would be the invalidation someone like your self's wine or shechita just
as R' Hillel's wine or shechita was not invalidated by Chazal although
they obviously felt that R' Hillel was undermining one of the ikray
(according to the Rambam) haemunah. The reason for this is as follows:

If a Jew categorically denies any of the ikray haemuna such as Metzius
Hashem, than everyone would hold that he is a kofer and has no chelek
l'olam habba. However, if a Jew is an absolute ma'amin in all of the Torah
but when he comes to be choker v'doresh on one of the ikarim of the Torah,
he is mislead into a wrong conclusion due to his misinterpretation of
the pesukim of the Torah or ostensibly irrefutable scientific evidence,
then that man is not considered a kofer. Rather he is considered an
inadvertent sinner and when his mistake is revealed to him, he must be
chozer bitshuva. In the sefer haikkarim's words, this man is a "toeh
bi'eeyuno, choteh bi'shogeg, v'tzarich kapara".

So, there you have it. RYSE could actually be paskening that the material
in the book is technically kefira and therefore assur to read yet,
one holding those opinions would not necessarily be considered a kofer.

> A number of the things about this ban simply convinced me
> that these aren't the rabbanim I would choose to follow. I therefore
> feel no more dissonance than I do when learning VaYoel Mosheh.

The Satmar Rav's shita, based on his interpretation of a Maharal in
kisuvos, was a daas yachid. This ban has a lot more signatories. But
anyway, you know how I feel...you still have the right to maintain your
shita...for now :-) As it happens, I have RNS's books and enjoy them
very much. I just disagree (strongly) with some of his material and
agree with the gedolim's hashara regarding his approach to certain items.

> My real problem is that I ironically find that RYSE and R' Meir [do you
> mean Moshe?] Shapiro are apparently in agreement with the notion that
> we do not accept the Rambam's ikkarim (or some derivative of them) as
> definitive pesaq for what is kefirah... I'm trying to understand different
> shitos on the limits of what is O, and what is beyond eilu va'eilu.

I think my approach above (culled from the sefer haIkkarim) is a good start.

Gut voch
Simcha Coffer

Igros Moshe YD IV 17.19 page 197

Concerning the issue of ben/as niddah

"Since there is no issur but is it a desirable thing [not to be a ben/bas
niddah], one can rely on the presence of good middos to say the person
is not a ben/bas niddah. Even if it is known that the mother did not go
to mikveh - but it is possible that she went bathing in the sea or the
large swimming pool that are built in hotels and resorts. The majority
of them are not posul doreissa and therefore the tevila is kosher min
HaTorah. That is sufficient that her children should not be considered
ben/bas niddah..."

There is another way to undestand this, which how I understood it in
the past. There is a machlokes whther min hatorah a mikve is kosher with
all mayim sheuvim. Thus, a child may not be ben hanidah min hatorah if
his maother swam in a pool.

BTW, I understand that the Steipler wrote based on an early aharon that
the psul of ben hanida does notapply lemaase, becasue according tot hsii
aharon, it is hereditary ad so kol hadoros. It is therefore likely that
everyone is touched by this psl and a shiduch should not be rejected
bse of it.

I found this issue dicussed in the following: <http://tinyurl.com/b2wbw>
[reduced from a www.aishkodesh.org URL -mi]

Here is a quote:
What is the definition of pagum? The Beit Shmuel quotes the Oarchei Moshe:

He is tainted and his family is not meyuchas [genealogically
pure] and it is proper to keep a distance from them [in terms of
marriage]. Nevertheless, he is not pagum in terms of any actual issur and
[if it is a girl] she can marry a kohen.

Here we are told of the effects of the imperfection but not the nature
of the pegam itself. The Bach quotes the Maharshal:?He is tainted
and corrupted and is one of the azei panim (brazen), the rebellious
and sinful.?84 The source of this shocking statement has been traced
by many to the Gemara itself. In Nedarim (20b) we find:?And I will
purge from among you the rebels and them that transgress against
me? (Yechezkel 20:38). R. Levi said this verse refers to children of
people who exhibit nine undesirable midot (traits) which are: Bnei
ayma, bnei niddui, etc. According to Rashi, Ran, the Rosh and others,
bnei niddah are not included on this list. However, the Raavad and Tur
understood bnei niddui as bnei niddah? children conceived while the
mother was a niddah.85 The question is to whom does this classification
of?rebellious and sinners? refer to? The answer to this is the subject
of considerable debate among the Rishonim. There are those who say that
it in fact refers to the children themselves who are literally born with
this stigma of?rebellious and sinners.?86 Others contend that the parents
are those who receive this infamous title because of their neglecting to
observe the prohibitions of the Torah.87 Nevertheless, all the Rishonim
agree that a ben-niddah is more likely than another person to diverge
from the path of Torah observance and acceptable ethical behavior because
of the qualities inherited from his parents.88 They, therefore, concur
that it is preferable to avoid marrying an individual who is known to
be the child of a niddah.

Taking the above into consideration, is, in fact, an Orthodox Jew to be
deterred from seeking a match with a man or woman whose parents did not
observe the laws of family purity?

R. Yaakov Yisrael Kanievsky, known as the Steipler Gaon discussed this
issue in his Kehilat Yaakov89 and reached the conclusion that according
to halacha it is absolutely permissible to marry a child of parents who
did not observe these law. He bases this heter on two major points:

1. It appears that when Chazal determined that bnei niddah are?corrupt and
sinners,? etc., they were making a general statement that in most cases
the ben-niddah will possess these negative characteristic traits. Those
bnei niddah who even slightly exhibit such qualities should by no
means be considered acceptable candidates for marriage into Orthodox
families. However, when we encounter bnei niddah of exemplary character
we must assume that they are exceptions to the rule. Free choice is one
of the fundamental principles of Judaism and certainly even a ben-niddah
can overcome his?genetic? predisposition and thereby rid himself of
this stigma. In other words, the Steipler suggests that the pegam of a
ben-niddah is not a din? an absolute halachic classification? but rather
a statistical likelihood. The indication that a particular individual
has succumbed to his predisposition is that he or she behaves in a way
which betrays characteristics of chutzpah, rebelliousness, etc. If,
however, none of these?warning signals? have surfaced, then the person
is not considered pagum as far as his or her eligibility as prospective
mate is concerned.90

2. The Steipler cites an opinion which originated in the work Apei
Zutrei, who claims:?He [the actual ben-niddah] is pagum and all of his
descendants take after their ancestor.?91 This implies that the blemish
of a ben-niddah is literally inherited by each generation and continues
indefinitely. If this is true, writes the Steipler, then it would be
almost impossible to find any man or woman who is not pagum even within
the?born-Orthodox? community itself, since it is very unlikely that
somewhere along the line there wasn?t one set of parents who fell into
at least one of the categories of nine unworthy midot. According to this
there is no reason why a?born-again? Jew?s halachic status should be
considered less noble than that of a Jew born in an Orthodox family.92 93

A fascination solution to the problem of bnei niddah was suggested by
R. Moshe Feinstein in the most recent volume of Iggerot Moshe.94 He
begins with the premise that the characteristics of the ben-niddah are
in fact passed down from generation to generation. He writes:?In reality
even if we see a girl who is a bat-niddah and yet she is modest and
possesses wonderful traits in the manner of any worthy Jewish woman,
nevertheless one should avoid marrying her. The reason for this is
that although, because of her fear of G-d, she is able to overcome her
natural instincts, we must fear that these negative characteristics will
appear in her children and perhaps they will not succeed in overcoming
them.? R. Moshe then continues to explain that this is the case only
when it is absolutely certain that the mother was in the halachic state
of niddah at the time of conception. This, R. Moshe claims, is rarely
the case. In the Gemara there is a debate as to whether or not tevila
(immersion in a mikvah) requires specific intent for removing the state
of niddut.95 The Shulchan Aruch rules:?A niddah who immersed herself
without any intention [to change her status], i.e., she fell in the
water, or simply entered the water to cool off, is permitted to her
husband.? The Ramo notes:?There are those who are strict and require
her to immerse again. It is preferable to follow this opinion a priori.?96

He continues that, since Chazal provided us with a number of identifying
traits of the ben-niddah and many Baalei Teshuva appear not to possess
any of them, we can safely assume that although the mother never immersed
herself in an actual mikvah, she most probably had gone swimming in a
lake or ocean and in doing so became permitted to her husband before
the child was conceived. The fact that the mother had no intention
to?purify? herself halachically makes no difference. Even the Ramo
agrees that a second tevila should be performed only if it is possible,
and certainly if the status of the child is at stake he would accept
the unintentional tevila as valid. If this particular Baal Teshuva is
in all respects a fine person, we may assume that immersion took place
at the proper time.

At the conclusion of the responsum, R. Feinstein qualifies his psak by
adding that it only applies in a case where it is known that the woman
is in the habit of going swimming on a regular basis.

R. Yitzchok Isaac Leibes raises a number of objections to R. Moshe?s
heter (lenient ruling). First of all the entire heter could only be
considered in the case of a child born in the winter or early spring
since most people only go swimming (in the ocean, not in a swimming pool)
regularly in the summer. In all other cases such an assumption would be
absurd. Secondly, even if we assume that the woman did go swimming, many
women do not immerse themselves completely in the water and if they do
they often wear tight-fitting, bathing caps which constitute a barrier
between the person and the water.97

Despite this, R. Leibes himself rules liberally without relying, upon
R. Feinstein?s novel suggestion, by insisting that the stigma can be
overcome, as is evidenced by the individual?s behavior.98

A more conservative heter was reached by R. Weiss of Jerusalem:

As far as the halacha is concerned I agree with R. Wosner [of Bnei Brak,
author of Shevet Halevi] that it is impossible to entirely ignore the
fact that a pegam exists. Therefore, the one who intends to marry the
Baal Teshuva must be told of this halacha. Nevertheless, it is permitted
to tell that person not to be overly concerned with it and it is very
likely that the marriage will be a very successful one.99

In conclusion, according to halacha, it is absolutely permissible to
marry an individual who is most likely or even definitely a ben-niddah
or bat-niddah, but there is some measure of debate among the Acharonim
as to whether such a marriage is advisable. The majority of contemporary
poskim agree that one need not hesitate in marrying a Baal Teshuva who
displays the exemplary qualities of a Torah-observant Jew.

M. Levin

This year we read Parshas Naso before shavuos, rather than after.
I can't even recall the last time we did so. Is it an extraordinarily rare
occurrence? Can anyone recall the last time we had this scenario? Thanks.

Pinchus Klahr

Micha: can you post the following to avoda anonymously (due to my
involvement it can't go out under my name)

------------

Chevra:

I recently got involved with the following case and am looking for advice
on how to deal with it.

A young man (his father was Jewish, his mother muslim, both non-practicing
at the time) converted 15 years ago. He married and has 4 children.

When his father died his mother became observant, and that influenced him
to study his Islamic heritage. As a result he recently converted to Islam.

Since he doesn't want to disrupt his family he has kept his conversion
secret from his family and friends (with a few exceptions, which is how I
got involved). He wants his children to continue as Orthodox Jews rather
than reveal his conversion and confuse them (with the result that they
would probably drop all observance totally)

Any advice on how to deal with this? Halachic issues I should be aware of?

I've checked the Jews for judaism site, but they only deal with
Jewish/christian issues.

ON  Sat, 4 Jun 2005 Eli Turkel WROTE:
>In the same vein a recent daf yomi stated that a wife dies because of
>her husbands false vows. While I can understand the punishment of young
>children for the sins of their parents I do not understand why a wife
>gets punished for her husband's sin

on the other hand there are times when a woman loses her husband not
because it was the Mazal of her husband to die, but because of the great
Zechuyos of another person who deserved her as his wife.As we find in
sotah 2: in the segua of ZIVUG RISHON AND ZIVUG SHENI where the Tosfos
Shantz explains that "Zivug Sheni" refers to a widow or widower. The
Zivug Sheni can only occur after the first Zivug occurred. In order for
the Zivug Sheni to occur, Hashem must take the life of one of the spouses
in the Zivug Rishon. Rabeinu Tam explains that this is the similarity
between Zivug Sheni and Keri'as Yam Suf. In both of them, Hashem must
take the life of some in order to benefit others.

Nosson Sternbach

Wednesday, June 1, 2005, 11:09:54 PM, [Micha] posed a difficulty:
> Brochos 8a says that "from the day that Beit Hamikdash was destroyed 
> haKodosh Baruch Hu only has 4 amot of halachah in His world". 

> And yet, among the reasons given for the churban was that no one went
> *lifnim* mishuras hadin. [Why wasn't the observance of the four amos of
> halachah enough?]

1. The wording of Bava Metziya 30b is: "Asher Ya'asoon" (Sh'mos
18:21)-this is lifnim m'shuros ha-din. For Rebbi Yochonon said,
Yerushalayim was destroyed only because they judged their court cases
by the din Torah, and did not act lifnim meshuras ha-din.

So, (although elsewhere it refers to anyone's personal behavior), it is
(as someone else posted) part of the "daled amos shel halachah;" and
in the context of this Gemara and Yerushalayim's destruction, "lifnim
m'shuros ha-din" is a Torah requirement, referring to how a beis din
should conduct itself. Rebbi Yochonon is therefore placing blame for
the Destruction on the courts for not conducting themselves properly,
by not following the "four amos shel halachah."

2. In the Introduction to his Mishnah Commentary, the Rambam chooses this
very Chazal (that haKodosh Baruch Hu only has 4 amot of halachah in His
world) to illustrate that one must not understand Aggadic statements
in a shallow way, and he proceeds to write at length in explaining
it. However, he cites it without the introductory phrase, "from the
day that the Beis HaMikdash was destroyed." And his objection to taking
the maamer on the surface is: "And at the time of Shem and Ayver, and
afterwards, when there was as of yet no halachah, is it possible to
say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu had no part in the world at all?! He goes
on to explain the maamer as referring to the purpose of the world being
the production of men who reach perfection in their thoughts of Hashem
and their deeds. (Unfortunately, I am unable to clearly connect the
explanation to the maamer.)

Zvi Lampel

Anonymous Chaver <chaveir@aishdas.org> wrote:
> A young man (his father was Jewish, his mother muslim, both non-practicing
> at the time) converted 15 years ago. He married and has 4 children.

> When his father died his mother became observant, and that influenced him
> to study his Islamic heritage. As a result he recently converted to Islam.

>...He wants his children to continue as Orthodox Jews rather
> than reveal his conversion and confuse them (with the result that they
> would probably drop all observance totally)

> Any advice on how to deal with this? Halachic issues I should be
> aware of?

These are enormous problems. First of all there is the question of
whether the conversion was actually legitimate. I sssume that it was at
the time. If possible you should definititely check out the circumstances
of the conversion. If this fellow is sincere and it sounds like he is, you
should have no trouble detting the iformation form him... specifically,
who was the Rav. If he is a legitimate Rav, you must then contact him
and find out if the conversion was legitimate. There are also queations
of whether his lack of observance now testifies to the legitimacy of
his conversion then. I beleive the Psak Halacha is not necessarily clear.

Under these circumstances it is probably best to ask a Shaila to a
Gadol as to how to go about handling the situation. Short of that, if
his original conversion to Judaism was legitmate, as I suspect it was,
then you must treat the children as full-fledged Jews who are being
raised by a Meshumad. In the case of Islam, however, there is no actual
AZ. So, since this Meshumad father is keeping his new conversion to
Islam secret and actually preffers his children remain Orthodox Jews,
it is proabably best and the path of least resistance to go along with
him but to moniter the situation closely. I would try and cultivate a
close relationship with him and his children so as to facilitate your
close observation of them. All of this should be done under the guidance
of a Gadol, if you can.

HM

[From the author:
... If OK, plese let it run anonymosly. Since I don't know who and about
whom I am talking, it is best that my privacy is also protected. -mi]

> I recently got involved with the following case...
> A young man (his father was Jewish, his mother muslim, both non-practicing
> at the time) converted 15 years ago. He married and has 4 children.
> When his father died his mother became observant, and that influenced him
> to study his Islamic heritage. As a result he recently converted to Islam.

> Since he doesn't want to disrupt his family he has kept his conversion
> secret.... He wants his children to continue as Orthodox Jews rather
> than reveal his conversion and confuse them (with the result that they
> would probably drop all observance totally)

I suggest consultation with a major posek regarding halachic issues. It
seems to me that the Jewish conversion is still valid since he has
practiced for 15 years.

A number of practical issues:

1. How much does this conversion to Islam depend on his desire to please
his mother? What are psychological issues and how deep do they go? He
might yet return after her death or after psychological issues run
their course.

2. Because the entire family is invlolved he should not be antagonized
or driven out of Jewish community. He is not involved in idol worship,
although he is clearly poresh midarchei tsibbur, and in quite a disturbing
way, at that. Perhaps he can be persuaded to forge a joint indentity
centering on common elements of the two faiths, with the hope of slowly
drawing him closer to Judaism and also keeping his family in the fold.

3. ALthough he is a more mature individual, he might yet be open to
influence by a charismatic Rav, one who has experience with Islam,
perhaps among Sefaradi rabbonim. You may consider contacting Lev L'Achim
who have worked with converts to Islam, especially women.

4. You should not understimate the power of sophisticated Islam. Although
only a copy of its older brother, it has many elements in it with which
this previously observant Jew probably feels familiar. This, together
with his mother's influence probably makes it feel "heimish" to him. He
must, however, feel a sense of vertigo in living an observant Jewish
lifestyle and, at the same time, identifying with hopes and aspirations
of Islam, that grants no legitimacy or good will to his own children and
family. This alienation may yet move him in one direction or another,
and as his friend, you might want to gingerly probe.

 A denizen of Avodah, contributing anonymously.

From: "Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org>
> I'm not sure how this [Arrow's theorem] is relevent.
<snip>
> Halakhah is about finding
> the right pesaq, not making the most number of voters content in a fair
> manner. Nor would I see how the ability to create and legislate compromise
> will make an unfair system fair -- it means you'd be compromising between
> two unfairly chosen alternatives.

Arrow's theorem says that if you vote on coherent preferences you may end
up with incoherent (i.e. not obeying the law of transitivity) conclusions.
It is trivial to prove the lemma that if some conclusions are implied by
multiple mutually contradictory premises, than voting on conclusions may
lead to contradictory implicit premises. In halachic terms, voting on
psak may lead to internal contradictions in sevaros. The Shulhan Arukh
sometimes suffers from that lemma.

> BTW, is sichlus muttar?

If by sichlus you mean folly then the Rambam says it's assur. See PhM
Hagigah 2:1.

David Riceman 

From: "S & R Coffer" <rivkyc@sympatico.ca>
> The Ramban explains that the avos had
> the power to "genetically" alter their future progeny with their Herculean
> acts of spiritual perfection.

Where does the Ramban use the word you translate as "genetically",
and what word is it?

> And IIRC, I responded that the mechanics for this transactional zchus
> work much the same way a bracha works. Rav Dessler explains that a
> brachah from a tzadik (like birchas Yitzchak) works because the misbarech
> becomes a medium for the aliyas hatzadik who is nisbatel to Hashem in his
> thanksgiving to Him for bestowing the blessing on whom he (the tzadik)
> blessed. Tehilim for a sick person can work much in the same way.

No! Rabbi Dessler says that the recipient of the bracha is inspired to
become a better person, and it's the hirhur tshuva which makes him worthy.
Our sick guy lives in Canada and doesn't even know that we're davening
for him!

> Then how would the Rambam explain "bra mizakeh abba"?

I don't think he ever mentions it.

> The answer is that there are two types of olam habba. One is called
> sachar and the other is called sheleimus.

That's certainly not the Rambam's opinion. See H. Yesodei HaTorah 4:9, H.
Teshuva 8:3. As far as I know that hiluk is mentioned by no rishon.
Do you have anything resembling a source?

David Riceman 

R S Coffer wrote:
> Then how would the Rambam explain "bra mizakeh abba"?

If he were to discuss it, here's one possible explanation consistent with
the Rambam: The father's zechus is for his own actions during the son's
lifetime. He is rewarded for raising a child who would say Barekhu (or
nowadays, Qaddish), or at least a child receptive to being moved to do so.

BTW, your splitting olam haba into sechar and sheleimus is incompatible
with the Rambam (and numerous other sources). Most see sechar as the
consequence of sheleimus. The Rambam says so explicitly -- that olam
haba is the consequence of yedi'as haBorei which in turn comes from
mitzvos. The big machloqes amongst rishonim is whether the loss of olam
haba through cheit is because it causes an external lichluch (perhaps akin
to kelipos, but I only saw "philosophical" rishonim) or an internal flaw.

This touches on RHM's recurring theme about why do mitzvos if there
weren't sechar va'onesh. Sechar is not imposed, we're set up so that
it's a consequence. Moreso, we were given the mitzvos because HQBH told
us how to best meet that consequence. IOW, the sechar is what caused
the mitzvah; not the other way around. In yet a third way: Mitzvos are
more like a doctor's orders than a seargent's. Which may be why it's a
"mitzvah" and not a "tzavah". ("Tzivui" is a post-Tanakh construction.)


On Tue, Jun 07, 2005 at 10:08:55AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
:>I'm not sure how this [Arrow's theorem] is relevent.
:<snip>
:Halakhah is about finding
:>the right pesaq, not making the most number of voters content in a fair
:>manner. Nor would I see how the ability to create and legislate compromise
:>will make an unfair system fair -- it means you'd be compromising between
:>two unfairly chosen alternatives.

: Arrow's theorem says that if you vote on coherent preferences you may end
: up with incoherent (i.e. not obeying the law of transitivity) conclusions.

You snipped my definition of Arrow's Th'm, which (to be frank) was far
more precise than yours. The theorem is that no voting system can meet all
of the following criteria (definitions in previous email): unrestricted
domain, non-imposition, non-dictatorship, independence of irrevevant
alternatives, monotonicity. You only included monotonicity. My questions
were to the assumption that acharei rabim required unrestricted domain,
non-imposition, and non-dictatorship. Take out the requirement that you
give the most people what they want and these criteria need not be met
and therefore Arrow's Theorem does not apply.

: It is trivial to prove the lemma that if some conclusions are implied by
: multiple mutually contradictory premises, than voting on conclusions may
: lead to contradictory implicit premises. In halachic terms, voting on
: psak may lead to internal contradictions in sevaros. The Shulhan Arukh
: sometimes suffers from that lemma.

It does, but that's a more general issue.

:>BTW, is sichlus muttar?

: If by sichlus you mean folly then the Rambam says it's assur. See PhM
: Hagigah 2:1.

Which was sort of my point; the question was rhetorical. (BTW, there's
a line in Nefesh haRav in which RHS quotes RYBS's answer to someone
who asked about the permissability of a norm in karate dojos to bow
to the matt. RYBS said it was not-AZ, but it was assur because it was
"stupid". RHS spelled "stupid" "samech-tes-vav-..." In an early Avodah
post I questioned why hakaras hatov to a matt for breaking your falls is
any stupider than covering challah during qiddush to show it kavod. The
sevarah -- alst habituation of a middah -- is in common.)

To bring this post back on topic: So, if the Rambam calls lechishah
"sichlus" then he is obviously assur-ing it.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 44th day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        6 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Gevurah sheb'Malchus: What type of justice
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            does unity demand?

RMB:
> Last, Hillel didn't deprive them of income by going to the roof. His
> alternative was not learning and they still wouldn't be paid.

If that's the case, wouldn't it be permissable (at least regarding
hasagas g'vul) for someone to copy an album s/he wouldn't buy anyway?

KT,
MYG

On Mon, Jun 06, 2005 at 06:38:30PM -0400, Moshe Yehuda Gluck wrote:
:> Last, Hillel didn't deprive them of income by going to the roof. His
:> alternative was not learning and they still wouldn't be paid.

: If that's the case, wouldn't it be permissable (at least regarding
: hasagas g'vul) for someone to copy an album s/he wouldn't buy anyway?

There are two differences.

Within this inyan, the parallel would be attending a concert they
woudn't go to if they had to pay. And that too would be a zeh neheneh
zezeh lo chaseir situation. However, once there is a recording involved,
its existence continues even if you later would have changed your mind,
or if someone else stumbles across it.

The 2nd problem is whether it's possible for the shi'ur itself to be the
source of parnasah. I believe this is a case where the fact that we're
using a "loophole" (typically "sechar bitul") makes a nafqa mina.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 44th day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        6 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Gevurah sheb'Malchus: What type of justice
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            does unity demand?

Apologies for asking what seems to me to be an elementary school question.

We all learn about the thief paying kofel, etc., if he is caught and
convicted by the beis din, etc. And so if the thief admits, he simple
has to re-imburse the item.

So... for a non-G-d-fearing person, what's the disincentive for
robberty or theivery? If you get caught, just admit, and, economically
speaking, there's no net loss. So, you have something to gain (the
item), and nothing to lose (just return it if caught). So, where's
the disincentive? (Yes, there is loss of reputation, and such, but I'm
thinking that there must have been some thieves or robbers that didn't
really care about that... )

Thoughts?
 - Sholom

On 6/6/05, Klahr, Phillip <klahrpd@upmc.edu> wrote:
> This year we read Parshas Naso before shavuos, rather than after.
> I can't even recall the last time we did so. Is it an extraordinarily rare
> occurrence? Can anyone recall the last time we had this scenario? Thanks.

Ari Brodsky (a list member) discusses this in Section N at
<http://individual.utoronto.ca/aribrodsky/>

He says it happens 10.5% of the time, and it last occurred 21 years
ago. It happens whenever it there is a leap year, and Rosh Hashana is on
Thursday. In that same section N, he lists a bunch of other peculiarities
to this year type.

> Can someone please explain more why an innocent person dies because
> someone else has something coming to him which would be affected by his
> living.

This is one of the most perplexing theological questions in life.
Is it any different from asking why of the six million Jews who were
slaughtered, there must have been a few innocent ones. Why did they die?

Only G-d knows. The closest we can come to an understanding is the fact
that the World to Come will even out many scores.

*********************


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