Avodah Mailing List

Volume 15 : Number 013

Monday, May 16 2005

• Sanhedrin Overturning a Previous Drash
• Re: Yom HaAtzmaut
• Re: YGB: Bava Basra Halachah l'Ma'aseh
• psak and haskafa
• authority of poskim in the realm of hashkafa
• Re: authority of poskim in the realm of hashkafa
• Torah before Sinai
• Reality of the Universe
• Re; pirkei avot
• Re: beli reishis beli sachlis [was: Rambam and miracles]
• Re: beli reishis beli sachlis [was: Rambam and miracles]
• RE: Lfnim mshurat hadin
• Re: Lfnim mshurat hadin
• Query Re Chazorat Ha-Shatz
• Re: authority of poskim in the realm of hashkafa
• Re: Erev Pesach on Shabbat (5765): A Short Guide
• Re: wearing tzitzis out
• RE: authority of poskim in the realm of hashkafa
• RE: authority of poskim in the realm of hashkafa
• RE: authority of poskim in the realm of hashkafa

On Mon, 9 May 2005 hlampel@thejnet.com wrote:
> In "Dynamics of Dispute," I wrote that the commentaries are hard put
> to find any actual historical occurence where one Sanhedrin overturned
> the drash-generated p'sak of an earlier one... Dr. Gary J. Schrieber has
> written me to suggest Zevachim 61b (bottom) as a source for it actually
> happening... 

> This would seem to be an historic example of a Sanhedrin excercising
> their power of overturning a previous drash l'ma'aseh!

> My only concern is how the rest of the sugya's p'sak that the maximum
> dimensions of the mizbeach is not me'akiev interacts with this. Is it
> in effect nullifying the previous understanding, and perhaps denying
> the historical occurences first suggested?

> Can...anyone...of Avodah help?

I'll take a shot at it. 

The Gemara (Shabbos 63:) records a machlokes between the tana kama and R'
Eliezer regarding the tzitz. According to the tana kama, the words Kodesh
LaShem are to be written on two rows. R' Eliezer holds that it is to
be written on one row and claimed that he actually saw an extant tzitz
in Rome that had Kodesh laShem written on one line thereby supporting
his view. Regardless, the Rambam (kley haMikdash 9, 1) paskens like
the tana kama (lichatchila) although previous generations were noheg
differently. The tana kama was not denying the historical accuracy
implicit in R' Eliezer's account. R' Eliezer was a perfectly valid eid
re'eeya however, Chazal were beholden to follow the kelaly hapesak and
based on their drashos, they concluded that it needs to be written on
two lines and thus overturned the previous method of doing it. (See
Michtav MeEliyahu chelek dalet in the ma'amar titled Torah sheba'al peh
uminhagim for a further clarification of this subject)

I hope this was helpful.

Simcha Coffer

On 5/11/05, Moshe & Ilana Sober <sober@pathcom.com> wrote:
> RAMB: "Does anyone have any authoritative information as to whether or
> not we say Tachanun at Mincha the day before Yom HaAtzmaut?"

> I guess Rinat Yisrael is reasonably authoritative for this sort of
> thing. It lists only Pesach Sheni, Erev Rosh Hashana, and Erev Yom Kippur
> as no-Tachanun days on which Tachanun is said the previous mincha. So
> it seems we don't say it erev Yom HaAtzmaut. 

I agree that one could make such a diyyuk from Rinat Yisrael. But I'm
sure that Ari was looking for something a little more explicit.

I found in a book that I didn't know I had (my wife got it when she was
in seminary) called "Go'el Yisrael", a siddur + commentary put out by
Yeshivat haHesder Ramat Gan for Yom haAtzma'ut and Yom Yerushalayim. Now,
on page 32, when discussing the halachot of Yom haAtzmaut, s"k 11:
Ein omrim tachanun b'minchah shelifnei yom ha'atzmaut

Now, even more interesting is the reason I looked at this halachah:
there's a little magen david beside it, making sure it catches one's
attention :)

Shavuah Tov!
--Russell

At 07:01 PM 5/14/2005, Chana Luntz wrote:
>On thinking about this further s not this in fact precisely the case 
>quoted in relation to dina d'malchusa dina in Baba Basra 55a - except that 
>under Persian law, the period for adverse possession was 40 years (See the 
>Rashbam's explanation there).  Why does not the case of the neighbours 
>fall squarely within this example.

Rabbeinu Yonah there argues on the Rashbam and says the case cannot be
talking about a din between two Jews. I cannot cite the Hebrew on Avodah,
but I have copied it out of the Shittah (thanks to DBS!) at the blog site.

http://rygb.blogspot.com/2005/05/bava-basra-halachah-lmaaseh.html

KT,
YGB

Gershon Seif queried:
>> 1) What is the name of the issur of saying chazal were fallible? I've
>> heard the words makchish magideha. Where does that term come from? Anyone
>> know if it's been used in the past in a similar way?

> It is from the Rambam, in Sefer Hamada, when defining a Kofer. Hilchos 
> Teshuvah, 3:17.

However you could say that "makchish magideha" just means that one is
obligated to accept Chazal's authority even if the possibility exists
that they could be mistaken as we find regarding a Sanhedrin. The same
could be said regarding the statement in SA YD 119:7 that equates "one
who does not believe in the words of our teachers" with an Apikorus. In
addition, some such as R' Hirsch held that it only applies to Halacha &
not Aggada. Many others such as Rambam himself (guide 3:14) clearly held
that Chazal could be mistaken in scientific statements made in Aggados.

All the best,
Yisroel Felder

On Tue, 10 May 2005 "Gershon Seif" wrote:
> Rav Elyashiv has come out with a psak regarding the Slifkin books... 
> 1) What is the name of the issur of saying chazal were fallible? 

This has been discussed at length on Avodah however I happened to come
across a new source that indicated that *all* maamarei Chazal, halachah
and drasha are equally true. See first Rashbam in Parshas Bereishis.

> 2) Does anyone have any SOURCES (not personal opinions - we've had
> too many of those!) that would show how psak is or isn't limited to
> non-hashkafic areas.

Why are sources necessary? What distinction is there between halachah
and hashkafah that would make one think that a gadol baTorah could
only pasken on one and not the other? In fact, the Rambam put all
his "hashkafic" views right in the beginning of the Yad, a halacha
sefer. Besides, possessing hashkafic views that are suspect has many
halachic ramifications.

Personally, I see halachah and hashkafa as being inextricably intertwined.
This is not to say that halachah always mandates the assumption of a
particular hashkafah however all hashkafos must fit within specific
halachic parameters; otherwise, they must be rejected.

As far as the pesak re RNS, I don't see how a person who follows Rav
Elyashiv in all his pesakim could choose to reject one at will. Obviously
if Rav Elyashiv "paskened" re R' Noson, he felt he had the right to do
so. Once you question his judgement in one area, why not question his
judgement in all things? (I'm not encouraging this :-)

Simcha Coffer

On Sun, May 15, 2005 at 12:42:08AM -0400, S & R Coffer wrote:
:> Rav Elyashiv has come out with a psak regarding the Slifkin books... 
:> 1) What is the name of the issur of saying chazal were fallible? 

: This has been discussed at length on Avodah however I happened to come
: across a new source that indicated that *all* maamarei Chazal, halachah
: and drasha are equally true. See first Rashbam in Parshas Bereishis.

But our discussion is about a third category of maamarim: neither halakhah
nor aggadita. I believe he's asking about their fallibility on scientific
matters. That is why it's so relevent that the Rambam, who (as far as
we can tell) coined the term makchish magideha, did question not only
their science but even halachic conclusions based on that science to
pasqen lequla!

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 21st day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        3 weeks in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Malchus sheb'Tifferes: What is the unifying
Fax: (270) 514-1507                             factor in harmony?

On Wed, 11 May 2005 "Zilberberg, David" wrote:
> I came across a fascinating footnote regarding the status of pre-Sinai
> Torah... 
> "And give heed to the important principle included in this mishnah...
> that everything that we either refrain from doing or do is because of God's
> commandment through Moshe not because of what God said to prophets that
> preceded Moshe..."
> I find the Rambam puzzling. Why is it that a commandment given by
> God to the Avos or to Noach -- even if clearly phrased "lidoros" --
> is not binding on us without the separate "michayev" of Sinai? A good
> example is mila -- the mitzva in Vayera is clearly phased "lidoros"
> (Gen. 17:10-14) and I had always understood it to be binding on Bnei
> Yisrael before matan torah. Why not after?

The Rambam doesn't mean that mila would not have been binding for future
generations. Rather, he means to say that now that the Torah is given,
we are michaven to fulfill the tzivuy Hashem as manifested through nevuas
Moshe, (a qualitatively greater nevua that bestows upon the action the din
of "Torah"), rather than fulfilling it because it was given to previous
neveim. As far as the comment regarding "lidoros" this can (and should)
be understood as being written by Moshe at the time of matan Torah as
a nesinas taam for the Mitzvah of mila (see Rashi's peshat on the tana
kama re gid hanasheh in Chulin daf kuf amud beis s.v. amru lo)

> In addition, where do we see in the torah that the all pre-Sinai mitzvos
> were repeated at Sinai?

The Rambam states that since mila, gid hanasheh etc. are all part of
taryag mitzvos, and the gemmara in makos says that 613 mitzvos were given
at Sinai, this is proof that all pre-Sinai mitzvos were repeated at Sinai.

As an aside, the sefarim say that there were three "Toros" that preceded
Toras Moshe; Toras Adam, Toras Noach and Toras Avraham.

Simcha Coffer

On Sun, 8 May 2005 hlampel@thejnet.com wrote:
> Sefer Ikkarim, Maamar Sheyni, chap. 27:
> "It is clear therefore that the word "nimtza" (existent) cannot truly
> be predicated of any existing thing except G-d.... 

> In the previous discussion, R. Micha Berger disagreed with my
> understanding of the Rambam. The Rambam says that Hashem is the only
> "emmes," and that everything He created is dependent upon and persists
> only through His Will, but is not as permanent as He. I took it to mean
> that only Hashem (truly) exists. R. Micha, IIUC, takes it to mean that
> the universe's existence is less permanent, but that "as long as" it
> exists, the existence is as real as Hashem's.

> I believe that the Sefer Ikkarim supports my understanding... 

I don't understand why you need to run to the Sefer Ikarim. The Rambam
himself states (Yesodei haTorah 1, 4) that ein od milvado means "ein
sham matzuy emes milvado kimoso". If the Rambam uses the terminology
"kimoso", he is obviously assuming the presence of other "nimtzaim"
(as the pishuto shel mikra implies) yet in comparison (kimoso) to Hashem,
they do not possess the same amitas hamitziyus as Him.

Simcha Coffer 

I wrote, citing a mashal I read somewhere
> Let's say you want to investigate a piece of cloth. You can put it under
> a microcope. You can unravel it and examine the threads that make it
> up. You can compare it to other similar pieces of cloth. You can feel it.

>The first procedure represents R. Chaim; the second, R. Shimon; the third,
> the Rogachover; the fourth, the Chazon Ish.

RMB responded
>I don't get the subtle distrinctions in mashalim that map them to
>the nimshalim. How is the "microscope" different than looking at the
>individual threads? And what is implied by "feeling"?

The idea is that the microscope represents the strictly scientific
approach, which analyses the phenomenon on the atomic level, without
inquiring why the components are put together the way they are. The second
approach (the unraveling is a critical part of the process, not a mere
preparatory stage to the investigation itself) tries to understand how
the components relate to one another; why were they put together in
that particular way? The third examines dozens of similar and related
phenomena, in an attempt to understand the one under investigation.
The reference to the CI means to say that he was more intuitive and less
strictly rationalistic than the other gdolim referred to, and was more
inclined to give weight to the "feel" of the halacha or the sugya.

This mashal is not mine, and try as I can, I cannot remember where I
saw it or who says it.

I do believe that it has certain merit in understanding the general
approach of these gdolim.

Saul Mashbaum

In Avodah V15 #12 dated 5/15/2005 RMB writes:
> To last  for an infinite
> amount of time still is within time. I would rather say HQBH has no
> time, just as the notion "1+1=2" has no color or weight. Not of infinite
> extent on the timeline, but not on the line at all.

> Beli reishis beli sachlis or Atah Hu harishon ve'Atah hu ha'acharon,
> as others seem to take it, would not make Him lema'alah min hazeman!
> Infinite time is not a negative attribute.

I think you're playing with words rather than grappling with any actual
concept. "Infinite" -- when applied to G-d -- is just the human way of
saying "not on the time line."

On Sun, May 15, 2005 at 08:09:03AM -0400, T613K@aol.com wrote:
: I think you're playing with words rather than grappling with any actual
: concept. "Infinite" -- when applied to G-d -- is just the human way of
: saying "not on the time line."

I believe that there's a very real difference between "everywhen" and
"has no 'when'".

But even if it were a semantic game, the words in question are a nevu'ah
(Ata hu..) and a piyut, each of which are said daily! And rishon, acharon,
beli reishis and beli sachlis are not as vague as "infinite". So we need
to understand what we're saying!

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 21st day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        3 weeks in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Malchus sheb'Tifferes: What is the unifying
Fax: (270) 514-1507                             factor in harmony?

[Micha:]
> Look at mefarashim on "qedoshim tihyu" (in particular the famous
> Ramban), "ve'asisa hatov vehayashar" (similar idea, but bein adam
> lachaveiro) and "vehalachta bidrachav" (the Rambam's maqor, as well as
> that in the gemaros in the next paragraph). Not to mention the entire
> existence of Hilchos Dei'os. Or to a CD search for "lifnim mishuras hadin"
> -- the expression is not a modern invention.

> Frankly, I find the idea that halakhah is the end-all of human behavior very
> hard to defend. See also BQ 99b, BM 30b, Tosafos ad loc (citing Yuma 9b that
> the churban was due to a lack of lifnim mishuras hadin!), and BM 83a.

> In fact, I just came across an clear-cut example during a chavrusah last
> night. The mishnah on BM 44a (also the gemara on 49a), we find it explicitly
> say that backing out on some kinds of deals is muttar me'ikkar hadin, but
> the person is mechusrei amanah and subject to a kelalah!

Actually my request was made only after a BI-CD search because I wanted to
be sure I hadn't missed anything nor was I drawing improper conclusions.
One thing that has struck me so far is that all the LM"HD sources are
bein adam lchavero. Any thoughts on this?

KT
Joel Rich

On Sun, May 15, 2005 at 02:16:42PM -0400, Rich, Joel wrote:
: Actually my request was made only after a BI-CD search because I wanted to
: be sure I hadn't missed anything nor was I drawing improper conclusions.
: One thing that has struck me so far is that all the LM"HD sources are
: bein adam lchavero. Any thoughts on this?

Qedoshim tihyu is usually taken in a bein adam laMaqom manner, as opposed
to ve'asisa hatov vehayashar.

I think this gets to an interesting difference between the Ramchal's
approach to middos and that you find in the Mussar Movement. Mesilas
Yesharim follows the beraisa's path up to qedushah and ru'ach haqodesh.
Cheshbon haNefesh's sample middos are more bein adam lachaveiro.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 21st day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        3 weeks in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Malchus sheb'Tifferes: What is the unifying
Fax: (270) 514-1507                             factor in harmony?

On Fri, 13 May 2005 "Rich, Joel" commented:
>> I have a personal minhag which I adopted based on RYBS shita (I heard from
>> two different talmidim that this was his shita). Whenever I daven for the
>> amud, I wait for the tzibur to finish modim d'rabanan and then say the
>> shatz's modim out loud.

> Actually R' Y Sacks said the shatz should say  the 1st 3 words in a very
> loud voice (so as not to appear as not saying thanks) and then wait for the
> tzibbur to finish)

This is actually what I do however, I was told that RYBS repeated the whole
thing. 

Simcha Coffer

S & R Coffer <rivkyc@sympatico.ca> wrote:
> On Tue, 10 May 2005 "Gershon Seif" wrote:
>> Does anyone have any SOURCES (not personal opinions - we've had
>> too many of those!) that would show how psak is or isn't limited to
>> non-hashkafic areas.

> Why are sources necessary? What distinction is there between halachah
> and hashkafah that would make one think that a gadol baTorah could
> only pasken on one and not the other? 

Hashkafa. How does one define it?

It seems to me the closest definition of it would be, perspective.
IOW one's Hashkafa would be one's perspective. Or put another way, it
is how one approaches his Judaism... or in what way one sees fulfillment
of God's will. This is different than Halacha in the sense that it is an
approach... and not an activity. Halacha is by definition a way to act,
not think. It involves: doing... or not doing. It is not an overview.

Let's look at TuM as an example. If one chooses this Hashkafa over let's
say Chasidism has one violated Halacha? Or to use another example, if
a Chasid decides that TuM makes more sense to him than Chasidism has he
violated Halacha? And vice versa, If an adherent of TuM chooses Chasidus
has he violated Halacha. I think the clear answer is no. Paskining
Hashkafa therefore doesn't really make any sense. Inherent in Psak is
that you believe anything other than your Psak is Assur. In Paskinining
the correctness of one Hashkafa you automatically say another Hashkafa
is Assur.

Is this what even the most RW of Charedim think? Is, for example,
the Chasidic approach to Judaism Assur to a Litvak? I don't think so.
Each Hashkafa is valid if it does not violate Halacha. It is only the
perspective that is different. To Paskin a particular Hashkafa invalid
if it does not violate Halacha is nonsense.

>  Personally, I see halachah and hashkafa as being inextricably intertwined.
> This is not to say that halachah always mandates the assumption of a
> particular hashkafah however all hashkafos must fit within specific
> halachic parameters; otherwise, they must be rejected.

Well, who ever said anything different? Halacha and Hashkafa are NOT
intertwined. Hashkafa has to follow Halacha. But Halacha does not have
to follow Hashkafa. Halacha is the observance of Mitzvos. It is the
"how"... not the "why".

> As far as the pesak re RNS, I don't see how a person who follows Rav
> Elyashiv in all his pesakim could choose to reject one at will.

One does not have to be of the same Hashkafa as R Elyashiv to follow his
Psak. It is well known for example that RSZA was R. Aharon Lichtenstein's
Posek. But it is equally well known that their Hashkafos were not the
same. To say that not follwing R Elyashiv's Hashkafa means that you are
rejecting his Psak is ridiculous, IMHO.

> Obviously
> if Rav Elyashiv "paskened" re R' Noson, he felt he had the right to do
> so. Once you question his judgement in one area, why not question his
> judgement in all things? (I'm not encouraging this :-)

As I said in matters of Hashkafa one does not necessairly have to follow
one's Posek's Hashkafa.

While the following story is not exactly comparable I will never-the-less
cite it as an illustration.

When R. Aaron Solovechik's Shloshim took place, Rabbi Yaakov Perlow (the
Novominsker Rebbe) flew in to Chicago to give a Hespid. He considered
RAS his rebbe. RAS taught RYP how to learn his first Rambam. He felt that
so strongly about RAS that he took time off from his very busy schedule
to fly in to Chicago and address, in Yeshivas Brisk, a relatively small
crowd. Yet when it comes to Hashkafa, he had little if anything in common
with RAS. Rabbi Perlow is a Chasid. RAS is not. RAS said Hallel on Yom
HaAtzmaut, RYP does not. In short one can be a devoted adherent to one's
rebbe and not accept his rebbe's Hashkafa.

Hashkafa is a personal thing having to do with one's life experiences,
one's Mesorah, and how one filters information through the portals
of one's mind. It includes all of one's life experiences learned both
formally and informally. Accepting someone else's perspective as Psak
Halacha is to forcibily negate one's own Daas and is intellectually
dishonest. It is impossible, IMHO to simply deny one's own conclusions
as irrelavent or false and embrace another's conclusions as one's
own unquestioningly. SAYING... one accpets unquestionaingly another's
conclusions does not make it true. It only makes it politically correct.

HM

About a month ago, I mentioned the many guides to Erev Pesach SheChal
B'Shabbos which advise us to make Hamotzi somewhere far from the table,
clean ourselves well, and then continue the meal at the table, eating
from Pesach food on Pesach keilim. I questioned whether or not the
HaMotzi will cover those other foods under such circumstances. To see my
posts in full, please refer to Avodah volume 14, digests #110-113, under
the subject "Erev Pesach on Shabbat (5765): A Short Guide"

Over Yom Tov, I found more sources to substantiate my question, but I did
not get a chance to post it until now.

Mechaber, Orach Chaim 177:2 states: "Things which come after the meal,
but before birkas hamazon: In the times of the chachamim of the gemara,
it was the practice the at the end of the meal, they'd withdraw their
hands from the bread, and remove it, and set themselves up to eat fruit
and drink whatever would be brought to them at that point, whether things
related to the meal or things unrelated to the meal -- they need their
own bracha, both beforehand and afterward, because hamotzi and birkas
hamazon only cover what is eaten in the main part of the meal. But this
last halacha is not common (aino matzui) among us, because we do not
usually withdraw our hands from the bread until birkas hamazon."

My point is that it is indeed rare for us to "withdraw our hands from the
bread" before benching, EXCEPT in the case of how these Guides suggest we
act on Shabbos Erev Pesach. In fact, give the extreme care with which we
avoid allowing any chometz crumbs on the Pesach table (some Guides
suggest brushing our teeth in between!), there can be no greater example
of "withdrawing from the bread" than this.

But do we hold like this Mechaber?

For example, the Beur Halacha there ("She'ayn anu ragilim") suggests that
the Mechaber's halacha would apply only in a case where they removed the
table at which the meal was eaten, and that since we use the same table
for both the meal and the dessert, the dessert can be considered as part
of the meal. But this would not apply to those who make Hamotzi far from
the table on Shabbos Erev Pesach.

But that Beur Halacha also mentions other shitos which say nothing of the
"table removal" concept, and focus on whether the food is a meal-food or
a dessert-food, and allow meal-food to be eaten without additional
brachos. Namely, the Rashba (that meal-foods do not need their own
brachos at all, even if after the meal) and the Eshkol (who brings 2
similar perushim from Rav Hai Gaon, that meal-foods after the meal need
their own bracha rishona, but dessert-foods after the meal would need
both a bracha rishona and bracha acharona).

Ultimately, the Beur Halacha says that if one ate daisa (oatmeal,
porridge) after the meal, one can hold "safek brachos l'hakel" because of
shitos that say birkas hamazon works as a bracha acharona for daisa.

But after saying Hamotzi on Erev Pesach far from the table, daisa is one
thing that will certainly *not* be eaten back at the kosher l'pesach
table. And (unless I misread it, which is quite possible) the Beur
Halacha doesn't say what to do for the meat and fish which *will* be
eaten there.

What's the halacha? Say a bracha rishona like the Eshkol, or skip it like
the Rashba? One could go "safek brachos l'hakel", but I count four
different ways to avoid this safek:

1) Make hamotzi on real chometzdik bread at the table as described in so
many Acharonim, and leftover chometz can be disposed as they explained.
Those who do sell even chometz b'en can use disposable kelim and wrap all
the leftovers and everything in the tablecloth, and place it with the
chometz to be sold.

2) Use Matza Ashira. Prior to Sof Zman Achilas Chometz (and according to
some, even later) even Ashkenazim can eat this at the Pesach table,
together with their Pesachdik food.

3) Use sheets of cooked and dried pesachdik matza.

4) Use rolls made of matza meal. Depending on the recipe, these rolls
will either be pas habaa bkisnin (hamotzi under these circumstances) or
outright hamotzi.

The last two (or three) of these ideas have the advantange that this
bread can be eaten even past Sof Zman Achilas Chometz. The more I think
about it, the more I wonder why we don't find any poskim suggesting these
last two as a way for Ashkenazim to get Hamotzi for their Shalosh Seudos
on this day --- and they don't discourage them either, for some reason.

Akiva Miller

RMB wrote on areivim (v15 # 37)
>There is also a technical reason why they [tzitzis] shouldn't be
>visible. R' Chiya berei deR' Nasan tells us (Menachos 39a) that ideally
>tzitzis should be 1/3 chulyos >and 2/3 gedil.

RSRH says that the chulyot, the knotted part, represent the elements of
Judaism which are fixed and immutable; the gdil, the free-hanging part,
represents the elements which may vary (different haskafot, different
approaches). It is thus very significant that the gedil is twice the
length of the chulyot.

Saul Mashbaum

On May 15, 2005 4:55 PM Harry Maryles wrote:
> Hashkafa.  How does one define it?

> It seems to me the closest definition of it would be, perspective.
> IOW one's Hashkafa would be one's perspective. Or put another way, it
> is how one approaches his Judaism... or in what way one sees
> fulfillment of God's will. This is different than Halacha in the
> sense that it is an approach... and not an activity. Halacha is by
> definition a way to act, not think. It involves: doing... or not
> doing. It is not an overview.

I couldn't disagree more. Like I mentioned in my original post, the Rambam
puts his "hashkafic" views right at the beginning of Yad haChazakah.
Rabbeinu Bachya referred to his monumental sefer as *Chovos* haLevavos
implying that we have a duty to maintain certain attitudes regardless of
personal opposition. The mind is the most important organ we possess. Why
would halachah only govern the duties of the body and ignore the duties
of the mind?

RHM and I have (despite our mutual respect and "electronic" friendship)
certain fundamental hashkafic differences that, if left unchecked, would
commandeer Avodah cyberspace for a long time. Thus, I believe it to be an
inequitable usage of Avodah space to respond in point by point fashion.
However, I do wish to state that I believe that R' Harry's response
is primarily ad hominem and does not address my original points. (no
offence R' Harry :-)

Simcha Coffer

S & R Coffer <rivkyc@sympatico.ca> wrote:
> However, I do wish to state that I believe that R' Harry's response is
> primarily ad hominem and does not address my original points. (no offence R'
> Harry :-)

Ad hominem? How do you see that? I did not attack you at all. I was
simply defining Hashkafa and my disagreement with your attitude about
it. Hashkafic "Psak" is not the same as Halachic Psak. Of course there are
certain principles of belief that are invioble. I wasn't talking about
those. I was talking about that area that we are in dispite about. The
area of one's approach to Judaism. I think I was clear about that through
the examples I used. Just to make my point clearer, I would ask, "If
Chasidus is a Hashkafa and the Rambam does not mention the elements of
Chasidus" does that mean that according to the Rambam Chasidus is Assur
as an Hashkafa and that the only way to look at Judaism is exactly the
way he spells it out?

Of course not. Similarly if R. Elyashhiv "Paskins" that belief in
a universe older than about 6000 years is Apikursus, when there is
physical evidence to support an older universe and there are Rishonim
and Achronim who say corroborate that, we do not have agree with him.

HM

On May 15, 2005 Harry Maryles wrote:
> Ad hominem? How do you see that? I did not attack you at all. 

According to the Encarta online Dictionary ad hominem is defined as
"appealing to people's emotions and beliefs rather than their ability
to think" I know you didn't attack me. I simply mean that I find your
arguments (regarding our current discussion) to be geared more towards
deep-seated emotional beliefs than objectivity and reason. For instance,
by invoking, TuM, Chareidi RW and Chassidus all in one paragraph,
it becomes impossible to argue objectively as any statement I make in
response may be seen as knocking a particular group. I have made that
error in the past and do not wish to repeat it again.

It looks like you are not going to let me get away without responding
so here goes.

> Hashkafa.  How does one define it?

> It seems to me the closest definition of it would be, perspective.
> IOW one's Hashkafa would be one's perspective. Or put another way, it
> is how one approaches his Judaism... or in what way one sees
> fulfillment of God's will.

I am not using the term Hashkafa in this context. The various disciplines
you go on to quote (Chassidus, Litvak etc...) are drachim in Avodas Hashem
and as we all know, harbey drachim lamakom. In our current discussion,
I am using the term "hashkafa" more in line with the Rambam's *Hilchos*
Yesodei haTorah and *Hilchos* Dayos i.e. fundamental principles and
attitudes that a Jew must know and adopt whether he is a Chasid, misnaged
or whatever.

> One does not have to be of the same Hashkafa as R Elyashiv to follow
> his Psak. It is well known for example that RSZA was R. Aharon
> Lichtenstein's Posek. But it is equally well known that their
> Hashkafos were not the same.  To say that not follwing R Elyashiv's
> Hashkafa means that you are rejecting his Psak is ridiculous, IMHO.

Not ridiculous at all. RAL is a talmid chacham of repute both in halachah
and hashkafa. He only approached RSZA in areas that he was misupak in. In
hashkafa, he was not misupak and thus did not require RSZA "psak". OTOH,
a person who, as I said originally, follows Rav Elyashiv in all of his
pesakim has basically adopted him as his moreh hoRaah. In such a case,
I don't see a distinction between what you refer to as halacha and what
I refer to as hashkafa. We all know that the halachah is "Apikorus harey
hu kinachri". You cannot use him for part of a minyan, his shechitah is
invalid etc. etc. If Rav Elyashiv paskened that certain elements in RNS
books may be "questionable", this a halachic pesak, (on the contents,
not the person...I believe) not a pesak regarding the merits of Chassidus
over Mussar or some such thing.

> I was
> simply defining Hashkafa and my disagreement with your attitude about
> it. Hashkafic "Psak" is not the same as Halachic Psak.  Of course
> there are certain principles of belief that are invioble.

Precisely. IMO, our current discussion surrounds just that; an inviolable
principle of belief as will be illustrated shortly.

> I wasn't
> talking about those.

I guess we're not arguing then :-)

> I was talking about that area that we are in
> dispite about. The area of one's approach to Judaism. I think I was
> clear about that through the examples I used. Just to make my point
> clearer, I would ask, "If Chasidus is a Hashkafa and the Rambam does
> not mention the elements of Chasidus" does that mean that according
> to the Rambam Chasidus is Assur as an Hashkafa and that the only way
> to look at Judaism is exactly the way he spells it out?

I believe I addressed this point already. The Yad haChazaka is a
halchah sefer to which Chassidim and non-Chasisdim are equally beholden
(withstanding differences in Askenazic customs of course). There have
been many movements, such as Mussar or Chassidus, that have materialized
in generations after the Rambam that were specifically geared towards
making fundamental tikkunim in klal Yisroel. In fact, Moreh Nevuchim
was just such a sefer. In the lands of ashkenaz (France) they did not
require it but in the lands of sfarad, it was indispensable for the
hatzalas nefashos of klal yisroel. This has nothing to do with the
halachic component of the Rambam's sefarim though (of which Hilchos
Yesodei haTorah is a part of) and thus does not pertain to our current
discussion. You are mixing kashas with borscht.

> Of course not. Similarly if R. Elyashhiv "Paskins" that belief in a
> universe older than about 6000 years is Apikursus, when there is
> physical evidence to support an older universe and there are Rishonim
> and Achronim who say corroborate that, we do not have agree with him.
> IMHO to do so would be intellectually dishonest to oneself.

This point has been argued on Avodah for a long time now. I believe
that the Rishonim and Achronim that corroborate an old universe are
marginal at best and represent a shita dechuya in klal yisrael that
certain modern-day groups/people (RNS for instance) are attempting
to revive. I believe that maaseh bereishis is one of the fundamental
ikkarim (metzius Hashem) of the Torah of which we possess a 5 thousand
year mesora and should not be tampered with. This is the heart of the
debate re the age of the universe and there is really nothing more for
me to add to the arguments that were already made. I honestly think that
the moderator of this site would not appreciate a fourth revival of this
subject so I will respectfully point you to Avodah's search engine for
arguments supporting (and rejecting) my contention.

Best wishes
Simcha Coffer

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