Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 105

Wednesday, March 30 2005

• Re: adoption and aveilus [was: Aveilus for an intermarried parent]
• Metzitza b'fe developments
• Eiruvin
• Re: Races of Mankind [was: age of universe]
• Re: Races of Mankind
• Re: schiavo case
• RE: schiavo case
• Re: schiavo case
• RE: Startling historical beliefs
• fallibility of Chazal
• Re: kavod hatorah
• Re: The 13 Rules and Logic
• Do I say Kedusha, Borchu?
• mitzvah of mikvah
• Re: Do I say Kedusha, Borchu?
• Re: adoption and aveilus [was: Aveilus for an intermarried parent]
• RE: mitzvah of mikvah

In Avodah V14 #88 dated 2/28/05 R' Micha Berger writes:
> I asked my rebbe about whether an adopted child was obligated to mourn
> a birth parent. After clearing up the idea that nowadays most adopted
> children would know who the birth parent is and when she/he had passed
> away, Rav Dovid answered that for a child who was Jewish before the
> adoption, the question is whether they can formally mourn the adoptive
> parents while the birth parents are still alive. The child can, but
> technically it's because a student may formally mourn his mentor.

This is something I have wondered about from time to time. My son's birth
parents are Jewish, and I know who they are, although my son does not. (I
won't stop him if he wants to, but he hasn't expressed any interest in
meeting them.) Do I have to keep track of their whereabouts for him? Does
he have to try and keep up with them so he can sit shiva for them after
120 years? Is he obligated to sit shiva for them? If he never has any
contact with them, but somehow finds out?

Truthfully I want him to sit shiva for me after 120, and to say kaddish,
but is he obligated to do so? You mentioned mourning for a rebbe--but one
doesn't mourn for a rebbe for a whole year, does one? Does my son have any
obligation to mourn for a year for me and my husband? Does he have any
obligation to say kaddish for us? We have two bio daughters but no other
son. If he doesn't have an obligation to mourn for his adoptive parents
(us), may he? Re-reading what you wrote, I see that he may mourn for
us even if his bio parents are alive then, but for how long? I assume
he will ask his own shailas when the time comes so I'm not asking for
a psak now, only for discussion.

I do know someone who sat shiva for his grandparents, because they
raised him. He later also sat shiva for his mother, who he thought was
his sister when he was growing up. But he would have been obligated to
sit shiva for his mother in any case, because he would have sat shiva
for her as a sister if he'd never learned the truth, so his case is only
tangentially related to my own.

 -Toby  Katz
=============

I have a shiur every Monday with R. Bleich. We are currently
covering medical ethics and yesterday we discussed metzitzah b'fe.
Going through the shitot of the mekilim on the b'fe requirement we saw
several interesting things. Please note these are my conclusions, not
those of R. Bleich. All the mekilim we saw assume that the metzitzah is
purely for reasons of refuah. Most assume that the essential component
of the metzitzah is extraction of blood mimkomot harechokim. Thus they
are matir the use of tubes or gauze given the assurance of the mohelim
that such techniques do indeed achieve the same effect. The Chatam Sofer
seems to raise the possibility that a doctor might be able to deermine
what is the nature of the intended refuah and on that basis suggest an
alternate treatment such as cleansing the wound with wine from a sponge
or something similar. It is not clear if the Chatam Sofer actually holds
this, and he does not elucidate how one could determine absolute knowledge
of the intended refuah. The Binyan Tzion raises the possibility that we
have no knowledge whatsoever of the manner of refuah intended.

According to the view of the Binyan Tzion we see the possibility
that there may be some significance to metzitzah being davka bape.
One person in the shiur suggested the sterility of the saliva, and also
the immunological benefits of saliva in protecting the site of the wound.
This possibility requires real investigation. If it could be determined
that the use of saliva creates a benefit that is not achieved by a tube
this would certainly bolster the claims that metzitzah must be bape.

R. Bleich AFAIU holds that it is very difficult to extract the requisite
amount of blood with a tube, and that many brissen nowadays are done
incorrectly by mohelim who don't know how to use the tube. A possible
solution suggested in shiur was the use of an adpated version of the
negative pressure devices once used to treat male infertility. This will
also have to be investigated, but expect to seem them in brissen within
a few years (that's my guess). The underlying assumption is of course
that we are not fully aware of the medical implications of metztitza
and therefore it should not be discontinued, rather every precaution
shoul be taken to make sure the environment is sterile etc. Note that
to pass on a herpes infection it is not necessary to do metzitzah b'fe.
Rather if the mohel is shedding he should not be near the baby at all.
Hepatitis is also a serious concern.

Jonathan Cohen
jcoh003@yahoo.com

[RYGB:]
> There are numerous examples of these issues - even here in undzer
> heilige shtetl. Indeed, if you travel down a certain heavily-traveled
> highway in one of the boroughs of City of New York, you will see - "galui
> l'kol ho'amim" - one of the eruvin that is relied upon by thousands,
> if not tens of thousands, of yidden - pasul l'kol ha'dei'os, u'kdai
> bizayon vo'kotzef.

I think that our friend, RYGB, should publicize this problem promptly.
I'm sure there are people who would want the situation corrected.

Second, I have heard that the main reason for the inability of there
installing an eiruv in Brooklyn is that 600,000 travel through Ocean
Parkway daily. However, each vehicle is a reshus hayachid. So the
population of vehicular traffic ought not count toward 600,000, and
therefore, an eiruv ought to be viable. Since there are eiruvin in other
large cities, including Queens, NY, (I may be mistaken, but i think even
across Queens Blvd), we are maikel against Rashi's opinion concerning
the width of the street/avenue. Baltimore also has some very wide avenues
inside its eiruv.

Finally, I have also heard it said that Rav Aharon Kotler zt"l told RMF
never to permit an eiruv in Manhattan or Queens.

Noach Witty

On Mon, Mar 28, 2005 at 11:12:56PM -0500, T613K@aol.com wrote:
: Another possibility is that people--even many people--were created AFTER
: Adam Harishon...

As I wrote, this has two problems:

1- It requires a minimalist attitude WRT the mabul that has no supporting
medrash or maamar chazal.

2- We get moral milage out of the idea that one can't say that their
ancestors were superior to others'.

...
: 2. I have no source but this is what I believe: Shem = Europeans,
: Indians (from India) and Semitic peoples, Cham = Africans and Australian
: aborigines, Yafes = Asians, Pacific Islanders and American Indians.

According to Mei'am Lo'ez, Sheim fathered the Asian peoples. The
people of India and the Far East are described as Benei Keturah, their
spiritual excercises the degenerate remains of the gifts Avraham gave
those children. We are Asians, not Europeans.

The whole system doesn't work too well WRT Edom.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A sick person never rejects a healing procedure
micha@aishdas.org        as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what
http://www.aishdas.org   other people think when dealing with spiritual
Fax: (270) 514-1507      matters?              - Rav Yisrael Salanter

In Avodah V14 #104 dated 3/29/2005  "m cohen" <mcohen@touchlogic.com>
writes:
> I  don't understand this chidush of that people--even many  people--were
> created AFTER Adam Harishon.

> Every source that I know of understood that the fact that the sons of
> Adam and Chava married and had children was because that they married
> other children born to Adam/Chava by normal means.

> do you have any sources that indicate  otherwise?

No, I have to admit that I have no sources. I was only speculating when I
said that MAYBE many people were created after Adam Harishon, even though
they are not mentioned explicitly. It is true that Rashi says that Adam
and Chava had [unmentioned] daughters, and that brothers married sisters
in the beginning ("Olam chessed yibaneh.") However, the world seems to
have become thickly populated very rapidly. Kayin has to wander lest
he be killed--at a time when there seem to be only half a dozen people
in the world, all close relatives?! Chanoch builds cities--populated
by less than a hundred people?! There is art, music, culture, even
intermarriage between different races of men. There are many hints in
the early perakim of Bereishis that there are a whole lot of people there,
and where did they all come from? Again, I am only speculating.

 -Toby  Katz
=============

In Avodah V14 #104 dated 3/29/2005: 

R' Gershon Seif, paraphrasing Rabbi Shmuel Fuerst, Dayan of the Agudah
in the Midwest:
: Are the umos haolom guilty of murder in cases of brain death  when they
: pull the plug? He answered they are not obligated to seek out a  Jewish
: beis din to determine what is considered being alive. They are  obligated
: to use their own legal system to attempt to arriving at  truth...

R' Micha replied:
>>What about the Rambam, who defines keeping the 7 mitzvos as specifically
keeping them because they were given at Sinai. Wouldn't that imply a
duty to follow halakhah, not some natual/intuitive moral law?<<

I don't think goyim are obligated to follow our halacha exactly in
determining that death has occurred. Brain death is a reasonable and,
I believe, halachically acceptable definition of death for goyim. However:

TERRI SCHIAVO IS NOT BRAIN DEAD! According to any possible definition
of death, Jewish or Noahide, what is being done to her is murder.

Defining "I wish she were dead" as the legal equivalent of "She is dead"
is immoral, a sin for goyim and for Jews, and repugnant. Even defining
"SHE wishes she were dead" as the equivalent of "She is dead" is a sin,
for them and for us.

(Aside from the fact that we don't know whether Terri really ever said
she wanted to die, but even if....)

 -Toby  Katz
=============

[Micha:]
> What about the Rambam, who defines keeping the 7 mitzvos as specifically
> keeping them because they were given at Sinai. Wouldn't that imply a
> duty to follow halakhah, not some natual/intuitive moral law?

I wondered the same thing. It seems he was saying that they only have the
obligatin to set up a system, knowing that Hashem revelaed this desire at
Sinai. The specific system of the Torah though is only obliatory for the
Jews. I will try and ask Rav Fuerst next time I see him and report back.

[RnTK:]
> I don't think goyim are obligated to follow our halacha exactly in
> determining that death has occurred. Brain death is a reasonable and, I
> believe, halachically acceptable definition of death for goyim. However:

> TERRI SCHIAVO IS NOT BRAIN DEAD!  According to any possible definition of
> death, Jewish or Noahide, what is being done to her is murder.

I agree. I only quoted Rav Fuerst because of the public interest in the
topic, not because the case matches.what he ws saying.

On Tue, Mar 29, 2005 at 11:56:22PM -0500, T613K@aol.com wrote:
: I don't think goyim are obligated to follow our halacha exactly in
: determining that death has occurred. Brain death is a reasonable and,
: I believe, halachically acceptable definition of death for goyim. However:

: TERRI SCHIAVO IS NOT BRAIN DEAD! According to any possible definition
: of death, Jewish or Noahide, what is being done to her is murder.

How about this very plausible definition: A person ceases to be a person
when they can never again regain consciousness.

Once you allow non-Jews to define death for themselves, one can be quite
"creative".

-mi

Someone forwarded to me what Jonathan Ostroff has written, so let me respond.

He writes:
> Shapiro writes on p96:
>> According to a number of Midrashic sources, R. Meir himself had a
>> Torah text that differed from that of his colleagues (BR 9: 5,20). For
>> example, while the standard version of Genesis 1:31 reads "tov me-od",
>> R. Meir's text read "Behold, death was good" (tov maves)... According
>> to Nachmanides, this was not the result of an error made by an ignorant
>> scribe, but rather that that R. Meir himself was responsible for the
>> variant.

> According to Shapiro (using Nachmanides as support), R. Meir had a
> legitimate variant text!

This is all smoke and mirrors. After pointing out that there were variant
texts in Temple days, I note that R. Meir also had a variant text. Then
I point that that according to Ramban, it was R. Meir himself who was
responsible for this variant. All this is correct.

I never say that R. Meir had a "legitimate" variant text. I don't
even know what this means. If you believe in Torah then there are no
such things as "legitimate" variants. Rather, all variants are due to
corruptions of the original text, and R. Meir's variant falls into this
category, as anyone who examines the reference will see.

As to the larger question, let me add the following in the name of R.
Shlomo Fischer, who after the death of R. Kafih is the only gadol who
in addition to his knowledge of Shas and poskim is also expert in the
medieval Jewish philosophical tradition. When the controversy about the
commentary of R. Yehudah he-Hasid broke out, R. Fischer commented that R.
Moshe was having such a problem with this commentary, leading him to
say it was a forgery, since he assumed that all of our sages agreed with
the 13 Principles. But the truth is many sages rejected aspects of the
principles. (In my book I quote this, but now I give the context of R.
Fischer's comment).

The quote that Mr. Ostroff brings from Zioni, and uses to offer a new
interpretation of R. Yehudah he-Hasid, has no relevance to the passage
of R. Yehudah he-Hasid. In this quote. Zioni claims that the entire Torah
was written by Moses. In the text of R. Yehudah he-Hasid that he brings,
nothing is said in opposition to this. Rather, R. Yehudah speaks of a
text *taken out* of the Torah. Note that Zioni does not quote R. Yehudah
he-Hasid's view that there are post-Mosaic additions in the Torah,
perhaps because he disagreed with this. To repeat, the quotation from
Zioni that the entire Torah was written by Moses is *not contradicted*
by the passage from R. Yehudah he-Hasid that he quotes. Mr. Ostroff's
extrapolation from it is completely unjustified.

Let me also note one more thing regarding R. Yehudah he-Hasid's view
that the Great Hallel (Ps. 136) was removed from the Torah by David. In
my book I state that there must have been soe tradition regarding this
verse, the source and nature of which is unknown. In fact, nowhere in
rabbinic literature does it say that the Great Hallel was recited by
the Israelites. Yet I recently found that the Rokeah, in his Perush on
the Siddur also says that the Israelites recited the Great Hallel and he
claims that is is found in Seder Olam (but it's not in our versions). He
doesn't say that this was every included in the Torah, just that they
recited it, but it is still significant in that it shows that in Ashkeneaz
there was this tradition about the Great Hallel being sung.

Simcha Coffer wrote: 

<<<
On March 28, 2000 R' David Glasner responded:
> The Chazon Ish dismisses the Kesef Mishna, but the Kesef Mishna only
> came to explain how the Rambam could havepaskened in Mamrim 2:1 that
> a beit din ha-gadol may overturn the halakhah decided by an earlier
> beit din ha-gadol based on its interpretation of the Scripture even if
> the later beit din is inferior to its predecessor in wisdom and number.
> The Kesef Mishna is trying to reconcile this psak l'halakha of the Rambam
> with the method of the Talmud, which doesn't allow an amora to argue
> with a tannaitic source. The Chazon Ish may not like the Keseph Mishna,
> but his problem seems to be with the Rambam about whom he is silent
> (at least in the quotations I have so far read).

Excellent point. And this is precisely why I believe that rather than the
Chazon Ish dismissing the Kesef Mishna, he is appending a nesinas ta'am,
a reason for klal yisroel's universal acceptance. In fact, a neutral
reading of the text of his letter yields exactly this conclusion. I've
quoted it on a previous post but I'll do it again.

Uma shekasav maran shekiblu kein, translation - and that which our master
(the Kesef Mishna) wrote that they (the generation of ammoraim after
the chasimas hamishna) accepted thus (i.e. not to argue on the chosmei
hamishna), lo tova vachesed assu im harishonim, translation - they
(meaning the first generation ammoraim, notice the plural form here assu,
they did. According to RDE who understands the Chazon Ish as dismissing
the Kesef mishna, it should say assa, singular) were not performing a
goodness and kindliness with the Rishonim (i.e. the chosmei hamishna),
ela haemes cheeyeiv osam - translation - rather, the truth (of the fact
of the more profound stature of the earlier generations) obligated them
(to accept not to argue on the earlier generations).

Your reading of the Chazon Ish seems quite reasonable (though I don't mean
to take sides in your discussion with RDE). However, I don't believe that
you resolve the difficulty in the position of the Chazon Ish, because the
whole point of Mamrim 2:1 is that, by law, the beit din ha-gadol has the
right to uproot the p'sak of an earlier beit din ha-gadol even though the
earlier beit din was GREATER than the later one in wisdom and numbers.
So how can that be a "nesinas ta'am" for the Kesef Mishna's attempt
to reconcile the Rambam's p'sak with Talmudic methodology when that
it is gufa the point of the Rambam: the greater stature of the Tanaim
doesn't matter for purposes of determining the halakhah based on peirush
ha-p'sukim? It would seem that whatever the Kesef Mishna meant to say
(and I agree he didn't make himself clear) he must have meant something
more than to say "and Talmudic methodology doesn't contradict this
halakhah because the Amoraim accepted upon themselves not to argue with
the Tanaim because they recognized that the Tanaim were greater than
they were." Can't you hear the clanging dissonance?

David Glasner

On Sun, 27 Mar 2005 RYGB wrote:
> But, as I tried to highlight in "The Contemporary Eruv," while the
> reshus ho'rabbim issue is a davar she'yeish lo mattirin, the majority
> of eruvin (even those constructed by distinguished-looking rabbis
> with luxuriant white beards and resplendent frocks or bekeshes)
> are pasul - some of them "pasul l'mehadrin." Moroever, even those
> that were constructed k'dos u'k'din often become pasul sometime after
> construction, because the individuals left charged with maintenance are
> either irresponsible or ignorant - and, worse still, often lacking in
> yiras shomayim.

This point can be made about anything that requires a hechsher. There
are many mikvaos that have problems as well. However, since an eruv by
nature is visible, the problems are more noticeable.

The fact that there are pasul eruvin does not proscribe the construction
of all eruvin. As a matter of fact the kol koreis against eruvin never
argue this point -- that since there are pasul eruvin they should not
be erected. The Chazon Ish was the baal ha'machsher of the Bnei Brak
eruv. However, he noted that almost every time he inspected the eruv after
Shabbos it was either broken or ripped and therefore he maintained that
the eruv was considered be'chezkas pasul every Shabbos (Teshuvos V'Kasvim,
siman 85). Nevertheless we do not see that the CI gave up the hechsher.

While there may be some city eruvin that are not constructed correctly I
am positive that there are even fewer private eruvin that are kosher. This
is one of the reasons why lately in some large cities one encompassing
eruv was erected with one baal machsher. Unlike the typical private eruv
constructed by a baal habayis whose knowledge of eruvin is limited, the
chances are still much greater that the city eruv would be built by an
expert in the halachic intricacies of the inyan.

The important thing in maintaining a city eruv is to establish a board
that has the responsibility to make sure that there is baal ha'machsher
and a mashgiach. We are also fortunate that most city governments today
allow us to build eruvin to the most stringent specifications that our
fathers in Europe could only have dreamed about. When you come to my
neck of the woods, Boro Park, I would love to give you a tour of one of
the most mehudardig eruvin you've ever seen.

SP

I posted from RMLevin's "Midrash and Method" list:
...
: While syllogisms are excellent tools to equate simple entities, they
: are unable to adequately represent complex relationships of things that
: are similar in some aspects but different in others. Such "messy logic"
: requires different logical tools....

: An example may be useful. Imagine that you went to the railway station
: where you encountered the ticket master in full railroad regalia and
: wearing a distinctive conductor's cap. As you board the train, you
: are greeted by ticket checker who is in the same uniform but wearing
: different pants. After a few hours on the train you make your way across
: the engine room and see there a man who is loading coal into the heaving
: furnace. Because of the heat in his compartment he is wearing nothing but
: shorts and the conductor's hat. Is there any doubt that this one part of
: the uniform would be sufficient for you to assume that he is an employee
: of the railroad, just like the others? This example illustrates the
: kind of logic that enables us to handle shifting and complex categories
: without recourse to syllogism and formal categories of Greek thought.
...
: The underlying principle underlying the thirteen rules of interpretation
: is the principle of unity of the Torah. In some ways it is similar
: to the scientific method; when different phenomena evidence similar
: characteristics, one looks of for common mechanisms. This is known after
: J.S. Mills as the Method of Agreement, which states: "If two or more
: instances of a phenomenon under investigation have one circumstance
: in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is
: the cause of the phenomena". R. Adin Steinsaltz wrote in the Essential
: Talmud (p. 97) that "Rabbis anticipated modern science while endeavoring
: to employ an empirical approach without having recourse to theoretical
: structures that did not derive from tested facts". They applied this
: most modern logic to texts and linguistic structures, in the world of
: hearing and reception, as scientists apply them to the world of visible
: and natural phenomena.

There are three distinct kinds of reasoning being described:

In the first quoted paragraph, RML talks about the effects of non-boolean
logic, where the borders between the categories are inherently blurry.
(Fuzzy, statistical or another logic.) Such as reasoning about the word
"red". Some items are definitely red, and the sky on a clear summer
day at noon definitely isn't. But some things are a brownish burgandy,
and is somewhat red -- yes or no doesn't work.

The 2nd kind is inductive reasoning, building up a category and a rule
for a category from examples; in this case, of railway workers. This
method is not airtight. For example, until the coal shoveler was met,
the person "proved" too much about train workers' clothing. Someone
else might similarly prove that all birds fly simply because he never
encountered a penguin or another flightless bird. That's not fuzziness
of category, but limitations in our ability to define our categories.

The third is the notion we discussed in the past, as the "Semitic
Perspective". The idea that no idea stands alone. Every item is a nexus
of relationships, nothing can be really isolated, and therefore there
never really is a single predicate, of the kind the syllogism works with.

: It might be instructive to compare Kal V'Chomer and syllogism in
: its so-called a-fortiori form. Whereas syllogism deals with names and
: predicates, kal v'chomer deals with sentences. It is not concerned with
: relationships of classes. Syllogism apply terms such as 'all' and, 'every'
: but kal v"chomer employs juxtapositions - if an aspect of a law is found
: in the minor case, so much so must it be present in the major case. In
: fact, kal v"chomer works just as well for transferring leniencies as
: stringencies, an aspect not found in syllogism. Kal v'chomer argues that
: if a lenient aspect is found in the stricter case, it should also pertain
: in a less strict case. Conversely, if there is strict aspect to a lenient
: case, we should expect that it should also exist in a stricter case.

x is more chamur than y.
IOW:
    The set of things which are assur in din x is a superset of those
    which are assur in din y.
Or, as the first clause of a syllogism:
    All issurim that apply in x, apply in y.

Qal vachomer min haqal el hachomer:
   a is assur in x
   Therefore a is assur in y
A straight darii syllogism, as in the "Socrates is mortal" textbook
case. (Darii: All a are b, x is an a, therefore x is a b.)

Qal vachomer min hachomer el haqal:
    a is muttar in y
therefore 
    a is muttar in x
This is a baroco syllogism.

Both classical Aristotilian syllogism forms, once you identify that
superset-subset relationship. I think it's the identification of
that relationship that makes this a derashah.

...
: Let us restate the traditional majority opinion about the 13 rule. It
: is that that the thirteen principles are themselves received at Sinai.

As I wrote, this is more mistabeir to me.

: In this view, the Divine Author intentionally encrypted multiple
: meanings in his Torah and also provided the keys with which they may be
: comprehended or decoded. In addition, certain limitations on how these
: rules work, such as that an individual may not derive a gzeirah shava
: on his own, or that principle of D'yo for a Kal V'Chomer, fit best with
: this approach. There should be no limitations on use of pure logic,
: if that is what the 13 rules are.

Dayo is logical. Particularly as a syllogism. One simply can't extend
it beyond issurim identified in the qal (or v.v.) saying that it's
reasonable that the chamur case goes beyond the limits of the qal,
because we have no way of proving how far beyond those limits -- if any.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org        excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org   'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (270) 514-1507      trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

I have in the past day or so logged on to www.770live.com which is a
Chabad website and includes a 24/7 coverage- video and audio - of the
main L shul in 770.

It is really very interesting, to sit here in Melbourne and watch and
hear - clearly - what hundreds of people are doing on the other side of
the world.

My shaalo is, what do I do when I hear the Shatz saying brochos, borchu,
kaddish and kedusha? Do I answer - or not? Does anyone know of tshuvos
on this?

SBA

(posted to avodah since this has no bearing on the ongoing areivim
discussion)

Israel Zucker wrote in [Areivim] Re: Orthodox tackle premarital sex
dilemma:
> And Erev Yom Kippur nobody makes a bracha, not just post-menopausal women.
> That act is not one that fulfils an obligation d'orayso or d'rabanan. A
> single girl, however, who goes to the mikva after menstruation, is
> performing an act as prescribed in the Torah.

what an amazing coincidence (or not!) - I just listened this afternoon
to a tape of shiur by R' Hershel Shachter on parshas shmini, in which he
mentioned that according to some (brought by the Rosh), r' saadya gaon
held that "lifnei Hashem Tit'haru" means there is a mitzva to become
tahor before yom kippur.

k't
elly

--
Elly Bachrach
Engineering Intent http://www.EngineeringIntent.com
mailto:EBachrach@EngineeringIntent.com

SBA <sba@sba2.com> wrote:
> It is really very interesting, to sit here in Melbourne and watch and
> hear - clearly - what hundreds of people are doing on the other side of
> the world.

> My shaalo is, what do I do when I hear the Shatz saying brochos, borchu,
> kaddish and kedusha? Do I answer - or not? Does anyone know of tshuvos
> on this?

My intution is that the answer is no, you do not. What you are hearing
is not a human voice making a Bracha but an electronic reproduction akin
to listening to a recording of a Bracha. Saying Amen to a recording of
a Bracha is considered an Amen Yesomah. OTOH some Poskim hold that one
may be Yotze Havdalah over the phone so perhaps one may be Talui on
that(...saying Amen in the proper places).

Based on this apparent dichotomy it seems IMHO to be at best a Safek,
and "Safek Brachos L'Hakel". Where Shem HaShem is concerned as in Barchu
and Kedusha you should not answer. Yehe Shem Rabbah it seems to me would
be in the same Geder of at least an "Amen" so I wouldn't say that either.

HM

T613K@aol.com wrote:
> This is something I have wondered about from time to time. My son's birth
> parents are Jewish, and I know who they are, although my son does not. (I
> won't stop him if he wants to, but he hasn't expressed any interest in
> meeting them.) Do I have to keep track of their whereabouts for him? Does
> he have to try and keep up with them so he can sit shiva for them after
> 120 years? Is he obligated to sit shiva for them? If he never has any
> contact with them, but somehow finds out?

I believe the Halacha is you do not have to go to extra-oridinary
means to assure the bio parent are given their complete due which would
mean the whole ball of wax including the Yud Beis Chadash. As such if
your son hears about the death of a bio-parent at a later time, it is
considered a Shmuah Rechokah for which he would tear Kriah and observe
a brief Aveilus period of a few minutes. All this if the bio-parent is
not a Rasha Gamur. If a parent is, then I beleive there is no Aveilus
at all. But I am not 100% sure of any of this so best ask your LOR.

> Truthfully I want him to sit shiva for me after 120, and to say kaddish,
> but is he obligated to do so? You mentioned mourning for a rebbe--but one
> doesn't mourn for a rebbe for a whole year, does one? Does my son have any
> obligation to mourn for a year for me and my husband? Does he have any
> obligation to say kaddish for us? 

Again I believe that one may be Noheg complete Aveilus for adoptive
parents. I beleive, however, it is in the Geder of a Reshus rather than a
Chiuv. I'm not sure he may say Kaddish if both bio-parents are alive. But
all other Pratim are, I beleive, legitmate. Perhaps REMT can comment?

HM

[Off topic: You would never tell someone their birthparent was a rasha
gamur. There is enough psychological baggage there without it. -mi]

From: Elly Bachrach
> what an amazing coincidence (or not!) - I just listened this afternoon
> to a tape of shiur by R' Hershel Shachter on parshas shmini, in which he
> mentioned that according to some (brought by the Rosh), r' saadya gaon
> held that "lifnei Hashem Tit'haru" means there is a mitzva to become
> tahor before yom kippur.

Interesting. I would've assumed it's mentioned in Shulchan Aruch,
considering how widespread the custom is. I know many Chasidim who go to
Mikvah every day, but on Erev Yom Kippur they try to use a more mehudar
Mikvah, such as a Mikvah Maayon (generally only built as a women's Mikvah,
at least where I live.)

Yisroel

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