Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 097

Sunday, March 20 2005

• Is Yahadus a "religion"?
• Re: Is Yahadus a "religion"?
• Re: Age of the Universe
• Re: Relationship of Science to Torah
• Re: men dying hair [was: Purim question]
• Purim Question
• Re: fallibility or non fallibility of chazal
• Re: Purim Question
• On the Akeida
• Re: Crispy Matzos
• Re: Definition of a Lav
• Re: Relationship of Science to Torah
• Re: going round in circles [was: Relationship of Science to Torah]
• RE: going round in circles [was: Relationship of Science to Torah]

In another conscious attempt to discuss something other than ma'aseh
bereishis (soon entering its 8th month here on Avodah -- threatening to
prove that both in Tishrei and in Nissan nivra ha'olam), I bring you
material from Yashar Books written by RGS. I'm deleting much of the
marketing, even Areivim moderators don't get to advertise on Avodah.

 -mi

 ------------------------------ Original Message ------------------------------
Subject: "Books For Life" vol. 1 no. 4
From:    BooksForLife@yasharbooks.com
Date:    Thu, March 17, 2005 3:35 pm
To:      micha@aishdas.org
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

...
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Is Judaism a "Religion"?
2. Excerpt: "The Right and the Good: Halakhah and Human Relations"
   by Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman
...

1. Is Judaism a "Religion"? Contrary to popular belief, Judaism isn't
just about the rules of interacting with God. Yes, "religion" focuses
on the link between the human and the Divine, the temporal and the
infinite. So it's natural to think that the code of laws of a religion
would be essentially a manual for that Human-God connection.

Not so, declares Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman, in his newly expanded book
"The Right and the Good: Halakhah and Human Relations," part of the
series on Jewish ethics published by Yashar Books.

Judaism is not a religion in the commonly understood sense of service
and worship of God. In truth, God cares just as much about how we treat
each other. Judaism can be seen as being also, perhaps even primarily,
about the Human-Human bond. Jewish law -- halakhah -- regulates every
aspect of the human experience, particularly how people interact with
each other. "The day-to-day interactions between people, the treatment
of one another in mundane conversation, in walking in the street, in
traveling on a bus, or waiting in line to be served in a store are no
less the home of halakhah than are the activities of the synagogue or
the kitchen, the study hall or the hospital bed."

Jewish law is more than just religious ritual. In truth, the author
demonstrates, the scrutiny of traditional Jewish thinkers that is
generally thought to have been focused solely on ritualistic behavior
has actually been applied, with all of its Talmudic rigor, to the
area of interpersonal behavior as well. With encyclopedic thoroughness,
Feldman takes the reader through 14 areas of human conduct and eloquently
summarizes the vast rabbinic literature on the subjects. Readers might
be surprised to discover that the same vigorous analysis that Talmudists
apply to questions of kosher food has also been applied to scenarios of
avoiding embarrassing a fellow human being.

Rabbi Feldman's prose is concise and unambiguous, explaining the
terminology and concepts he uses so that any reader, regardless of
training, can easily be captured into this fascinating tour of rabbinic
views. This is not only a sourcebook for interpersonal commandments
but is also a rare window into the workings of Talmudic logic. Readers
with little background in rabbinic literature can find in this work
examples of how rabbinic scholarship approaches sources, conceptualizes
topics and draws proofs and counterproofs from texts. Feldman's skill in
organization and explanation have created not only a testament to the
ethical concerns of the Jewish religion but also a taste for newcomers
to the exciting world of Talmudic debate.


2. Excerpt from "The Right and the Good: Halakhah and Human Relations"
by Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman.

The Jew­ish system of ethics is not an autonomy, not even the most nobly
intentioned one, but a theonomy, instructed in every detail by Divine
command. The dealings of the boardroom, the classroom, and the side­walk
are no less directed by holiness and spirituality than are those of the
beit midrash, the synagogue, or the kitchen. While lamentably, stories
appear in the news on occasion implying that this is not obvi­ous to all,
and one hears of apparently observant Jews involved in circumstances
of financial impropriety or general dishonesty, the vast majority of
those committed to halakhah are acutely aware that its scope extends
far beyond the ritual.

However, just how far beyond that may, unfortunately, not be as
well-known. That the wearing of tefillin is governed by halakhah
is obvious, and that the purchase of a car or financing of a house
is so regulated is almost as widely understood, despite the rare but
well­-publicized lapses that may occur. Yet the Torah's influence eclipses
that of civil legislation; the line for a bus, the conversation at dinner,
and the behavior on the basketball court share equally as the site of
religious influence. That the shove one gives another person in order
to be served more quickly in the cafeteria, or the comment made moments
later when the tray is dropped on the other person's clothes, are subject
to their own prohibitions, sometimes comes as a surprise; so, too, that
the Torah has a very specific idea of how the victim and the aggressor
should deal with each other in the aftermath. These interactions, so
mundane and basic, are believed to be a matter of style and personality,
immune from interference by any agency. The truth is far different --
the voice of halakhah is as loud on these fronts as on any other.

The tractate Avot, which deals with morals and ethical values, begins
with the foundation of all tradition: "Moshe received the Torah at
Sinai..." The placement is somewhat puzzling; such a basic principle
of Judaism belongs at the introduction of the Talmud, rather than in
a tractate that comes at the end of the fourth of its six orders. But
R. Menachem HaMeiri and R. Ovadiah of Bartenura explain that the
organization is most appropriate, for we are given the information when
it is most necessary. When studying the laws of the proper blessing
on a certain food, or what time to pray, or how to observe Shabbat,
or how to build a sukkah, no reminder is necessary that those laws were
given at Sinai; no other source could compel such observance. However, a
reminder is needed when encountering the less ritualistic aspects of life;
it is then that the interest of religion is less obvious and the Sinaic
tradition must be invoked. It must be noted that on further consideration,
these commentators appear to be addressing a larger portion of the
population than might be assumed. Avot is placed sequentially after Bava
Kamma, Bava Metzia, Bava Batra, and Sanhedrin; these tractates dealt at
great length with details of monetary interac­tion several hundred folios
before we are reminded of the Divine revelation. Despite unfortunate
exceptions, most Jews do not limit their religious perspectives to
overtly ritual activities; it is understood that Torah law is no less
encompassing than that of the secular govern­ment. Nonetheless, when
a tractate says, "Love peace and pursue peace," "Greet all men with a
cheerful countenance," "Your friend's honor should be as dear to you
as your own," "Whomever the people are satisfied with, God is satisfied
with," and other such statements, even the most committed Jew may often
believe he is merely receiving good advice. It is then that it must be
emphasized: This, too, is from Sinai.

The divinity of these principles was not left for the Oral Torah to
explain; many of the regulations governing these day-to-day interac­tions
stem from explicit biblical verses. "You shall not hate your brother
in your heart, you shall reprove your fellow and do not bear a sin
because of him, you shall not take revenge and you shall not bear a
grudge against the members of your people, you shall love your fel­low
as yourself, I am God," "In justice shall you judge your friend,"
"You shall not oppress your friend," "Keep far away from falsehood,"
"Seek peace and pursue it," and many other such scriptural passages
address themselves directly to everyday interactions.

Some may question the need for the halakhah to involve itself in this
area; if social conventions and secular laws take up this concern,
perhaps the Torah is indeed best focused upon the overtly spiritual. In
fact, some authorities attribute the lack of a blessing assigned
to interpersonal mitzvot to a reflection of this mindset among the
popu­lace. Immediately, certain advantages become clear. As R. Natan
Gestetner observes, when these behaviors lack the force of halakhah,
they fall by the wayside in the face of challenges from economic and other
aspects of self-interest. Further, the moral ambiguity present in general
society is absent within halakhah. However, even these con­siderations,
while not to be underemphasized, are more practical than fundamental.

By involving itself in the details of daily interaction, the
halakhah brings the Divine Majesty into the streets, the workplace,
the cafete­ria line. When the restraint in business ethics comes on
penalty of imprisonment, it represents perhaps no more than fear of the
government; when it stems from a realization of God's Will, it attains a
sta­tus of holiness. Generosity toward others may be a manifestation of
a pleasant personality or a vague notion of "goodness"; within Judaism,
such behavior is a basic fundamental of spirituality. The words ex­changed
upon meeting in the street may be a social convention or an avoidance of
awkwardness; in Torah law, these phrases acquire abun­dant elements of
religious achievement. Treating others with respect, love, and kindness
is not convention, policy, or personality; it is holi­ness, it is mitzvah,
it is the Word of God.

The Ramban, in his commentary to Chumash, makes a general observation as
to the nature of these commandments in general. Dis­cussing the verse,
"and you shall do the right and the good," the Ramban notes the somewhat
vague character of its imperative. Cer­tainly, all behavior should be
"right" and "good." The Torah, how­ever, wished to impose the standards
of holiness onto man's behavior with the community at large, and to this
end several biblical verses, including those mentioned previously, are
intended to contribute to the formation of a personality in which every
action in the social sphere is influenced by Divine command. Nonetheless,
the complexity of life's challenges will inevitably result in situations
where immediate scrip­tural instruction is unclear; inclusive of all
such circumstances, the Torah exhorts, "you shall do the right and the
good." No act that may impact negatively upon another person can be said
to be devoid of Sinatic guidance.

Thus, the principles dictating people's behavior with each other
have been stamped with the seal of Divine commandment, subject to the
commitment and seriousness that this entails. However it may be that
these principles, for certain purposes, carry a severity that not
only equals but exceeds that inherent in mitzvot in general. A story
told, involving R. Yisrael Meir Kagan and R. Yisrael Lipkin, may be
instructive in this area. R. Kagan (1838-1933) was the revered author
of the authoritative work Mishnah Berurah on the Orach Chaim section of
R. Yosef Karo's code of Jewish law, the Shulchan Arukh. However, he was
perhaps better known for his treatment of the laws of gossip, lashon
hara, whose title became his own, Chafetz Chaim. This story relates
that a certain businessman requested to purchase all of R. Kagan's
many books, with the glaring exception of Chafetz Chaim. When R. Kagan
questioned this, the man admitted that the pressures of his business
made it difficult to avoid saying derogatory things about the people he
came into contact with, and he would rather not pur­chase a work whose
directives he felt compelled to ignore. R. Kagan prevailed upon him to
buy it anyway, relating a comment made to him by R. Lipkin. R. Lipkin
(1810-1883), known after his hometown as R. Yisrael Salanter, is famed
as the founder of the Mussar movement, which popularized the intense
study of ethical concepts. When the work Chafetz Chaim was completed,
R. Lipkin told its author, "If all you accomplish is to evoke one sigh
from one Jew [who becomes aware of the prohibitions and cannot observe
them], the work is worthwhile." So, too, R. Kagan told the businessman,
he may not believe himself able to adhere to the contents of the book;
but if it will at least "evoke a sigh," it is worth the purchase price.

On Fri, Mar 18, 2005 at 11:42:06AM -0500, I forwarded from RGS:
: 1. Is Judaism a "Religion"? Contrary to popular belief, Judaism isn't
: just about the rules of interacting with God. Yes, "religion" focuses
: on the link between the human and the Divine, the temporal and the
: infinite. So it's natural to think that the code of laws of a religion
: would be essentially a manual for that Human-God connection...

According to the chassidish fork, Yahadus *is about the Human-G-d
connection. Even mitzvos bein adam lachaveiro are about deveiqus.
Would chassidisher derakhim qualify as "religion"?

...
: 2. Excerpt from "The Right and the Good: Halakhah and Human Relations"
: by Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman.
...
: The tractate Avot, which deals with morals and ethical values, begins
: with the foundation of all tradition: "Moshe received the Torah at
: Sinai..." The placement is somewhat puzzling; such a basic principle
: of Judaism belongs at the introduction of the Talmud, rather than in
: a tractate that comes at the end of the fourth of its six orders. But
: R. Menachem HaMeiri and R. Ovadiah of Bartenura explain that the
: organization is most appropriate, for we are given the information when
: it is most necessary. When studying the laws of the proper blessing
: on a certain food, or what time to pray, or how to observe Shabbat,
: or how to build a sukkah, no reminder is necessary that those laws were
: given at Sinai; no other source could compel such observance....

The Bartenura has a much more ready answer, I'm surprised the Bartenura
himself didn't give it. Leshitaso, the name of the mesechtah comes from
avos as in "avos melakhah"; it's not Chapters of Our Forefathers, but
Chapters of Categories / Principles. In which case, the origin of the
mesorah is on topic.

:         ... most Jews do not limit their religious perspectives to
: overtly ritual activities; it is understood that Torah law is no less
: encompassing than that of the secular government...

How is one meyasheiv that with the Me'iris and Bartenura's answer? If
Jewish culture realizes that the din is no less about chaveiro as Maqom,
why does one need the reminder at the intro?

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

From: "S & R Coffer" <rivkyc@sympatico.ca>
> There can't be more than one legitimate opinion when we're dealing
> with facts. I assume this to be true because I see no other logical
> conclusion. Perhaps you can illustrate to me how it would be possible
> for two factually exclusive things to be simultaneously real?

Masseches Sukkah is replete with arguments over historical facts
(did the zkeinim say anything when they saw the undersized sukkah?).
There's an argument about whether kli sheini is m'vashel. There's an
argument about how many days in the solar year. Plenty of other examples
where those came from.

>> There is no psak in hashkafa

> Who says?

Rambam PHM Sotah 3:3, Sanhedrin 10:3, Shvuoth 1:4, Ma'amar Tehiath
HaMeithim ed. Sheilat, p.354.

>> and even in halacha after the gemara there
>> is a lot of wiggle room.

> Only for things that were not dealt with directly in the Gemara. I know
> of no Rishonim that argue on Chazal.

The derech of Tosafos is to put local custom above the psak of the Bavli.
I'm sure RRW will be happy to cite dozens of examples, but mayim aharonim
springs immediately to my mind.

David Riceman 

R Eli Turkel wrote:
> There is no psak in hashkafa and even in halacha after the gemara there
> is a lot of wiggle room....

Actually, to repeat something RGS argued here at length as well as being
central to his review of RMShapiro's book, what the Rambam says is that
there is no pesaq in non-pragmatic questions. In his essay, RHS quotes
RYBS as saying that aggadita is just a pesaq in chovos halvavos -- but
that would only hold if the belief actually is a chiyuv haleiv. The
definition of kefirah has pragmatic impact. If both sides agree that
the other's position is not kefirah, meenus or apiqursus, there is no
issue of pesaq.

> That does not make them toim.

In the eyes of the one who believes the other tzad of a historical matter,
their tzad is in error, a ta'us. Therefore they are to'im.

As R' Tzadoq writes, while in olam hamachshavah contradiction is
inevitable, in olam hapo'al it is impossible. Therefore, one can't
invoke eilu va'eilu on a history question. Nor can one follow both shitos
bevas achas. At least, kach nir'eh li. When we last discussed it,
someone brought down an Igeres from the LR in which he writes from
the position of Terumah and Tetzaveh preceding the eigel while also
drawing from the idea that they post-dated it.



hlampel@thejnet.com wrote:
> Because there is no reason to think the Jews at the time of mattan
> Torah were incapable of accepting the idea of a multi-billion-year age
> of this earth (or the evolution of life) were it stated in the Torah
> as true....

Actually, I have a hard time believing that people who saw more than
Yechezqeil ben Buzi and then received an even greater revelation during
the first two diberos (and a very relevent message to our topic) couldn't
comprehend a non-corporeal G-d. My guess is that we're speaking about the
ability of their children, grandchildren or maybe slightly beyond. Not
"the time of matan Torah" itself.

But you as well as RSC are making an overly strong point. The alternative
to a literal maaseh bereishis is not necessarily teaching science
that they lack the background for. It's simply teaching that it's not
literal. Therefore, the alternative is not a text of the Torah that says
"12-15 billion years" (whatever is the precise number), but one that
doesn't say anything in particular.

By parallel, my 8 yr old has understood for years that the RSO doesn't
look like a person, or have a look at all. I'm sure his understanding is
not as complete as yours or mine, but he doesn't need "Yad H'" to aid
his comprehension. Adults in those days weren't stupid and there was
a lot less qitun hadoros. They could understand a non-corporeal G-d,
but they had no opportunity to develop the idea of the alternative.

I lumped RSC in there because his posts seem to confuse the requirement
of proving that Bereishis 1-2 could accomodate belief in a slow natural
creation with that of proving that it actually describes the one currently
supported scientifically.

However, according to the positions of REED or of R' Yaakov (as "Gerald"
prefers to be called) Shroder, there is no diminution of the literalness
of the pasuq while still affirming the possibility of a 15 billion year
physical unfolding. (I took the Maharal off the table in light of never
having convinced you on that point.)

As for REED, RAC's recent letter stresses REED's position that it was
described as being only a week for the purposes of playing down the
physical involvement in favor of the spiritual one. Which would be a
motivation for speaking of 6 yamim or not speaking of a long gap between
the first two pesuqim other than a lack of possible comprehension.

:-)BBii!
 -mi

 -- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
micha@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (270) 514-1507      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

T613K@aol.com wrote:
> In Areivim Digest V14 #248 dated 3/17/2005, saul mashbaum
> <smash52@netvision.net.il> writes:
>> I'm considering coloring my beard black this Purim. Chadesh yameinu
>> k'kedem.

>> My virtuous chardalit daughter Yocheved questioned the propriety of
>> this, since it's similar to plucking out gray hairs from one's beard,
>> which in general is assur.

> We have a friend who is a talmid chacham and who dyes his hair. He's  sort 
> of charedi, in that way some call charedi-light or modern-charedi. (I know 
> that R' Micha would use the term "charedi-light" differently, but 
> anyway....)  

Not just RMB but I do as well. But be that as it may...

> Many learned members could cite chapter and verse re why it is assur for a  
> man to do this, but the counter-argument is that so many men dye their hair  
> nowadays that it is no longer considered a "woman's thing" to do--which I  
> believe is the basis for the original issur?  

There is a Machlokes as to the Issur for a man to pluck out or dye even
a single white hair in a black beard. The Rambam Assurs it as he holds
it is an Issur D'Oraissa based on the Lav of Lo Yilbash Gever Simlas
Isha. He permits it only for Refuah purposes.

Interestingly Tosphos (Shabbos 3B) brought down by Shaarim Mitzuyanim
B'Halacha (173:1) holds that if one does so because of embarrassment
and not to make himself better looking, he is permitted to do so. Other
Poskim add that if one is pre-maturely grey then he is permitted to do
so as well (as opposed to an older person who is normally grey wishing
to make himself look younger).

RMF has a famous Teshuva on this (YD 1:82). He says that if one is older
and wants to make himself look younger by dying his hair (or beard),
not to make himself look good but for business purposes, he is permitted
to do so, as long as in doing so he is not attempting to deceive his
employer about the workload he is capable of. IOW, if he wants to look
younger so that his boss will think that he is younger and capable of
doing the work of a younger person, than he must be capable of doing a
younger person's work as well. If he isn't but merely wants to give the
impression that he is, then it would be Assur to fool a boss this way.

The Rama (AC: at the end of 696) writes men who wears women's clothing
on Purim are permitted to do so as it done for purposes of Simcha. But
the Bach argues and Assurs it even on Purim or any other time such as
Simchas Chasan V'Kallah.

So as to R. Saul Mashbaum's original Kasha I would say that clearly the
issue of dying his beard on Purim is tied to the Issur of Lo Yilbash
Gever Simlas Isha. If one Paskins like the Rama than it appears that it
would be permitted. If one Paskins like the Bach, then it would appear
that it is Assur. The only question is whether it makes any difference
that after Purim women's clothing can be removed whereas hair dye or
beard dye remains after Purim.

Therefore, if Purim is the "Matir", must one remove the dye after Purim?

HM

Haven't researched the issue, but I would imagine dyeing one's BEARD
might be different vis-a-vis beged isha than dyeing one's HAIR.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

R Gershon Seif wrote:
> The Ramchal writes in Maamar Haagados that when chazal presented us with
> medical information, their intention was not about the medical facts. The
> medical information conveyed in shas was just a levush to convey sisrei
> Torah therein. Had they lived in a different era the information would
> have been different. If the information seems faulty, it shouldn't bother
> us because their intent was not about the information.

I see no problem with this -- it's of a peice with the Rambam's ridicule
for those who think every medrashic tale is historical.

> 1) We see clearly that the Ramchal holds that in certain cases, chazal
> conveyed information that is not scientifically accurate.

More than that -- that they do not convey science in these cases at all.
They're meshalim. Some might be true, some might not, but they simply
didn't care about the truth of the mashal, only the nimshal. So none of
it can be claimed as rabbinic science.

It's like a rav today using some odd relativistic or quantum mechanical
effect to illustrate a point. Is the rav endorsing the theory, or simply
using a known idea to explain an unknown one -- without caring about
the truth of the "known" being used berekh mashal?

The only difference is that chazal were far more reluctant to write down
the nimshal, since it is TSBP. So you need a Ramchal to remind you that
it's only a mashal.

> 2)Does this Ramchal imply that unless there is some good explanation
> which is part of our mesorah(as in this case of transmitting sisrei Torah)
> then we are to assume that all the information is accurate?

AIUI, the Ramchal is saying that unless the science is the basis of a
pesaq, there is no reason to even ask the question. The message is in
the nimshal.

> 3)The Rambam in hilchos dayos culls medical advice from shas, halocho
> l'mayseh. Does the Rambam argue against this Ramchal? Would anyone
> venture to extend this machlokes (if you learn that there is one)to the
> issue of fallibility of chazal?

Based on what I wrote about chazal, it has nothing to do with fallibility
since the Ramchal is saying the claim was never made, and therefore it
can't fail.

:-)BBii!
 -mi

 -- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
micha@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (270) 514-1507      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

Gershon Dubin <gershon.dubin@juno.com> wrote:
> Haven't researched the issue, but I would imagine dyeing one's BEARD
> might be different vis-a-vis beged isha than dyeing one's HAIR.

Why? I know a few women with beards. :)

Seriously though I think that the Issur of Lo Yilbash Gever Simlas
Isha relates to a modality of women and not the location of the hair,
facial or scalp, you are trying to dye. It's the modality of trying to
make yourself look younger or more beautiful (handsome) that reflects
the Issur. This is the reason that looking in mirrors is prohibited by
some Poskim ...or shaving the armpit hair.

HM

I need help with a source. Some time during the past 2 years I read a
D'var Torah that stated that the Akeida came (in part) to teach us and
the world that sacrificing children is Assur.

Does anyone know the sources for this?

Thank you.
Shoshana L. Boublil

From: RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com
> There is a POTENTIAL Halachic probelm with non-cripsy matzos
> AIUI - our crispy matzos obviate the need to worry about gebruktz
> {Matza shruyah}
> OTOH, even if soft Matzos were kosher, it would likely re-introduce
> a TRUE halachic concern - not just a chumra nor a minhag - re: these
> Matzos coming into contact with water

Why? Have you seen the Sephardi matzot? I have, every year. Just b/c
a matza is soft doesn't mean it's full of unbaked flour. I make Pitot
regularly. They are made in extremely hot ovens (~250C or higher).
Nothing remains unbaked.

The special soft Matza are made in special ovens, which are made of
stone and very hot. My FIL who was a Mashgiach in his youth, told us
how the matzot were made. I was impressed by the steps taken to ensure
a kosher matza.

Shoshana L. Boublil

zev@sero.name posted on: Mar 18, 2005
> I'm trying to remember whether it ["bal" appears in the Mishna....

I found (using a search program) six mishnas using the word "bal" to
refer to 7 biblical prohibitions:
    bal tigra and/or bal tosef: Zevachim 8:19, Peachim 9:3
    bal tikach me'ito (Vayikra 25:37): Bava Metsia 5:11
    bal takif, bal tashchis and bal t'tamei l'meisim: Bikurim
	4:2. Kiddushin 1:7
    bal yei'ra'eh u'bal yimatsei: Peachim 9:3

Zvi Lampel

I wrote:
> [T]here is no reason to think the Jews at the time of mattan 
> Torah were incapable of accepting the idea of a multi-billion-year
> age of this earth (or the evolution of life) were it stated in the
> Torah > as true....

In response, driceman@worldnet.att.net posted on: Mar 15, 2005:
> The Rambam's position is that an educator...needs to emphasise those
> points which are essential immediately, and leave the other parts for
> later. The immediate essentials were creation and miracles. Incorporeality
> was left for several thousand years later, when the Rambam introduced the
> novel idea that advocating God's corporeality was a form of heresy. ... If
> I understand you correctly you are disagreeing with the Rambam's expressed
> position in Maamar Tehiyyat HaMeitim.

I think RDR misunderstood what I wrote.

I was responding to the proposal that Hashem withheld the information
that the world is billions of years old because the Jews at the time of
Mattan Torah would not be able to handle it, and would thereupon reject
everything. Presumably the people of those days were unable to grasp
that things can take long times, beyond common experiences. I therefore
disagreed by pointing out several examples of where Hashem reported to
those people that things in the past took place over periods of time that
in their common experience were extraodinary--either exraordinarily long
or extraordinarily short--such as the report "that the ancients lived
lifespans of hundreds of years (even beyond 900 years!); that the first
man and woman came into existence, had children, went through the entire
experience leading to their banishment from Gan Eden all in one day;
that Noach was 600 years old when he had all the animals of the world
in his ark and that the world experienced a 40-day long global!
 flood."

RDR replied concerning the issue of Hashem's incorporeality, a different
issue.

But now that he mentioned it, Rambam uses his "they're-not-ready-for-it"
sevara to explain mitzvos ma'assios" such as korbonnos and davvening. For
the theological issue of anthropomorphisms, his explanation is "dibra
Torah k'lashom b'nei adam."

Zvi Lampel

In Avodah V14 #96 dated 3/18/2005 R' Simcha Coffer wrote:
> ...Rav Dessler explains that the proper perspective on time is not to
> view ourselves as stationary and time as a dimension that flows past
> us; rather time is a medium and we are constantly in motion traveling
> through this medium. This medium however, is not linear, it is circular
> (in the sense that it continues to progress in ever-widening concentric
> circles - my peshat). That is, we continue to pass through exactly the
> same time that we did the year before. Thus, we are experiencing exactly
> the same revelations of yetzias metzraim that klal yisroel experienced
> at the exodus, or revelations that they experienced at matan Torah etc.
> we just don't have the spiritual sensitivity to experience them at the
> same level that previous generations did.

And--albeit in response to something else entirely--another chaver wrote:
> You realize how circular this is.   

I would like to point out that the "concentric circles" mental model
of historic/Jewish time is not such a good one, since it would require
something like a quantum leap to get from one point on a circle--say,
the Pesach point--to the corresponding point on the next outer circle,
without somehow traversing the intervening space.

A better mental model is a spiral, going down like a spiral staircase,
in which you keep reaching the same place, but a little further down,
as you go round and down the spiral. I am thinking "down" because of
yeridas hadoros and our usual way of thinking: the beginning is at
the top of the page and then you go down as you get closer to the end.

It would also be possible to visualize the spiral as going up, if you
think of it as getting closer and closer to the era of Moshiach.

But in any case, a spiral is a better model than concentric circles.
BTW this thought is not mine, but sadly, I don't remember where I read
it and can't quote beshem omro.

 -Toby  Katz
=============

On March 19, 2005 T613K@aol.com wrote
> But in any case, a spiral is a better model than concentric circles. BTW
> this thought is not mine, but sadly, I don't remember where I read it and
> can't quote beshem omro.

Concentric doesn't have to necessarily mean that the outer circles are
not joined in any way to each other. Here's a simple experiment. Take a
pen, put it to paper and start drawing a circle. When you get close to
the end of your circle, begin widening it thus causing the commencement
of one (ever-widening) concentric circle. You can continue to do this ad
infinitum (you would eventually run out of paper) without ever taking the
pen off the paper. Where is your "quantum leap"? In addition to the fact
that this "mental image" is used in kabbalistic texts all the time, it
is easier to work with because you can draw a line (originating directly
from the center of the innermost circle outward in any direction) and
it will flow directly through the same point in the outer circles thus
symbolizing the giluyim that began at the inception of time and flow
equally through all the subsequent generations (symbolized by the circles)
equally. Although your model of a staircase would work similar to mine,
my mind is more comfortable with my own. I suspect that in essence,
we are saying the same thing

Best Wishes
Simcha Coffer

*********************


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