Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 094

Tuesday, March 15 2005

• Re: Relationship of Science to Torah
• Re: Uprooting Torah
• Re: Sephardi psak on pe'at nochrit
• mishenichnas adar marbin bisimcha' - 'Ein simcha ela Torah' ?
• Re: mishenichnas adar marbin bisimcha' - 'Ein simcha ela Torah' ?
• 'mishenichnas adar marbin bisimcha' - 'Ein simcha ela Torah' ? ( II )
• Fw: Relationship of Science to Torah
• fallibility or non fallibility of chazal
• Re: Age of the Universe and guided evolution
• Re: sheitels
• age of universe
• gifts to women
• Head Covering
• RE: 'mishenichnas adar marbin bisimcha' - 'Ein simcha ela Torah' ? ( II )
• Re: Relationship of Science to Torah
• Re: Relationship of Science to Torah
• RE: Relationship of Science to Torah
• Re: Relationship of Science to Torah
• Relationship of Science to Torah

At 03:58 PM 3/13/2005, RSC wrote:
>Wrong. He had no answer other than to say that he couldn't convince me
>and I couldn't convince him regarding RB in Bereishis 1,3. Incidentally,
>RYGB admitted openly (I still have the e-mails saved) that the only
>unambiguous source he had for a universe older than 5765 years is this
>RB, unlike the way you are wont to represent him as having a long list
>of unambiguous meforshim.

If I admitted such, then I (and I) am clearly schizoid.

There are many more sources than RB for a universe more than 5765 years old.

>In RYGB's own lashon "I believe the evidence - both in Chazal and
>Rishonim and in nature indicates that the world (or universe) is older
>than 5765 years." The operative word here is "indicates" not that the
>evidence is conclusive. So, he tyches one way, while someone else can
>tytch another way. Besides, older than 5765 can mean 5766. If you ask
>RYGB, I bet he will tell you Chazal cannot be used as conclusive proof
>that the world is billions of years old and in fact, I doubt he himself
>believes it. At the very least, he will tell you (as he has written to
>me) that he doesn't know nor does he care.

"Indicates" means that I do not want to brand the Arizal wrong - who am I 
to do so?! - but that I personally perceive his position to be erroneous.

The last sentence RSC writes correctly reflects my position.

YGB 

On Fri, Feb 25, 2005 at 10:30:49AM -0500, Sholom Simon wrote:
: A mitzvah could be nullified if:
: a) it was a positive mitzvah
: b) the abolishment is merely inaction.
: c) the abolishment is to helping avoid other issurim (issurei d'oraissa).
: (Tangent question: is there a (d), that this can only be done by a
: Sanhedrin?)
: (Another tangent question: are (a) and (b) completely equivalent?)

Your presentation is incomplete. This list is part of a description of
a gezeirah. Unlike there dinim derabbanan, a gezeirah (which is being
defined to be identical to a siyag) can call for the violation of an
asei besheiv ve'al ta'aseh.

So yes, that (d) is implied. Without a Sanhedrin, there is no authority
to make a gezeirah altogether.

The difference between an aseir an a lav is textual: a lav is a mitzvah
that the Torah describes using the words lo, al, bal, other negatory
terms, or shamor. I'm sure other terms exist. So asei vs lav isn't
necessarily defined by the nature of the activity.

For example, the list of kosher animals is an asei and while eating a
non-kosher animal would also involve a lav, cannibalism would be the
violation of that asei. The violation is action, the compliance, inaction.

Also, even if the asei requires an action, there are violations that
would be through action, not inaction. E.g. putting on a four-cornered
garment without tzitzis.

: Speficially, Sotah 9:9, where we read of the abolition of the eglah
: arufah...
: Then more questions arose in 9:10 when we read that the ma'aser confession
: was abolished...

The gemara ad loc addresses this. I didn't forget your question,
but after three weeks -- forever in email list time -- I wanted
to keep the thread from being forgotten even though I don't
have an answer yet. I invite others to revisit RSS's post at
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol14/v14n087.shtml#14>.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

From: Russell Levy <russlevy@gmail.com>
> The sephardi remark is not entirely true. AIUI, though ROY assurs
> sheitels, that is not a psak held by all sephardim. For example, the
> Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Toronto is my father-in-law's first cousin and
> from Morroco, not Iraq (like ROY). His wife wears a sheitel. My first
> cousin by marriage recently married the daughter of a Sephardi Rosh
> Kollel in Yerushalayim and is also the great (great?) granddaughter of
> the Baba Sali (her maiden name is Abuchatzera). Both she and her mother
> wear sheitlach. So not ALL sephardim hold sheitlach are assur, and some
> actually wear them!

> It could be that it is a Moroccan-Iraqi mahloket, anyone have any sources?

Nice try but most (traditional) morrocans that i know do not wear sheitel's, 
and that includes Baba Sali's wife and daughter. If the Rosh Yeshiva/Kollel 
that you are referring to is rosh Yeshiva/Kollel in Kol Yaakov, i could ask 
him next time he comes to netivot- he davens in the neitz where i lain.

I noticed on R. MB's 'sig line' an English version of something Rav Dovid
Lifshitz z"l reportedly used to say - 'mishenichnas adar marbin bisimcha -
ein simcha ela Torah'.

While it seems like a very Litvish way of looking at things, which
generally speaking would be okay with me, I question if this formulation
(which I assume was coined by him - please correct me if I am wrong)
is entirely accurate.

It says in Megillas Esther 'LaYehudim hoyso oroh visimcha visosson
viykor'. Chazal comment on that posuk - Oroh zu Torah - Simcha zeh yom
tov - Sosson zu miloh - Viykor - eilu tefillin. We see that Chazal don't
interpret Simcha as Torah - rather as yom tov.

There are also maamarei chazal such as 'ein simcha ela bibosor vidogim'.

Of course we are also taught (based on 'pikudei Hashem yishorim, misamchei
leiv') that Torah (learning) makes a person happy. If Rav Dovid would
have said 'mishenichnas adar marbin bisimcha - Torah misamaech haleiv',
I would not have these problems with his reported formulation. However,
if he said 'ein simcha ela...', which seems to imply that *only* Torah
brings simcha, yom tov doesn't, despite what Chazal say, I think the
formulation, lanaiyus daati, may require some reworking.

Of course, I realize that I may be taking it a bit too seriously - that
he probably said it to be mizareiz his talmidim - so they shouldn't get
too carried away with various Adar 'narishkeiten', 'shtick' and the like,
which are not real simcha unless within limited bounds, and should keep
on learning.

Neverthless, while strongly agreeing on that point, I wanted to share
my thoughts, just in case someone, not knowing their context, might take
the words of Rav Dovid completely literally.

A gutten chaydesh !
Mordechai

On Mon, Mar 14, 2005 at 01:40:02AM -0500, Phyllostac@aol.com wrote:
: I noticed on R. MB's 'sig line' an English version of something Rav Dovid
: Lifshitz z"l reportedly used to say - 'mishenichnas adar marbin bisimcha -
: ein simcha ela Torah'.

The full text:
	Mishenichnas Adar marbin besimchah
	Ein simcha ela Torah
	Vekhol hamarbeh harei zeh meshubach

In those days, nearly all computers printed on "form feed" paper. (The
sheets that have the holes on either side so that the printer can pull
them through and are continuous, separable at the dotted line.) It was
common to make banners by printing letters by composing them out of
many copies of smaller symbols, so that the text would run like a banner
across many sheets running sideways. Someone in YU wrote a version that
did Hebrew banners. Rav Dovid would ask one of us CS majors to make such
a banner for the walls of the beis medrash every Adar.

...
: Of course, I realize that I may be taking it a bit too seriously - that
: he probably said it to be mizareiz his talmidim - so they shouldn't get
: too carried away with various Adar 'narishkeiten', 'shtick' and the like,
: which are not real simcha unless within limited bounds, and should keep
: on learning.

Yes, that was the primary point. But not the entire one.

RDL also made the point that ein simcha ela bebasar veyayin only yeilds
true lasting simchah when the meat and fish are lesheim Torah. IOW,
(which are my words) ein simchah ela Torah -- but a life of Torah,
not necessarily Talmud Torah.

Simchah is simchas Yom Tov, but only true simchah shel mitzvah, not
simply celebration unconnected to the point of the YT.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow
micha@aishdas.org        man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries
http://www.aishdas.org   about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                       - Rabbi Israel Salanter

It also occurred to me that if the above formulation is used, what
does one do when chodesh Av comes around and we encounter the maamar
'mishenichnas Av mimaatin besimchoh'.

Would we say - mimaatin besimchoh - ein simchoh ela Torah - so there
should be less learning (ch"v) ?

Mordechai

S. Coffer wrote:
> Chazal speak about Maaseh Bereishis (MB) in many places and nowhere
> is there even an intimation that the six days are anything other than
> six regular days.

To which David Riceman responded:
>I would like to draw an analogy here. Tanach and Hazal speak in many
>places about God having body parts (hands, legs, eyes, etc.). Now almost
>all rishonim agree that God doesn't have a body. In fact the Rambam
>maintains that someone who thinks that God has body parts is a heretic.

RHerschel Schacter mentioned this point in his recent lecture in
Yerushalayim on Eilu v'Eilu. (My notes on this lecture are posted on
the aishdas website: <http://www.aishdas.org/articles/rhsEilu.pdf>. See
section V "Eilu v"eilu in Hashkafa", p. 9)

Interestingly, some rishonim (albeit a minority) held exactly the
opposite: a wealth of maamarei chazal indicate clearly and explicitly
that God has body parts, (we've seen quite a few in the last few days
in daf yomi, for example) and thus anyone who holds that He does *not*
is a kofer, denying as he does both the Torah and chazal. RHS said that
some in fact held that the works of the Rambam were heretical, and one
this basis justified their being publicly burned.

It seems to me that this is a telling argument against those who draw
far-reaching conclusions from a literal reading of maamarei chazal. Do
they believe that Hashem is corporeal? If not, why not, in light of
numerous maamarei chazal to that effect? Is there anywhere in chazal
"even an intimation" that the body parts ascribed to God are "anything
other than" regular literal body parts? If these maamarei chazal can be
understood metaphorically, why must others be taken literally?

I think that all of us have been brought up to believe that a belief
in an incorporeal God is an absolute ikkar haemunah. I would like some
indication from any rabbinic source that chazal believed that God was
incorporeal. If we conclude that they "must have" believed this because
our reason says that this is true, we can probably attribute to chazal
many other positions as well.

Saul Mashbaum

In light of current events...

The Ramchal writes in Maamar Haagados that when chazal presented us with
medical information, their intention was not about the medical facts. The
medical information conveyed in shas was just a levush to convey sisrei
Torah therein. Had they lived in a different era the information would
have been different. If the information seems faulty, it shouldn't bother
us because their intent was not about the information.

1) We see clearly that the Ramchal holds that in certain cases, chazal
conveyed information that is not scientifically accurate.

2)Does this Ramchal imply that unless there is some good explanation
which is part of our mesorah(as in this case of transmitting sisrei Torah)
then we are to assume that all the information is accurate?

3)The Rambam in hilchos dayos culls medical advice from shas, halocho
l'mayseh. Does the Rambam argue against this Ramchal? Would anyone
venture to extend this machlokes (if you learn that there is one)to the
issue of fallibility of chazal?

Gershon Seif

RYGB wrote in reply to RAA:
>>Why doesn't mesorah allow for (a)? What sources prohibit guided evolution?
>>R' Kook, for one, had no problem allowing it.

> I was not aware that Rav Kook explicitly endorsed evolution. Please let
> me know where he did so.

Allowing and endorsing are different things.

Herb Basser wrote:
> Pure and beautiful drush: the paired dualities are selected to signify
> the word r (ruach) a(or) sh(shomayim) y(yom) t(tohu).=reishit.
> shamayim, tohu, or, ruach, yom
> likewise the first letters of the prexistent things mentioned in some
> midrashim spell bereshit.
>
> It's problematic to see here a serious scientific position rather than
> a poetic summary (an artistic rendering) of the first day packed into
> the first word of the Torah.

1- I don't think anyone holds the first pasuq is part of the description
of day 1. It's either taking as a preface to pereq 1 (or 1&2), or as a
pre-week yeish mei'ayin that preceeded day 1.

2- This brings up the bigger issue: If the 1st pasuq is about creation
from ru'ach, or, shamayim and tohu, then where is the description of
yeis mei'ayin? Do you mean that it was beri'ah yeish mei'ayin "be-"
in the sense of "via" these 5 "elements" as initial steps? Or, do we
take the IE's position that yeish mei'ayin isn't described in the Torah?

(I know some believe he was an eternalist, i.e. that the IE only believed
in yeish meyeish, with no begining to matter. But the work is parshanut,
one can only use it to prove what the IE thought was being described,
not what he believed occured. Presumably the two can't contradict, but
that doesn't rule out omissions that HQBH didn't bother writing about.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy'
micha@aishdas.org         'Joy is nothing but Torah.'
http://www.aishdas.org    'And whomever does more, he is praiseworthy.'"
Fax: (270) 514-1507                     - Rav Dovid Lishitz zt"l

On Sun, Mar 13, 2005 at 02:18:43AM +0000, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
: The key to this conundrum is that hair is a different sort of erva
: than other parts of a woman's body. This can be seen and proven by the
: different status of girl's hair (even above bas mitzvah age), versus a
: married woman's hair. The married woman must cover her hair, the single
: girl does not.
...
: As it was explained to me, the above facts prove that the "erva-ness"
: of a woman's hair is a simple gezeras hakasuv, unlike the very rational
: "distraction" category which applies to other parts of her body. This is a
: requirement that she has to comply with. She has to cover her hair, and if
: the thing she covers it with also happens to be hair, it doesn't matter.

The arguments made here in previous discussions of this topic convinced
me that sei'ar be'ishah ervah is a consequence, not a cause, of the
requirement for a married woman to cover her hair. The issur is from a
geziras hakasuv, and once it's a part of the body that is supposed to
be covered, it is consequently ervah.

This is much like what RAM writes, except it frees one from asking why
a sheitl that might be prettier than her real hair would be less ervah.
The issur simply isn't ervah. Sei'ar be'ishah ervah is not why her hair
is covered, so one can not deduce from the logic of ervah what ought to
be done.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             With the "Echad" of the Shema, the Jew crowns
micha@aishdas.org        G-d as King of the entire cosmos and all four
http://www.aishdas.org   corners of the world, but sometimes he forgets
Fax: (270) 514-1507      to include himself.     - Rav Yisrael Salanter

> RSRH, in the article that I saw, never claimed to believe in
> evolution. He just said that even if evolution and millions of years
> were true, it wouldn't undermine our Torah HaKidosha. Besides, the fact
> that a few gedolim thought that evolution was compatible with the Torah,
> does not make it so. Look, you must take a stand. According to the gedolim
> that hold that evolution is kefira, they obviously feel that evolution is
> not compatible with our mesorah. Either it is, or it isn't but someone
> has to be wrong. Its ok even for a gadol to err; it doesn't make him
> ois gadol. Like RYGB said, they were not kofrim chs'v, just toim.

There can be more than one legitimate opinion. Why do you assume that
it is or isn't. Ritva allows many different correct views with elu
v'elu. That was basically the fight over the Rambam. In the end different
viewpoints were accepted. There is no SA for haskafa or science. The
main point is that accepting a viewpoint based on a rishon or acharon
means it is not kefirah and is acceptable within torah Judaism. It also
means they are not toim.

There is no psak in hashkafa and even in halacha after the gemara there
is a lot of wiggle room. Even things in SA were not accepted by every
kehilla. That does not make them toim.

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel
-- 
Eli Turkel

SA states that a man should not give shalach manot to a woman because it
might be interpreted as a marriage gift. In fact I saw that RSZA needs
a justification to give shalach manot to one's widowed grandmother on
the grounds that "kiddushin anom tofsim"

Given that is a man allowed to give a girl a present eg bat mitzvah
present (if she is over bat mitzvah) or else an engagement present etc?
i.e. Is this a halacha concerning Purim or a blanket prohibition for a
man to give gifts to single women when no intention of marriage exists.
This would also affect rabbis and other professionals who give gifts to
female students as encouragements for learning

kol tuv
-- 
Eli Turkel

In Defense of Sheitlach:

1. Most women devote significant time, energy, and financial resources
to their physical appearance - clothing, cosmetics, hair, etc. And for
many of them, self-image and identity are closely bound up with personal
appearance. There are exceptions to this rule of course (perhaps a
disproportionate number of us can be found devoting our time and energy
to Avodah/Areivim instead), but the rule is not likely to change.

2. Many women in modern, western society, where hair is not normally
covered, find the obligation of kisui rosh extremely challenging. They do
not like looking different from others, or they find it uncomfortable and
restricting. This is perhaps exacerbated by the fact that the requirement
is imposed suddenly in adulthood, often on women with very pretty hair
which has been an important element in their self-image.

3. Many poskim permit sheitlach, and some even recommend them as the
ideal form of kisui rosh.

4. So, given that kisui rosh is a challenging mitzvah - so challenging
that a significant number of orthodox women are neglecting or minimizing
its observance - we should make sure that the widest possible range of
halachically acceptable options remains available to women. A sheitl
enables a professional woman to look like her colleagues. It goes
with every outfit. It lets a girl who is getting married continue to
look pretty much like she is used to looking. Many women feel much more
attractive with a sheitl than with an alternative form of hair covering,
and many husbands prefer it. It is good for shalom bayis. I see no reason
to challenge the legitimacy of this very well-established heter.

 - Ilana (who has never worn a sheitl and doesn't plan to)

> used, what does one do when chodesh Av comes around... 
> Would we say - mimaatin besimchoh - ein simchoh ela Torah - 
> so there should be less learning (ch"v) ?

Well, there is a connection. We don't learn on Tisha B'Av, right? So we
are lowering our Torah learning that month...

 --Rena

13 Mar 2005 R' David Riceman <driceman@worldnet.att.net> posted:
> ...[Some say]someone who thinks that God has body parts is a heretic.
> Why then is this metaphor so common? ... [The answer is given that]
> G-d presented a corpus which would, when read superficially, conform to
> their prejudices, but which, when studied carefully, would induce them
> to abandon those prejudices. Why doesn't the analogous explanation apply
> to the age of the universe?

Because there is no reason to think the Jews at the time of mattan
Torah were incapable of accepting the idea of a multi-billion-year age
of this earth (or the evolution of life) were it stated in the Torah
as true. The Torah states such extraordinary physical phenomena and
time-oriented assertions as that the animals and man were formed from
out of the earth; that the ancients lived lifespans of hundreds of
years (even beyond 900 years!); that the first man and woman came into
existence, had children, went through the entire experience leading to
their banishment from Gan Eden all in one day; that Noach at age 600 had
all the animals of the world in his ark and experienced a 40-day long
global flood and that the Yam Sufsplit. Why then would Jews from Moses'
time until recently not be able to be told that the world was created in
a longer time than six days? Why would they be unable to comprehend it
if the Torah wrote that it took "billions of years," or "years," or even
"a long, long time." Why would only we moderns and our seven-year-olds
(and, I might add, the ancient Greek philosophers of Tannaitic times,
and the Orientals cited by Rebbi Yehudah HaLevy in his Kuzari) be able
grasp and accept such thoughts? I don't buy it.

Zvi Lampel

On Mon, 14 Mar 2005 21:57:52 +0200, Saul Mashbaum
<smash52@netvision.net.il> wrote:
> I think that all of us have been brought up to believe that a belief
> in an incorporeal God is an absolute ikkar haemunah. I would like some
> indication from any rabbinic source that chazal believed that God was
> incorporeal. If we conclude that they "must have" believed this because
> our reason says that this is true, we can probably attribute to chazal
> many other positions as well.

The use of "kiveyachol" to qualify anthropomorphic images strongly
suggests this, e.g. in Mishna Sanhedrin 6, 5.

On  March 14, 2005 1:05 PM Daniel Israel wrote:
>> S & R Coffer wrote:
>> Chazal speak about Maaseh Bereishis (MB) in many places and nowhere
>> is there even an intimation that the six days are anything other than
>> six regular days. For instance, the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah documents
>> a machlokes between R' Eliezer and R' Yehoshua regarding the month
>> of creation. The shakla vitarya goes on for close to two blatt and in
>> addition to MB, several other episodes are introduced into the machlokes
>> such as leydas and meesas Avos, pekidas Sarah, Rachel and Chanah,
>> Yetzias Yoseph, Yetzias Mitzraim etc. ...

> I find this a very interesting example to pick.  You will note that the
> halacha actually comes out that the world was created in Nisan.  But
> clearly our nusach ha'tefilah goes according to the view that the world
> was created in Tishrei (well, Elul, technically).  So I would say that
> this is a clear indication that what is being discussed is not a literal
> historical description.

Maybe but you haven't addressed my issue. If Maaseh Bereishis is indeed
not historical, than what is it doing stuck in amongst several other
historical episodes? Doesn't that seem strange? How is it that the
Gemara would document a machlokes between two tanaim regarding several
historical issues, insert one that was not historical, and carry on as
if all the episodes were the same?

> If we were speaking historically, how could we
> hold like one position in one inyan (ma'aser), and the other position in
> another inyan (tefilah)?  History can only admit one possible version.

That is a great kasha! Actually, the Rishonim deal with it. See, for
instance, the Ran (daf gimmel in the Rif) who answers that we can say
that indeed the world was created in Tishrei but since the crop growing
season begins in Nissan (in the lashon of the Ran, "the 'hiluch' of the
sun is most prominent in Nisan"), we use Nissan as a starting point for
Ma'aser. (the Ran also has an approach if we would hold that the world
was created in Nissan like R' Yehoshua)

>> Really? Says who? Certainly not the Rishonim. If you are referring to the
>> Tiferes Yisrael, you cannot bring a raayah from him or from anyone for
>> that matter that was influenced by the modern day scientific dogma.

> You realize how circular this is.  By this arguement, no one who
> disagrees with you can possibly be cited.

AMEN... burn them all...just kidding...Avodah has been getting quite
heated lately...perhaps some comic relief is in order.

> Clearly, no one who has never
> heard of modern science can possibly have an opinion on how to reconcile
> scientific findings and traditional sources.

I am not following you. In your citation above, you quote me in response
to Reb Michah. Our dialogue was in reference to the Gemara in Chagiga
of midas yom va'layla which I was attempting to bring as a ra'aya that
time existed during the sheishes yimei bireishis. RMB responded that

> The gemara is choleiq with Bereishis Rabba, which says that tohu vavohu
> is the relic of the previous olam(os).

RMB is referring to the medrash of boneh olamos u'machrivan. I simply
responded that there were no Rishonim that indicated a machlokes
between these two sources. Clearly, these two sources (the Gemara and
the Medrash) pre-dated modern science by many years and thus were not in
any way predicated on it. The medrash must have a peshat regardless of
the findings of modern day science. Thus, any peshat in the medrash that
uses modern day science as an indispensable component of its elucidation
is necessarily un-provable for the original author of the ma'amar Chazal
was not aware of this science.

I am not the first one to make this argument. Rav Aryeh Kaplan refers
to this as "post ex facto"; that is, you are using evolutionary theory
to explain a medrash when the author of the medrash was not aware of
evolutionary theories. If one wishes to be intellectually honest, he
must find a source in our tradition that pre-dated evolutionary theory
and yet attributed immense age to the universe.

> Also, you also know
> "modern day scientific dogma."  How come you haven't been influenced?

Two reasons. First and foremost, because Hashem saved me. (I'm not being
facetious) He sent me Rabbeim that gave me (what I believe to be) the
proper hadrachah in hashkafa.

The second reason is that originally, when Darwin proposed his theory,
very little information was known about geology and fossil finds by the
"other side". People like the TY just took for granted that everything
the scientists were saying was true and formulated a response based on
this assumption. Today, we know that there are many inconsistencies in
the theory of evolution and thus it is easier for us to contend with
the anti-Torah claims of science.

> If those who agree with you are capable of maintaining objectivity, how
> do you know that those who disagree can't also maintain objectivity?

I know neither. I don't know if people who agree with me are maintaining
their objectivity, and I don't know that people who disagree with me are
not maintaining their objectivity. You are bringing up an essentially
epistemological dilemma for which I have no answer. All I can tell you
is that this is my opinion; accept it or reject it...its up to you.

>> (If
>> you ask me, I believe the TY would have been chozer from his shita had
>> he been alive today although I have no proof)

> Well, I'll assume you're not advancing this as an arguement.

Correct

>  I recall
> one Reform individual who asserted that where the Rambam alive today he
> would hold like the Reform.  My response: maybe that's true (although I
> don't think so), but if it was then I would disagree with him, too.

I agree wholeheartedly.

Best wishes
Simcha

From: <hlampel@thejnet.com>
> Because there is no reason to think the Jews at the time of mattan
> Torah were incapable of accepting the idea of a multi-billion-year age
> of this earth (or the evolution of life) were it stated in the Torah
> as true. The Torah states such extraordinary physical phenomena and
> time-oriented assertions as that the animals and man were formed from
> out of the earth; that the ancients lived lifespans of hundreds of
> years (even beyond 900 years!); that the first man and woman came into
> existence, had children, went through the entire experience leading to
> their banishment from Gan Eden all in one day; that Noach at age 600 had
> all the animals of the world in his ark and experienced a 40-day long
> global flood and that the Yam Suf split.

The Rambam held that the philosophy confronting Moses was the doctrine of
a group he calls "the Saba", which seems to be a variant of neoPlatonism.
He has a long chapter in the Moreh Nevuhim about how they retell corrupt
variants of Biblical stories in such a way as to imply the eternity of
the world and the impossibility of miracles.

The Rambam's position is that an educator has to make a choice. He needs
to emphasise those points which are essential immediately, and leave
the other parts for later. The immediate essentials were creation and
miracles. Incorporeality was left for several thousand years later, when
the Rambam introduced the novel idea that advocating God's corporeality
was a form of heresy.

Modern science demostrates that the world is in flux. I think there are
several maamarei Hazal which indicate that they knew this. Nonetheless
it would have been another slap in the face, not only for the Saba,
but even for the Aristotelians, to try to introduce it explicitly in
the Biblical text.

If I understand you correctly you are disagreeing with the Rambam's
expressed position in Maamar Tehiyyat HaMeitim. That is certainly your
privilege, but I don't think that you are entitled to deny that his
position is respectable.

David Riceman 

smash52@netvision.net.il Posted on: Mar 14, 2005:
David Riceman responded:
>>I would like to draw an analogy here. Tanach and Hazal speak in many
>>places about God having body parts (hands, legs, eyes, etc.). Now almost
>>all rishonim agree that God doesn't have a body. In fact the Rambam
>>maintains that someone who thinks that God has body parts is a heretic.

> RHerschel Schacter mentioned this point in his recent lecture in
> Yerushalayim on Eilu v'Eilu. Interestingly, some rishonim (albeit a
> minority) held exactly the opposite: a wealth of maamarei chazal indicate
> clearly and explicitly that God has body parts, (we've seen quite a
> few in the last few days in daf yomi, for example) and thus anyone who
> holds that He does *not* is a kofer, denying as he does both the Torah
> and chazal. RHS said that some in fact held that the works of the Rambam
> were heretical, and one this basis justified their being publicly burned.

Can anyone please name the rishonim who held so?(Rambam in Maamar Techias
HaMeisim refers to "so-called chachamim" of his day who did so, but are
any our presently recognized rishonim)?

Also, does anyone have the source that the complaint about the Moreh
Nevuchim which led to its burning was this issue?

Zvi Lampel

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