Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 033

Tuesday, November 23 2004

• Re: Orthodox Conservative Rabbi
• Ma'aser mystery
• Re: Tiqun Olam
• Re: Requesting this list to list machshava classics
• Re: Asking questions
• Re: Knowing and Believing
• Re: Torah and science
• Re: Torah and Science
• Re: Locusts
• Re: Orthodox Conservative Rabbi
• Re: Orthodox rabbis, Conservative shuls
• Hearing Aids
• Re: Asking questions

Shinnar, Meir wrote:
> It is well known that Rav Moshe Feinstein was vehemently opposed to the
> Conservative movement, and to their rabbis. Furthermore, he ruled that
> weddings done by Conservative rabbishave the hazaka of not being kosher,
> and thus not requiring, at least bdiavad, if not lecatchila, a get.
> However, it has also been documented here that when confronted with
> an individual case where the Conservative rabbi was known to be shomer
> mitzvot, he viewed the wedding as valid, and therefore requiring a get.
> Therefore, at least RMF seemed to hold of the possibility of non trafe
> Conservative rabbis....

I don't see this as revolving around RMF's opinion of C "rabbis".

When dealing with mamzeirus, the imperative is to be very strict in
avoiding mamzeirus lechat-chilah, and meiqil once it's bedi'eved. Thus,
Rav Moshe says we can assume the wedding was void bedi'eved -- but
only bedi'eved.

The pesul le'eidus is only one of the issues with a C wedding. And
considering the possibility that the wedding was valid doesn't necessitate
believing that the rabbi was one of the eidei qiyum. It doesn't even
necessitate believing that the rabbi /intentionally/ got all the steps
correct!



But as I see it, no substantiated arguments have been made for the
central point: Someone whose personal emunah and practice is within
O but believes in the validity of the full range of C as options for
other people -- is such a person O or not? Does simply affiliating with a
movement change someone's status? And what halachic chalos corresponds to
"movement", anyway?

If I am mistaken, and someone has gotten beyond identifying this question,
kindly accept my apology and send a reference.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (270) 514-1507

In this week's parsha, VaYishlach 32:25 when the angel fights with
Yaakov, there's a fascinating Targum Y. (The T Yonasan and T Yerushalmi
are identical on this posuk - as on most psukim in the Torah.)

The TY says that the angle reminded Yaakov that he had promised to tithe
everything Hashem gave him. However he had not tithed his children.

He ignored the 4 "first borns" - one for each mother, leaving 8. (Pirush
Yonasan [PY] says Binyomin, already in gestation was counted in.)

He then started counting at Shimon and (coming around the 2nd time [PY])
the 10th was Levi.

Michael (the angle) then declared Levi to be "the holy one" for all times.

I thought this was fascinating, but my son wanted to know since when we
tithe quantities under 10 - and determine the 10th by starting from the
beginning again.

Any ideas how to explain this?

Thanks
 - Danny

T613K@aol.com wrote:
>> Is that tiqun olam? I've only heard tiqun olam defined  that way in non-O
>> circles. I thought it was about ha'alas hanitzotzos or  tiqun hakochos...

> I am using the pshat definition of "tikun olam" (which long predates
> non-O mis-use of the term to refer to liberal politics). Pshat is that
> it refers to maintaining the world, civilization. See RSRH. You are
> using a kabbalistic definition of the term.

RSRH has a large corpus of work. I checked Collected Writings, but I
could only skim. I spent more time on vol VIII "Mensch-Israel". I didn't
find anything.

In the siddur, the "be-" in "lesaqein olam bemalkhus Shakai" is rendered
"through", fixing the world through the kingdom of G-d.

Although I used qabbalistic terminology, the notion that tiqun olam
is about using it for G-d's ends does not require those terms. And in
fact, the little I did find from RSRH on the subject does seem to imply
this definition as opposed to maintaining and furthering the world and
civilization.

Related to this is a topic I'm working on for my blog: the difference
between self-help and mussar. A key element of the difference is that
self-help's goal is personal realization whereas mussar's is reealization
as an eved Hashem. Pretty much the same distinction on a personal level.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (270) 514-1507

I have interest in a related question: Finding a reading list of material
that AishDas could provide.

Here's what comes to mind:

Philosophy:
    1- R' Saadia Gaon's Emunos veDeios
    2- Rambam:
	    Moreh Nevuchim
	    Hilkhos Teshuvah
	    Introduction to Cheileq
       (Yesodei haTorah is largely redundant after the Moreh, and not
       treated as "a classic" in most circles -- from the Gra to RSRH.)
    3- HaIkkarim
    4- HaKuzari
    5- Ramchal's Derekh Hashem
    6- Gra's Peirush al Kama Agados
 From here onward, I think defining "classic" depends on the derekh of
the reader:
    7- MmE
    8- RSRH's 19 Letters
    9- R' Tzadoq's Tzidqas haTzadiq
    10- RYBS
	    Halachic Man
	    The Lonely Man of Faith
    11- R' Hutner's Pachad Yitzchaq
    12- Nesivos Shalom

Ta'amei haMitzvos:
    1- Chinukh
    2- Horeb

Mussar:
    1- Rabbeinu Yonah:
	    Sha'arei Teshuvah
	    Commentary on Mishlei
    2- Chovos haLvavos
    3- Rambam
	  8 peraqim
	  Hilkhos Dei'os
    4- Mesilas Yesharim
    5- Orchos Tzadiqim
    6- Or Yisra'el
    7- Alei Shur (not because it's really a classic, but because much
                  of mussar requires contemporariness)

I would also produce a list of metahalachic sources, ie the nature of
pesaq, of machloqes, what does "Torah miSinai" mean, etc... but I haven't
put as much thought to it yet.

Also, as implied by RSB's post, huge swaths of exerpts from peirushim
on Tanakh are useful. But I couldn't call the Ramban on Chumash a
"mechshavah classic".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                    ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (270) 514-1507

From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <ygb@aishdas.org>
> Sorry. as RYBS, great as he may have been, refuses to incorporate Mussar
> and only the smallest smidgen of Chassidus and Kabbalah in his writings,
> he is inadmissible as a candidate for "the greatest ba'al machashava
> of generations." To cite him as such is to misunderstand machashava. I
> suggest the writer consult the classic work "Perakim b'Machasheves
> Yisrael" by Rabbi Yisraeli and see how often RYBS is cited. V'ha'maskanah
> berurah.

I meant to say of the generation not generations. I would not say that
the Rov was the greatest baal machshva of any generation. But he was
certainly near the top of the 20th century.

As for the definition that one need cite Mussur, chasidus and kabbala
to be considered. But to be established as a baal machshava you need to
be included in Rav Yisraeli's classic work. Clearly this is an arbitrary
definintion. If it works for you - great.

The Rambam RASAG, the kuzari all clearly fall short because of the
lack of the first criteria - not citing Mussur, chasidus and kabbala. I
assume that Rav Yisraeli can save them as ballie machshava bdieved. Rav
Yisraeli did not have access to the vast majority of the Rov's thought -
so the number of citations is irrelevant.

The rov does cite Gdolie Chassidus and Kabbalh, though I suspect he was
less inclined to cite Balie musur. I would offer a different definition of
machsava - someone who can articulate the non-halachik parts of chazal -
someone who understands what chazal says between the lines. Someone who
understands midrashim and aggaadata. This you will find in the Rov's
writings and teachings.

> As to the ma'aseh with RCS, I stand by my comment. It is slanderous
> to assume that RCS did not know that there are countless shnei kesuvim
> without a kasuv ha'shelishi which Chazal and Rishonim deal with all the
> time. At best one can assume that the story was sichas chullin shel TC.

As far as the tradition of Rav Chaim please read what the Rov wrote,
which he says he heard from his father in the name of Rav Chaim - there
is nothing scandalous - read it. Rav Chaim says that as long as there
was a contradiction Avraham did not question he proceeds toward the task
at hand - the akaida (he implies that Avraham has emunah that a third
verse would resolve the contradiction).

Ari Kahn

Micha Berger wrote:
>Emunah comes from a shoresh meaning reliable or trustworthy. Emunah
>means that someone considers the fact reliable. Says nothing about why.

>Yedi'ah seems to be the product of binah and chokhmah-- as in chokhmah
>binah vada'as. Closer to Plato's definition of knowledge.

Rav Saadiya Gaon(Introduction 5): It is appropriate to mention the three
different paths to truth which are the source of all knowledge and the
mainspring to all perception. 1) Knowledge from direct observation. 2)
Intuitive knowledge of the intellect. 3) Knowledge derived from logical
necessity. Now we will elaborate on each of these categories. The
knowledge from direct observation is that which a person perceives with
one of the five senses.... The intuitive knowledge of the intellect are
those apriori values such as the importance of truth and the disapproval
of lies. The third category of knowledge from logical necessity are
those things which are so clearly evident that if a person would reject
them he would simply have to deny the evidence of his senses and his
conscious awareness of reality. Since he obviously can not reject them he
is forced to accept them...But we the community of monotheists not only
acknowledge the validity of these three paths but we also have a fourth
path which is derived from these three paths. 4) Our fourth path is that
of our authentic tradition which is based upon knowledge of our senses
and the intuition of our intellect as we will explain in chapter three.

Michtav M'Eliyahu (1:170): We find in our holy books that emuna is belief
in that which we have not yet fully grasped with our intellect. In other
words, emuna is accepting something as true because it seems reasonable
to accept it. For example, a person might accept something his parents or
teachers told him primarily because he can not conceive that they would
tell him something which is a lie and not to his benefit. Similarly he
might note that a complex machine, made up of many precisely integrated
components, could not have been made by accident. A watch cannot be
assembled simply by dropping the components and assuming that they would
connect themselves correctly by chance. Therefore belief is a function
of what is considered reasonable rather than clear proof or direct
experience. Thus emuna stands in contrast to things like mathematics
that can be directly and conclusively proved. This reliance on the
standard of reasonableness instead of actual knowledge even applies
to such things as life and death decisions. Murder trials based upon
circumstantial evidence are an example. It is important to note that if
we multiply the strength of the circumstantial evidence in a typical
murder trial by a factor of 1000, it would still pale in comparison
that the evidence that the incredibly complex world was created by an
infinitely intelligent Creator. Thus emuna is something that we accept
because it is reasonable. However there is a level beyond merely being
reasonable. Emuna can develop into rational certainty that is as strong
as mathematical certainty. This shift happens when the obviousness of
the belief is so strong that it becomes equivalent to directly knowing
the facts that had initially appeared only reasonable. This shift
can also occur when the likelihood of the belief being wrong becomes
remote. When a belief is deeply thought about and analyzed and then
becomes intuitively obvious ג€" it is called tzedek. In other words it
becomes totally rational. This is what the expression that a ג€˜Tzadik
lives by his emuna'. Tzedek is derived from that which starts as emuna.
However since emuna originates in the heart as something that seems
or feels reasonable ג€" it also is strongly influenced by bias and
motivation. This problem is described in the Torah (Devarim 16:19),
"Bribery blinds the eyes of the wise and distorted the words of the
righteous". Because of this problem of bias our holy books say that the
entire reason for heresy is that a person wants an excuse to fulfill his
physical desires. Similar it is said that the only reason why Jews ever
worshiped idols was to provide an excuse to permit sin but not because
they believed in it. Thus the path of great people is that they start with
emuna that eventually becomes rational awareness i.e., they comprehend
from the perspective of tzedek. That is why the Torah (Bereishis 16:6)
describes Avraham's emuna as being, "considered as tzedakah".

Ramban (Emuna vHaBitachon 18): There are in this verse 3 things each
one greater than the previous. The first is seeing. Above seeing is
hearing. That is to say that the sense of hearing is more pure and
refined than that of seeing. Above both of them is yediya (knowledge).
That is because neither seeing nor hearing is complete until yediya is
achieved. When a person sees something or hears a sound and doesn't know
what it is it is as if he hadn't seen or heard a sound. That is why the
Torah uses both the term seeing and hearing to indicate understanding.
For example Devarim (28:49) and Koheles (1:16). Similarly if a person
knows something -- even though he never saw it and never heard it -- it
is still like he saw or heard. You should be sure to remember this idea
and don't forget it. You should know that we apply the term knowledge
(yediya) only when the idea of the thing being comprehended is engraved
deep in the heart to the degree that he can readily distinguish between
it and other things both in terms of general factors and specific
factors. Alternatively if there is emuna with the yediya. And all emuna
is yediya based on convincing proofs that it is so. That information
which has been transmitted from one person to another is called emuna.
All emuna requires yediya i.e., it requires that he believes that which
he knows....

Malbim (Hoshea 2:21): Yediya or knowledge is something which is perceived
directly with the senses or is understand through such clear proof that
it is impossible to doubt it at all. Emuna on the other hand is something
which is not comprehended in an irrefutable manner but is accepted from
highly reliable sources and is believed based on their say so. Wherever
there is a completely clear knowledge there is no longer any relevance
for emuna.

Beis HaLevi(Shemos 12:43): The main mitzva of emuna is to believe in all
the words of the Torah and the tradition from our rabbis concerning that
which is impossible to know according to direct proof or experience. In
fact all that is amenable to direct proof or experience is not called
emuna but is called knowledge. We have a mitzva to believe and that
applies to those things which are beyond the comprehension of our
intellect. Therefore a person who only believes that which is amenable
to direct proof or experience has not fulfilled the mitzva of emuna at
all. Just as a person is commanded to submit his energies to serve G-d
such as the breaking of the physical lusts concerning the pleasures of
this world ג€" similarly a person has the obligation to submit and to
nullify his intellect to serve G-d. That is what we mean by emuna in the
words of Torah concerning that which is beyond the comprehension of the
intellect. Therefore someone whose intellect has become corrupt and his
heart weaken in emuna can not be directly aided by his friends. Instead
it is necessary to pray that G-d put faith in his heart and purify his
heart to serve G-d...

R. S. R. Hirsch(Collected Writings Volume I p97ff): There is no evidence
or guarantee of the truth and reality of an historic fact save our
trust in tradition. All sorts of documents and monuments, all sorts
of internal and external circumstances may lead you to the conclusion
that it is probable, or almost certain, that such-and-such an event
did really happen; but who tells you that what you consider probable
or even certain has really happened? Or that the very documents from
which you draw your conclusions are not in reality forged? What other
assurance have you that the conclusions you draw are a safe enough
basis for both your present and future course of action, if not your
trust in the genuineness of tradition? The fact mains, however, that
Jewish tradition -- a phenomenon unique of its kind -- refers us back
to itself only; and that it refuses any documentation by the written
Torah, which, after all, is only handed down by that oral tradition it
presupposes it everywhere. This itself is the most trustworthy sign of
its truthג€" more trustworthy than any document with seven seals could
possibly be. The fact is that Holy Writ contains no direct documentary
evidence of this truth of the oral tradition. And yet, a whole nation has
joyfully committed the preservation of its existence during more than
3,000 years to the authority of this oral tradition. This shows in the
most striking manner how deeply convinced all these generations were of
the truth of this tradition; how sure our forebears were of the veracity
of what had been handed down to them by their own fathers and would one
day be passed on to the children -- a truth which they themselves had
sealed with their life and death. So completely assured was the people
of the faithful transmission of this gained tradition that it required
no other legitimation. Nothing would have been gained -- it would even
have been dangerous -- if Holy Writ (whose authenticity rests in the
last resort only on the veracity of tradition) had itself contained a
direct legitimation of this same tradition. The same enemies of Israel's
tradition -- who now use the argument that tradition is not legitimated
in the Written Law -- would have argued that a clerical error might have
crept into Holy Writ.

Tanya (1:18): Chochma (wisdom) is the source of intellect and
understanding. It is above understanding i.e., the understanding of the
intellect and its comprehension. Thus chochma is above understanding
and comprehension and at the same time is their source. This is seen
even in the word chochma itself which is composed of "koach" and "mah"
i.e., that which above comprehension and understanding... Therefore
all Jews ג€"even the women and simple masses ג€" have emuna in G-d
since emuna transcends knowing and comprehension... Even the lowest of
the low and the sinners usually become martyrs for Kiddush HaShem and
suffer great torture rather than reject the One G-d. This is true in
spite of the fact that they are totally ignorant and do not know the
greatness of G-d. Even the little they know they don't think about
at all so they are not sacrificing their lives because of knowledge
and understanding of G-d at all -- rather in spite of their ignorance
and lack of understanding. The One G-d is apparently something which
is impossible to deny even without conscious understanding but rather
because of the transcendent reality of His Unity illuminates and gives
life to the soul through chochma which is above rational comprehension.

Daniel Eidensohn

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> The natural laws are themselves part of the "artwork". Your argument is
> circular. Had Hashem desired to create a universe which told its true age,
> He could have utilized laws of nature that accomodate that.

Well, yes. The laws and the world are part of the same artificial system,
the same work of art. That's the point - that's what makes it art.
He defined a set of rules and then worked within those rules, creating
a wonderful and detailed expression of them. Yes, He could easily have
used different rules, and a universe that was an expression of *those*
rules would be very different, but would be equally consistent with them.

Maybe it's the fact that I'm a science fiction fan, and this is the
essence of what science fiction writers do. Make an assumption or five,
and then work them out rigorously. Create a world, and then write a
story that shows off that world, and is completely consistent with it,
reflecting its backstory, its natural laws, etc. Explore what far-reaching
effects the original assumptions might have.

> Second, it only shifts the question from asking why G-d would falsify
> history to why G-d felt a need for Realism.

'Why G-d felt a need' is not a valid question, any more than is why a
person feels a particular need or desire. 'Af a taive fregt men nisht
kein kashes'. Once you have reduced the issue to one of a desire, or
an aesthetic need, then you've taken it as far as it can go, because
these things are higher than the intellect and are not amenable to
intellectual inquiry.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

On Mon, Nov 22, 2004 at 12:16:19PM +0100, Minden wrote:
: Interesting summing-up of how to establish truth, at least with a small  
: type t...:
: <http://www.sophists.org/news.html>

I think you mean <http://www.sophists.org/article380.html>, which seems to
fit your description and contain the word "maven".

It's about ESTABLISHING truth, not what is truth. But the whole
disagreement between the religious and disbeleving mindset is how to
weigh different kinds of evidence. Not the solidity of argument.

Besides, there are many truths that can't be established as such.

Both points, the difference between true and provably true and the value
of non-empirical evidence, are at the heart of our little debate over
the word "fact".

: An aside: Is it an American thing that the author, who seems to be
: addressing a general public, uses the word "maven"?

Around the NY area, many Yiddishisms krept into English.



On Tue, Nov 23, 2004 at 12:54:49PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
: Maybe it's the fact that I'm a science fiction fan, and this is the
: essence of what science fiction writers do. Make an assumption or five,
: and then work them out rigorously. Create a world, and then write a
: story that shows off that world, and is completely consistent with it,
: reflecting its backstory, its natural laws, etc. Explore what far-reaching
: effects the original assumptions might have.

However, that doesn't address the question, "Why would G-d create a
universe that misleads us about its age?" You would need to provide
a reason for natual laws that imply a misleading age and therefore
requiring a backstory. IOW, the original question stands, albeit
rephrased.

:>Second, it only shifts the question from asking why G-d would falsify
:>history to why G-d felt a need for Realism.

: 'Why G-d felt a need' is not a valid question, any more than is why a
: person feels a particular need or desire. 'Af a taive fregt men nisht
: kein kashes'. Once you have reduced the issue to one of a desire, or
: an aesthetic need, then you've taken it as far as it can go, because
: these things are higher than the intellect and are not amenable to
: intellectual inquiry.

As you might recall from the previous iteration, that was sort of my
point. The question "Why would G-d create a universe that misleads
us about its age?" is a pointless one. There's no need to provide the
metaphor of Artistic Realism or Sci-Fi writing style, the question won't
yeild an answer either way.

BTW, since this rehash seems to be productive, I suggested a different
reason in the previous iteration. Any discontinuity would have effects
that trickle down until the end of time. Therefore, there had to be
a continuity between the effects of the origins of the universe, and
the rules of nature under which we live. The rules of nature, though,
were chosen to foster free will, a balance between predictability and
indeterminism -- not realistic estimates of age.


Since I raised the Kantian approach in my previous email, I would note
that REED appears to be Kantian in this regard.

REED says that time as we know it is a product of our perception (as
I've mentioned when discussing my own opinion WRT ma'aseh bereishis),
and a product of the eitz hada'as imposing a progression from desire ->
effort -> fulfillment/frustration. Kant constructs the antinomy of space
and time to prove that they are phenomena, products of man perceiving
the universe and not numena of the universe-in-itself.

(In short, the antinomy runs as follows: the world must begin in space and
time because an infinite regress of time is unacceptable; yet the world
must also be infinite in space and time because any finite temporal and
spatial extension begs the question of what is before and beyond. Many
believe Einstein answered the question WRT space, but not time.)

Similarly, when discussing nissim, I wrote how REED understands the
Maharal. See also <http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/beshalach.pdf>.
Someone who focuses on teva, lives in a world where teva is absolute.
Someone who focuses on higher ideals, lives in a world where they are
the absolute laws, and teva is relative.

Note the assumption that laws are a product of the order the person is
imposing on reality, which is why they can differ between people. This is
exactly the idea I cited in the name of Kant and Mach to explain why
human math and reason explain the universe so well.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Dale Carnegie

Chagavim were a topic of discussion at this years OU conference on the
Mesorah of birds and animals. An OU Daf Hakashrus which addresses
the issues of mesorah transfer (with citations) can be found at
<http://www.ou.org/pdf/daf/5765/Daf%2013-2.pdf>.

At the conference, they had a box of live chagavim (some of which escaped)
and brought in a Yemenite yeshiva student who described the simanim using
one of the live chagavim. They then fried one, but he declined to eat
it, saying that he didn't want to eat in front of a crowd (and that it
was underdone).

Several possibilities were discussed regarding the transfer of mesorah
of chagavim from the Yemenite community to others, including the opinion
that a non-Yemenite may eat chagavim, provided he is in Yemen anomgst
members of the community.

Gil Winokur
gilwinokur@usa.net

R. Meir Shinnar writes:
> It is well known that Rav Moshe Feinstein was vehemently opposed to the
> Conservative movement, and to their rabbis. Furthermore, he ruled that
> weddings done by Conservative rabbis have the hazaka of not being kosher,
> and thus not requiring, at least bdiavad, if not lecatchila, a get.
> However, it has also been documented here that when confronted with
> an individual case where the Conservative rabbi was known to be shomer
> mitzvot, he viewed the wedding as valid, and therefore requiring a get.
> Therefore, at least RMF seemed to hold of the possibility of non trafe
> Conservative rabbis. 

The conclusion does not necessarily follow. After all, there is no
need for an observant m'sader kiddushin for a marriage to be valid;
what is needed are two kosher eidim. RMF obviously assumed that the
average Conservative rabbi would not worry about such matters, since his
own lifestyle renders him pasul, and he is unlikely to have insisted
on eidim who are more observant than he. However, one who is himself
a shomer mitzvos is much more likely to have seen to it that there be
kosher witnesses. For that reason, RMF would view the wedding as kosher
despite the "trafe" rabbi.

EMT

On Mon, 2004-11-22 at 10:25 -0800, Harry Maryles wrote:
>> Speaking into a microphone in an of itself may not be a violation of
>> Hilchos Shabbos. The Halachic principle that allows speaking to someone
>> on Shabbos who has a hearing aid may be applicable to microphone use. It
>> is not a simple issue and there may be a version of microphone that is
>> actually permissible. This is not a Psak. Just an observation.

To which R Shaya Potter remarked:
>interesting tidbit, in consecutive tshuvot, Rav Moshe assured microphones,
>but permitted hearing aides.

RSZA in Minchas Shlomo (Vol. 1 - written by him) in siman 9 (pg 63-76)
explains the difference between a hearing aid and a microphone. He comes
to the same conclusion.

The teshuva is so detailed (technology-wise) that you could probably
build both of these, with minimal other instructions.

He does have a footnote saying that if the technology involved changes,
then the psak may change.

Interestingly enough - according to one of his biographies (HaMoar
haGadol, by his nephew YM Stern, pg 59)- this is one of RSZA's earliest
tshuvos. Supposedly when he was a teenager his mother became hard of
hearing, and he went about saving his pocket-money to buy her a hearing
aid, and then investigating the halachos relevant to Shabbes, megila,
etc. and her hearing aid.

 - Danny

There are 3 problems with using hearing aids on shabbat:
1) problem of carrying [a biblical prohibition]
2) using a hearing aid turned on before shabbat
3) adjusting volume on shabbat

CARRYING [wearing the hearing aid when there is no ERUV]

There is a difference of opinion [which reflects the type of hearing
aid used [old fashioned type vs. modern worn-in-the-ear type]. Those who
prohibit [referring to the old type] include the Har Tzvi Orach Chaim I
173; the Minchat Yitzchak [in a later responsa] II 113; and Rav Neubarth,
author of Shmirat Shabbat K'hilchata [referring to a hearing aid worn
in *back* of the ear].

Those that permit: Minchat Yitzchak I 37 [if the hearing aid can't
fall off]; Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in a comment in Shmirat Shabbat
k'Hilchata 34 # 108; Har Tzvi I 173 [if the hearing aid is *built in*
the eyeglasses.

USING ON SHABBAT

As long as the device is turned on before shabbat, it's permitted to
use on shabbat (see: Iggrot Moshe Orach Chaim IV 85; Beer Moshe I 17 #
6; Minchat Yitzchak I 37; Yabia Omer I 19 # 19)

ADJUSTING VOLUME

Permitted (see: Shmirat Shabbat k'Hilchata 34:28 and Tzitz Eliezer VII
11). The topic is discussed in detail in Tzitz Eliezer VI 6 and the
Minchat Yitzchak I 37; Minchat Yotzchak II 17, 18, 113.

Josh

Ari D. Kahn wrote:
>As far as the tradition of Rav Chaim please read what the Rov wrote,
>which he says he heard from his father in the name of Rav Chaim 

Halakhic Man by Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik: [note 5 page 143]
One of the thirteen rules for interpreting the Torah is the contradiction
between two verses and their harmonization by a third verse. Therefore,
it is not for naught that the Midrash (Gen. Rabbah S6:B [cited in Rashi
on Gen. 22: 12]) informs us that after the angel told Abraham, "Lay not
thy hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing unto him" (Gen. 22:
12), Abraham arose and asked: Yesterday You told me "For in Isaac shall
seed be called to thee" (Gen. 21: 12), and today You told me "Take now,
thy son, thine only son... and offer him there for a burnt-offering"
(Gen. 22: 2), etc., etc.-i.e., the exalted drama of the Akedah, of the
binding of Isaac, is reflected not only in the act of self-sacrifice on
the part of the father and the son and in the offering up of Isaac as
a sacrifice on the altar, but also in the struggle taking place within
Abraham's soul. For it seemed to him as though the words of God were
contradictory, heaven forbid; nevertheless, he overcame the pangs and
torments of contradiction, rose up early in the morning and saddled
his ass. When the angel appeared to him and revealed to him the third
verse which harmonized the two contradietory verses, then Abraham rose
up and questioned. I once heard from my father [R. Moses Soloveitchik]
in the name of our great master, R. Hayyim of Brisk [R. Soloveitchik's
paternal grandfather], that as long as the third harmonizing verse had
not yet been revealed, Abraham had no right to question God's word,
and for this reason he contained himself until the end of the epic. The
pangs of consciousness of the man of God and the towering and awesome
strength of his self-restraint shine forth here in a clear and pure light.

Maharal (Introduction to Baer HaGolah): The precondition for achieving
perfection -- through knowledge and comprehension of reality -- is
accurate self evaluation. However self knowledge is not easily achieved
and in fact it is rare to find someone who has an objective understanding
of who he is. Paradoxically this should be the easiest thing to know
ג€" he needs to simply open his eyes. He is not far away and is not
in Heaven ג€" in fact there is nothing closer! However the majority of
people perceive themselves inaccurately. In particular they mistakenly
think that they are the equal of the early sages and say "I also have
a brain and that the early days were not better than now". They insist
the intellect of man is identical in all ages. True sages, however, know
their own value. They do not distort justice concerning their money and
surely concerning themselves. An example of this accurate self evaluation
is found in Eiruvin (53a): "The hearts of the early generations were as
open as the 20 amos wide door of the Ulam of the Temple, while that of
recent generations is like that of the 10 amos wide door of the Heichal
of the Temple while our heart is like that of the eye of a needle...."

Daniel Eidensohn

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]