Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 026

Monday, November 15 2004

• Re: Halloween
• Re: Reasoning With G-d
• Re: onaah
• Re: Asking Questions
• Re: Asking Questions
• Re: Requesting this List to List Machshava Classics
• Re: Requesting this List to List Machshava Classics
• Subject: Re: LECTURE #3: TORAH AND SCIENCE -- Rambam, methodological naturalism, and the starlight p
• Re: Subject: Re: LECTURE #3: TORAH AND SCIENCE -- Rambam, methodological naturalism, and the starlight p
• Torah and science
• Re: Asking Questions
• Two observations in a beis olam
• Re: Asking Questions

Rt Chana Luntz wrote:
>>and thank God for the candy before eating it.

> Interesting. Do you understand that Avraham was requiring a brocha
> rishona? I always thought that what was being asked was for a brocha
> achrona (the d'orisa of v'achalta v'savata) (it might depend on whether
> the kids in your neighbourhood who come are in fact Jewish or non Jewish).

This gets into the subject of natural morality. Berachos rishonos are
derabbanan, but the logic is one of qal vachomer from the de'oraisa. I
would think this implies that without a chiyuv for either (which is the
state of a non-Jew), the rationale for berakhah rishonah is the more
compelling from an innate morality perspective.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
micha@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (270) 514-1507      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

RZL wrote at <http://www.aishdas.org/articles/reasoningWGd.htm>:
> The truth is that technically G-d's thoughts are beyond us. The deepest,
> most complex, and even most beyond-us kinds of thoughts are elementary
> to His mind. His thoughts are way above ours, and it is foolish to
> hold Him to ours. However, there are times when He reveals that He
> desires to descend to our level of understanding, when He wants us to
> understand him according to our perception of logic and morality. And
> this is indicated when He reveals to a prophet that He is "descending"
> into our realm of thought.

The eigel is a borderline case for this idea.

Hashem Himself doesn't act, rather Hashem withdraws -- promising a mal'akh
to lead them. However, H' does order Moshe "leikh reid" (32:7), which
would seem to imply that Moshe is expected to understand the reaction. And
yet, "lo yir'ani adam vachai ... vera'isa es Achorai, uFanai lo yeira'u"
(33:20,23) and "Vayeired Hashem be'anan..." (Shemos 34:5), the ability
to partially see, to see with hindsight, or to be obscured with clouds.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
micha@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (270) 514-1507      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

Mlevinmd@aol.com wrote:
> There are 3 ways to set price, as per marketing textbooks:
> 1. Cost + a designated price which depends of the field. F.E. a
> supermarket may determine its cost and then add a 30% surcharge.
> 2. Survey the market and set prices in the same range as other sellers
> 3. Survey buyers ands set the price based on what they are willing to pay.
>
> It seems that onaah cannot apply for #1 and 3. How would onaah be relevant
> for the modern price setting methods?

I would have said the opposite:

When using the range of pricing already in the market, ona'ah should be
a non-issue, as one can't price within the range and also be 1/6 above
the range.

However, if adding a surcharge or checking what the market would bear,
it is possible to end up pricing beyond 1-1/6 market norms. As I saw it,
the din of ona'ah is forcing the seller to use criterion #2 to limit
extravagant uses of method numbers 1 and 3.

:-)BBii!
-mi

On Fri, Nov 12, 2004 at 01:25:55PM -0500, T613K@aol.com wrote:
:>>*Rav Chaim Brisker****(MeAtiki Shemuah): *Some ask how it is  possible to
:>>ask question about the Torah? They answer that in fact  one can not ask
:>>critical questions but can only raise questions  rhetorically in order to
:>>present the answers...
...
: I remember a story about a godol--if anyone remembers which one, please
: let me know--who was asked a challenging question about something
: in the Torah that didn't seem to make sense to the challenger. R'
: Godol's reply was, "To questions I have answers. But you don't have
: a question, you have an answer. To answers I don't have answers."
: And he dismissed the cynic with no further ado.

The gadol in question (pun intended, sorry) was R' Chaim Brisker. Very
fittingly.

-mi

In Avodah V14 #25 dated 11/12/2004
>>*Rav Chaim Brisker****(MeAtiki Shemuah): *Some ask how it is  possible to
>>ask question about the Torah? They answer that in fact  one can not ask
>>critical questions but can only raise questions  rhetorically in order to
>>present the answers...

R' Daniel Eidensohn:
> This  issue came up a few years ago. R Moshe Tendler had heard from Rav
> YB  Soloveitchik that R Chaim had said that a great leader is one who
> raises  questions as we see with Moshe Rabbeinu. Sanhedrin (111a).

> I raised the  question from this citation of R'Chaim which seems to be
> a direct  contradiction. Rabbi Tendler did not know how to reconcile the
> two  statements of R' Chaim.

RMB:
> As I  understand R' Chaim, he is talking exclusively about qushyos, which
>  are particularly dangerous since someone who doesn't find a teirutz  might
> conclude that one does not exist, that ch"v he actually found an  
> upshlug...

RHM:
> But the problem with forbidding questions is the impossibilty of the mind
> to deny a question when it is raised. .... In fact the impermissiblity
> to even ask the question makes the likelihood of doubt increaes.

It seems to me that there is a way to reconcile the two different
opinions--ask questions, don't ask questions. It depends entirely on how
you ask the question. If you are seeking information and understanding,
you can ask the question. Even if you don't have an answer yet, you
will keep looking for one, with confidence that an answer exists.
But if you are trying to challenge and debunk the Torah, then your
question is cynical and verbalizing it cannot lead to anything good.

I remember a story about a godol--if anyone remembers which one, please
let me know--who was asked a challenging question about something
in the Torah that didn't seem to make sense to the challenger. R'
Godol's reply was, "To questions I have answers. But you don't have
a question, you have an answer. To answers I don't have answers."
And he dismissed the cynic with no further ado.

 -Toby Katz
=============

In a message dated 11/3/2004 8:35:26pm EST, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> I'm not sure how to make a canonical list of classic quotes. The
> assessment would be overwhelmingly subjective, and largely reflective of
> the editor's own mehalekh. Everyone sees a very different set of ideas as
> "classic".

Wouldn't you think that a lot of people consider various quotes "bavuste"?! 

Kol Tuv,
R. Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@alumnimail.yu.edu

On Sun, Nov 14, 2004 at 12:01:56AM -0500, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
: Wouldn't you think that a lot of people consider various quotes "bavuste"?! 

Yes. And in every kehillah, it's a different list!

-mi

R. Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> posted on Tue, 9 Nov 2004:
> RJO concludes:
> : Contra the VBM article, there is no "clash between the plain sense
> : of Scripture and modern scientific findings" when science is done
> : responsibly and assumptions are clearly identified. Rather, the clash
> : is between scripture and scientism, i.e. the unwarranted assumption of
> : methodological naturalism.

RMB:
> What I don't understand is how the Rambam and yourself [R. J. Ostroff] can
> stop there.
> If reality during ma'aseh bereishis was so far from our experience, why do
> you assume (contra Maharal) that we are capable of making sense of the
> pasuq's description either?

Neither does Maharal stop there. Just like the Rambam, the Maharal
comments upon and uses the p'sukim even beyond "B'rayshis barra Elohim"
to describe the facts of Creation and its sequence. As I noted in a
previous post:

In Derech Chaim. p. 215, perek Chamishi, Maharal understands the sequence
of Creation to be as presented in the pesukim. He evidently considers
himself "capable of making sense of the pesuqim's descriptions," and
does not consider them "totally unfathomable."

In Derech Chaim pp. 236-7, Maharal speaks of the six days of Creation
plainly as six days with evenings and mornings and bain hashmashos. If
he considered it all "unfathomable," how could he do this?

Again, in Ner Mitzvah, pp. 23-4, Maharal identifies the days of Creation
as specific calendar days of seasons and months (as do Chazal, when they
debate over which month Hashem created the earth as experiencing.)

This is why I maintain that the Maharal, like the Rambam (both citing the
same posuk, "The Glory of G-d is a hidden thing, and the glory of kings is
to investigate a thing" -- Mishlay 25:2), hold that much of the /unstated/
mechanics involved in the creation are beyond our comprehension, but the
facts (such as the length of the processes and the origins of created
things--e.g., animals and man from the earth) and the sequences of events
that /are/ revealed in the Torah are meant to be taken as stated. When
the Rambam states that we cannot hold the process of Creation to the
laws of nature we witness post-Creation, he is defending the truth of
the process that /is/ described in the Torah, not saying that we should
not understand the parts of the process that /are/ described to have been
as they are described. I understand the Maharal the same way. Otherwise,
the passages of Maharal I cited above would be incomprehensible.

Of course, one may insist that whatever the Maharsha says he means in a
non-literal way, "the same as the p'sukim," but in the above instances,
read in context, I think that such a stance cannot be honestly taken.

Zvi Lampel

On Sat, Nov 13, 2004 at 09:44:28PM -0500, hlampel@thejnet.com wrote:
: This is why I maintain that the Maharal, like the Rambam (both citing the
: same posuk, "The Glory of G-d is a hidden thing, and the glory of kings is
: to investigate a thing" -- Mishlay 25:2), hold that much of the /unstated/
: mechanics involved in the creation are beyond our comprehension, but the
: facts (such as the length of the processes and the origins of created
: things--e.g., animals and man from the earth) and the sequences of events
: that /are/ revealed in the Torah are meant to be taken as stated. When
: the Rambam states that we cannot hold the process of Creation to the
: laws of nature we witness post-Creation, he is defending the truth of
: the process that /is/ described in the Torah, not saying that we should
: not understand the parts of the process that /are/ described to have been
: as they are described. I understand the Maharal the same way. Otherwise,
: the passages of Maharal I cited above would be incomprehensible.

I don't see that in the Maharal's words. He speaks of ma'aseh bereishis
being incomprehensible even by nevu'ah, that creation can't be understood
by beings who have only experienced the world once created. Nothing about
this element yes, that element not. He even makes a point of discussing
the impossibility of Moshe capturing it in nevu'ah -- how would that make
sense if he was only discussing those things not transmitted benevu'ah?

: Of course, one may insist that whatever the [Maharal] says he means in a
: non-literal way, "the same as the p'sukim," but in the above instances,
: read in context, I think that such a stance cannot be honestly taken.

I have no idea how you reach this conclusion. Of course the Maharal is
speaking of how the world works, and not the history. Derekh haChaim is
far from a historical work -- Pirqei Avos is about mussar, no? Neir Mitzvah
is more obviously historical, but as we agree as to when beri'ah ended, I
don't see the contradiction.

I found accepting that far less problematic than the reinterpretation
of a pretty clearly stated thesis that you're calling for.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Here is the test to find whether your mission
micha@aishdas.org        on Earth is finished:
http://www.aishdas.org   if you're alive, it isn't.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Richard Bach

The issue of facts mentioned in the torah, nach, and talmud being 
apparently inconsistent with scientific findings is a long-standing 
subject of debate in Avodah.  As a working scientist,  I find the 
efforts to bridge the differences by speculative reinterpretation of 
scientific data or restricting their validity to the current era to be 
most unsatisfactory.   The great antiquity of the earth is attested to 
by various independent lines of evidence.   The oldest rocks dated by a 
variety of radioactive decay processes are some 4 billion years old. 
 Meteoritic rocks have been determined by such means to be 4.5 billion 
years old.   The massive ice  in Greenland and in Antarctica have some 
100,000 seasonal layers.   There are shales derived from seasonal 
melting of glaciers which show tens of thousands of layers, and the tree 
ring record goes well past 6,000 years.   There is an anti-creationist 
website run by scientists which features detailed articles setting forth 
such lines of evidence.   Little in what I alluded to has any connection 
with the speed of light.   Any attempt to reconcile 6 days of creation 
with scientific data on the age of the earth and the universe by such 
ad-hoc speculation must remain unconvincing.  No drift in the speed of 
light (c) is apparent since accurate measurements were first made late 
in the 19th century.  The speculation by P.A.M. Dirac on the drift in c 
with time is just that - speculation [Even the greatest physicists 
entertained themselves with "what if" questions].   The interpretation 
of a few physicists on star data as indicative of a variation in the 
spectroscopic (Rydberg) constant with time is disputed by others.   In 
sum,  we have no real basis for doubting the various lines of evidence 
that the earth and solar system are some 4.5 billion years old, while 
the universe is some 14 billion years.

The idea that "natural law" that we observe in this era did not apply 
for the first 6 days (although the sun rose and set in the same 24 hour 
cycle since the 4th day), or that the earth preceded the heavenly bodies 
is a large mouthful to swallow.  Those who can accept such concepts are 
in a more comfortable position than the rest of us.  Those to whom the 
scientific evidence is compelling are caught in a bind.   Should the 
creation story in the torah and other early matters such as a world-wide 
deluge be regarded as monotheistic midrash,  or should attempts be made 
at reconciliation - albeit at the cost of reinterpreting the torah text? 
  I much prefer the latter and have developed a scenario which 
transposes the creation story to a rather more "recent" era of the earth 
- the cenozoic era.   Here, as in the long essay by Harav Yisroel 
Lifshitz at the end of Nezikin - Tiferet Yisroel, the second verse of 
the torah poetically and very briefly describes the state of the earth 
after an enormous impact [The asteroidal impact in the Yucatan peninsula 
that killed off the dinosaurs and most living things 65 million years 
ago].   Each day of creation is then an era of variable length which 
features the stepwise evolution of the earth to its present state [I can 
elaborate on my conception of the events of the creation days if people 
are interested].   The traditional objection to having the creation days 
other than 24 hour periods is based on a seeming diminution of the 
relevance of our shabbat observance if the 7th day was not a real day. 
 However,  I find a powerful message in considering the creation shabbat 
to be an era - for it is our era,  the era of mankind.  This era 
featured the general divine cessation from overt regulation of earthly 
affairs ["Va'yichal Elokim ba'yom ha'shevii melachto asher asa, 
vayishbot ba'yom ha'shevii mikol melachto are asa."  Note that the 
cessation from creative work occurs in the 7th day].   That cessation 
occurred at the end of the biblical period.   Ever since,  we have been 
left to direct our affairs as best we can as a test of whether we have 
matured sufficiently to take over as the world's caretakers.   We are 
required to acknowledge and remind ourselves of that task every week by 
observing every 7th day as a day of cessation from creative work.  We 
may not have not much time left to demonstrate such wisdom and maturity 
before such opportunity is taken away.

Yitzchok Zlochower      

On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 01:17:51PM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
:> It would seem RCS rules out asking qushyos from science on Torah.

:> But notice he's still speaking about accepting vs questioning. It's very
:> much about the danger of qushyos getting in the way of acceptance.

: I agree with what you have noted in translating the Hebrew literally.
: However noting the context alters the understanding. R' Chaim had asked
: why Avraham did not object to the Akeidah. So while you can transpose this
: to mean why I - the reader of the story can not question the Akeidah -
: it clearly means that Avraham did not even have a question until it was
: possible to have an answer.

R' Chaim discusses primarily the student's question, and cites Avraham as
an examplar. That doesn't touch the point of your reply, just clarifying.

I think, though, we need to create less ambiguous terminology. It means
that Avraham did not consider the possibility of a tiyuvta, and therefore
didn't treat the question seriously until he saw it was a masiv.

My objection to your citing R' Chaim in this context is that the person
had emailed me asking about curiosity. That's more in the domain of
she'eilos that aren't lema'aseh than whether or not people fret about
qushyos for which they have no answers.

: I think that R' Chaim was actually making both points. One can not
: in fact question the Torah from logic or Science unless there is an
: available answer. Therefore Torah is a closed system. The discussions
: in the Torah itself need to conform to this principle of not asking or
: challenging but rather clarifying.

I think so too. In fact, that's what I thought I was saying in the post
to which you're replying.

In a subsequent email RDE writes:
: The attitude of non questioning -- passive acceptance -- is curiously
: absent in early sources such as Tanach (Akeida does present a problem)....

(Note that being on a list like Avodah self-selects away from people
interested in passive acceptance.)

The aqeidah itself does not establish a pattern -- the very same Avraham
questions Hashem's destruction of Sedom vaAmorah. I think the aqeidah
was different than the examples you list because it was a tzivui. It
wasn't Avraham grappling with fate, but Avraham being given a destiny.

I was surprised RDE omitted one of the more famous examples, David
haMelekh's cry "Keili Keili, lamah azavtani?"


RYBS's approach in Qol Dodi Dofeiq is that tragedy is something to be
confronted, not resolved. Pain is real, and not dismissable through
sophistry. However, one should grapple with the problem because by
struggling with the question of "Why G-d?" one is relating to G-d.
OTOH, he also writes that the Jewish question of tragedy is not "Why?"
but "How am I to respond?"

What this says about questioning things that seem to raise questions
about tzaadiq vera lo is complex. One can't clearly say RYBS supports
or rejects the value of such questions.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Until he extends the circle of his compassion
micha@aishdas.org        to all living things,
http://www.aishdas.org   man will not himself find peace.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Albert Schweitzer

I happened yesterday to have been in the same cemetery that the
Lubavitcher Rebbe is buried in. The person who drove me there wanted
to pass by the LR's "Ohel" and in the process I observed two strange,
to me, practices.

1. Those who went to the kever took off their shoes and put on slippers.
2. There was a box there (I did not see it in use) that I was told was
to be used to bring kohanim into the "ohel".

Are there sources and/or precedentsfor these practices?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 01:17:51PM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
:> It would seem RCS rules out asking qushyos from science on Torah.

:> But notice he's still speaking about accepting vs questioning. It's very
:> much about the danger of qushyos getting in the way of acceptance.

: I agree with what you have noted in translating the Hebrew literally.
: However noting the context alters the understanding. R' Chaim had asked
: why Avraham did not object to the Akeidah. So while you can transpose this
: to mean why I - the reader of the story can not question the Akeidah -
: it clearly means that Avraham did not even have a question until it was
: possible to have an answer.

R' Chaim discusses primarily the student's question, and cites Avraham as
an examplar. That doesn't touch the point of your reply, just clarifying.

I think, though, we need to create less ambiguous terminology. It means
that Avraham did not consider the possibility of a tiyuvta, and therefore
didn't treat the question seriously until he saw it was a masiv.

My objection to your citing R' Chaim in this context is that the person
had emailed me asking about curiosity. That's more in the domain of
she'eilos that aren't lema'aseh than whether or not people fret about
qushyos for which they have no answers.

: I think that R' Chaim was actually making both points. One can not
: in fact question the Torah from logic or Science unless there is an
: available answer. Therefore Torah is a closed system. The discussions
: in the Torah itself need to conform to this principle of not asking or
: challenging but rather clarifying.

I think so too. In fact, that's what I thought I was saying in the post
to which you're replying.

In a subsequent email RDE writes:
: The attitude of non questioning -- passive acceptance -- is curiously
: absent in early sources such as Tanach (Akeida does present a problem)....

(Note that being on a list like Avodah self-selects away from people
interested in passive acceptance.)

The aqeidah itself does not establish a pattern -- the very same Avraham
questions Hashem's destruction of Sedom vaAmorah. I think the aqeidah
was different than the examples you list because it was a tzivui. It
wasn't Avraham grappling with fate, but Avraham being given a destiny.

I was surprised RDE omitted one of the more famous examples, David
haMelekh's cry "Keili Keili, lamah azavtani?"

RYBS's approach in Qol Dodi Dofeiq is that tragedy is something to be
confronted, not resolved. Pain is real, and not dismissable through
sophistry. However, one should grapple with the problem because by
struggling with the question of "Why G-d?" one is relating to G-d.
OTOH, he also writes that the Jewish question of tragedy is not "Why?"
but "How am I to respond?"

What this says about questioning things that seem to raise questions
about tzaadiq vera lo is complex. One can't clearly say RYBS supports
or rejects the value of such questions.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Until he extends the circle of his compassion
micha@aishdas.org        to all living things,
http://www.aishdas.org   man will not himself find peace.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Albert Schweitzer

*********************


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