Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 004

Wednesday, September 22 2004

• Re: Mesorah
• Re: shltn
• Re: linguistic norm
• Re: linguistic norm
• Re: Public expression by women
• Re: shltn
• Non-Nitbal Dishes on Shabbos
• minhagim
• Re: Non-literal explanations/ Gan Eden
• Re: Non-literal explanations/ Gan Eden
• Re: Torah as allegory
• Re: Torah as Allegory
• Balancing Machshavah Amuqah and Emunah Perhutah
• Re: minhagim
• Re: linguistic norm

Micha Berger wrote:
>On Wed, Sep 22, 2004 at 01:36:10PM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
>:                                                  Are there any other
>: discussion of the Mesorah of the masses versus gedolim?

>As in R' Haym Soloveitchik's essay on mimeticism vs textualism
><http://www.lookstein.org/links/orthodoxy.htm> and subsequent replies
>to Tradition, as well as numerous threads here?

 From the various responses posted I realize I wasn't clear about the
nature of the dispute between the Chazon Ish and R' Chaim Na'eh. It was
more than just minag versus text or the masses verus the gedolim. The
masses in this case included people like R' Yisroel Salanter (whose
kiddush cup is too small) and the Meshech Chochma etc. The authoritative
gedolim were asserted to be a subset of gedolei Torah. Therefore even
though the common practice of everyone - including the vast majority
of gedolei Torah - was and had been in agreement with R' Chaim Na'eh,
the Chazon Ish said that that Mesorah was less authoritative than the
assertions of the Nodah B'Yehuda, Gra, Chasam Sofer.

In fact this dispute is closer to the issue of Zaken Mamre - even though
he clearly knows that the mesora is a certain way and this understanding
is not disputed by the Sanhedrin. Their sevora predominates because they
are the majority. Here the Chazon Ish is asserting that the weight of
practice through the ages is less authoritative than the weight of a
select group of gedolim.

My brother once asked Rav Yaakov Kaminetsky about following a psak that
he personally disagreed with. R' Yaakov asserted that when it came to
the ruling of the Nodah BeYehuda and the Chasam Sofer - it was different
than other achronim. One should follow them because they were accepted
by klall Yisroel to have a superior status of other poskim.

Daniel Eidensohn

Re: R' Saul Newman's question: << I am not a big kamatz kattan mayven. is
the word in yamim noraim amida shalton, sholtan, sholton , or shaltan
for those who prounounce kamatz katan differently than gadol?

The kamatz under the shin is usually considered to be katan so, in modern
Israeli Hebrew, the word is pronounced sholtan.

But R' Shaul seems to be ignoring or avoiding the much bigger question
of whether the word is sholtan or shilton.

Without going into the history of the word and/or machloket, if we are
permitted to make a decision there is a much simpler way to do it.

Assuming that prayers are supposed to make sense in the spoken language,
how would Mr. Average Israeli understand the words sholtan and shilton?

The nun ending is used in modern Hebrew as "one who". A swimmer is a
sachyan, one who swims. A gardener is a gannan. A manufacturer is a
ta'asiyan. A dictator is a rodan. The radio announcer is a karyan and
the maker of horse reins and straps is a ratz'an. Sometimes, instead of
"one who" it means "one that" - so a bottle opener is a potchan. And
ragzan, pachdan, ra'ashan etc., etc.

Similarly, sholtan is one who exercises power, a king,a ruler such as
the ruler our neighbors call a Sultan.

The League of Nations gave Great Britain the shilton on Palestine,
called therefore, shilton hamandat. Majority rule is shilton harov as
opposed to shilton hami'ut. So, shilton is the power of rule.

Thus, in Hebrew as she is spoke, it is not the Sultan or ruler who is
l'fanekha. It is the power of rule that God has, the "oz b'yad'kha and
g'vura etc., etc.

But all the above is just about understanding and making sense.
Since when do Jew make sense?

R' Daniel Goldschmidt in his Ashkenazi machzor (Mavo, p. 21) goes into
the history of the word. The old sources have shilton, Seder R" Amram
Gaon and the Rambam, as do the Sefaradim. According to RD"G. the ba'al
hal'vushim (talmid of the Ram"a) was the one who suggested the change
to sholtan that was later accepted by Ashkenazi poskim.

One can find sources for both usages of the words. In Kohelet we learn
that "ein shilton b'yom hamavet". In Daniel (Prakim 4 and 7) we have
sholtan used as "power to rule". But Daniel is in Aramaic, so perhaps
sholtan is the Aramaic form of the Hebrew shilton.

When Goldschmidt published his machzor where were those who jumped on him
for using shilton instead of the Ashkenazic sholtan but, to me at least,
their arguments were not too convincing. The reason is simple.

Some 63 years ago, when I started as a ba'al shaharit, I decided to say
shilton because it made better sense and I continue to this day. And
don't try to convince me otherwise.

gh"t,
David

R' L.P. Minden asked
> What is the haloche lemaase considering the whole complex of baale mesoure
> s. later grammarians?...according to the mesoure, in the vast majority of
> "tenue gedoule followed by rofe consonant with shevo" cases, the shevo is
> nach, closing the phonetic syllable, with or without a ga-ye accompanying
> the tenue gedoule (e.g. veshomru, not veshomeru

This question might be more appropriate for the Mesorah list but, before
one attempts to answer, a simple decision is a prerequisite. When did
ba'alei mesorah cease to exist (if ever) and when were they replaced
by grammarians.

 From the e.g., above: If Aharon ben Asher was the deciding ba'al
mesora the word is veshomru. If R' Yosef Kimchi and his son Radak were
grammarians, the word remains veshomru. If however, they were ba'alei
mesora the word became veshomeru. Who decides what title to give the
various chakhamim from before A. ben Asher up to the present day who
expressed opinions about pronunciation?

gh"t,
David 

[RDB:]
> This question might be more appropriate for the Mesorah list but, before  
> one attempts to answer, a simple decision is a prerequisite. When did  
> ba'alei mesorah cease to exist (if ever) and when were they replaced by  
> grammarians.

Would the difference in designation (baale mesoure vs. baale dikduk,
medakdekim etc.) have an impact on the authority of the person in
question?

The question is still agonizing me: What is the norm, and based on what?
Maybe there isn't an unambiguous norm at all?

Lipman Phillip Minden

R' Micha Berger wrote <<< This is a field of study that needs to be
explored. Perhaps if the woman knew and understood her role, she wouldn't
want to abandon it for another? Or perhaps we'd learn that the feminist
mission does fit within that role. My complaint is that no one bothered
to look, or even seem to think there is anything beyond issur veheter
or chiyuv ureshus to look for. >>>

I don't think the problem is that no one bothered to investigate this
topic. I think it quite likely that until a couple of generations ago,
this information was quite well-known among the women. They may or may
not have shared this with the men, but certainly passed it on to their
daughters.

So, k'darkan bakodesh, there was no need to ever write it down. But now,
unfortunately, in the words of R' Haym Soloveitchik's essay, this topic
has been "ruptured", and our attempt to "reconstruct" it will be slow
and difficult, if even possible.

Akiva Miller

On Wed, Sep 22, 2004 at 04:05:17PM +0200, D&E-H Bannett wrote:
: Re: R' Saul Newman's question: << I am not a big kamatz kattan mayven. is
: the word in yamim noraim amida shalton, sholtan, sholton , or shaltan
: for those who prounounce kamatz katan differently than gadol?

: The kamatz under the shin is usually considered to be katan so, in modern
: Israeli Hebrew, the word is pronounced sholtan.

And if the first qamatz were gadol, it would be "shale..." with the shin
and lamed in different syllables, ie the shva would be na. The closed
syllable "shol", with a sheva nach under the lamed requires the qamatz
be qatan.

-mi

Someone asked on another forum: Are dishes that didn't go to the miqvah
yet muqtzah?

I thought of them as keilim shemilakhtam le'issur, as the appropriate
melakhah for such dishes in bringing them to the miqvah.

Someone else (who happens to also subscribe here, IIRC) replied:
> The most obvious is OC 323:7 - since there's a way out even according
> to those who forbid tevilah on Shabbat, it's not muktzeh.

> Secondly, there are plenty of non-food related uses for food related
> utensils. (Although there may be one small problem - there's a machloket
> if such utensils can be moved for no purpose whatsoever. For example,
> can you play with your fork at the table for no purpose? For those who
> hold it's not an issue, it may be an issue for non-toveled cutlery -
> it wouldn't be muktzeh, but you couldn't play around with it for no
> reason whatsoever).

> Thirdly, there's a mishnah in Terumah 2:3 about if you tovel your utensils
> on shabbat be-shogeig (although not if you did it me-meizid). If they were
> muktzeh, you wouldn't be able to use them even post-tevilah be-shogeig.

I objected to the phrasing of his second point, but it turns out the
difference was that he assumed the keli would be muqtzah machmas (*)
gufo. In retrospect, that may make more sense.

In his opinion, therefore, since the issur has an "out", it's not muqtzah.
It's a lav hanitoq la'asei, and I saw it (like esrog) in terms of an
object whose purpose is the asei.

Any thoughts?

-mi

* In the niqud version of the Gra's peirush on Mishlei, the word is
written "meichamas", as in "from the heat of". Nice, no?

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Dale Carnegie

i have seen different practices . are there mkorot or just minhag hamakom

1- no minyan at start of slichot. when minyan arrives, do they
backtrack and say the opening kaddish or not?

2- "" . is 13 middot
deleted? can it be said with trope without a minyan? [ i had seen that
brought down somewhere but cant find it}

3- yihyu leratzon imrei fi. e g at the end of ochila la kel
does the chazan say it out loud? seen it both ways

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 21, 2004 at 05:27:56PM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
> : The speed of light is constant...

> Are you so sure? Dirac (one of the fathers of quantum mechanics
> important
> enough to have a constant named for him) wasn't.

According to the Institute of Physics website, Dirac's contribution to
physics was that he had shown that classical physics could not explain the
behavior of atoms and electrons and developed his own theory of quantum
mechanics which included wave mechanics, the version of quantum mechanics
developed by Erwin Schrצdinger, and matrix mechanics, the theory put
forward by Werner Heisenberg. He later combined the theories of quantum
mechanics and special relativity. The resulting Dirac equation was able
to explain the mysterious magnetic and "spin" properties of the electron.

Dirac used his equation to predict the existence of a particle with
the same mass as the electron but with positive rather than negative
charge. This "anti-particle", now called a positron.

As far as I can tell he doesn't address the issue of the speed of light
not being a constant.

> R' Eliezer (Dr. Leon) Ehrenpreis opined that the dating issue can be
> explained with the reduction of a physical constant called alpha (now
> roughly equal to 137, possibly exactly, no units of measure) that relates
> the speed of light, the relative strength of gravity to the other forces
> of nature, and quantum uncertainty.

I havn't got a clue what you are talking about. Dem's nice words but
don't splain nuttin.

> If you assume that it didn't reach the current value until the midrashic
> Yom haShishi, i.e. matan Torah (Sivan 6), then during the six days of
> bereishis, physics was dominated by uncertainty, not law. As law ascerted
> itself, things emerged.

I can't assume anything if I don't know what you are talking about.
Please provide more explanation of what you are saying.

> He also showed that a simple hyperbolic progression would mean that the
> spectrum created by water's diffraction would first become visible at
> around year 1,700 -- just around the time of the flood.

Hyperbolic progression? Forgive my ignorance which I realize is pretty
great but what is that? ...and what does it have to do with the Mabul?

HM

On Wed, Sep 22, 2004 at 11:04:58AM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
: According to the Institute of Physics website, Dirac's contribution to
: physics was that...

Paul AM Dirac published far more than the one paper that made his name
in the field.

:> R' Eliezer (Dr. Leon) Ehrenpreis opined that the dating issue can be
:> explained with the reduction of a physical constant called alpha (now
:> roughly equal to 137, possibly exactly, no units of measure) that relates
:> the speed of light, the relative strength of gravity to the other forces
:> of nature, and quantum uncertainty.

: I havn't got a clue what you are talking about. Dem's nice words but
: don't splain nuttin.

Alpha is a weird constant. It's a ratio between the constants of the speed
of light, the minimal amount of uncertainty in any two measurements that
quantum mechanics says you can't simultaneously know, and the relative
strength of gravity to electromaganetism (actually three such forces,
but tafasta merubah...)

What's weird about it is that it has no units of measure, they cancel
out. And, it seems very likely it's exactly 137, an integer. But no one
can guess why.

If this idea of Dirac's (and others just beyond the mainstream) is right,
then alpha is not a constant, but has been shrinking with time. The
amount it has been decreasing is itself steadily less and less. On a
chart, it would make a hyperbolic curve, a curve that steadily gets
closer and closer to some value, but never quite reaching it.

It would mean that until the end of the six days, quantum uncertainty
was big enough to be visible. Nothing in our world would "exist" in
any meaningful and stable way. Laws of nature of a non-statistical form
would slowly emerge as the role of randomness declined.

How do we know the dimensions of this curve?

Rabbi Dr Ehrenpreis used the midrash involving matan Torah (Sivan 6)
as the "yom hashishi" to get the scale. It also explains why the
first two millenia were "tohu vavohu", somehow more associated with
chaos.

Given his many assumptions, the rainbow wouldn't be visibly broad until
around 1700 AM, just around when Hashem told Noach about them as an os
beris.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org        remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org   winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Peter Marshall

On Tue, Sep 21, 2004 at 05:58:50PM -0400, Shinnar, Meir wrote:
: 2) Allegorization (non literal interpretation) is permitted only if
: there is an internal reason within the mesora this seems to have been
: RMB's position. to cite
:>     Q6: What is your criterion for saying something is ahistorical
:>     allegory, if ever?

:> I'll only go with this answer if someone proposed it for reasons entirely
:> within the Torah -- TSBK or TSBP. 

Yes, that's my own position.

: 3) Allegorization is permitted if it does not contradict the mesora

Which is what I believe is the Rambam's position. As REG described it.
However, the Rambam relies on his belief that there are no machloqesin
in matters of strict mesorah, and therefore one can use the presence
of a machloqes to know what contradicts mesorah, and what contradicts
extrapolations made by people who were also ba'alei mesorah. Few people
hold like the Rambam on this, notably the Ramban. I am more comfortable
with one of the other shitos.

:          ... WRT to position 2, the rambam would, I believe, argue that
: a contradiction with "sechel" is a reason within the mesora - but clearly
: rejects the notion that one requires some other reason within the mesora.

This would parallel "lama li kera? sevara hi!"

: Positions 3 and 4 differ primarily in understanding what it means to
: contradict the mesora - which reflects a fundamental disagreement over
: which parts of the nonhalachic traditions carry the weight and authority
: of mesora. RMB is arguing that anything that we don't have a history of
: disagreement over, is inherently part of the mesora...

I'm saying that's what the Rambam is arguing.

I personally am using a definition of "mesorah" that would include any
conclusion reachable from within seichel applied to mesoretic data and
a priori postulates as being a possible shitah. Not just the material
transmitted itself. This is both narrower in some ways and wider in
others than what I believe is the Rambam's position.

I would only rule out synthetic arguments from other disciplines, as
that would mean that the other discipline, not Torah, is being treated
as primary.

On Mon, 13 Sep 2004 16:06:37 -0400 RMS <Meir.Shinnar@rwjuh.edu> wrote:
: eg, age of the universe - in the Kuzari, RYHL, one of the more
: pshat oriented, when asked about the age of the world, based on Hindu
: traditions extending beyond 5000 years, said that the problem was that
: the traditions were not reliable - but if they were solidly reliable,
: we would understand ma'ase breshit differently....

You did the same thing to the Rambam's statement in the Moreh about
Aristo's argument for an eternal begining-less universe last time around
this discussion.

No, the Kuzari says that a solid mesorah is more certain than a conclusion
based on philsophical argument. Therefore, the Hindu tradition, if it
were reliagble, would not disagree. The Kuzari doesn't say he'd use
one to reinterpret or reassess his understanding of the other -- he
says that the issue could never arise. There would never be a need to
"understand ma'aseh bereishis differently".

Similarly, it's not that the Rambam holds #4. Rather, he holds #3 --
but feels that the situation that forces the difference between the
two positions could never arise. There never would be a reason to need
allegorization because of a solid philsophical argument that is in
contradiction to mesorah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A person must be very patient
micha@aishdas.org        even with himself.
http://www.aishdas.org         - attributed to R' Nachman of Breslov
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

I (MYG) wrote:
> I want to throw a question back at you, and our fellow Avodites: In the
> mishna you quoted (Chagiga 2:1) the mishna places restrictions on
> studying Ma'ase Be'raishis in public. What are we doing, if not that?

R' DR answered:
> See Yerushalmi ad. loc., cited l'halacha in Rabbi Kaplan's "B'Ikvuth
> HaYirah" pp 27-28.

Yaga'ati v'lo matzasi al ta'amin, but I can't find where the Yerushalmi
discusses this subject, and I'm afraid I don't have "B'Ikvuth HaYirah".
Would you point it out, please?

Thanks,
Moshe Yehuda Gluck
mslatfatf@access4less.net
www.esefer.blogspot.com

On Mon, Sep 13, 2004 at 12:06:55AM -0400, MYG wrote:
: Additionally, and I'll elaborate on this in another post - I'm not
: saying to accept what you know isn't true. I'm saying to accept what you
: know is true - even though your understanding of this truth was based
: upon an inaccurate argument. (Apparently I phrased this incorrectly,
: because a few people noted this.)

I'm reminded of an old philosopher's chestnut: the Gettier Problem.

Since Plato's Theaetetus, most definitions of "knowledge" revolve around
the notion of "justified true belief". If you believe something that happens
to be true, and you have reason to believe it (as opposed to picking by
luck a truth), you can be said to know it.

Here's Edmund Gettier's problem(s):
>  Case I

> Smith has applied for a job, but has a justified belief that "Jones will
> get the job". He also has a justified belief that "Jones has 10 coins
> in his pocket". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of
> the transitivity of identity) that "the man who will get the job has 10
> coins in his pocket".

> In fact, Jones does not get the job. Instead, Smith does. However, as
> it happens, Smith also has 10 coins in his pocket. So his belief that
> "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket" was justified
> and true. But it does not appear to be knowledge.

> Case II

> Smith has a justified belief that "Jones owns a Ford". Smith therefore
> (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of disjunction introduction) that
> "Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona", even though Smith has no
> knowledge whatsoever about the location of Brown.

> In fact, Jones does not own a Ford, but by sheer coincidence, Brown really
> is in Barcelona. Again, Smith had a belief that was true and justified,
> but not knowledge.

According to Gettier, someone following the "RAMM" doesn't know the iqarei
emunah. He has belief, but not knowledge. As RSM already pointed out,
the Rambam (for one) quite clearly required knowledge, not faith.


On Sat, Sep 18, 2004 at 11:08:59PM -0400, Zeliglaw@aol.com wrote:
: However, if you look at RYBS's written record so far, the conflict between
: Torah and science did not appear to be one of his major concerns....
: [Email #2. -mi]
: RDE posted a series of quotes from footnotes of RYBS re Torah and science.
: WADR to RMS , these posts were from RYBS's philosophical writings in
: which RYBS was underscoring and emphasizing the eternal relevance of
: the halachic system, as opposed to any other competing philosophical or
: scientific system...



I think there are a variety of approaches to the dilemma.

1- The Rambam seems to belittle emunah peshutah. Yedi'ah is the key to
olam haba. The hoi paloi may have to settle for the vague approximation
of emunah peshutah, but the philosopher's machshavah amuqah is superior.

2- The Baal haTanya, as framed by RYGB, invokes a mystical resolution.
The conflict is a function of pursuing machshavah amuqah from a source
other than the Yechidah Kelalis. Through the unity of the national soul's
yechidah, a single view of G-d emerges even at both planes of existance.

3- At the other extreme, Rav Nachman miBreslov discouraged the study
of theology, placing all value on having a relationship with HQBH. The
philosopher's G-d, while logical sound, is a cold, transcendent and
incomprehensible -- very uncondusive to this natural parent-child style
relationship which is at the center of his definition of "deveiqus" and
man's tafqid.

4- The Brisker approach is to avoid the whole subject. As Rav Moshe
Feinstein put it, it's a hashkafah of not studying hashkafah. It differs
from Rav Nachman's position not so much in that they feel it's wrong,
but that it's pointless. The ikkar is learning halakhah and man's duty
in this world.

RYBS puts forth this position in Qol Dodi Dofeiq: The Jewish question
[of tragedy] is not "Why?" but "How am I supposed to respond?" As implied
by RSB's observations, RYBS simply wasn't curious about theological
questions. His philosophy has an existenrialist agenda. It doesn't
deal with questions of how G-d is or how He runs the world, but rather
RYBS presents a detailed analysis of the human condition and the world
as we see it.
Because our dilemma is part of the human condition, he discusses it as
a dialectic. RYBS has no problem with the idea that we simultaneously
embrace conflicting truths. However, he leaves little record of his own
personal confrontation with the tension of this particular dialectic. I
believe it's his Brisker heritage.

The problem with positions 3 and 4 is that it does not have the support
of either the scholastic rishonim (eg: Rav Saadia Ga'on, the Rambam,
R' Albo), the antischolastic rishonim (eg: R' Yehudah haLevi), the
qabbalistically inclined (eg: the Ramban), nor the Ramchal, the Besh"t,
the Gra, R' Chaim Vilozhiner...
In short, it seems to be the stance of two relatively modern movements,
with few to no anticedents!

When thinking about this thread I realized that I took a different stance
when writing AishDas's charter.

5- R' Lopian defines mussar as dealing with the space of an amah --
getting ideas from the mind to the heart. We often think things that
don't reflect how we feel and many of the forces that influence our
decision-making. Akin to RYBS's dialectic, we embrace different ideas
and motives in different modes of our consciousness.

As for our contradiction, the question is one of finding unity between
mind and its ability to understand and explain, to philosophize about
G-d and His governance of the universe, and the heart and how we feel
and react toward Him.

Emunah, bitachon, ahavas Hashem, yir'as Hashem, etc... are middos.
They are not acquired directly through study, but through the tools
of tiqun hamidos. (With the caveat that constant return to a subject
operates on both levels.) There is a reason why the kiruv movement is
built on the experience of a Shabbos, and not the ultimate proof of
G-d. (Aish haTorah's "Discovery" program, the only counter-example that
came to mind, is intended to be a hook, to pique people's interest to
get them to that Shabbos, not kiruv itself.)

Rather than seeing this as a dilemma, I saw it as a need. We can embrace
both because each involves a very different component of self. And since
avodah must be bekhol nafshekha, we actually MUST study both machshavah
and mussar. Meaningful avodas Hashem must require involvement of both
mind and heart.

-mi

PS: See this email's signature [self-]quote, it's relevent.

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

In a message dated 9/22/2004 1:42:55 PM EDT, Saul.Z.Newman@kp.org writes:
> i have seen different practices . are there mkorot or just minhag hamakom

> 1- no minyan at start of slichot. when minyan arrives, do they
> backtrack and say the opening kaddish or not?

local minhag - backtrack and say opening kaddish (B"H it's been a few years 
since it's been lmaaseh)

> 2- "" . is 13 middot
> deleted? can it be said with trope without a minyan? [ i had seen that
> brought down somewhere but cant find it}

local-skipped but I have heard it said you can read as complete psukim

> 3- yihyu leratzon imrei fi. e g at the end of ochila la kel
> does the chazan say it out loud?

seen it both ways

On my reply to the original question, R' LPMinden asks <<Would the
difference in designation (baale mesoure vs. baale dikduk, medakdekim
etc.) have an impact on the authority of the person in question?
The question is still agonizing me: What is the norm, and based on what?
Maybe there isn't an unambiguous norm at all?>>

I am a tricky fellow who likes to leave things slightly ambiguous.
I think you missed the hidden hint. Or, on second thought you didn't. Your
last sentence was "maybe there isn't an unambiguous norm". And that was
really the hinted at point.

In ben Asher's time the ba'alei mesorah speak of the seven vowels and
the statement "shiv'a m'lakhim marpim" is the source of their sh'va nach
in v'shamru, shoftim v'shotrim, etc. They had good ears and heard seven
vowels. Therefore there were only seven.

A few hundred years later R' Yosef Kimchi invented a logical system of
ten vowels, five long and five shorter companions. This was a brilliant
concept and led to open syllables with long vowels being followed by a
sh'va na' while, with short vowels, the syllable closes with a consonant
and its sh'va is nach.

This addition of vowels occurred some 800 years ago, affected the
categorization of the sh'vaim, and made pronunciaton obey grammatical
rules.

The Kimchi family were talmidei chakhamim. The Radak's works were based
completely on the Tanakh. Were they ba'alei mesorah? Or weren't they? The
fact is that the "new" pronunciation was accepted. After so many years
is it not a tradition that we should follow?

If we say that Kimchis were grammarians, then perhaps we should attempt
to return to the world of seven vowels and more sh'vaim nachim.

As for me, all my life I have been a bal-koireh who follows Kimchi and
reads shofetim v'shoterim, v'shameru, etc.When I became older and learned
more about the subject, I sometimes, but not consistently, make the "new"
na'im a bit weaker than the others and certainly do not go back to correct
one no matter what it sounded like. (I should add what it sounded like
to me, because I don't think anybody in the shul notices the differences.

Out of respect for R' Aharon ben Asher, the accepted authority, I also
tint the sh'vaim before a gronit according to the previous vowel and
replace the grammarian's alef g'nuva by a vav or yud g'nuva as the
early ba'alei mesorah note. I also try not to make the chatafim into
full vowels. All of this is for my own entertainment.

All of this shows my doubts about the automatic acceptance of later
authorities. I don't think there has ever been a definite p'sak as
to whose pronunciation we must follow. Just think how many gedolim
acccepted R' Zalman Henneh's t'nu'a kalla. And then think of all the
different Ashkenazi litvak, galitzianer, Yekke, pronunications of Hebrew
and then the different Sefaradi pronunciations, the bgd-kft rafot, and
even the Teimani jim for gimmel chazak. And last, Abazit, the modern
Israeli Hebrew which carefully chooses the worst parts of every other
pronunciation. Of late, there has been a scholarly suggestion to reform
written Hebrew to leave only some 15 o16 consonants and five vowels.

I agree with you. There is no longer a norm.  Should there be one?

gh"t,
David

********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]