Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 094

Thursday, September 9 2004

• Re: halcha vs agada
• Re: Non-literal explanations/Gan Eden
• RE: Non-literal explanations of Torah (Ralbag) and age of the Universe
• Re: Pshat and Drash
• RE: Age of the Universe
• RE: Age of the Universe
• Calendar
• the end of the year
• Re: Ikkarim (again??)
• (Ashkenazic) nusach of kaddish
• Re: Ikkarim (again??)
• RE: Non-literal explanations/Gan Eden
• FW: Non-literal explanations of Torah (Ralbag) and age of the Universe
• Re: Non-literal explanations/Gan Eden

S Goldstein wrote:

>RDE:

>>The Meiri ... doesn't analyze the gemora to show that this view is
>>wrong but simply argues from a metarule that Jews must have free will
>>and that is why he rejects this view. Rambam does the same thing in
>>rejecting the validity of any evidence against free will - which he
>>acknowledges does apparently exist in various verses. He[ the Meiri]
>>nowhere demonstrates where and how Shas rejects this view - but he says
>>instead that *he* rejects this view. Thus he is not understanding Shas
>>but has a preexisting view that prevents him from excepting certain
>>views found in Shas. Anyone taking this approach to a sugya in gemora
>>can not be said to trying to understand what the gemora is saying -
>>he knew before he opened the gemora.

>I think this is a serious distortion of the Rishonim's  positions.

This criticism does not deal with the data but simply rejects out of
hand the possibility of what I said. I am well aware that the criticism
is a reflection of commonly held views. However that does not make the
data disappear. If you want to say that I misunderstood my sources, I'd
appreciate being corrected. But to simply deny that rishonim clearly said
what I asserted they say makes this an exercise in religious correctness
not scholarship.

>1. Unlike RDE, the Meiri quotes Chazal that ein mazal lyisroel.

I fail to see the relevance of this. The Meiri does in fact state that
there is a view in Chazal of "ein mazal lyisroel". The chidush is how
he deals with the opposing view of "yeish mazal lyisroel". He simply
dismisses it as being from "confused scholars". How does he know that
they are confused? Simply because he knows that this view violates the
principle of free will. Therefore he concludes that they came to this
incorrect view because of their direct experience of the suffering of
tzadikim or of their own personal suffering. What would happen if you
claimed that in a dispute between R' Yochanon and Reish Lakish that we
should ignore Reish Lakish since he obviously came to his conclusion
because of his guilt for being a criminal? It is obvious that the Meiri
is dismissing the alternative rather than trying to understand it. The
Ran on the other hand is an example of someone who faced the same issues
as the Meiri and yet elucidated both positions.

>2. The Rambam does not believe that he is arguing with psukim. This is
>an impossibility. There is the old yeshivish joke that the yeshivaman is
>asked after 120 to state the Torah he has learned. He replies that he is
>not so good at delivery. Let Hashem say a vort and then the yeshivaman
>will shlogg it up. Of course, this is only a joke. One cannot argue with
>dvar Hashem as expressed in psukim.

You misread my assertion. I am not saying that the Rambam is arguing
with psukim but rejecting the evidence that they present. I stated,

"Rambam does the same thing in rejecting the validity of any evidence
against free will - which he acknowledges does apparently exist in
various verses."

He is acknowledging that psukim exist which seem to contradict the
principle of free will. He says not to pay attention to this *evidence*
because there is an explanation of why they in fact say that man has no
free will. The following are a number of citations from Rishonim. If you
can provide a better interpretation of what they are saying - I would
be grateful to hear it.

Meiri(Shabbos 55a): It is one of the foundation principles of Judaism
to believe that all happens to a person - both the good and the bad -
is determined by Gג€‘d according to the person's deeds. One should not be
confused by what seems to contradict this principle i.e., the suffering
of the righteous and the pleasures of the wicked. It seems that the
righteous and wicked are treated the same. In fact the nature of justice
is hidden from us and we don't know why a particular person is punished
or is rewarded. We do know the general principle that G?­?­ג€‘d does not
withhold the reward due to any creature- whether pleasure or punishment.
This principle is what our sages meant when they said, "There is no
death without sin and there is no suffering without transgression".
You shouldn't be disturbed by the fact that this principle is apparently
refuted in the gemora when it says that four died by the sin of
the Serpent - thus indicating that death is a universal punishment
because of the Serpent and was implanted in Nature. It should not be
taken literally because we know that there is no one who hasn't sinned.
Furthermore even though the gemora appears to reject the principle that
death and suffering is caused by sin since it uses the term "tiyuvta" ג€“
that conclusion is incorrect. **That is because our religious beliefs are
not dependent upon proofs from the simple meaning of verses and agadata.
There is the established principle that one does not resolve issues
entirely on the basis agadata.** The fact is that even Moshe and Aaron
died because of their sins so obviously so has everyone else.

Rambam(Hilchos Teshuva 6:1,3): There are many verses in the Torah and
words of the prophets that appear to contradict this principle that man
has total free will. Most people err because of this and they think that
Gג€‘d decrees whether man does good or bad and that man does not have
the ability to decide which way he wishes to go.I will therefore explain
a major principle that will enable you to understand the meaning of all
these versesג€¦...3) It is possible that a person sin such a great sin
or so many sins that Divine justice requires thatג€¦ he be punished by
the prevention of his ability to repent and he is not allowed to cease
sinning in order that he die and be destroyed in the sins that he didג€¦.

Rambam(Teshuva #436): Question: Concerning the principle that
ג€œEverything is in the hands of Heaven except for Fear of Heaven
[Berachos 33b]. Answer: This that you say that not everything that a
person does is determined by Heaven is absolutely true. That is why a
person receives reward if he goes in the good path and is punished if
he goes in the bad path. All of a manג€™s deeds are included in the
category of Fear of Heaven. Ultimately all actions are either mitzvos
or sins. Therefore this expression of our sages that ג€œEverything
is in the hands of Heavenג€ is referring the events of the world and
nature. For example the world of vegetables, animals, spirits, mazel
and spheres as well as angels are totally controlled by Heaven. We have
already discussed this at length in the commentary to Pirkei Avos 1:13,
3:18-19, 4:28 Shemona Perakim #8 as well as in Mishna Torah [Beginning
of Hilchos Teshuva Chapter 5] . Whoever ignores my explanation based on
established principles and instead searches amongst agadata and medrash or
the words of the Gaonim until he finds something which seems to contradict
my cogent exposition is committing suicide and deservedly suffers the
consequences. This that your teacher cited from the gemora [Sotah 2a;
Moed Koton 18b]: that a Heavenly voice announces to whom each girl will be
married and to whom wealth will sent they were not meant to be understood
literally and simply. This can readily be seen from the Torah itself where
it says [Devarim 20:7] that before a war it was announced that whoever
is engaged but has not yet married should not fight because he might
die in battle and someone else will marry her. Or that another man will
benefit from his newly planted vineyard. Can any intelligent person be in
doubt as to the meaning of the words of our sages after reading what it
says in the Torah? In fact it is correct for one who has understanding
and his mind is straight to take the path of truth and he should place
that which is stated openly in the Torah as the essence and foundation
and not destroy the structure and the structure which has been firmly
planted so that it doesnג€™t move. When he finds verses of the prophets
or statements of our sages which seem to contradict the foundation he
should examine and analyze carefully until he can properly reconcile
them with the words of the Torah. If he fails to find a reconciliation
he should simply say that he doesnג€™t understand properly the words of
the prophet or the sage and that their words are not to be understood
literally. For example the apparent contradiction to free will represented
by the gemora which indicates that oneג€™s spouse is predestined is to be
understood as being dependent upon merit. In other words if this man or
woman does a mitzva which gives them the merit of having such a spouse
ג€“ then Gג€‘d arranges that it happen that they marry each other. On
the other hand if they so something which merits the punishment of having
a marriage without peace and harmony- that will also occurג€¦

Chovas HaLevavos (3:8): I have found in books information about
Divine compulsion, decree, rulership, and will. They state that
everything is controlled by Gג€‘d from mineral, plant, animal to human
beings. Tehilim (135:6): Gג€‘d does whatever He wants to do in Heaven and
earthג€¦. There are many similar verses that teach this idea that man and
other creatures were prepared merely to adorn the world. That they move
only with His permission, with His power, and with His ability. ג€¦ Our
sages had intense debates about how to reconcile Divine compulsion and
Divine justiceג€¦ Some held man has total free will and that is why man
receives reward and punishment. Others held the opposite that everything
is determined by Gג€‘dג€¦ When this latter group is asked about reward
and punishment they respond that it is a mystery but Gג€‘d is just in
whatever He doesג€¦ There is a third group which believes in both Divine
compulsion and Divine justice. But they add that whoever delves into the
matter cannot avoid sin and trouble no matter how he attempts to explain
the matter. They claim that the best approach is to have full faith that
man has full free will and will be rewarded and punished for his deedsג€¦
but at the same time to have the full trust in Gג€‘d as one who believes
that everything is fully determined by Gג€‘d. Furthermore to believe
that Gג€‘d can make claims against man but man can not demand anything
of Gג€‘d. This position is closer to resolving the problem than the
others. That is because our ignorance of Gג€‘dג€™s wisdom is well known
because of the weakness of our minds and the limited awareness. But in
fact our ignorance is the means by which Gג€‘d shows His kindness to us
and that is why it is hidden from us. Because if there was any benefit
in revealing this secret then Gג€‘d would have revealed it to us.

>3. It is impossible to accuse the Rishonim of presenting their own
>"preconceived notions", "personal" opinions against Gemaros. A Rishon is
>a baalMesorah who helps us understand the daos of Chazal. The Rishonim
>might hold certain ideas to be dictated by svara; but they are most
>certainly trying to understand Gemaros. They might have sophisticated
>ideas or remez or allegory[which then can be radically different from
>the superficial understanding of any maamar Chazal] but certainly it is
>all an attempt to understand Chazal.

The Meiri says that the views of these sages found in the gemora should
be ignored ie., they are wrong and are not part of the mesora. That
in fact they arrived at these erroneous views because of overwhelming
personal experience which made them confused. How do you read the Meiri?

When the Rambam says that astrology is wrong - he acknowledges that
there are some of our sages who espouse this view - but they are wrong.
When he denies the validity of the concept of yissurim shel ahava - he
says that even though it is stated in the gemora it is fact has no basis
and is wrong. Thus while we all agree that rishonim are the transmitters
of our mesora, they do occasionally state that certain views found in
chazal are wrong. Just as we occasionally say that some statements found
in the rishonim are wrong. Therefore not every statement in chazal is
part of the mesora ( nor is every statement made by a rishon). You can
of course use this principle to simply say that the Meiri was wrong in
this issue. But I don't understand how you can deny he said what he said.

Daniel Eidensohn

At 02:07 PM 9/8/2004, [RNS] wrote:
>As a study of the Avodah archives will show, I wasn't citing the Ralbag
>as precedent for allegorizing the Mabul, which was not the topic
>of conversation at any time. I was citing it to refute your blanket
>statement that to allegorize the Torah is unacceptable, which is what
>we were discussing - whether allegory is *ever* acceptable. I think it
>refutes it, no?

It does not. While it shows that elements in an account may be understood
as allegory, it also shows that the existence of the account's principals
and the reality of the events must be taken literally - at odds with
the Spero school.

[Email #2. -mi]

At 12:51 PM 9/8/2004, [RNS] wrote:
>I am also astounded that RYGB apparently expects us to accept his
>interpretation of Moreh Nevuchim over that of two Rishonim, a major
>Acharon, and a contemporary gadol who was specifically renowned for his
>expertise in Rambam.

Don't be astonished. You obviously do not know RYGB too well if you
are. It is self evident to anyone who takes the time to look that the
Rambam was not interpreting Bereishis chap. 1-2 as would the Spero school.

Moreover, it escapes me (now that I located my Kapach MN) where RYK says
what you attribute to him. Please advise.

YGB 

Rabbi Nossen Slifkin wrote
>I apologize for not previously citing a source or citation for Ralbag. 
>It is a very extensive section of his commentary on Bereishis. Here are 
>some brief extracts, beginning on p. 53 of the Mossad HaRav Kook edition:
>"The 'Garden' alludes to the material intellect....

While taking some aspects of the account of Adam HaRishon allegorically
(e.g. the nachash), the Ralbag upholds the essential historicity of the
creation of Adam and Chava directly from earth on the 6th day ("yom"
ha-shishi) in Gan Eden.

(1) "Know that the creation of Adam and Chava was on the 6th day" (p67).

(2) Adam HaRishon was created directly from earth (no hominid
"evolution"). According to the MHK editor, the Ralbag refers to
the MR (12:8) that says Adam was created "afar min ha-adama - min
ha-tachtonim". The Ralbag writes that theTorah mentions "earth alone
because most of [Adam HaRishon] was from earth". Adam was created mainly
from "afar" but all 4 "yesodos" were involved (see footnote 92, p60).

(3) Gan Eden was a real garden. "Know that Eden is a certain place in the
inhabited world, and to the east of it is found the Garden which contains
all fruits of delight ... and from Eden a river goes out to water that
Gan and from there it diverges into the four well-known rivers, the great
rivers that water a large part of the inhabited world. The wisdom of this
"mashel" [of the garden] is that its "peshuto" [the physical Gan Eden]
exists (pages 55-56).

(4) The Ralbag writes at at p67 directly before (1): "a few of the
great chachamim erred in this area, and made allegories (tziyurim) out
of the account of Kayin, Hevel, and Shes. In so doing they ruined the
intent of the Torah. Know that it is not appropriate to allegorize the
Torah, except in places where it is absolutely necessary. If this method
["mashal"] is freely used, the Torah would fall and we would not be able
to derive from it the intended benefit", also quoted by RNS.

(5) The Torah provides an account of Adam HaRishon to prove to us
"emunas hachidush as mentioned by the Rambam in MN (III:50)". This is
the same Rambam that refers to the 2500 years between Adam HaRishon and
Moshe to establish the great "yesod Hatorah" that, as the Ralbag puts
it, proves that "the world was created and that a single man [Adam]
alone was created with it". This is the same Rambam quoted approvingly
by the Ramban and Rabbeny Bechaya for the essential historicity of the
Torah from Adam HaRishon until Moshe Rabbenu "eid mi-pi eid". P67. See
my earlier post for the details.

RYGB writes that "it is wrong and perhaps assur to believe that when
the Torah asserts adam was made afar min ho'adamah that this is the
result of evolution". There is clear support for this from Chazal and
the Rishonim mentioned thus far.

The Ralbag does not allow Rabbi Slifkin much room to succeed with his
"theory that man was created by inserting a soul into a hominid creature
which itself evolved from the earlier creatures is no more problematic
than the embryo evolving from a sperm and egg". It does not fit the
historical account of Adam HaRishon in Gan Eden in the Torah as explained
by Chazal and the above Rishonim. Such an apologetic approach merely
distorts the pesukim ("lefi aniyas daasi") to accommodate a less than
compelling materialistic approach to life. Rabbenu Levi ben Gershom zt"l
(the Ralbag) was unusual even by the standards of the great Rishonim
when it came to his method of seeing in the Torah philosophical truth
by way of allegory. Even so, he considers the historical account of the
lone creation of Adam HaRishon as part of the demonstration of the great
yesod HaTorah of chidush ha-olam.

Kol Tuv ... Jonathan Ostroff

I am giving a talk on the subject in Chicago at the AJS in Dec. Here are
some entries from only the first pages of my notes. My point here is that
you should not offer opinions until you examine the detailed studies of
the texts.

M. Lockshin, "Tradition or Context: Two Exegetes Struggle
with Peshat," (Eds. J. Neusner, E. Frerich's, N. Sarna) From
Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism: Intellect in Quest of
Understanding, Atlanta, Brown University, 1989: vol 2,
173-186. Uriel Simon, "The Spanish School of Biblical
interpretation", (ed. Haim Beinart), Moreshet Sepharad: The
Sephardi Legacy, Vol. I, Magnes, Jerusalem 1992, pp 115-136.
Avraham Grossman, "Biblical Exegesis in Spain During the
13th-15th Centuries, (ed. Haim Beinart), Moreshet Sepharad:
The Sephardi Legacy, Vol. I, Magnes, Jerusalem 1992, pp
137-147. David Weiss Halivni, Peshat and Derash: Plain and
Applied Meaning in Rabbinic Exegesis, Oxford University
Press, Oxford 1991. Abraham Ibn Ezra and His Age, (ed.
Fernando D?�az Esteban), Asociacion Espa?�ola de
Orientalistas, Madrid 1990. M. Friedlaender, Essays on the
Writings of Abraham Ibn Ezra, The Society of Hebrew
Literature, London 1877. Nahum M. Sarna, "Abraham Ibn Ezra
as an Exegete," (Eds. Isadore Twerski and Jay M. Harris),
Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings of a
Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge 1993, pp 1-27.
 Avraham Grossman, "The School of Literal Exegesis in
Northern France," in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: The History
of Its Interpretation. Volume I: From the Beginnings to the
Middle Ages (Until 1300). Part 2: The Middle Ages, ed. M.
Saebo. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000:pp 321-371.
Saebo's work contains excellent bibliographies and many fine
articles. See also Elazar Touitou, Essays in perpetual
motion: studies in the Pentateuchal commentary of Rabbi
Samuel ben Meir, Ramat Gan, Bar Ilan University press, 2003.
His first chapter has many new insights.
There is a great deal of reason to think that in fact
Nahmanides might have held ibn Ezra (who had low regard for
rabbinic midrash) in higher esteem than Rashi even though he
openly rebukes him. See Bernard Septimus, "'Open Rebuke and
Concealed Love': Nahmanides and the Andalusian Tradition,"
in Rabbi Moses Nahmanides (Ramban): Explorations in His
Religious and Literary Virtuosity, edited by Isadore Twersky
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983),p. 13.
See Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 71a where Rabbis argue if
the biblical passages concerning the "rebellious son"
(Deuteronomy 21:18-21) and the "leprous house" (Leviticus
14:33-53) were to be taken literally or simply meant to
serve as sources of "midrash-tale." See further Babylonian
Talmud Eruvin 23b for the distinction between contextual
interpretation of the Bible and non-contextual
interpretation in the Talmudic era.
Sarah Kamin, Rashi: Peshuto shel Mikra u-midrasho shel
Mikra, Jerusalem, 1986.
J. Heinemann, Aggadah and Its Development, Jerusalem, Keter,
1970:
On Rashi's interspersing midrashic comments and his own
views see A History of the Jewish people, H. H. Ben-Sasson,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976 (Henceforth
"Ben-Sasson"): ch 29, "The Middle Ages," pp 460f.
See the remarks of J. Gabel and C. Wheeler, The Bible as
Literature: an Introduction, 2nd edition, New York, Oxford,
1990: p. 256.
G. Brin, Studies in the Biblical Exegesis of R. Joseph Kara,
Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv University Press, 1990

I previously asked: 
>>RYGB tells us that he reconciles the billions of years with the Torah 
>>via previous cycles of history. I would appreciate some elaboration...

>Bereishis 1:1 alludes to the pre-existing creation; the following pesukim
>describe the re-creation at the beginning of this cycle.

Sorry, I am still not entirely clear as to what you are saying. Please
elaborate; does this mean that the sun and moon existed for millions of
years (in the previous cycles), then ceased to exist, then were created
anew 5764 years ago? And that, for a period, there was no dry land until
the waters receded 5764 years ago?

Kol tuv,
Nosson Slifkin

> We've been down this road before. Ha'me'ayein yivchar. I repeat: No
> reputable source allows for a chronicle in Tanach to be dismissed as
> the Spero school does.

But WE weren't discussing the "Spero School" (and shouldn't that be "R'
Spero School"?) -- we've been discussing whether or not ANYTHING can
be allegorized.

And, as usual when we go down this road, list members have been bringing
a long list of Gaonim, Rishonim, Acharonim, and contemporary Gedolim
who allow allegorization. Some allow more allegorization than others,
to be sure, but there certainly are "reputable sources" (like the Rambam)
who seem to allow allegorization near to or at the "Spero School" level
(given convincing scientific reasons).

Akiva
--
"If you want to build a ship, then don't drum up men to gather wood, give
orders, and divide the work. Rather, teach them to yearn for the far and
endless sea." - Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[FWIW, I'd think one speaks of "R' Spero" or "R' Spero's School", but
"Spero School" as a name of a school of thought wouldn't get the title.
-mi]

From: Saul Mashbaum <smash52@netvision.net.il>
<<RSY Zevin cites the Baal HaMaor to AZ, 2b in dapei haRif, who says
that it makes more sense to count from molad v"yd, but the minhag is to
count from b"hrd>>

I believe it was Rabbi Reisman (quoting someone?) who said that this is
the reason we write "leminyan she'anu monim" since the way we count is
dependent on minhag.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

<http://www.ou.org/chagim/elul/> rav leff's audio on how to finish
off the year discusses a bit about ending the year, closing a cheshbon
before new books open, deciding what is the 'you' that should be carried
over before being judged, and the importance of the last week...so rosh
hashana should be in the new year

From: "Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org>
> #9 Lishmoa' min hanavi hamdabeir bishmo.

But the Kuzari (and R. Yehudah HaLevi) lived in the middle ages when no
neviim were operating. He didn't violate that issur because there were
no neviim around. What he denied was the possibility of Mosaic prophecy
and the authenticity of the Khazar King's dream. What prohibition did
he violate?

David Riceman

From: Joelirich@aol.com
> I'm trying to do some homework on why there seems to be a difference
> in the nusach of kaddish drabbanan and other kaddeishim (brachamav,)
> as well as whether to add v'ara and tovim. I've found different nuschaot
> in general of kaddish but not that would explain why drabanan would be
> different nor why to prefer (or not) the additions.

I would like to suggest the following ideas -

Firstly, for one thing, in general, most of the time, nusach Ashkenaz
is more concise, containing less words than the Hassidic 'nusach sfard'
and nusach hasfaradim / bnei eidos hamizrach. Once the ikkar idea is
expressed, adjectives such as miheira and tovim are not added.

To address the issue of kaddish more specifically, I would like to
suggest the following possibilities -

Re adding viara - 

If we look through our davening, we will see that Hashem is depicted as
'residing' in shomayim (kivayochol - so to speak). For a few examples,
one can cite
1) in Yehi chivod.... (a collection of pesukim before ashrei) we find
the passage 'Hashem bashomayim heichin kiso....' Hashem set up his seat
in shomayim,
2) in 'Ezras Avoseinu....' before 'shmoneh esreh', it is stated 'birum
olom moshavecho.....' - in the height(s) of the world (meaning the
heaven[s], presumably) is Your (Hashem's) seat - dwelling place,
3) in 'al hakol....' said after the sefer Torah is taken out and is
being taken to the bimah for krias haTorah, it says 'hayoshev bimerchavei
morom, hashochen bishmei shmei kedem' - that Hashem stays and 'dwells'
in the heavens.

If elsewhere in davening Hashem is described as being in shomayim,
why should there be a deviation from this depiction in kaddish ?

Additionally, in kaddish tiskabal, we say tiskabal tzloshon.......kodom
avuhon * di vishmaya * (with no mention of viara). So why should there
be a change when it comes to kaddish dirabbonon ?

Therefore nusach Ashkenaz kaddish never contains viara. It is only seen
in kaddish dirabbanan of 'minhag polin', which seems to have come from
'nusach sfard'.

Re adding tovim to chayim -

We must understand what the basic nature of kaddish is. Kaddish is a
doxology. The focus on kaddish is the greatness of Hakodosh boruch Hu -
His great name should be exalted, etc. It is not a 'prayer for the dead',
as some think, nor is it a prayer for our individual needs, such as
parnosso, etc., as we have elsewhere in davening. If we ask for chayim
tovim - a good life - it could appear as if we are asking for money,
luxuries, etc., - bakoshos that have no place in kaddish. On the other
hand, chayim alone can mean that we are asking for life to be able to
serve HKB"H (lo hameisim yihalilu Koh..). Asking for more than that
however, would seem to be out of place in kaddish.

Therefore, once again, nusach Ashkenaz kaddish never contains tovim. It
is only seen in kaddish dirabbanan of 'minhag polin', which seems to
have come from 'nusach sfard'.

Mordechai

On Wed, Sep 08, 2004 at 04:31:22PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
:> #9 Lishmoa' min hanavi hamdabeir bishmo.

: But the Kuzari (and R. Yehudah HaLevi) lived in the middle ages when no
: neviim were operating...

Who said the navi must be alive at the time in order for one to be
obligated to listen to him?

It's not mashma like that from the Rambam, Yesodei haTorah peraqim 6-9.
(For which mitzvah #9 is part of the introduction.) He speaks of the
permanence of the message, and the superiority of Moshe's nevu'ah,
etc... Not simply the duty of his contemporaries to listen to a navi.

Someone who doesn't believe nevu'ah is possible can't believe in Torah
miSinai. Another one of the 613.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org        remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org   winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Peter Marshall

> It does not. While it shows that elements in an account may be understood
> as allegory, it also shows that the existence of the account's principals
> and the reality of the events must be taken literally - at odds with
> the Spero school.

Nonsense -- there are Rishonim who hold the visit of the 3 malachim ONLY
took place in a dream. They obviously don't agree that "events must be
taken literally".

Akiva

--
"If you want to build a ship, then don't drum up men to gather wood, give
orders, and divide the work. Rather, teach them to yearn for the far and
endless sea." - Antoine de Saint-Exupery

> While taking some aspects of the account of Adam HaRishon allegorically
> (e.g. the nachash),

Which is all RNS was claiming -- that the Ralbag supports the permissibility
of allegorizing.

> (3) Gan Eden was a real garden. "Know that Eden is a certain place in the
> inhabited world, and to the east of it is found the Garden which contains
> all fruits of delight ... and from Eden a river goes out to water that
> Gan and from there it diverges into the four well-known rivers, the great
> rivers that water a large part of the inhabited world. The wisdom of this
> "mashel" [of the garden] is that its "peshuto" [the physical Gan Eden]
> exists (pages 55-56).

Where? What are those "4 well-known rivers"?

> (4) The Ralbag writes at at p67 directly before (1): "a few of the
> great chachamim erred in this area, and made allegories (tziyurim) out
> of the account of Kayin, Hevel, and Shes. In so doing they ruined the
> intent of the Torah. Know that it is not appropriate to allegorize the
> Torah, except in places where it is absolutely necessary.

Exactly. the KEY phrase there is "except in places where it is absolutely
necessary".

IOW -- It's Muttar to allegorize. The debate between all the sources brought
centers around how much, and under what conditions it's muttar.

Which is very different from RYGB's claim that it's assur.

He also supports the claim that there were "great chachamim" who allegorized
Kayin, Hevel, and Shes -- which is much more problematic than allegorizing
the six days of creation. The Ralbag doean't support that -- but at worst
it's a disagreement between Gedolim.

> The Ralbag does not allow Rabbi Slifkin much room to succeed with his
> "theory that man was created by inserting a soul into a hominid creature
> which itself evolved from the earlier creatures is no more problematic
> than the embryo evolving from a sperm and egg".

Of course he does -- he supplies all the needed room with "except in places
where it is absolutely necessary".

Also -- the theory you dismiss is basically the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim.

Akiva

--
"If you want to build a ship, then don't drum up men to gather wood, give
orders, and divide the work. Rather, teach them to yearn for the far and
endless sea." - Antoine de Saint-Exupery

On Thu, Sep 09, 2004 at 01:50:10PM +0300, Akiva Atwood wrote:
: Nonsense -- there are Rishonim who hold the visit of the 3 malachim ONLY
: took place in a dream. They obviously don't agree that "events must be
: taken literally".

Tangent: The only rishon I know who says this is the Rambam. That said...

It does mean the Torah is to be understood literally. The literal
retelling of what was seen in a prophetic vision. The mashal is the
nevu'ah, not the chumash's retelling of it.

As the Rambam understands it, "Vayeira H'" is a pasuq telling you that
the Torah is about to repeat a nevu'ah.

Similarly, giving proof that the Ralbag took the story of gan eden as a
metaphor doesn't say anything about its historicity. Everyone agrees the
story has deeper meaning. But the mashal could have been written in the
form of events, and not necessarily into the text of the chumash alone.
Proving there's a nimshal says nothing about whether the mashal was
historical.


FWIW, I think a large part of the reason why this thread is going on
and on is the format. People feel their points aren't being addressed,
or that the other person is reading too much -- and incorrectly --
between the lines. I think it's because we're using a dialogue format
rather than laying out our positions in a more orderly manner.

Perhaps if the other participants could post a single email addressing
at least all of the following questions, we could make some headway.


    Question 1: What is the relationship between Bereishis 1:1 and the
    rest of the pereq? (E.g. Is it an introduction to the story or a first
    event? If a first event, was it immediately before 1:2, years before
    but within this olam, before a cycle of olamos, or something else?

I don't know.

    Q2: Is yom used literally, idiomatically, allegorically,
    relativistically (ala RGSchroeder) or something else?

Literally, but in a manner we can't comprehend. The only thing we can
take from it with only certainty is the allegory.

    Q3: Is the sequence of events and the events themselves on the six
    days literal, literal in some non-physical way, idiomatic, alegorecal
    or something else?

Literal, but in a manner we can't comprehend. There is therefore no
conflict with science -- the subject is to rife with our ignorance to
worry about contradictions. We don't understand the Torah's historical
claims nor the science, because we can't understand the subject being
described.

To the question (asked by RSP) of why this rules out trying to understand
it at some level: It doesn't. However, you'll never know how much is
understood and how much is misunderstood. Since the Torah isn't about
history, I don't see the point in bothering.

    Q4: What does the creation of man as "afar min ha'adamah" mean?

    Q5: Would you include gan eden in the above answers?

I'd consider both of these literal. But because time isn't yet linear,
one can't even talk about whether the formation of Adam was before
or after other hominids, or even if other homonids existed or are our
projection of order on a period that lacked any.

    Q6: What is your criterion for saying something is ahistorical
    allegory, if ever?

I'll only go with this answer if someone proposed it for reasons entirely
within the Torah -- TSBK or TSBP. For example, if the Torah's description
of mal'akhim seems to contradict, it would be fitting (as does the Rambam)
to suggest that some of the description is allegory. Or RHM's example:
if the TSBK says they ate bread and also that they didn't, the Ramban
is justified in assuming one is allegorical.

I do not like the idea of declaring something allegorical despite a
total absence of intra-Torah reason for saying so. It's an epistomolgy
that puts Torah on the retreat, lurking only in corners for which the
person has no other means of answering.

    Q6a: How does your answer to Q6 justify insisting that ma'amad har
    Sinai is historical?

It is clearly at odds with anything ever suggested from within mesorah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

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