Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 074

Thursday, August 19 2004

• Re: lice and change of nature
• Re: lice and change of nature
• re: lice and change of nature
• lice
• Re: lice
• Re: Pi ( was Lice)
• RE: measurements
• Re: Pi
• RE: Evolution, Creationism, Lice and Other Mythical Creatures
• Re: WAS Evolution and Creationism
• Re: Emanationism
• Re: lice & change of nature
• Re Lice

RDE wrote "I will repeat my original assertion. Change in nature
is generally not cited by modern poskim when there is a clear cut
contradiction between the scientific views of chazal and that of modern
science. In fact the disparity will generally be ignored [i.e., it is
of no interest to the posek] unless it is mentioned in the rishonim or
early achronim and unless there is some major consequence."

However Rav Feinstein does say Nishtanu Hativim on his own to change the
Halacha(YD 4,number 17) regarding a nursing woman having to be concerned
for her period nowadays, although according to the Gemara and SA they
don't have to for 2 years after giving birth even if they are not nursing
the baby. Regarding a pregnant woman, he think that probably they don't
have to be concerned for their period even before three months, which
goes against the Gemora and SA.

Regarding many Treifos of the Gemara, he acknowledges that nowadays they
can live , & vice-versa some defects which are not listed as Treifah,
nowadays do not live. However he explains that regarding Treifos, the
Halacha doesn't change, because the Treifos were given "Halacha Lemoshe
Mesinai" in order that the Halacha should be determined based on which
defects were fatal in the time when the Torah was given.

Kol Tuv,
Moshe Schor

Moshe Schor wrote:
> However Rav Feinstein does say Nishtanu Hativim on his own to change 
> the Halacha(YD 4,number 17) regarding a nursing woman having to be 
> concerned for her period nowadays, although  according to the Gemara 
> and SA they don't have to for 2 years after giving birth even if they 
> are not nursing the baby. Regarding a pregnant woman, he think that 
> probably they don't have to be concerned for their period even before 
> three months, which goes against the Gemora and SA.
> Regarding many Treifos of the Gemara, he acknowledges that nowadays 
> they can live , & vice-versa some defects which are not listed as 
> Treifah, nowadays do not live. However he explains that regarding 
> Treifos, the Halacha doesn't change, because the Treifos were given 
> "Halacha Lemoshe Mesinai" in order that the Halacha should be 
> determined based on which defects were fatal in the time when the 
> Torah was given.

The issue of when Rav Moshe Feinstein uses the term Nishtanu HaTeva is
complex. An intelligent discussion of this is found in "Shinuy HaTeva :An
analysis of the halachic Process in Journal of halacha and Contemporary
issues. by R' Dovid Cohen of Yeshiva of Far Rockaway.

Concerning the first issue of a nursing or pregnant woman R' Cohen writes
on pages 7-8.

"There are times in a woman's life when she does not have a period.
During these times, a woman does not have to follow the restriction of
a veset on the days that, based on her previous periods, would have
been days of her veset. The Shulchan Aruch [48. Y.D. 184:7, 189:33,
190:52] cites two of these times as (a) from the time a woman is 3
months. pregnant until delivery and (b) for 24 months after birth or
miscarriage. The question that arises is how should the halacha regard
women in the present, who differ from the description in the Talmud, in
that typically they stop menstruating close to the start of pregnancy,
and only in rare cases is menstruation postponed for a full 24 months
after giving birth. Writing in the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, Rav Akiva Eiger [ Vol.1, 128. A careful reading of his ruling
reveals that he is using the haIacha as we have it in Shulchan Aruch
to be lenient (in a case of mamzeirut). See Noda BIYehuda n Y.D. 88
and 93, who follows the guidelines of the Shulchan Aruch in a case
of roah machmat tashmish, such that the guidelines are a stringency].
and the Avnei Nezer [ Y.D. 238;3.] reason that, although everyone knows
that women nowadays stop menstruating as soon as they are pregnant and
may resume menstruation any time after birth, we can not rely on "our
assumptions" to change the halacha in a case like this where none of the
earlier authorities mention this change in nature [The Badei Hashulchan
184:39, footnote 53, accepts this opinion.see also Mishna Berurah 550:3.
The Noda BiYehuda E.H. 69 is similarly perplexed as to why no one mentions
this change in nature, as it is as it is relevant to many other haIachot
as well.]

Rav Moshe Feinstein, however, finds their position difficult - conceding
that change has occurred, but insisting that the halacha has not changed
accordingly! [ Iggerot Moshe Y.D. III 52.] He notes that almost 400
years ago, the Bach [#100]. based a halachic ruling on the very fact
that menstruation is a sure sign that a woman is not pregnant (ie.
women do not menstruate during pregnancy). Nevertheless, Rav Feinstein
concludes his responsum in a somewhat equivocal fashion: although the
Bach says that we may consider the fact that nature has changed in
determining the halacha, however, in deference to the resistance of
Rav Akiva Eiger and the Avnei Nezer to changing the halacha, we should
change the halacha only where it results in a stringency; but "change
in nature" should not be utilized as the rationale to render a lenient
ruling [Although in the aforementioned Teshuva, it is unclear that this
is Rav Moshe Feinstein's conclusion, see his Teshuva printed in the
appendix to Halachot of Niddah (Rav Shimon Eider) 1-2, where he says so
specifically. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, quoted in Nishmat Avraham Y.D.
189:2, reaches the same conclusion.]. Rav Wosner [Shiurei Shevet Halevi
184:7.s.k. 1 and 4] agrees with Rav Moshe Feinstein's rulings concerning a
woman after she has given birth. In regard to a pregnant woman, however,
Rav Wosner is inclined to remain with the guidelines of the Shulchan
Aruch. The Nishmat Avraham asserts that even in the time of the Gemara
the nature of most women was that their period stopped at the onset
of pregnancy nevertheless, despite their awareness of this phenonemon,
the rabbis of the Talmud stated the halacha as written [Possibly because
during a period of time that even some women will continue menstruating,
all women must be cautious for their vestot] Therefore, he concludes,
inasmuch as there has been no change in nature since that time, there
should be no reason even to consider changing the halacha. "

The issue of treifos is an issue that has a long history and seemingly
everyone agrees that the halacha does not change - in spite of our
awareness that these animals live longer than 12 months. I don't think
that Rav Moshe is saying anything that isn't found in earlier sources -
this is also discussed in R' Cohen's article.

Therefore I don't see anything in the sources cited to change my assertion
especially since R' Akiva Eiger, Avnei Neizer and others state such
a principle. One should also see Rav Moshe's permission of biopsy
and prostate removal - even though it seems to violate the halacha
of the gemora - for examples of the condition of "major consequence"
for acknowledging shinui hateva without clear precedent in the earlier
sources.

Daniel Eidensohn

RDE wrote," I am looking for contemporary poskim who 1) acknowledge the
scientific reality 2) acknowledge that it apparently contradicts Chazal
3) state that because the reality is not in accord with chazal therefore
so the halacha has changed.

Although Rav Moshe's position is equivocal regarding a pregnant woman
where relying on change of nature would be a Kula, he is not equivocal
regarding a nursing woman that nowadays we should be machmir. So there
you have a Posek that does the three criteria you were looking for. Even
regarding a pregnant woman, the editor writes in parenthesis in Igros
Moshe YD 4,number 17, that when Rav Moshe was asked orally he would pasken
leniently relying on Nishtanyu Hativim. It was only because of the fact
that he was responding to Rav Eider for guidance in what to write in an
English sefer that Rav Moshe did not want to publicize his heter.

RDE wrote, "In fact the disparity will generally be ignored [i.e., it
is of no interest to the posek unless it is mentioned in the rishonim
or early achronim and unless there is some major consequence."

Did you mean that it will be ignored unless both of your conditions are
met, or either one?

What do you consider a major consequence?

[Email #2. -mi]

> The generalization of the prohibition of killing on shabbat from the
> melachot involving the obtaining of rams' skins (or Tachash skins) is
> limited to those creatures that have skins and blood. This would exclude
> insects (more generally, arthropods) who have an exoskeleton instead of
> a skin and no blood (their circulating fluid is more like a plasma - no
> red blood cells). The generalization to cover all living things would
> then be Rabbinic in nature. The sages could then have exempted lice
> from the killing prohibition because they cause considerable discomfort
> (itching). Others more learned than I can offer arguments against or in
> support of this conjecture. My aim is primarily to preserve the validity
> of the basic halacha even if it involves a fairly radical approach.

This is not true. First of all Rav Eliezer(Talmud Shabbos 107b)
states that one who kills lice is Chayav, which means Min Hatorah. The
Gemara there explains that even the other Rabbis only disagree with
him regarding lice which don't reproduce sexually, but regarding other
insects they agree with him. See also Rambam Laws of Shabbos Chapter 11,
and SA Siman 316, S'ief 8. Insects also have a type of blood. The fact
that they don't have red blood cells, is not Halichically significant.

[Email #3. -mi]

R' YGB wrote: "What Chazal say is ex cathedra. So much so that even if in
on an objective, klapei shemaya galya plane the spiritual (or physical)
reality is otherwise. Of course, the archetypical instance of this
principle is BM 59b. V'hu ha'din b'nidon didan. If Chazal ruled that it
is muttar to kill kinim on Shabbos, heim gozrim v'HKB"H mekayem. It is
therefore permitted to kill kinim on Shabbos ba'zman ha'zeh as well."

I can understand the Gemara BM which deals with a Machlokes in Svara,
that we say Torah Lo Bashomayim Hi, so Hashem goes along with the psak
of the majority of Chacmei Yisroel. Rashi ( Kesubos 57a) explains that
Elu V'alu only applies to a disagreement in Svara but not to a fact,
because only one can be true when it comes to a fact, whereas a svara can
always have truth to it. If you will agree that the reality on which the
Halacha was based is false, how can it be valid? In addition there is a
Parsha in the Torah & a whole Mashecte Horiyos regarding the possibility
of a Sanhedrin making an error. However if you are saying that there
are other reasons why the Halacha should be true such as the fact that
the eggs were not visible to the human eye, I can understand that.

Kol Tuv,
Moshe Schor

Again, quoting Sternberg there are several approaches to treating
conflicts between gemara and science

1. Nishtane Hateva - with this approach the psak of the gemara was correct
in their time and place but is no longer true and so we change the psak.

This need not refer only to major changes - Thus for example Tosafot say
that we can drink from uncovered water because snakes are not prevelant
in our homes. Other cases like changes in an animals age of giving birth
are reasonable effects of changes in feeding and breeding. Others like
changes in anatomy are harder to accept

OTOH the artscroll in the beginning of Nidah explains the (false)
analogy of the gemara to the anatomy of a woman by explaing that in the
days of Chazal most women had diseases that destroyed the walls between
elements of the body. Hence, anyone doing an examination would indeed
find chazal's anatomy. Not because it is natural but because of disease.

2. REED - Chazal got the halacha from previous generations but not
the reasoning. So they applied their own knowledge of science. If the
reasoning is wrong we still have the halacha and don't change it.

I note that in modern versions of this reasoning it is made PC. REED
implies that Chazal's reasoning could be wrong even when the halacha is
correct. Today it is rephrased that Chazal knew the real reason but did
not tell us all the reasons, as the Gra says in other contexts.

3. Re-interpret the gemara in modern terms. Thus, if the gemara talks
about poison in a cat's claws which don't exist they are referring
to bacteria.

BTW some achronim already point out that when we have an disagreement
between Rambam and Rashi or Tosafot we follow Rambam as he knew more
science. Hence, when Rashi seems to be confused over the connections
between the heart and the lungs we can assume he was in error and follow
Rambam (who in this case is not much better). Again, some achronim try
and re-intrpret Rashi to conform to anatomy.

However, IMHO when it comes to Rishonim we are forced to say that they
sometimes erred in biology/math/physics. Perhaps the most glaring case
is the Rash who states that the Pythagoras theroem is wrong for general
non-isoceles triangles. As R. Karo already points out ignoring math one
need only measure right triangles to verify that it is wrong. Further,
I strongly believe that Rashi did not know the Pythagoras theorem. Many
rishonim and achronim did not realize that the earth was round and as
before their knowledge of anatomy was imperfect.

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel

On Fri, Aug 13, 2004 at 07:15:19PM +0300, eli turkel wrote:
: So why not just simply state that though lice may have spontaneously
: generated in the days of chazal they no longer do so and so it is
: forbidden to kill them on shabbat like the Pachad Yitzchak.

I think RAS's problem was not with the maskanah. I think that had the
PY argued "nishtanah hatevah", he wouldn't have objected.

-mi

Jonathan Ostroff wrote:
>Tosefos HaRosh (Eruvin 14a) specifically states that the value of Pi is
>not in disagreement with Chazal. When the Talmud says "mena hani mili"
>it means:
>(A) How do we have a licence to record Pi as 3, i.e. as an
>appoximation. The Talmud anwers that the licence is from Scripture
>(i.e. Solomon's pool where it is also recorded approximately).
...

I am not sure how you read Tosfos (Eiruvin 76b) and especially the
Gra's reaction to it. Tosfos there is obviously questioning the accuracy
of the value of pi found in the gemora and the Gra is upset with that
question. I agree with you that there are clearly sources that understand
that the issue is simply whether one can record the value of pi as a whole
number. However the Mishna Berura Shaar HaTziyun 372:18 states: "In truth
IMHO one does not have to be more precise because Chazal relied on these
measurements regarding Torah halacha because it is difficult to be precise
with the fraction left over. Perhaps they had a tradition from Sinai to
rely on these measurements and this seems to be implied in the Rambam..."

My point in all of this is to show that Tosfos and the Tashbatz do
not simply say that that if Chazal said pi = 3.000 I must accept it
literally.The sources you cited also attempt to reconcile the physical
reality that is universally accepted and the statements found in Chazal.

In contrast RYGB's assertion: "What Chazal say is ex cathedra. So
much so that even if in on an objective, klapei shemaya galya plane the
spiritual (or physical) reality is otherwise. Of course, the archetypical
instance of this principle is BM 59b. V'hu ha'din b'nidon didan. If
Chazal ruled that it is muttar to kill kinim on Shabbos, heim gozrim
v'HKB"H mekayem. It is therefore permitted to kill kinim on Shabbos
ba'zman ha'zeh as well." - eliminates the justification to reconcile
and interpret statements of Chazal with scientific reality. This would
apparently apply not only to halachic issues but also agadata. I am
hoping however that RYGB did not mean to make such a radical assertion.

Daniel Eidensohn

> is very difficult for me to imagine that they really thought that pi
> was EXACTLY three.

WADR -- maybe they were "locked in" to the idea of three because
Nach reports it as three -- and, not having a mesorah to explain the
discrepancy, were unwilling to change it?

> Then again, maybe "nishtaneh hateva" is not such a ridiculous
> idea. According to those who believe it in regards to reproductive
> biology and orbital mechanics, maybe it happened to trigonometry as well?

"nishtaneh hateva" can have 2 different meanings:

a) teva actually changed
b) our understanding of teva has changed

Those trying to reconcile Torah and Science usually mean (b); (a) is
usually an attempt at apologetics -- since, except during a miracle,
the "laws of nature" don't change (and even most miracles are perfomed
b'derech hateva).

Akiva

--
"If you want to build a ship, then don't drum up men to gather wood, give
orders, and divide the work. Rather, teach them to yearn for the far and
endless sea." - Antoine de Saint-Exupery

On Mon, Aug 16, 2004 at 12:37:08PM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
: You are oversimplifying the issue. There is a major discussion of
: this issue in R' Beinishe's sefor Midos v'Shiurei Torah Chapter 3
: page 43-48. At the end he states: Concerning halacha many achronim
: write that it is possible to use approximate measures since they are
: brought as halacha....

It is impossible to use exact measures of irrational numbers. Nor is any
ruler perfect. So I'm not sure what heter he's giving -- that we don't
have to do the impossible?

Perhaps the machloqes is whether the gemara is saying that 3 or 1.4 are
appropriate estimates, or that the best estimate possible is appropriate
-- which in there day happened to be 3 and 1.4.

BTW, with circles there is a second, real but balebatesher problem. Wonder
how they didn't know pi? How do you measure the length of a curve? Your
accuracy is limited by the elasticity of the string you wrap around the
circle. If you stretch it tighter to mark the end of one circumferance
than you do when you lay it out to measure, or visa-versa, your measure
is off. There are similar problems rolling the circle on a flat surface
and slippage.

The Babylonians did the experiment with string and got 3-1/8. But if
you had "the official science" telling you it was three, it's easy to
see how you would end up with three.

On Tue, Aug 17, 2004 at 11:29:11PM -0400, RYGB wrote:
: What Chazal say is ex cathedra...

More so than Sanhedrin, which obviously can err, since half of Horiyos
addresses the subject of kaparah?

I'm not arguing with your maskanah, that since chazal have the power to
define halakhah, what they conclude is true by definition. I just don't
understand how the two points jibe.



On Mon, Aug 16, 2004 at 11:09:48AM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
: I assume RDE is talking about the Tosefot in Eruvin, where the gemara
: is emphatic that pi is exactly 3.000000, with no approximation at all.

It's a clear case of reverse engineering by the amora'im. It's not
the tanna who insists 3 is accurate rather than an approximation, it's
a later source trying to explain an existing pesaq.

It is therefore unsurprising that Tosafos do not call for throwing out
the pesaq. A question on the reverse engineering is not a question on
the earlier statement.

One can't use this to prove that Tosafos would do the same if the pesaq
and the reason were given together.

I must have had a rebbe who explained this gemara according to the Tosafos
haRosh. I understood the gemara to mean that one can hold pi is three,
and not a closer approximation, and didn't realize that wasn't the most
naive read until this thread forced me to reopen the gemara.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org        And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

> It's pretty simple really. Not all scientific data have equal credibility,
> for our scientific beliefs in the data can be based on:
> (a) repeatable observable phenomena
> (b) interpolation
> (c) extrapolation and
> (d) deep theory

Your (d) is incorrect -- it should be a "deep hypotheses". A "theory"
is a hypotheses which has been shown to be correct by observation and
testing -- and would therefore be higher than (a).

> Most of the current dating methods (including the big bang) weigh in
> heavily towards (c) and (d) especially when you backward extrapolate from
> a few years of observation to billions of years.

> optics, motion etc. General relativity and quantum mechanics, of course,
> demonstrated that the extrapolation of Newtonian physics from a small base
> of observations to the whole universe was fatally flawed and dead wrong.

Not really -- Newtownian physics is still useful - and correct at
non-relativistic speeds.

> Science is wonderful and exciting and useful. But we should not forget
> recent history in which we saw the overthrow of an eternal universe,
> determinism and many other deeply held scientific beliefs which should
> remind us that "those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat
> it" [George Santayana].

There have actually been very few "overthrows" of deeply held scientific
beliefs -- it's usually a refinement of the previous theory.

Akiva

--
"If you want to build a ship, then don't drum up men to gather wood, give
orders, and divide the work. Rather, teach them to yearn for the far and
endless sea." - Antoine de Saint-Exupery

On Sun, Aug 15, 2004 at 12:27:26AM -0400, hlampel@thejnet.com wrote:
: You can believe what you want, but please answer: Why would Hashem
: deliberately fool us by writing in the Torah that He created the world
: in a mature state, in six days, 5000 years ago, while "in reality"
: He started creating it billions of years ago?

You can ask the same thing about the difference between parashas Emor
and avodas Yom haKippurim. TSBP doesn't insist on literalness, why do you?

Is the Maharal a kofeir for writing that Bereishis alef can't be
literal? What about the generations who wrote about the esoteric meaning
of ma'aseh bereishis before him?

Are the dual creationists, the Ramban (and his talmid R' Yitzchaq
mei'Aqqo), the Zohar, the Tif'eres Yisrael, outside the realm of the
mesorah?

As I wrote, I share your concern with the attitude that whenever the
two seem to conflict, we assume the Torah must be rewritten rather than
that the science is misunderstood. One that tries to keep Torah away
from empirical claims. It is a "god of the gaps" attitude that cordons
emunah off to those dark areas where man has no other explanation, the
birthplace of paganism. But that doesn't prove the other extreme either.

On Sun, Aug 15, 2004 at 05:23:31PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
:            Rather, He was like an artist depicting a scene that only
: exists in his imagination, and depicting it with complete thoroughness
: that a viewer could imagine himself there, and very easily believe it
: to be true, if he didn't know otherwise.

I don't see how this answers the question. All your saying is that once
Hashem strove to create a natural-looking universe, He would of course
do a thorough and perfect job.

It doesn't answer why he would choose to make that scene.

For that matter, He created the patterns, and humans try to deduce laws
from it. Any history consistant with contemporary experiment would
be okay, and that's pretty broad. Then add to that that Hashem could
have defined "nature", the patterns scientists study, differently. G-d
could have given certain parts of the world control over the fuel supply
myriads of other ways. I think that's RHM's point about the dinosaurs
being redundant, but made more broadly.

So, I'm asking two-fold:
1- Why did the world need to look naturally made, if it wasn't? Why is
that "better artwork"?
2- Even if it must look natually made, why didn't the natural look more
closely match the history?

On Mon, Aug 16, 2004 at 05:45:31PM +0300, Zoo Torah wrote:
: R' Michah wrote:
: >Pesuqim must be historical unless we had TSBP reason, without the
: >scientific challenge, to say otherwise.

: Rambam didn't follow this principle - he said that the episode of Bilaam's
: donkey, and other episodes, were not historical truth, but rather a
: prophetic vision.

First, as I wrote in the bit before the one quoted, "to me". I was
stating the position that appealed the most to myself. I can't possibly
be equally comfortable with everybody.

Second, his reason for the donkey had to do with reasoning from the
mesoretic description of mal'ach, not because he found first principles
(postulates or experimental data) that were from another source more
compelling than the mesorah (or at least than the words of ba'alei
mesorah).

: Rav Saadia Gaon permits allegorization in several circumstances, one of
: which is a conflict from metziyus (i.e. scientific challenge). No mention of
: a TSBP license required.

Reference? In my recollection, he permits allegorization of ma'amarei
chazal, and doesn't discuss allegorization of Tanach.

Another problem with using science to explain Torah is raised by a post
of RZS. On Mon, Aug 16, 2004 at 12:46:25PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
: Only if you view randomness as something that 'just happens'.  Quantum
: mechanics may give us a clue to the real meaning of hashgacha pratit:
: the big puzzle of QM is how it actually works...

Unless it turns out that Afshar's experiment is real, and really disproves
the non-determinism of the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM. As he writes
it "may give us a clue", but then, it may not.

Schroeder's program of identifying peshat in pesuqim with current theory
is an example of what kind of approach is prone to this problem.

As for random there are three meanings I could think of:
1- causeless. This is what RnTK assumes when she asked about Hashem using
random processes.
2a- containing no pattern, ie can not be described in a manner shorter
than listing it out. (Shannon's definition)
2b- containing no useful pattern, and therefore can be described for
our purposes very concisely. (Chaitan's definition)

2b, which is defined in terms of the purpose against which we're calling
something random, can't be applicable in our case.

However, it's the only definition that distinguishes between all the
complexity of static and all the complecity of a symphony. Static
contains more information by Shannon's definition, the symphony by any
colloquial one. Or the complexity of a living organism vs random fatal
changes to DNA.

ID requires showing that neither mutation nor natural selection can
be sources of information by Chaitan's definition. The irreducible
complexity version of the argument gives rigor to the word "useful".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             You will never "find" time for anything.
micha@aishdas.org        If you want time, you must make it.
http://www.aishdas.org                     - Charles Buxton
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

On Sun, Aug 15, 2004 at 05:23:39PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
: As I understand it, this is not a statement of fact but of philosophy.

I object to your terminology. This redefinition of terms, that "fact"
somehow excludes the philosophical is wrong. It's part of the modern
western worldview in which the empirically measurable is more real.

As ma'aminim, we know there are facts, in the classical sense of true
statements, which are purely philosophical. Let's not let them rob from
us the ability to say so in some Orwellian Newspeak ploy.

: What do we mean by 'real'? Think of gestures: does a gesture really
: exist? Is it an entity on its own? ...
:                            Since everything besides Hashem only exists
: so long as He is creating it, philosophically the world isn't an existent
: entity, it's merely something that Hashem is doing.

This is the Besh"t's point about 10 amiros. A spoken word exists as long
as the speaker is speaking it.

Which is a third ontology, different than emanation and panentheism.
Neither turn the concept of existance into a process. And it takes a
middle stance between whether the universe is of G-d or not.

But not what the Tanya says, either time.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (270) 514-1507      

At 02:13 PM 8/19/2004, Moshe Schor wrote:
>R' YGB wrote: "What Chazal say is ex cathedra. So much so that even if on an
>objective, klapei shemaya galya plane the spiritual (or physical) reality
>is otherwise. Of course, the archetypical instance of this principle
>is BM 59b. V'hu ha'din b'nidon didan. If Chazal ruled that it is muttar
>to kill kinim on Shabbos, heim gozrim v'HKB"H mekayem. It is therefore
>permitted to kill kinim on Shabbos ba'zman ha'zeh as well."

>I can understand the Gemara BM which deals with a Machlokes in Svara, that 
>we say Torah Lo Bashomayim Hi, so Hashem goes along with the psak of the 
>majority of Chacmei Yisroel. Rashi ( Kesubos 57a) explains that Elu V'alu 
>only applies to a disagreement in Svara but not to a fact, because only 
>one can be true when it comes to a fact, whereas a svara can always have 
>truth to it. If you will agree that the reality on which the Halacha was 
>based is false, how can it be valid? In addition there is a Parsha in the 
>Torah & a whole Mashecte Horiyos regarding the possibility of a Sanhedrin 
>making an error. However if you are saying that there are other reasons 
>why the Halacha should be true such as the fact that the eggs were not 
>visible to the human eye, I can accept that.

Al acharon rishon:

1. I am not addressing the issue of "why." Shaarei teirutzim lo nin'alu. I
am only addressing the issue of "what" - what is the Halacha? What is
etched in stone by Chazal.

2. If you recall, the parasha in the Torah and most, if not all of
Horayos (I do not vouch to remember the entire mesechta offhand!),
concerns mistakes that the Sanhedrin made in forgetting or contradicting
pesukim or mesoros mefurashim, not mistakes pertaining to "reality."

3. Halacha is a legal system. A law that is legislated properly is valid,
regardless of the "reality." It may later be repealed or amended, but
until that is done, it remains the law. The same is true concerning a
judgment of a court - it is valid, so long as it is based on the law in
effect at the time. Even if the reality is proven otherwise, as long as
the law is not repealed or amended it remains the law.

4. What does this have to do with Eilu va'Eilu? There is no machlokes
here!

KT,
YGB

RYGB
>We have discussed this here in the past - the acceptance is the flip side
>of the coin of their capacity to determine Halachic reality ba'elyonim.

I am quite puzzled by this statement of RYGB about the nature of hazal.
We agree that the sanhedrin had the power to determine halachic reality.

However, the power of the decisions of the bavli are not based on the
power of sanhedrin, but, according to the rambam and most other rishonim,
not based on an intrinsic issue of stature, but on the more mundane issue
of universal acceptance - and is therefore due to the later generations.
It isn't merely the nature of hazal - because the same acceptance doesn't
apply to the other statements of hazal (eg, yerushalmi, midrash), but
is specific to the bavli.

What are the earliest sources to suggest, as RYGB does,either 1) This
universal acceptance was because of a fundamental difference in the
nature of hazal (not merely that amoraim were different)

2) Post sanhedrin hazal could affect halachic reality ba'elyonim, while
post bavli rabbanim couldn't?

  After all, the halachic reality lemata was only affected later, when
  it was accepted.

A related question. I am aware of recent shitot that halachic
determinations affect physical reality - what is the earliest appearance
of this shitta? (please don't cite zadik gozer - in its original form
that meant something different)

Meir Shinnar

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