Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 042

Wednesday, June 30 2004

• Re: progress - relationship between Jewish and worldly ideas
• Re: progress - relationship between Jewish and worldly ideas
• Disputing Earlier Genrations--Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai Message
• Disputing Previous Generations and "Ha TaTania," etc.
• Re: Totally Safe Pesak
• Re: Zoo Torah: Identifying the Animals of the Torah, Part One
• Re: segulas where tefilla/tzedaka aren't "working"
• Tesha Chanoyos,
• eating dead bugs
• Totally safe psak
• RE: Zoo Torah: Identifying the Animals of the Torah, Part One
• Re: Zoo Torah: Identifying the Animals of the Torah, Part One
• New Water Psak
• Re: eating dead bugs
• Re: New Water Psak
• Re: progress - relationship between Jewish and worldly ideas
• Disputing Previous Generations
• Re: Civil Marriage-Gittin
• Tanur shel achnai - how could a bat kol not be emes
• Re: Tanur shel achnai - how could a bat kol not be emes
• Re: VIDC [Voss Iz Der Chilluk] #13, MC p. 128

From: "Daniel Eidensohn" <yadmoshe@012.net.il>
> I was recently involved in a discussion concerning the concepts of
> progress (spiritual, moral, knowledge) or progressive revelation. Jewish
> sources discussing this are Rav Tzadok, Leshem, Rav Kook.

> 1) Does anyone have sources that predate the general belief in progress
> in the non Jewish world - i.e., 16th -17th century?

For knowledge see MN II:9. Cf. R. Abraham Maimonides, Maamar al Odoth
Drashoth Hazal (ed. Margalioth pp. 86-88).
It's also a commonplace among mekubbalim. I'll try to find sources later.

David Riceman

David Riceman wrote:
>For knowledge see MN II:9.  Cf. R. Abraham Maimonides, Maamar al Odoth
>Drashoth Hazal (ed. Margalioth pp. 86-88).
>It's also a commonplace among mekubbalim.  I'll try to find sources later.

This is not the modern concept of progress. R' Avraham ben HaRambam
was just indicating that the level of knowledge can fluctuate from
one generation to the next. The concept of progress assumes that a
general correlation of improvement with time. "The belief in progress,
the idea that human history forms a movement, more or less continuous,
towards a desirable future, began to take shape late in the seventeenth
century" "There is much to be said for the carefully balanced judgment
reached by Robert Flint towards the end of the nineteenth century. His
position may be briefly summarized thus: the view that the Greeks
and the Romans conceived of the course of history only as a downward
movement is not borne out by the facts; they conceived of it in
many different ways—as a process of deterioration, as a progress,
and as a cycle, though none of these conceptions were worked out
fully or consistently or supported by a survey of historical data
(Flint [1893], pp. 89-96)". [Dictionary of the History of Ideas
<http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-18>]. The
Meshech Chochma describes regular cycles of improvment that inevitably
lead to collapse. This is not the modern concept of progress.

Daniel Eidensohn

On Jun 24, 2004, Micha responded to Zvi Lampel re: an alternate definition
of HLMS, attributing it to the Malbim and Rav Shimshon Raphael Hirsch.

Ah! Now I see what you're saying! You're suggesting that "the
other possibility" defining "Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai" is held by
the Malbim. You are suggesting he holds, unlike the Rambam, that the
Scriptural associations to HLMS's are planted in the Torah (and we just
don't know what those remazim are). (This would mean that every peyrush
mekubal miSinai, before the remez for it was found--such as that "pri
aitz hadar" means an esrog--was classified as a HLMS.) My position is
that the only known definition of HLMS is the one given by the Rambam:
that Hashem purposely left these with no remez in the Written Torah to be
found. To support this definition, Rambam cites the Gemora (Sukkah 5b-6b)
which defends the declaration that "measurements" are HLMS by insisting
that the "remez" brought to support it is not a bona-fide drash, but a
mere mnemonic device (asmachta).

Micha, you infer from general statements of both Malbim and Rav Shamshon
Raphael Hirsch, that they hold that every fact of Torah ShehB'ahl
Peh--including HLMS--has a remez in Torah Sheh BiCh'sav. This indeed would
be at odds with the Rambam. However, we can see from explicit statements
from both of these Gaonim that they fully agree that Halachos L'Mosheh
MiSinai form an exception to that rule.

Malbim: See the beginning of parshas Emor (Vayikra 21:1, #3), where
he states,

    Wherever the halachos of Torah Sheh B'al Peh are anchored
    (m'yusadim) in the Written Torah [to be extracted] by the methods of
    interpretation we delineated in this work of ours, the Torah indicates
    this with the word "Daber" ("Speak" to the b'nay Yisrael).... But
    wherever it intends to indicate (the presence of) a Halacha L'Mosheh
    MiSinai, which has absolutely no anchor in the posuk (she'ayn lah
    shoom y'sod b'ha'kasuv," but was only transmitted orally with no
    ta'am and d'rush, such as the halachos of [writing] sifray Torah,
    tefillin and mezuzos, and all the Halachos L'Mosheh MiSinai that the
    Rambam lists in his Hakdama L'Seder Zeraim, that have absolutely no
    root in the kasuv, such as gud, l'vud, and dofen akuma, shiurim,
    chatzitzin u'mechitrzin, etc., regarding those the terminology of
    "dibbur" does not apply...Regarding them is says "Say, and say." Two
    "amiros": one for the written Torah, and one for the oral Torahs
    which were liukewise stated concisely.

Thus the Malbim is in full accord with the Rambam, except for the slight
"k'naitch" that the Torah does indicate that there is, in the posuk,
an indication that there exists a Halachah L'Mosheh MiSinai regarding
the subject, which, nevertheless, cannot be derived through drash. (An
interesting turn.)

Rav Shamshon Raphael Hirsch: See Collected Writings, Origin of Oral Law,
pp 39-40. Besides reiterating the Rambam's teaching that drashos are used
by Chazal both to support known peyrushim mekuballim, and (on p. 40)
to re-generate lost pieces of information about mitzva-observance,
he writes (p. 39): "These middos are rules by which the laws that
have been transmitted orally can be derived from that which is... in
writing. Interpreted in accordance with these rules, Torah Sheh B'ch'sav
will be found to contain the details that were handed down by word
of mouth. There are only a small number of halachoth which cannot
be directly linked with the written wording of the Law and which are
therefore specifically designated as Halachah L'Mosheh MiSinai."

I rest my case.

You raise another issue regarding k'lal u'prat vs. ribui u'mi'ute, and
Rabbi Akiva and R' Yishmael, which I would also like to address in a
separate posting.

Kol Tuv, 
Zvi Lampel 

From: "Jonathan Baker" <jjbaker@panix.com>
> What about "VeHaTania" and "VeHaTenan" in both full and contraction
> forms: VHTNIA, VHA TNIA, VHTNN, VHA TNN?

> They seem to be much more common than once every 10-15 blatt.

Good point! Scratch what I posted before. Here's a more accurate result:

HaT'nan:      1 (Not b'nichusa)
V'HaT'nan:  353 (4 b'nichusa)
Ha T'nan:    25 (0)
V'ha T'nan: 148 (0)
TOTAL:      527 (4)

HaTania:      4 (0)
V'HaTania:  931!(43)
HaTania:     12 (0)
V'ha Tania: 129 (2)

Ha Tanni:    13 (0)
HaTanni:      2 (0)
V'Ha Tanni:  33 (0)
V'HaTanni:   54 (0)
TOTAL:    1,178 (45)

On Thu, Jun 24, 2004 at 07:41:48AM -0400, Allen Gerstl wrote:
: This touches upon an area of interest to me: whether on an absolute level
: there is a perfect "Platonic" Halacha that we may attempt to approximate,
: or conversely whether there is on such absolute level a continuum of
: possible halachic choices that are all equally valid.

The Maharal seems to say so, but his opinion is outside R Prof MH's
scope of discussing rishonim.

: As I mentioned in a previous posting, there is an excellent
: (although I have some reservations) lecture by Prof. Moshe
: Halbertal and a written version of this is found at:
: <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/Gruss/halbert.html>.

I have nothing to add to my previous summation and comment on this
article at <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol13/v13n024.shtml#12>.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Until he extends the circle of his compassion
micha@aishdas.org        to all living things,
http://www.aishdas.org   man will not himself find peace.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Albert Schweitzer

On Fri, Jun 25, 2004 at 11:48:56AM -0400, I reposted from RNS:
: The Creator of the World obviously knows every creature that He created.
: However it seems clear the Torah would only mention animals that were familiar
: to the generation that received it. There is a principle that "the Torah
: speaks in the language of man." This does not mean mankind in general, but
: rather the people who initially received the Torah. For example, the Torah
: contains figures of speech and references that were used by the Jewish People
: at that time. It prescribes that Passover be celebrated in spring, even though
: such would not be the case for later Jewish communities in South Africa and
: Australia.

I don't see why this seems clear. It's not even taken for granted that
the rulers of Edom were people the Sinai generation could have heard of.

As for the ra'ayah, part of the meaning of Pesach is its celebrating the
the ripening of the crops in EY. Otherwise, the omer would be disconnected
from it. That the holiday has more meaning in EY has little to do with
the referents of the people Moshe gave the first copies to.

I also miss the significance of another point:
: (A qualification to this principle is that some animals, while not indigenous
: to that region, were nevertheless familiar to people due to their being
: imported to the area. The animals in this category are the monkeys and
: peacocks that were shipped to King Shlomo.)

That's a half of a millenium after matan Torah. I don't think it's safe
to assume slaves, even of the urban Egypt, had heard of these animals
just because the royalty of their pretty remote descendents did.

A third point I didn't follow:
: In many cases, perhaps even the majority, identifying the animals of Scripture
: is extremely difficult. Often there is no known creature that accurately
: matches the clues at hand. In face of these difficulties, it is sometimes
: suggested that the creature is unknown or extinct...

: Another important source of information for establishing a picture of the
: animals formerly in existence is the fossil record. In some cases, the fossil
: record does give us important information about animals that we would not
: otherwise think to be mentioned in the Torah. There are remains of animals
: that were formerly living in the region of Israel, but now only live
: elsewhere, such as the hippopotamus. We also find evidence of some animals
: that are now entirely extinct, such as the aurochs. But we should be skeptical
: of claims that a creature formerly existed if there is no evidence for it in
: the fossil record.

How isn't this circular reasoning? Of course we know about the animals
we know about? How does this prove there isn't huge gaps about which we
know nothing? Is it better to find a poor fit and keneitch the words
than assume we have a historical document that refers to an animal we
clearly don't encounter?

After all, entire cities mentioned in the Torah were denied based on a
lack of evidence, until evidence were found. Acknowledged that historical
archeology and exploring the fossil records are different things. Still,
how can I personally place confidence in such claims of knowledge from
absence of proof?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Thu, Jun 24, 2004 at 08:59:54AM -0500, Elly Bachrach wrote:
: Don't misunderstand me; if something can help this sick person, I am all
: for it. But I am confused by this use of a segula. Is a segula supposed
: to work where the learning, davening, tzedaka, etc. do not appear to be?
: Is this  a "what could it hurt" kind of thing?

I think anything creative that thereby keeps these things expressions
of communal pain at its member's suffering rather than the routine
"what was does in r"l this situation" is of value.

But I think these can hurt. The hamon am sees segulos in magickal
terms. (Spelling intentional.) Viewing it mechanistically, trusting in
segulos in a way far too detached from yir'as Shamayim. Just a technology
like an engineers, but one that has the added problem that it one feel
pious and therefore satistfies religious needs without focusing on emunah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Dale Carnegie

I think Micha Berger recently posted a query (asked by his father) about
Tesha Chanoyos, where the one shops sells a lot more than the nine others.

In case nobody else has responded, the Pischei Tshuvah (Yoreh Deah 110:2)
refers to this case, referring one to Shu't Beis Ephraim Yoreh Deah 40
and other sources.

Although I don't think the Pischei Tshuvah mentions this, I think the
Pri Megadim also refers to this case a little later in Y.D. 110.

Elozor Reich, Manchester

From: Shaya Potter <spotter@yucs.org>
> How does one know if a Bor is non flowing or not? now perhaps we can
>  use technology to figure it out, but 500, 1000, 2000 years ago how did
>  they figure these things out?

The Mishna uses a mashal of a bor sud she'eino me'abed tipa. So they knew.

I guess we're too technologically advanced to look at the bor and see
if it holds water.

Or at the water and see if it has any bugs.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

RTK wrote:
> I don't know whether--as another poster asked--there is some Platonic
> ideal of halacha towards which human poskim attempt to reach as close
> an approximation as possible. I do know that behind the scenes and
> sometimes right in front of the scenes--HKB"H is a player in halachic
> deliberations.

Although I am not even worthy of standing near the dust of your father's
shoes, i do wonder how he squared the above idea with the Gemara of
tanur Achinoi, especially the conclusion of "Nitzchuni Banai" ? If indeed
Hashem is a "player", does he "lose" sometimes?

David I. Cohen

[Micha:]
> How isn't this circular reasoning? Of course we know about the animals
> we know about? How does this prove there isn't huge gaps about which we
> know nothing?

Because those gaps usually show up (i.e. we know there's a gap there).

> After all, entire cities mentioned in the Torah were denied based on a
> lack of evidence, until evidence were found. Acknowledged that historical
> archeology and exploring the fossil records are different things. Still,
> how can I personally place confidence in such claims of knowledge from
> absence of proof?

Cities lasted, at best, a few hundred years before they would be
destroyed, so the lack of evidence is understandable.

Animal species, OTOH, last for 10's of thousands of years -- in which
case the lack of any fossil remains whatsoever is problematic.

Akiva
--
"If you want to build a ship, then don't drum up men to gather wood, give
orders, and divide the work. Rather, teach them to yearn for the far and
endless sea." - Antoine de Saint-Exupery

On Tue, Jun 29, 2004 at 09:08:57AM +0300, R' Akiva Atwood wrote:
:> How isn't this circular reasoning? Of course we know about the animals
:> we know about? How does this prove there isn't huge gaps about which we
:> know nothing?

: Because those gaps usually show up (i.e. we know there's a gap there).

Over spans under which there are evolutionary trends -- or perhaps our
habit of pattern seeking imposes those trends, yes. However, to know if
there was another relative of the camel or vulture? (One that might even
have a close enough skelatal similarity to require an accident to realize
that one isn't looking at parts of a known animal?)

:> After all, entire cities mentioned in the Torah were denied based on a
:> lack of evidence, until evidence were found. Acknowledged that historical
:> archeology and exploring the fossil records are different things. Still,
:> how can I personally place confidence in such claims of knowledge from
:> absence of proof?

: Cities lasted, at best, a few hundred years before they would be
: destroyed, so the lack of evidence is understandable.
: Animal species, OTOH, last for 10's of thousands of years -- in which
: case the lack of any fossil remains whatsoever is problematic.

Not really. The odds of any fossil is low. It requires much more than 10s
of thousands of years. Thus the whole issue of punctuated equilibria
and "rapid" (longer than the time in question) evolutionary transitions.

I wasn't clear. I acknowledged that these are two different things,
even if both are archeology. However, the argument from absence of proof
is in common. And the other archeology has had egg on its face from
assuming that we have a more complete picture than we do. So, how can I,
who don't know enough to assess relative odds, be so sure that this 2nd
academic community isn't falling into the same trap?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org        remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org   winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Peter Marshall

R' Akiva asked why I wrote <<< Ta'am of sheratzim is mutar; >>>

and I responded <<< Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah Siman 107 se'if 2.
Reasoning as well as pesak contained there. >>>

R' Akiva followed up:

<<If I'm reading it right, the reasoning is that the flavor which the
sheretz gives off is in the "nosen taam lifgam" category, which we're
normally machmir on, but here we're not. I don't know why. Maybe because
most of these halachos deal with maachalos assuros, and a sheretz is
merely a *davar* haasur, and isn't in the *maachal* category?>>

I know of no distinction between ma'achal and davar assur. But I would
venture to say that nosein ta'am lifgam refers to a deficient taste,
what the Mechaber refers to as not "pagum legamri" so as to be in the
category of nevelah she'eina' re'uyah leger.

The ta'am of sheratzim (as opposed to their gufim, which remain assur)
is so disgusting to (most) people that it would be pagum legamri.

Please explain what you mean by "normally machmir on"; we don't make bug
soup or any other nosein ta'am lifgam concoction lechatchila; it's only
mutar bedi'eved, but mutar it is. Not sure what the issue is.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

From: Shaya Potter <spotter@yucs.org>
> How does one know if a Bor is non flowing or not? now perhaps we can
> use technology to figure it out, but 500, 1000, 2000 years ago how
> did they figure these things out?

Gershon Dubin <gershon.dubin@juno.com> wrote:
>The Mishna uses a mashal of a bor sud she'eino me'abed tipa. So they >knew.
>I guess we're too technologically advanced to look at the bor and see
>if it holds water.

The way I was taught about this reference is that it is a man made
cistern. As opposed to digging for a natural well. Then you are trying
to find the water table/aquifier.

R' Gershon Dubin asked me <<< Please explain what you mean by "normally
machmir on"; we don't make bug soup or any other nosein ta'am lifgam
concoction lechatchila; it's only mutar bedi'eved, but mutar it is.
Not sure what the issue is. >>>

I think that when I wrote that we're "normally machmir on" nosein
taam lifgam, and when RGD wrote that nosein taam lifgam is "only mutar
bedi'eved", we were saying pretty much the same thing from different
angles.

For example, l'chatchila we are machmir and would not allow someone to
put a sheretz in his soup even if he will take it out before eating. But
if the sheretz got in there anyway, then bdieved, we do allow him to
take it out and eat the soup.

Or, l'chatchila, one cannot use a treif pot for the soup even if that
pot was past ben yomo (=had not been used in 24 hours, so the absorbed
taste was lifgam), but b'dieved, if one did so, he can eat the soup
(possibly subject to many other conditions; ask your LOR; kids, don't
try this at home!)

(Note: Why did I include the word "normally" in the phrase "we're normally
machmir" on nosein taam lifgam? Because this halacha seemed unusually
meikil to me. But now that I understand it better, I'll concede that I
should have left it out. As RGD points out, the Mechaber is not allowing
us to make sheretz soup, only to eat the regular soup after removing
the sheretz that got in accidentally.)

Akiva Miller

Micha Berger wrote:
>The Gra. We still have an article on line by R' Aharon Moshe Schreiber
>from a discussion of the Vilna Gaon and his shitah on the 7 chochmos
><http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/schreiber_gaon.pdf>.

>Included in the article is a reference to a relatively well-known Zohar
>about the necessary rise of mada in year 660 of the sixth millenium
>(5660) as part of the redemption process.

Thanks for the reference. However if you delete the material from Kol
HaTor - which as I understand is a problematic source - there is no basis
to justify a theory of progress in the sense found in Rav Tzadok and
Rav Kook or the modern world. It does seem that the Gra valued secular
knowledge - but it seems no different than the view expressed in the such
rishonim as Rabbeinu Bachye or the Rambam. The Zohar does not provide a
recognizable indication of the consequences of the rise of knowledge nor
does it indicate the relationship between secular knowledge and Torah .

Daniel Eidensohn

Daniel Feinberg was kind enough to correct the word Tannaim to AMORAIM
in the previously posted message, reproduced below:
"The fact that my CD-ROM searches did not, indeed, come up with examples
of tiyuvtos posed by Rav or Shmuel, or any of the other common AMORAIM
who flourished before R' Yochonon, supports this thesis that it was R'
Yochonon who first introduced the policy of refraint from disagreeing
with the past authorities (viz. Tannaim) even on issues of biblical
interpretation (despite the ability they possessed to do this, as per
Hilchos Mahmarim 2:1), on the grounds that they may be touching upon
laws from Sinai."

I was referring to Amoraim who came after the Mishna (and braissos)
but before Rebbi Yochonon's policy became widespread.

Zvi Lampel

At 04:51 AM 6/21/2004, Allen Gerstl wrote:
> At the end of his first maamar he states:
> "Aval bechol kidushei-arkaot harei he eishet ish LE-CHOL DEVARIM
> ve-tzerichah get bichdei le-hatirah le-almah".  "

Nowadays, in Israel, there is some change in the psika in this issue.
While in the past many demanded a GET while others paskened that it is
totally unnecessary, now as more and more cases of Russian marriages
are coming to Beit Din -- there has been some change.

The change is based on the question of Kavanah. Did the couple intend
to become married halachically or not? Some state that based on the idea
that Jews do not have Bi'at Zenut - therefore all marriages have intent.

But actually, b/c of the situation in Russia, jews did not have any
kind of choice -- there was state-marriage only. No possibility for a
religious marriage. OTOH, in the States, there is always the possibility
of having a fully kosher Jewish marriage.

Therefore, if a couple in the States (or any similarly situated country)
chooses NOT to have a Jewish marriage, they are explicitly showing that
they never intended to be jewishly married, and in these cases there
are more Dayanim that will say that the "wife" does not need a GET and
she is available.

But the couple from Russia (or similar situation) didn't have this choice
and therefore in these cases they require a GET LeChumra.

Shoshana L. Boublil

To HM's ? on areivim:
> The problem is that we are not capable of knowing with complete certitude
> what that singular truth is. So we do the best we can and the result
> is that many versions of that truth emerge. I think that is the essence
> of the concept of Elu veElu. God for reasons known only to Him did not
> give us the ability to know His truth, at least not in our day. But HE
> did give us the tools to TRY and determine it... and if we work at it,
> doing the best we can with complete honesty and Yiras Shamayim we are
> "Zoche" to to the words of Elu veElu Divrei Elokim Chaim. God in effect
> tells us that our words are treated as truth even if there are differences
> among us in our interpretations.

> OTOH, God in fact gave over to mankind the ability to determine His
> will. Lo BaShomayim He. This is quite the conundrum, if you think about
> it. This point is illustrated by the famous story of Tanur Achnoi where
> a Bas Kol (God's voice... Kah VeYochol in a sort of echo-like sound)
> is overruled by the rules God himself mandated for us in determining
> Halacha. Tanur Achnoi in fact shows that God's truth can at times be
> irrelevant.

> Or perhaps that there are many definitions of Emes. There is the absolute
> Emes of the Bas Kol but there is the practical Emes of Acharei Rabim
> L'Hatos which overrides the absolute Emes.

> Bottom line: There should be room for honest, sincere, and God fearing
> people to disagree about Truth and to realize that their own understanding
> of Emes may not be the exclusive understanding.


1. Tos yevamot 14a -1. It was only lchvod R''Eliezer(problem-how does
one know, how could BK be sheker w/r/t halacha) 2.it couldn't overcome
majority(stil emes problem)

2.Yabia omer(E"H 7/2/8)-the B"K came from R' Eliezer's ma;ach(how does
this square w/ nitzchuni, does malach have independent power from HKB"H)?

3.Yabia omer (O"C 1/41/18)-(quotin R' Chananel?)the whole thing was a
dream by one in the bet medrash

4.Igrot moshe(Y"D 14:92) -shivim panim(ie both were emet)

5.achronim-B"K is on gavra, not cheftza of din(R' eliezer was worthy of
being right)

6.Maharsha- B"M - We wouldn't follow rov in bet din shel malah and R'
eliezer would be right there

7. Ran-mafteach to brachot-It was test to see if chachamim would resist
B"K and go after rov.

As I was taught by Rabbi Dulitz-when there's a multiplicity of answers,
each has a weak point!

KT
Joel Rich

See my summary of the shitos listed in Encyclopedia Talmudit "Bas
Qol" at <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol02/v02n087.shtml#02>. The
question is how to balance two meqoros: the BQ of eilu va'eilu and
the story of the tanur achna'i. The first we follow, "halakhah kebeis
Hillel", the second's whole point is that we don't follow the BQ.

Also, we touched upon eilu va'ilu recently in discussing articles by R'
Prof Moshe Halbertal and R' Michael Rosensweig. If it means that both are
true (or, as per the Maharal, each are olam hazeh projections of the same
Truth), the bas qol was telling us which truth to use, not which is true.

TR

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Here is the test to find whether your mission
micha@aishdas.org        on Earth is finished:
http://www.aishdas.org   if you're alive, it isn't.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Richard Bach

>Now, for this week's VIDC, MC vol. 1 p. 128:
>We know that murder is one of the things that are not overriden by
>Pikuach Nefesh, because of the sevara of Mai Chazis: What did you see to
>lead you to conclude that your blood is redder than your friend's blood
>(Sanhedrin 74a et al)? On the other hand, when two people are drowning the
>Gemara in Horios (13a) suggests a hierarchy of who to save first. Thus,
>we see that in the Gemara in Horios we do reckon whose blood is redder;
>why, then, in the case of murder do we reject that assessment?

I'm not so happy with RCPS's answer:

RCPS says that in terms of saving someone there is no sin that requires
dechiyah, but only a positive directive of Lo Sa'amod al dam rei'echa
and the question is whom to save first - in this case one is required to
determine who is *probably* more precious before HKB"H and save him first.
In terms, OTOH, of murder, there is a very severe sin involved and in
effect until there is some catalyst for dechiyah - were it clear beyond
doubt that one person is more precious than the other then, indeed, we
would say that his "Va'chai bahem" would override the sin of murdering his
friend, but since it is never clear to us beyond a shadow of a doubt who
is more precious before Hashem the definite sin cannot be pushed aside.

As to what Reb. Katz wrote:

>Mah ho-ilu Chachamim?

>1.  This exact scenario may never occur, but other scenarios, presently 
>unforeseen, may occur in which knowing whom to save first may be critical 
>to making split-second decisions and taking necessary action.  Even if you 
>don't know or don't remember from your learning whether A or B has 
>kadimah, the very fact that you once learned this may set your brain, when 
>something must be done, into the mode of:  "Whose rescue would most 
>benefit Klal Yisrael?  Whom would the Torah want me to save first, right now?"

>2.  The order of priority tells you who gets kadimah in respect and 
>deference, in day-to-day situations where there are no life-and-death 
>issues involved.  To give an analogy, we have an order of who succeeds to 
>the presidency in the event of the president's death.  I don't remember 
>the order, but if the vice president dies, then someone else becomes 
>president, and if he dies too--well, you get the picture.  This has never 
>happened and it's a safe bet that the tenth person in the line of 
>succession will never become president by assassinating the current office 
>holder.  In fact, it has never happened even that the third in line ever 
>became president.  But the very fact that the order is spelled out tells 
>you the order of kovod and authority in more ordinary legal and diplomatic 
>situations.

This is a pretty similar to what RCPS said, and does not make me happy
either. The Gemara in Horios seems to deny the entire assumption of
individual merit in proportion to potential that is the axiom of most
Jewish thought - which is sustained by the sevara of mai chazis!

Therefore, I personally would choose a Hungarian (extrinsic) approach
here:

Where the choice is whom to save one assumes the role of a judge. When
the choice is between two other people one's own negi'os are diminshed
and one can make choices, if one cannot save both. The Gemara in Horios
is not l'ma'aseh, because it depicts a state with absolutely no additional
subjective factors involved, merely objective ones.

OTOH, when one's own life is at stake one's negi'os prevail, and it is
that which Chazal express with "mai chazis" - me'meilah you must submit
(i.e., not render judgment).

YGB 

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