Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 030

Wednesday, June 2 2004

• Disputing Previous Generations
• Bameh Madlikin and Hassidic custom
• Re: VIDC [Voss Iz Der Chilluk] #11, MC vo. 1 p. 100
• Re: VIDC
• Re: sheitels and AZ
• Re: sheitels and AZ
• Re: sheitels and AZ
• Indian hair, Sheitels and AZ
• sheitels and AZ
• Re: lav lhanos
• Re: Get Pashut
• RE: Electricity on YomTov
• Re: Disputing Previous Generations
• Kal v"chomer
• relationship of the "Manoach story" Haftorah to P'Naso
• re: yizkor
• IVF
• Re: lav lhanos
• Re: sheitels and AZ
• Re: lav lhanos

In response to a posting dated 3/19/2004, Rabbi RichWolpe suggested that
the early Amoraim were unaware of any problem with contradicting Tannaim,
as evidenced by many tiyuvtos on Rabbi Yochonon. He wrote, "He probably
was niftar long before he knew that this was a problem. The voice of the
Gmara--aka the so-called Stam--takes this for granted. But it is not so
obvious that Rav, Shmuel or R' Yochonon (etc.) were aware that an era
had ended."

Zvi Lampel replies: On the contrary, R' Yochonon himself was the one who
apparently introduced the idea that contradicting a Tanna is a problem. In
the Gemara Yerushalmi on Paya 2:6, we find: Said Rebbi Zeyra in the
name of Rebbi Yochonon, "If you come across a halachah (i.e., mishna)
whose reason you cannot fathom (ain aht yodaya mah teevah) do not brush
it aside and replace its law with another one (ahl tafleegeenah l'dvar
acher). For many laws were told to Moshe at Sinai, and all of them are
lodged in the Mishnah."

Indeed, the Gemora quotes Rebbi Yochonon confronting Resh Lakish with
teyuvtas from braissos and mishnayos over 40 times in the Bavli and
Yerushalmi (compliments of a CD-ROM search for aisvay, or haysiv,
R' Yochonon)--bringing to mind R' Yochonon's complaint to R' Elazar,
who cited braissos in his support, that the departed Resh Lakish would
instead always challenge him "with 24 kushyos," helping to clarify that
halachah Bava Metsia 84a). He certainly considered it a problem for
an Amora to be contradicted by a tannaitic source. If in fact there
is a preponderance of tiyuvtos against R' Yochonon in comparison with
other Amoraim (which assertion is subject to analysis of another CD-ROM
search), this would be only natural, since this is when the braissos
were first brought to light, and R' Yochonon, like all other Amoraim,
were not held responsible to know all the braissos, only to take them
into account when informed of them.

The fact that my CD-ROM searches did not, indeed, come up with examples
of tiyuvtos posed by Rav or Shmuel, or any of the other common Tannaim
who flourished before R' Yochonon, supports this thesis that it was R'
Yochonon who first introduced the policy of refraint from disagreeing
with the past authorities (viz. Tannaim) even on issues of biblical
interpretation (despite the ability they possessed to do this, as per
Hilchos Mahmarim 2:1), on the grounds that they may be touching upon
laws from Sinai.

Zvi Lampel

I was reminded by a question sent to me that I had meant to discuss this
in Avodah and don't think that I ever did.

R. Phyllostac wrote to me:
> There is an interesting piece related to this entitled 'Me'eimosai
> korin es 'kigavna' biarvis' by Professor Moshe Chalamish in his work
> 'HaKabolloh - bitefilloh, bihalocho uviminhog' (BIU), which originally
> appeared in the periodical 'Sinai' (114:78-82).

> He traces it back to the kloiz of Brod (Brody) in the latter half of
> the 18th century C.E., and perhaps also to Hassidic circles around the
> Hassidic leader referred to as the 'Maggid of Mezrich'.

> It seems that the Hassidim added it to their liturgy because they thought
> it inspiring and relevant for that time (entrance of Shabbos). He also
> notes that the fact that the Ar"i had already 'opened the door' for the
> addition of passages from the Zohar into the siddur some years before
> (when he added brich shmei.....when the sefer Torah is taken out to be
> read, which, by the way is, to this day, not recited by all), made it
> easier for them to add this additional Zoharic passage.

The issue that needs to be added here (that Dr. Chalamish does not
address, because it is not the subject he is discussing), is that
k'gavna did not substitute for Bameh Madliqin.  Saying Bameh Madliqin on
Friday night was not only the custom of some; it was the custom of _all_
Jewish communities, Ashk'nazim, S'faradim, Teimanim, and was instituted
in the times of the G'onim.  As a custom of k'lal Yisroel, it is binding
on all, and so is recorded in the S.O.

However, there were differences between communities about when on Friday
night Bameh Madliqin was said.  S'faradim said it immediately after
minha, before they said Mizmor Shir l'Yom haShabbos.  Ashk'nazim did not
say Mizmor Shir, but went directly from Minha to saying bar'khu, and
said Bameh Madliqin after 'Arvis (which is where it is printed in all
the old Ashk'naz siddurim).  (What is called "Qabbolas Shabbos, of
course, came later, shortly before the development of Chasidus.)  Saying
Bameh Madliqin before 'Arvis is a very recent custom among Ashk'nazim,
and was not done at the time that Chasidus developed.

So Chasidim started saying k'gavna, but that was before 'Arvis, and did
not at the same place in davening that Bameh Madliqin was said.  The
question is, then, why did they stop saying Bameh Madlqiin?

The answer to that is that Bameh Madliqin was said right when the Sha'Tz
said qiddush; in many communities in Ashk'naz, it was said concurrently.
Chasidim abandoned the saying of qiddush in shul, probably because they
woiuld accompany the rebbe and stand around his shabbos tisch, where he
would say qiddush.  When they dropped the old custom of saying qiddush
in shul, they dropped saying Bameh Madliqin.

Seth Mandel

On Sun, May 30, 2004 at 07:37:19PM +0000, Micha Berger wrote:
: I would have said there are three:
: 1- Bitul berov
: 2- Kol deparish meirubah parish
: 3- Achariei rabim lehatos

I should have added that this again invokes one of my repeated open
questions: What role do the laws of safeiq play in the rules of pesaq?
When do we pick a shitah on its merits, and when do we pasqen de'Oraisos
lechumrah, etc...?

-mi

At 03:48 AM 5/30/2004, you wrote:
>RYGB:
>> The Shev Shmaitsa 1:1 writes that even though we hold safek orlah
>> in Chu"l is permissible, nevertheless, if there is a rov l'issur we
>> follow the rov, as that is not considered a safek. He cites Tosafos BB
>> 24a as evidence,

>> This seems difficult, as at the end of the first perek of Kiddushin we
>> learn that kol ha'meikel b'orlah, even though when it comes to EY if he
>> is a yachid k'neged rabbim we reject his position, we can rely on him
>> in Chu"l - but according to the SS why do we not follow the rov poskim
>> even when it comes to Chu"l.

>RYGB seems to say that if we hold not like SS, then any safek orlah
>in chu"l is muttar, so too halacha kdivrei hameikil mtaam safek. Yet,
>vadai orlah btaaruvos is only batel one in two hundred (SA YD 294:22).
>So we see that not every safek, (nor even every rov lhatir) is mutar
>concerning orlas chutz laaretz.

But a ta'aroves is not a safek: It is a vadai, and bittul - it would seem - 
is a hanahaga that applies to vadai, not to safek.

>Rather we must answer, along the lines of RGS, that halacha kdivrei
>hameikil is a rule in psak and is not mtaam safek. See Tos. Shabbos 139a
>d"h lishlach that severely limits this klal. If it were mtaam safek,
>the Tos. would not make any sense.

But why?

[Email #2. -mi]

At 04:09 AM 5/30/2004, Eli Turkel wrote:
>If bittul be-rov determines the safek how does chozer ve-naor work?
>Also according to many one needws to throw out one piece even when there
>are 60 against the treifa piece.

As I noted elsewhere, bittul b'rov is a very different hanhaga that helech 
achar ha'rov (certainly according to the shittos that the whole ta'aroves 
may be eaten by one person).

[Email #3 -mi]

At 10:10 AM 5/30/2004, [RMLevin] wrote:
>I absolutely agree but would like to contribute the terminology of R. YD
>soloveitchik to the discussion. Even within what we call bittul b'rov,
>there is true bittul and heter hanhaga. The latter explains the concept
>of Chozer V'neyur. THE Rav said this when explaining the issue of bittul
>brov by yovesh and the diyun in the poskim whther one is allowed to
>consume the entire mixture or only as long as something is left over. He
>explained that the ones that say the latter, it is heter hanhaga which
>cannot be maintained if the entire mixture is being eaten up.

I have problems with Brisker nomenclature, and this is no exception - what 
does "heter hanhaga" mean and how does the invention of the concept add 
understanding?

YGB 

In  Avodah V13 #29 dated 5/31/04
>> Nowadays we do not feel ashamed of having our hair uncovered... But that 
> very
>> lack of shame may be similar to the lack of shame so many women in our
>> culture feel about showing their midriffs.... [--old TK]

> I don't think the comparison is apt. Are unmarried women "supposed to
> instinctively feel embarrassed at the idea of walking around with their
> hair showing?"  [--Avi Burstein]

A good point, two partial responses:

1. Unmarried girls are not really supposed to go around with their hair
loose and flowing either. It's supposed to be tied back or braided
or worn with a headband. Or cut short. In chassidishe circles and in
Israeli charedi circles, and also in the Bais Yakov where I teach,
tying the hair back is the norm.

I know that a lot of girls ignore this, and when I was a girl, I was
one of those. My father zt'l was always after me to put my hair back,
but I didn't really understand that it was a religious thing, and didn't
always listen to him. I thought it was a neatness thing. I still don't
know whether this falls into the area of halacha, minhag, or just good
taste--not to have hair that is too long, swingy and seductive and all
over your face and shoulders.

2. Precisely because married women ARE more experienced than single
girls, they have undergone a dramatic change in status. They are aware of
their power to attract in a way they were innocent of before marriage.
It is that very knowingness that they have acquired through marriage
that requires married women to be even more modest than single girls.

I am indebted to two sources for this insight into the changed nature
and status of an experienced over an inexperienced woman. The two sources
are Gila Manolson's wonderful book, *Outside Inside,* and Allan Bloom's
classic, *The Closing of the American Mind.* (Caveat: hers is Orthodox,
his is secular, but Torah-compatible.) He does point out that nowadays
single women often are experienced in ways that used to be the province
only of the married. A case could be made that single women who have
lost their innocence should cover their hair.

When I speak, BTW, of the married woman's consciousness of her power
to attract, I speak of a double-edged sword. Her power is the power to
cause, and to indulge in, grave sin--and it is also the power to bring
new life into the world, to provide safe harbor for a new neshama on
its transit from the other world to this one. Both edges of this sword
require a much higher level of discretion, restraint and modesty in a
married than in an unmarried woman.

>> If we were more sensitive to spirituality, I suppose, we WOULD
>> instinctively feel embarrassed at the idea of walking around with
>> our hair showing.  [--old TK]

> It doesn't seem to me to be about sensitivity to spirituality, despite
> how flattering that might seem to many. [--R'AB]

Why does it not seem to you that modesty is about spirituality?
Spirituality is the G-dly as opposed to the animal part of a human being.
Animals are nothing but bodies and bodily functions. Without clothes,
that's what humans are, too. With clothes, we are neshamos temporarily
housed in physical cabinets. Gila Manolson discusses this very sensitively
in her book.

Another truly exceptional and worthwhile book to read on this subject
is *A Return to Modesty* by Wendy Shalitt, but I will warn you that that
book is more appropriate for women or girls who are seriously struggling
with modesty issues, or who are not yet frum. It is not appropriate for
your average teenaged children in Bais Yakovs and yeshiva high schools.

 -Toby Katz
=============

From: <T613K@aol.com>
>>> The Torah seems to assume that women feel a similar sense of shame at
>>> having their hair uncovered [--old TK]

>> I don't know where the Torah says this.

> The isha sota's hair was uncovered, apparently to shame her. If she
> was guilty, this public embarrassment would tend to discombobulate her,
> throw her off-balance and make it more likely that she would confess.
> If she was innocent, she was compensated for the embarrassment she had
> suffered by special brochos, children if she didn't already have any,
> or more children--beautiful, healthy ones--if she did.

You have conflated two senses of the word "shame". A person can be
ashamed because she violated protocol, even for a good reason, or she
can be ashamed because she did something immoral. Rabbi B started this
thread by asserting that few Jewish women would wear sheitels in the
absence of a religious obligation. That is because many feel embarassed
at dressing in an unusual way. This is because of a violation of protocol,
not because of a sense of guilt.

The Sotah is embarassed by forcing her to violate protocol. After all,
whether or not she had previously sinned (and the midrash about Hannah
implies that one can be tried without having done anything wrong), she
is currently performing a mitzva by deranging her hair, so her shame
cannot be shame induced by guilt; it must be shame induced by violation
of protocol. Adam and Havah, OTOH, were embarrassed because of guilt.
That is the point of Rashi Breishis 3:7 s.v. vayedu, that naked means
they had lost their only mitzva.

>>> If there is any bracha to go with
>>> covering hair, I suppose it is that same bracha, malbish arumim. [--old
>>> TK]

>> It's oteir yisrael b'sifara

> I was under the impression that that bracha referred to tefillin shel
> rosh.

See OH 46:1 that it refers to any hat. You have recalled the custom of
the Rosh, OH 25:3, but (a) that is not our custom (MB ad. loc. SK 13),
and (b) he meant it to be allusive, not normative (MB ad. loc. SK 12).

David Riceman

In a message dated 6/1/04 2:10:36 PM EDT, driceman@worldnet.att.net writes:
> You have conflated two senses of the word "shame".  [--RDR]

Irrelevant. We can argue back and forth about what exact shade of shame
or embarrassment she experiences, doesn't matter. I have proven what
I set out to prove, that the Torah assumes it is embarrassing, shameful
or whatever word you care to use, for a woman's hair to be uncovered.

 -Toby Katz
=============

There are swirling rumors as to whether R' Belsky went to India or not,
but it appears that R' Belsky did in fact send a letter to R' Elyashiv
detailing the reasons R' Belsky feels that: A) The Tirupati hair is
not tikroves avodah zarah; and B) even if it was, there is no reason to
prohibit the wigs made from Indian hair because of the combination of
taaruvos. I do not have that letter. However, the following is a link
to R' Elyashiv's detailed response to these arguments. [The response
is from R' Elyashiv, not R' Efrati bishmo, to R' Belsky. The entire
letter including the signature line is typed up. I don't yet have the
handwritten version.]

<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/wigRE2RB.jpg>

HML

[RYGB:]
>>> LAN"D once one has spent hundreds or thousands of $$'s on a sheitel, it
>>> is a matter of b'di'eved.

>>How do you understand the Rambam? Does the shaker here have another set
>>of arba minim, or does he refrain from using the AZ even though this
>>will mean the loss of his mitzva?

>>Does the Rambam mean 'bedieved after you've spent thousands on a beautiful
>>set of AZ arba minim', or bedieved after you've shaken?

>Either one.

This is simply incorrect. The Rambam following the loshon of Chazal uses
the word bedieved to mean just that. Once you have already done it. Note
the Rambam does not say ' bedieved you may use it' , he says bedieved
you were yotze.

The Rambam never uses the word bedieved in place of bemokom hefsed meruba,
or beshaas hadchak. If you know of any place in the Rambam or Gemora,
please let me know.

In addition, if the shaker doesn't have another set, then ein lo hefsed
godol mize, the loss of the mitzva. And yet the Rambam says ossur.

Akiva B.

On 31 May 2004 at 11:00, David Riceman wrote:
> Incidentally I have no idea what sefer Get Pashut is (it clearly can't
> refer to the perek in Shas).

Sefer Get Pashut on Hilchos Gittin by R. Moshe Ibn Habib, the author 
of the Kapos Tmarim on Hilchos Sukkah and others. 

Machon Yerushalayim republished it several years ago. 

 - Carl

[RSGoldstein also replied, but his contents were subsumed in the posts
I did let through. -mi]

From: "David Riceman" <driceman@worldnet.att.net>
>Incidentally I have no idea what sefer Get Pashut is (it clearly can't
>refer to the perek in Shas) 

Get Pashut is a sefer on Gittin written by R Moshe Ben Habib, Jerusalem,
17th cent. author of the Kapot Temarim on Sukkot , Yom Teruah on RH,
and a Pnei Moshe on the Yerushalmi, though not the one printed in our
Yerushalmis...

Avi Burstein wrote:
"Where is it written that it was ever allowed? Doesn't the issur have
also to do with binyan (building a circuit) as much as lighting a fire?"

As a quick response, to date I have found the following:
1903- Rabbi Yehiel Michal Epstein (author of 'Aroukh HaShoulhan) in Bet
Va'ad LeHakhamim allows turning lights on on Yom Tob.

1903- Rabbi Yosef Yehoudah Strazberg (author of Yad Yosef, & Ab Bet Din
of Makasov, Galitzia) in Bet Va'ad LeHakhamim also allows turning them on.

1912- Rabbi Refael Aharon Ben Shim'on (Chief Rabbi of Egypt) (He wrote
this in 1901) in his OuMissor Debash allows turning them on.

1913- Rabbi Binyamin Aryeh HaKohen Weiss in his Eben Yeqarah allows
turning them on.

1924- Rabbi Yehouda Youdil Rozenberg in his Maor HaHashmal in Montreal,
Canada allows turning them on.

1932- Rabbi Reouben Margaliot in his Nefesh Hayah allows turning them on.

1934- Rabbi Yosef Messas (Rabbi of Tlemcen, Algeria and Meknes, Morocco
and Haifa, Israel) in his Mayim Hayim allows turning them both on and
off and he reiterated his position in numerous other places.

1934/35- Rabbi Sebi Pesah Frank (Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem) in Qol Torah
allows turning them on.

1935- Rabbi Ben Sion Meir Hai Ouziel (The Rishon LeSion himself) in his
Mishpete Ouziel allows both turning them on and off and he reiterated
this in 1947.

1936- Rabbi David HaKohen Saqli (Rosh Ab Bet Din in Oran, Algeria)
in his Qiryat Hanah David (volume 2) allows both turning them on and off.

1945- Rabbi Eliezer Yehoudah Waldenberg in his famous Sis Eliezer
(volume 1) allows turning them on.

1948- Rabbi Masoud HaKohen in his Pirhe Kehounah (Casablanca) allows
turning them on.

1964- Rabbi Shraga Faivel Frank in his Toldot Ze-eb allows turning
them on.

1973- Rabbi Shabetai Sheftel Weiss in his Hilkhita Rabeta LaShabeta
allows turning them on.

1976- Rabbi David Haim Sheloush (Chief Rabbi of Netanyah for 50 years)
in his Hemdah Genouzah volume 1 allows both turning them on and off on
Yom Tob.

There you go, 15 sources over a period of 75 years who have all allowed
it to be turned on and some even off.

Does this help at all?
Joseph Mosseri

On 31 May 2004 at 15:40, R Zvi Lampel wrote:
> The fact that my CD-ROM searches did not, indeed, come up with examples
> of tiyuvtos posed by Rav or Shmuel, or any of the other common Tannaim
> who flourished before R' Yochonon, supports this thesis that it was R'
> Yochonon who first introduced the policy of refraint from disagreeing
> with the past authorities (viz. Tannaim) even on issues of biblical
> interpretation (despite the ability they possessed to do this, as per
> Hilchos Mahmarim 2:1), on the grounds that they may be touching upon
> laws from Sinai.

See Ramban Bava Basra 131a s"v Amar Lei Abayei (starting from "u'l'inyan
piska") and Rabbeinu Yona Bava Basra 131a s"v Ela Tnai Beis Din Sha'anee,
both of whom indicate that there are instances when amoraim feel free
to disagree with tanaim. There's also a Kovetz Shiurim on this, but I
was unable to find it (all cited by R. Zev Cohen in his Daf Shiur on
Chulin 117).

 - Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

> There is a long discussion in Meshech Chochma parshas shoftim. I am
> quoting from memory, will bl'n look it up and cite,. He discussed if
> kal v'chomer is a method of logic or a technical tool. He proves the
> latter from the fact that a kal vchomer to prohibit one own's wife is
> seriously considered, as he brings.

As promised - it is on the posuk of lo tasur. The kal vchomer is from
meseches derech eretz - if one is prohibited in one's daughter where he
is muttar in her mother, is it not the din that he should be prohibited
in any other woman who is born of eishes ish who is forbidden to him.

M. Levin

I had a "crazy" thought Shabbos morning and don't know whether it's
legitimate and/or if I subconsciously was remembering something heard
in the past. The "Manoach story" section seems to be the designated
Haftorah because of the n'zirus connection, but I was wondering if it
[also] was connected because Manoach suspected his wife and subjected
her to the b'diqah process mentioned ahead of parshas nazir in the Torah
(with his wife "v'niq'sa v'nizr'ah zora"). Comments? Thanks.

All the best from
 - Michael Poppers via RIM pager

Can anyone enlighten me as to when and for what reason Yizkor began to
be said on Yom Tov (rather than on Yom Kippur only) ?

Debbie

i am not familiar with the halachot in this area. are there poskim who
give heterim for these types of procedures for couples who already were
mkayem pru urvu, but would nevertheless like more children? on or offline,
please let me know if there are mekilim and who they are

In response to my citation of the MB that we don't say MLLN in a case of
hanaat haguf, in opposition to the Chelkas Yaakov quoted by RYGB, he wrote

>I don't get it - is the CY not allowed to argue on the MB? I was citing
>the CY, not the MB.

I was merely citing a differing, and extremely authoritative, opinion.
Kvodo she ha-CY bmkomo munach.
I would future point out that the MB, in his statement about MLLN,
is explaining the psak of the mechaber in SA OH 586:5. Thus, according
to the MB, *the mechaber* does not hold MLLN in a case of hanaat haguf.

>In any event, I do not think there is any hano'as ha'guf in yemos ha'chama
>from wearing a sheitel.

I hear what you are saying, but I'm not sure this is correct. I believe
that any garment, worn in the normal manner, is considered to provide
hanaat haguf. The function of clothing clearly goes beyond mere protection
from the elements, and I think that the "good feeling" of being dressed
properly can be considered hanaat haguf. Much of what we wear in the
summer is uncomfortable (black suit, tie, hat for men , long sleeves
and stockings for women), but it seems to me all these things should
be considered providing hanaat haguf. For example, I think someone
who wears a suit of hekdesh on a very hot day would be hayyav b'meila,
and of course the same goes for a sheitel.

We must be careful to categorize a sheitel as a garment, and not only
as a cheftza shel mitzva, or otherwise we will come to the conclusion
that one can't wear a sheitel outdoors on Shabbat!

In response to RYGB's statement
>I also don't see why there should be any chilluk between this
>and a sandal shel chalitzah shel AZ that the Ein Yitzchok 2:EH62 is
> metzaded to be mattir.

I wrote
>We're talking about tikrovet AZ, not AZ. The Rambam (Yibum ve-Chalitza 4:20)
>says that a sandal of tikrovet AZ is pasul lechalitza even bdiavad. (This 
>is a gmara meforeshet Yevamot 103b). So too SA EH 169:23.

and he responded
>Not relevant. There it is a specific din because eino asui l'halech ba (see 
>the end of the halacha in the Rambam), so that it is ois-sandal. There is 
>no parallel here.

I apparently do not understand RYGB. I don't see how he can say
>I also don't see why there should be any chilluk between this
>and a sandal shel chalitzah 
and about the same subject
>There is no parallel here.
(Perhaps the first statement is the hava amina, and the second is
the maskana)
In any event, I believe that my comment that we are talking about
tikrovet AZ and not AZ in the sheitel issue is relevant; they have
different dinim.

On the same topic, RDR quotes a source that
"MLLN applies only b'diavad, but l'chatchila is prohibited"

It seems that the mechaber in SA OH 596:2 disagrees. The mechaber states
that a shofar of AZ which belongs to a goy may be used b'diavad. The
mforshim explain that such a shofar may not be used l'chatchila because
it is maus. It seems clear from the mforshim that mi-tzad hanaa from AZ
it would be useable even l'chatchila, since MLLN (see MB sk 13,14).

Similarly, in seif 5 there, in the case of mudar hanaa mishofar,
the mechaber says "someone else may blow for him and he fulfills his
obligation", lashon l'chatchila, since MLLN.

Saul Mashbaum

[RDR:]
>From: "Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <rygb@aishdas.org>
>>> I'd like to ignore the practical issues (e.g. mitzva l'abeid avoda zara)

>> Ee meshum ha, lo iriya - that is a safek mitzvas aseh, asher kvar dashu bo
>> rabbim in the sugya of the modern techeles.

>Is there a source for this? What's the connection between techeiles and AZ?

There has been extensive discussion re the topic of techeles as to whether
we say safek l'chumra by a mitzvas aseh, or only by a lav. The consensus,
IIRC is that safek l'chumra does not apply to mitzvos aseh. Hence,
als the aseh of Biur AZ, one would be entitled to refrain so long as
one was using the object in question for a mitzva - as is evident from
all the sugyos that discuss cheftzei mitzva of AZ without reference to
the mitzva to destroy AZ.

>>> 2.  Why can't I wear a four cornered garment of shatnez with tsitsis,
>>> arguing mitzvos lav lehenos nitnu?

>> See the cited Chelkas Yaakov that the mitzvah is on the kanfos, and
>> the beged is therefore hano'oh not associated with the mitzvah. This,
>> of course, does not apply to kisui rosh.

>I think you're misreading him (Rabbi B kindly emailed me a copy of the
>tshuva). Nonetheless, let's assume you're correct. If I understand the
>construction of wigs correctly there is a substrate which holds the hair
>and covers the head, and the hair itself is attached to the substrate.
>Wearing the substrate would enable a woman to legally walk in the
>marketplace. Mimah nafshach? If we view the beged and the tzitzis as
>separate, we should also view the substrate and hair as separate and
>prohibit the hair. If we view them as a unit we should have a heter
>for shatnez.

>If, OTOH, you wish to be mchalek I would argue that the chiluk has to
>go the other way (clothing as a unit, not wig) since there's no mitzva
>without the beged+tzitzis, but kisuy rosh is accomplished with the
>substrate alone.

IIUC the substrate is like "kalasah," which would fulfill Das Moshe but
not Das Yehudis.

>My copy of the SA says "lo seilachna benos yisrael pruos rosh bashuk
>(EH 21:2)." I don't know where this "specific directive" exists.
>If you would only rent your wife a sedan chair and a couple of bearers
>she wouldn't need to cover her hair in the marketplace. OTOH she would
>not be permitted to be naked even inside the sedan chair.

Why would she not be permitted to be naked inside the sedan chair?

>I found my diyyuk from kisuy hadam convincing. I don't see why you
>think you can draw an analogy from me'ilah. Not do I see how orlah can
>possibly be more strict than AZ.

But it is!

YGB  

At 05:30 PM 6/1/2004, [R Saul Mashbaum] wrote:
>I hear what you are saying, but I'm not sure this is correct. I believe
>that any garment, worn in the normal manner, is considered to provide
>hanaat haguf. The function of clothing clearly goes beyond mere protection
>from the elements, and I think that the "good feeling" of being dressed
>properly can be considered hanaat haguf.... For example, I think someone
>who wears a suit of hekdesh on a very hot day would be hayyav b'meila,
>and of course the same goes for a sheitel.

Are you sure that someone who wears a suit of hekdesh on a very hot day is 
chayav because of the ha'na'ah? From the Rambam, Hil. Meilah 6:1 it sounds 
that it is davka because and when the garment is nifgam that he is chayav.

>In any event, I believe that my comment that we are talking about
>tikrovet AZ and not AZ in the sheitel issue is relevant; they have
>different dinim.

True, but I did demonstrate that the problem with the sandal of tikroves is 
that it is not raui l'halech, which is not relevant here.

>It seems that the mechaber in SA OH 596:2 disagrees. The mechaber states
>that a shofar of AZ which belongs to a goy may be used b'diavad....

I would like to return to the issue of b'di'eved in another email.

[Email #2 -mi]

> >>Does the Rambam mean 'bedieved after you've spent thousands on a beautiful
> >>set of AZ arba minim', or bedieved after you've shaken?

> >Either one.

>This is simply incorrect. The Rambam following the loshon of Chazal uses
>the word bedieved to mean just that. Once you have already done it. Note
>the Rambam does not say ' bedieved you may use it' , he says bedieved
>you were yotze.

I'm sorry, which Rambam are we referring to again? In Lulav 8:1 he says 
that shel AZ lo yittol l'chatchila v'im nottal yatza. Is that the one?

YGB

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