Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 027

Tuesday, May 25 2004

• sheitels and AZ
• Re:Endangering one's life to recover body parts
• Re: Kal v'homer
• Re: coincidence
• kal v'chomer
• Re: Kal v'homer
• Re: water
• Indian hair, Sheitels and AZ
• Re: Kal v'homer
• Re: sheitels and AZ
• RE: sheitels and AZ
• Re: sheitels and AZ
• Re: sheitels and AZ
• Re: sheitels and AZ
• Re: sheitels and AZ
• Re: Indian hair
• Tikkun Leil Shavuot Material
• Re: About the water controversy
• Shaving
• lengthof a mil (in time)
• Tshevuot or sources regarding basic rights of workers, etc.

According to one of our local newspapers R. Chaim Kanevsky spoke with
R. Elyashiv to determine whether the prohibition against Indian wigs was
safek or vadai. He was informed that it was vadai and then participated
in a wig burning and recited a beracha (without shem u-malchut).

I didn't understand the psak - according to the figures I have seen
about 10% of Indian wigs come from these temples. Henc, even assuming
that it is certainly AZ it would still leave only a minority being AZ.
Hence, while it would be prohibited in benefit would there be a mitzvah
to burn it with a beracha?

Seperately there was an interview with an Israeli professor of Indian
philosophy. He stated, as others have stated, that 1- no change in
practice has occurred over the recent past years 2 - It would be very
difficult to explain the meaning of these ceremonies to anyone not very
familar with the religious/cultural background. In particular to make
a decision based on a short trip would be meaningless.

-- 
Eli Turkel,  turkel@post.tau.ac.il on 5/23/2004
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University

>The recent situation in the Gaza Strip where 11 soldiers were blown up
>and other soldiers had to risk their lives to retrieve body parts for
>kevura, has lead to extensive debate...

There were two diametricly opposed psakim issued:

The Rav Rashi of Tzahal, R. Weiss, called it a mitzva and I believe
allowed it as part of a military operation on Shabbat (I did not see
his psak in writing, this is from newespapers).

R Eliezer Melamed wrote a column where he paskened that the enemy seeing
such behavior (hundreds of Jewish soldiers burrowing thru the dust and
dirt) would feel a victory, and we must be careful not to allow a victory
like that. He stated that the reason we are allowed to go out to fight on
Shabbat for "iskei kash vaTeven (not iskei nefashot but only border-area
monatery thievery) is that the thievery would give the enemies a "moral
boost " and that this is a similar case.

Dov A Bloom
dovb@netvision.net.il

On Mon, May 17, 2004 at 10:00:43PM +0200, Saul Mashbaum wrote:
: The "middot", the hermeneutical rules, relate only to the analysis of, and
: deriving halachot from, the text of the Torah. Thus even if, lu yetzuyar,
: a person needed a mesorah for a kal v'homer to derive a halacha from
: psukim, this would not mean that he would need such a mesorah to make
: a kal v'homer in regular logical discourse.

I didn't follow from your post why one would need a separate concept of
QvC for pesuqim if it's a valid line of reasoning in general.

On Mon, May 17, 2004 at 06:37:09PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: A kal vahomer is an argument of the form: X is more stringent than Y
: in contexts a, b, and c, ..., and there are no known cases where X is
: less stringent than Y, therefore X is always more stringent than Y,
: even in unknown cases.

: If it weren't a midda it wouldn't necessarily be true. It's an argument
: based on silence, which is sometimes persuasive but not irrefutable.

AIUI, the generalization from a, b, c... with no exception to saying that
X is always more stringent than Y is normal inductive reasoning. Are you
saying that sevarah only includes deductive arguments? (Not a challenge,
but a request for clarification.)

However, QvC does not always base the assessment of which is more chamur
on induction. Shabbos is more chamur than Yom Tov because of an explicit
din that phrases Yom Tov in terms of Shabbos melachos minus. Yom Kippur
is more chamur than Shabbos because the pasuq calls it Shabbas Shabbason.
Then there are situations where we deduce which din is more chamur from
the oneshim.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 47th day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        6 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Hod sheb'Malchus: What is glorious about
Fax: (413) 403-9905               unity-how does it draw out one's soul?

This issue of whether rishonim speak in terms of life's mission is
interesting, but tangential. I would think that the fact that the
ushpizin and the like are described as having missions was generalizable,
but I can't really prove the point. I'm revisiting possible meqoros, more
word after more thought. But back to our topic:

If all of HP were sechar or onesh, then it's all midas hadin and no
midas rachamim.

-mi

David Riceman wrote:
>A kal vahomer is an argument of the form: X is more stringent than Y
>in contexts a, b, and c, ..., and there are no known cases where X is
>less stringent than Y, therefore X is always more stringent than Y,
>even in unknown cases.

>If it weren't a midda it wouldn't necessarily be true. It's an argument
>based on silence, which is sometimes persuasive but not irrefutable.

This is equivalent to saying that a kal v'chomer is a form of inductive,
rather than deductive, reasoning. The conclusions of inductive reasoning
are never necessary, inescapable consequences of their premises; they are
characterized by varying degrees of reasonableness (or persuasiveness,
as RDC puts it), rather than certainty (irrefutability).

I am not sure that it is correct to say that this form of reasoning
is valid only because it is included in the middot. Surely inductive
reasoning has value and validity independent of its inclusion in
the middot; it would seem that a kal v'chomer (in the absence of a
contradictory case, a pircha) *is* a good svara, and its conclusions
have halachic validity even if they are not logically compelling. I
therefore prefer my formulation, which maintains that a kal v'chomer is
*both* a svara and a midda, the latter meaning that it has validity also
in the narrow context of textual interpretation.

Saul Mashbaum

From: "Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org>
> AIUI, the generalization from a, b, c... with no exception to saying that
> X is always more stringent than Y is normal inductive reasoning. Are you
> saying that sevarah only includes deductive arguments? (Not a challenge,
> but a request for clarification.)

Two separate issues:

1. There's no reason inherent in the nature of dinim to assume that dinim
can be well ordered (that's a technical expression, not a grammatical
error). In fact it's demonstrably false. The assertion that, under
certain conditions, we can establish an order relation between certain
dinim is an application of a midda, it is not an example of deductive
or inductive reasoning.

2. Normally when we practice induction we want lots of cases before
we're happy with a conclusion. The typical Talmudical application is to
give one case, and to provide others only when someone raises a cogent
objection to the first. That's hardly induction as I know it.

David Riceman

R. Akiva Miller wrote
> R' Melech Press wrote <<< While Rav Moshe Feinstein held that one must
> be able to see what is clearly a "bug," both Rav Shlomo Zalman z"l and
> Rav Elyashiv held that if it is visible, even as a speck, and might be
> a bug it requires b'dika >>>

> When RSZ and RE made the above psakim, did they specify what *kind*
> of bedika would be required?

Both R. Feivel Cohen and R. Simcha Klor spoke directly to R. Elyashiv.
He told them that even if magnification were required to see the speck
as a sheretz it would be asur as long as the speck was visible to the
naked eye. R. Moshe Vey (?) in the first volume of his work on bdikas
tola'im (p. 102) also quotes R. Elyashiv to this effect. R. S'Z 's view
is a little less clear; see the teshuva in Minchas Shlomo v.2 siman 61,
pt. 2 and other citations which I don't have access to at the moment
and R. Vey. By the way, Rav Vozner disagrees; see Shevet Halevi 7, 122.

> It is very difficult for me to imagine that their psak could have been
> "if it is visible, even as a speck, and might be a bug, then you must look
> again with a magnifying glass", because if so, then how would this bedika
> have been performed before magnifying glasses were invented?

I too asked this question and R. S"Z, R. Moshe and R. Vozner raise it.
Certainly it would seem that the Chazon Ish would have said, as he does
in treifos, that the halakha is determined by the state at the time of
Matan Torah.

Melech

Prof. Eli Turkel writes [in a nearby thread]:
"Separately there was an interview with an Israeli professor of Indian
philosophy. He stated, as others have stated, that 1- no change in
practice has occurred over the recent past years. 2 - It would be very
difficult to explain the meaning of these ceremonies to anyone not very
familar with the religious/cultural background. In particular to make
a decision based on a short trip would be meaningless."

I wonder if the disparate accounts of the meaning of the tonsure in the
V. Hindu rite can be explained by the following:

Moshel limah hadavar domeh? To mispallelim at kivros tzaddikim. Imagine a
Japanese person [a Shinto priest, perhaps] would identify those tefillos
with what he knows as ancestor worship. If he would broach the issue with
Jewish leaders, rabbis of all stripes would tell him that the tefillos are
not directed to the neshamos but rather to Hashem Who will, the mispallel
hopes, answer the prayers in the zechus of the niftar, or that the niftar
should be a melitz yosher. In fact, they would add, there is a specific
negative commandment against this: Doresh el hameisim. There would be no
disagreement about this and numerous sources and proofs could be cited
to support this. And it would all be true.

In theory. However, as we well know, there are many people who go to
kivros hatzaddikim with the best of intentions but transgress that lav
because of innocent misconceptions or bad chinuch. Their actions do not
reflect Torah policy, but their actions are their actions. If the Shinto
priest would survey them and conclude that they are engaging in a form of
ancestor worship, he would be right, despite the copious expert opinion
to the contrary.

Similarly, Dayan Dunner may have come across many donors, and perhaps
barbers, who were under the impression that the hair is being sacrificed
to V. just like the coconuts in the Temple in a later part of the
ceremonies. Perhaps knowledgeable Hindis would laugh at them; perhaps
even ashram newbies would do so as well. But it is not at all clear to
me that if there is a sizable group of people who believe that this is
a form of avodas V, their kavanos would be discounted by halachah.

Henoch Moshe Levin

On Sun, May 23, 2004 at 07:17:53PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: Two separate issues:

Both good points. Thank you.

: 1. There's no reason inherent in the nature of dinim to assume that dinim
: can be well ordered (that's a technical expression, not a grammatical
: error)...

Dinim exist on multiple axis -- something could be more chamur in
one direction, but less in another. Well ordering requires a single
measurment criterion.

: 2. Normally when we practice induction we want lots of cases before
: we're happy with a conclusion. The typical Talmudical application is to
: give one case...

I still question whether #2 is sufficiently frequent to be considered
a part of qal vachomer. Even worse: It sounds like I went from not
understanding why QvC should not even qualify as a single rule of derashah
to wondering why you haven't just listed two!

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 47th day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        6 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Hod sheb'Malchus: What is glorious about
Fax: (413) 403-9905               unity-how does it draw out one's soul?

I believe it is pretty well common consensus here that there are many
tzedadim to be mattir sheitels from India and likely even sheitels that
are known (if there is such a thing) to come from the tonsure at the
Temple as well.

I would like, however, to approach this sugya for the moment azoi vi
a Poilisher (remember the VIDC's, anyone?) and ask, why not be mattir
als mitzvos lav lehenos nitnu. I think it is pretty reasonable to assume
that were it not for the Torah' strictures, almost every frum woman would
walk, ba'zman ha'zeh, bare-headed (the sevara does not apply, of course,
to those who do not fall into this category, such as R"L chemotherapy
patients). To wear the sheitel is thus purely l'shem mitzvah. As we know
from the sugyos, lulav, mikveh for a muddar hano'oh from water, etc.;
where kitutei mekhtat shiurah is not a problem (which it is not here,
a la R' Chaim by lechi shel asheirah), issurei hano'oh may be used
for such mitzvos. The fact that a human hair sheitel may be nicer than
a synthetic sheitel is noy mitzvah - lu yitzuyar esrog shel asheirah
would be permitted, we could assume that one would be allowed to take a
mehudar'dicke one even if it impresses his neighbors. Why not say that
hu ha'din b'nidon didan?

Prove me wrong :-)

YGB 

At 09:55 PM 5/23/2004, a correspondent wrote:
>Isn't the gemara itself mechalek between using a mikvah in yemos hachamah
>and yemos hageshamim? I.e. where there is hana'as haguf, we don't say
>mitzvos lav lehnos.  I recall a Rashba to that effect, but am swamped and
>can't check.

Shu" Chelkas Yaakov Inyanim Shonim #13 cites evidence that the principle
of mitzvos lav lehenos nitnu (MLLN) applies even where there is hano'as
ha'guf. I also don't see why there should be any chilluk between this
and a sandal shel chalitzah shel AZ that the Ein Yitzchok 2:EH62 is
metzaded to be mattir.

(He cites the Rashba - to Sukkah 31 - who is mattir tevilah b'yemos
ha'chama because MLLN even where there is hano'as ha'guf.

YGB

On 23 May 2004 at 21:02, Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M.  wrote:
> I would like, however, to approach this sugya for the moment azoi vi a
> Poilisher (remember the VIDC's, anyone?) and ask, why not be mattir
> als mitzvos lav lehenos nitnu. I think it is pretty reasonable to
> assume that were it not for the Torah' strictures, almost every frum
> woman would walk, ba'zman ha'zeh, bare-headed...
>          As we know from the sugyos, lulav, mikveh for a muddar
> hano'oh from water, etc.; where kitutei mekhtat shiurah is not a
> problem (which it is not here, a la R' Chaim by lechi shel asheirah),
> issurei hano'oh may be used for such mitzvos. The fact that a human
> hair sheitel may be nicer than a synthetic sheitel is noy mitzvah...

The case you described though is fulfilling an aseh. Wearing a wig (or
covering hair in general) isn't a mitzvas aseh - it's a lo sa'aseh to
walk around with hair uncovered mi'shum erva.

> Prove me wrong :-)

Nu? :-) 

 - Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

At 04:56 AM 5/24/2004, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
>The case you described though is fulfilling an aseh. Wearing a wig
>(or covering hair in general) isn't a mitzvas aseh - it's a lo
>sa'aseh to walk around with hair uncovered mi'shum erva.

Me gela raz zeh l'bonai?

It is a mitzvah lishmo'a divrei chachamim (v'asisa al pie asher yorucha)
to fulfill the d'rabbanan of Das Yehudis. Indeed, the argument may well
be made that Das Moshe is also a command (and I am making it): Azhara
l'bnos Yisroel shelo teitzena b'gilui rosh - althought azhara generally
means a lav, hear it sounds like a command.

But, al kol panim, alecha l'hovi ra'ayah that MLLN is not applicable to
a lav.

YGB

On 24 May 2004 at 8:54, Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
> But, al kol panim, alecha l'hovi ra'ayah that MLLN is not applicable
> to a lav.

MLLN always applies to a cheftza shel mitzva (Matza, Lulav, Sukkah, 
Ner Chanuka, etc.). Here there's no cheftza shel mitzva. There's only 
a cheftza shel aveira (an exposed female head of hair). 

 - Carl

At 10:01 AM 5/24/2004, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
>MLLN always applies to a cheftza shel mitzva (Matza, Lulav, Sukkah,
>Ner Chanuka, etc.). Here there's no cheftza shel mitzva. There's only
>a cheftza shel aveira (an exposed female head of hair).

???

What about the afar of ir ha'nidachas for kisui ha'dam - that's also a 
cheftza shel mitzva!?

With no offense intended, I see a direct parallel between kisui ha'dam
and kisui rosh.

YGB

Eli Turkel <turkel@post.tau.ac.il> wrote: <The "official" answer is that
the method of worship in India changed in the last 20 years. Personally
I find that very hard to believe.>

My sources tell me nothing has changed except the amount of hair
sold and the prices. But I have not gone, and so cannot really give a
definitive answer. However, I wish to make one point which may not have
been considered by R. Dunner and R. Elyashiv zol zain gezunt un shtark.

I learned a long time ago from a sociologist that if you want to
understand a foreign culture, you cannot just ask a member of that
culture. You cannot even travel to the place and interview members of
the culture. People from other cultures tend to view tourists/foreigners
with a mixture of suspicion and amusement. To find out what the people
really think you have to learn their language and live with them for a
while so that they begin to accept you.

Let me ask a question: if a galloch were to appear in Lederman in Bnei
Braq wearing his priestly garb and a big tzeylem around his neck and
started asking people questions, saying that he wanted to understand what
Jews really do in their temples, what sort of answers do you think he
would get? Does anyone think that the talmidei chachomim and the rov of
the shul would go over and hold a serious discussion with him? And if,
even more, he never bothered to learn Hebrew or Yiddish, and only spoke
English? To me the answer is clear: the only people who would talk with
him would be people who wanted to show off their English, wanted to get
publicity, or were amused at the oddity of it all. Does anyone think
that their answers would accurately reflect anything? Some of them would
probably give the answers that they thought the "guest" wanted to hear.
(Note: this is NOT an excuse to raise the issue of the cardinals touring
a YU beis medrash.)

I am positive that R. Dunner, zol zain gezunt, did his best to find out
what was going on in the Hindu temple and that he knew the questions
to ask.

But one must ask: who did he hire to tell him the answers, since he knows
no Hindi? What were their motivations? The members of the Sanhedrin
were required to know shiv'im loshon so that they could do a complete
examination of edim, and even knowledge of the language does not assure
that you will be getting accurate answers. I know that R. Dunner did
not shave off his beard and I assume he did not dress in native garb
(nor would one want to, unless one were sure there were no questions
of chuqqos haggoyim). I am just pointing out that any "information"
brought back by a sociologist who went to, say, Katmandu, dressed in his
tweed jacket and smoking a pipe and knowing none of the native language,
would be laughed at in scholarly circles. Even if the sociologist in
question was the doyen on sociologists and ahead of all the others in
scholarship and brilliance.

Unfortunately, this does not add any information, it just should
serve as a large caveat for anyone trying to get accurate information.
The information gathered by myself and many others 20 years ago tried to
avoid some of the problems by having academicians talk with professors
of comparative religion or Hindu professors who felt comfortable giving
such information in an academic environment. That does not assure that
the information is entirely correct, but it does eliminate many of
the barriers.

This does not mean that I am implying that R. Dunner is wrong, only
that additional facts are needed. AIUI, R. Dunner did not say that it
was definitely taqroves AZ, but only that there is a sofeq AZ involved.
That may be true; it would not justify burning wigs, but it might justify
avoiding henceforth buying hair from the Indian Temples. IMHO, that
should have been done 30 years ago when the question was first raised.
And that was what was in the original psak of R. Vozner and R. Karelitz:
"henceforth," nothing about taking wigs and destroying them.

Seth Mandel

As per Joel Rich's request, attached here is a set of maareh mkomot for
a shiur on the subject of "Ein Shaliach L'Dvar Aveirah". I have attached
the files both in PDF and (Hebrew) Word format. (The sources come first,
followed by a brief outline of the shiur itself).

Chag Sameach.

<http://www.aishdas.org/tls/un_NoAgentForIlegalAct1.doc>
<http://www.aishdas.org/tls/un_NoAgentForIlegalAct1.pdf>

Saul Stokar

[I created a www.aishdas.org/tls directory to hold the collection of
Tiqun Leil Shavous submissions. RJR's submission can be found there as
well. -mi]

Melech Press wrote:
>While Rav Moshe Feinstein held that one must be able to see
>what is clearly a "bug," both Rav Shlomo Zalman z"l and Rav
>Elyashiv held that if it is visible, even as a speck, and might be
>a bug it requires b'dika

I'll add Rav Wosner to the list of meikilim. I didn't see it inside,
but my rav told me it as part of his reasoning to be matir Brooklyn water.

>It is important to keep in mind that the term reservoir does not
>mean a big concrete box; most of the NYC reservoirs are lakes.

My understanding, perhaps mistaken, is that the NYC reservoirs are all
man-made ponds.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

R Shaya Potter wrote on Areivim:
> i've never understood the "close" shave thing.  In almost all lithuanian
> yeshivot many bochrim were clean shaven.  They weren't using electric
> shavers, but lye, and that gets much closer (and deffinitly destroys the
> hair) than any electric shave will.

Here's how R' Shwab explained it to his grandson (who was my chavrusah
at the time).

The gemara permits cutting one's beard with a scissors. With scissors,
one can not get a close shave. Most of us understand the heter for
electric shavers as deriving from this. (RYGB argued on list that a
shaver was actually a chisel, and mutar on those grounds.)

So, the question becomes: What if something is mechanically a pair of
scissors in that it cuts hair by squeezing it between two blades, but
does obtain a close shave -- in fact, it cuts the hair at or below skin
level? Is it still begeder misparayim or not?

A depilitory need not be like scissors to be mutar, so the question
wouldn't arise. It's simply not gil'uach.

R' Shwab also did not advise using a straight shaver, as the screen
in such shavers is used to protect the skin, not as one of a pair of
blades. So, if the din is in the mechanics of misparayim, such shavers
wouldn't qualify. However, he also did not advise using a lift-n-cut
shaver, since it's equally possible it's the distancing caused by having
two blades that's the source of the heter.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 48th day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        6 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Yesod sheb'Malchus: What binds different
Fax: (413) 403-9905             people together into one cohesive whole?

One mil = 2000 amos
One amah = 18-24 inches

Here's my question: most folks can walk a mile (5280 ft) in approx 20
minutes (3 mph).

Using simple arithmatic, at the 20 min/mile rate, a person could walk
a mil in 11-1/3 to 15-1/6 minutes. So why is a mil somewhere between 18
and 24 minutes?

One possible solution is that when halacha talks about "the average person
walking a mil", what is really meant is "take the average distance a
person can walk in 12 hours and divide accordingly". The assumption being
that while an average person can walk 3 miles in an hour, over an entire
day his rate will be lower because of stopping, resting, breaks, etc.

Another possible solution is that "back then", when people weren't walking
with the shoe technology we have over the even streets and sidewalks we
have, the distance covered was shorter.

Thoughts?

 - Sholom

[Sent to RYGB and myself with a request to share with the list (below).
-mi]

Way back on January 6, 2000 Ben Waxman <benwaxman55@yahoo.com> asked "if
anyone knows of tshevuot or sources regarding child labor, benefiting
from labor done in third world nations under cruel working conditions,
rights of workers to decent conditions, etc. "

Better late than never. Below is a basic reading list - mostly of
English-language sources, on traditional Jewish texts on Labor and Worker
Rights. I would deeply appreciate your sharing it with thoe participating
in your thoughtful e-mail discussion group. It seems only fitting to
share this with people on the "avodah" list!

>> Arieh Lebowitz / Communications Director / Jewish Labor Committee 

anon., "Labor," ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA Vol. 10, Keter Publishing House
(Jerusalem, Israel 1972)

Ayali, Meir, "Labor and Work in the Talmud and Midrash," [Hebrew] Yad
La-Talmud (Ramat Gan, 1984)

Baron, Salo, "Economics and Social Justice," in "THE ECONOMIC VIEWS OF
MAIMONIDES" in ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL JEWISH HISTORY, ed. Arthur Hertzberg &
Leon A. Feldman, Rutgers University Press (New Brunswick, 1972)

------- "Free Labor," op. cit. , pp. 248-260.

Bazak, J., comp. JEWISH LAW AND JEWISH LIFE: SELECTED RABBINICAL RESPONSA
(pp. 75, 80), Union of American Hebrew Congregations (New York, NY 1979)

Bleich, J. David, "Organized Labor;" "Tenure," in CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC

PROBLEMS (Vol. 1), KTAV Publishing House, Inc. / Yeshiva University Press
(New York, NY 1977)

----"Severance Pay;" "Teachers' Unions," in CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS
(Vol. 2), KTAV Publishing House, Inc. / Yeshiva University Press (New
York, NY 1983)

----"Organized Labor - Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature,"
in Tradition 13, no. 1 (New York, NY 1972)

---- "Physicians' Fees - Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature,"
in Tradition 19, no. 4 (New York, NY 1981)

---- "Physicians' Strikes - Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical
Literature," in Tradition 21, no. 3 (New York, NY 1984)

---- "Rabbinic Contracts - Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical
Literature," in Tradition 11, no. 3 (New York, NY 1970)

---- "Severance Pay: Hired Servant or Independent Contractor - Survey of
Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature," in Tradition 17, no. 3 (New York,
NY 1978)

---- "Severance Pay," in Jewish Law Annual 3 (1980)

---- "Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature [particularly
p. 126, Tenure on p. 129, and Employment During the Post-Nuptual Week
on p. 136]," in Tradition 14, no. 4 (New York, NY 1974)

---- "Teachers' Unions - Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature,"
in Tradition 19, no. 3 (New York, NY 1984)

---- "Teachers' Unions," in Jewish Law Annual (1987)

---- "Tenure: A Review of a Rabbinical Court Judgment," in Jewish Law
Annual 1 (1978)

Blumenfield, Samuel M., LABOR IN THE BIBLE, Dissertation Hebrew Union
College (Cincinnati 1930)

Cronbach, Abraham, "Labor," UNIVERSAL JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA (New York,
NY 1939-1943)

-----------------------, "Social Thinking in the Sefer Hasidim," in
Hebrew Union College Annual 22 (1949)

Elon, Menachem, "Ha'anakah (Severance Pay)," in ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA
Vol. 7, Keter Publishing (Jerusalem, Israel 1972)

Fasman, Oscar Z., "The Attitude of the Hafetz Hayyim toward Labor,"
in ISRAEL OF TOMORROW, ed. by Leo Jung, Herald Square Press, Inc. (New
York, NY 1946), pp. 117-184

Federbush, Simon, THE JEWISH CONCEPT OF LABOR, Torah Culture Department,
Jewish Agency and HaPoel haMizrachi of America (New York, NY 1956)

Fendel, Zechariah, "Employer-Employee Relations [p. 77];" "The Abusive
Employer [p. p. 80]," in THE HALACHA AND BEYOND: PROVIDING AN INSIGHT
INTO THE FISCAL ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE TORAH JEW, AS WELL AS AN
IN-DEPTH STUDY OF THE BITACHON CONCEPT, Hashkafah Publications (New York,
NY 1983)

Heinemann, Joseph H., "The Status of the Laborer in Jewish Law and
Society in the Tannaitic Period," in Hebrew Union College Annual 25 (1954)

Hirsch, Richard G., "Labor - Rights and Responsibilities," in THE WAY
OF THE UPRIGHT: A JEWISH VIEW OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE [pp. 36-62], Union of
American Hebrew Congregations (New York, NY 1973)

Horowitz, George, "Hired Workers/Further Rules Favorable to the Worker,"
in THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW, Central Book Company (New York, NY 1963)

Jacobs, Louis, "Strikes," in WHAT DOES JUDAISM SAY ABOUT ...? [pp. 309 -
310], Keter Publishing (Jerusalem 1973)

Jakobovits, I., "The Right to Strike," in STUDIES IN TORAH JUDAISM:
JEWISH LAW FACES MODERN PROBLEMS, Yeshiva University Dept. of Special
Publications (New York, NY 1965)

---- "The Right to Strike - Review of Recent Halakhic Periodical
Literature," in Tradition 5, no. 2 [p. 273] (1963)

---- "Strikes - Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature," in
Tradition 7,

no. 4/8, no. 1 [p. 98] (1965/1966)

---- "Workmen's Compensation and Severance Pay - Review of Recent Halakhic
Periodical Literature," in Tradition 4, no. 2 [p. 260] (1962)

Jung, Leo, "The Workingman," in HUMAN RELATIONS IN JEWISH LAW, Jewish
Education Press / Board of Jewish Education, Inc. (New York, NY 1967/1970)
[Reprinted in BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, Jewish Education Press / Board of
Jewish Education, Inc. (New York, NY 1976)]

-----. "Labor in Jewish Law," in BUSINESS ETHICS AND JEWISH LAW, Hebrew
Publishing Company in conjunction with the Board of Jewish Education of
Greater New York (New York, NY 1987)

Katz, Mordechai, PROTECTION OF THE WEAK IN THE TALMUD, Columbia University
Press (New York, NY 1925)

Klagsbrun, Francine, "Work, Wealth and Philanthropy," in VOICES OF WISDOM:
JEWISH IDEAS AND ETHICS FOR EVERYDAY LIVING, Pantheon Books (New York,
NY 1980)

Kogan, Michael S., "Liberty and Labor in the Jewish Tradition," in Ideas,
A Journal of Contemporary Jewish Thought (Spring 1975)

Kohler, Kaufmann, "Labor," in Jewish Encyclopedia, vol. 7, p. 590 (New
York, NY 1901-1906)

Levine, Aaron, FREE ENTERPRISE AND JEWISH LAW: ASPECTS OF JEWISH BUSINESS
ETHICS, KTAV (New York, NY 1980)

----, "Jewish Business Ethics in Contemporary Society," in BUSINESS ETHICS
AND JEWISH LAW, by Leo Jung, Hebrew Publishing Company in conjunction
with the Board of Jewish Education of Greater New York (New York, NY 1987)

----, "Labor Mobility: A Halakhic View, in Gesher 5, no. 1 [pp. 88-105]
(1976)

Levinthal, Israel H., "The Attitude of Judaism Toward Labor," in JUDAISM:
AN ANALYSIS AND AN INTERPRETATION, Funk and Wagnalls (New York &
London, 1935)

----, "The Attitude of Judaism Toward the Laborer," in JUDAISM: AN
ANALYSIS AND AN INTERPRETATION, Funk and Wagnalls (New York & London,
1935)

Neusner, Jacob, THE ECONOMICS OF THE MISHNAH, University of Chicago Press

(Chicago, IL 1990)

Reines, Chaim W., "Labor in Rabbinical Responsa," in ISRAEL OF TOMORROW,
ed. by Leo Jung, Herald Square Press, Inc. [p. 141] (New York, NY 1946)

----, "The Jewish Conception of Work," in Judaism, 8 [pp. 329-337] (1959)

Riemer, Jack, "The Jewish view of work (Avodah), in Jewish Heritage
(Summer 1962), p. 21-23

Sacks, Eliot, "Teachers and the right to strike," L'eylah (New Year 5746),
p. 16-17 [London]

Sacks, J[onathan?], "Halacha: Industrial Relations in Jewish Law,"
in Ha-Zvi 13 [p. 13] (Mizrahi Journal) (London Purim 5739)

Schnall, David J., BY THE SWEAT OF YOUR BROW: REFLECTIONS ON WORK AND

THE WORKPLACE IN CLASSICAL JEWISH THOUGHT, KTAV (New York, NY 2001)

Shapira, Abraham, "Work," in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RELIGIOUS THOUGHT, by
Cohen, Arthur A. and Mendes-Flohr, Paul, The Free Press (New York, 1987)

Sicher, Gustav, "Concept of Work in the Jewish Faith," in JEWISH STUDIES:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF G. SICHER, ed. by R. Iltis, Council of Jewish Religious
Communities [p. 5] (Prague 1955)

Silverman, William B., "The Dignity of Labor," in THE SAGES SPEAK,
Jason Aronson, Inc. (Northvale, NJ and London, England 1989)

Sulzberger, Mayer, "The Status of Labor in Ancient Israel," in Jewish
Quarterly Review 13 (1922-23), p. 245-302, 397-459; reprinted separately
(Philadelphia PA 1923)

Tamari, Meir, IN THE MARKETPLACE: JEWISH BUSINESS ETHICS, Targum Press

(Southfield, MI 1991)

-------, WITH ALL YOUR POSSESSIONS: JEWISH ETHICS AND ECONOMIC LIFE,
The Free Press (New York, NY 1987)

Vorspan, ALbert, and Eugene J. Lipman, "Labor," in JUSTICE AND JUDAISM,
Union of American Hebrew Congregations (New York, NY: 1956)

Warhaftig, Shillem, "Labor Law," in ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA Vol. 10, Keter
Publishing House (Jerusalem 1972)

Weisfeld, Israel H., "LABOR LEGISLATION IN THE BIBLE AND TALMUD, Yeshiva

University (New York, NY 1974)

Wigoder, Geoffrey, "Labor and Labor Laws," in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUDAISM,
[2002]

Wolkinson, Benjamin W., "Labor and the Jewish Tradition - A Reappraisal,"
in Jewish Social Studies Vol. 40 no. 3/4 (S/F 1978)

Woll, Jonathan S., THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP IN SHULCHAN-ARUCH
Dissertation Hebrew Union College (Cincinnatin, OH 1976)

Wolsey, Louis, "The Historic Attitude of Judaism to Labor," in CCAR
Yearbook Vol. 38 (1928) [pp. 311-343]

Zipperstein, Edward, BUSINESS ETHICS AND JEWISH LAW, KTAV (New York,
NY 1987)

This listing is a `work-in-progress' - additional suggested entries
welcome.

Jewish Labor Committee
25 East 21st Street
New York, NY 10010

*********************


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